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"I have always written my works with my whole body and my life: 
  I do not know what are purely spiritual problems » 
 
Nietzsche (Wolting , 2016)  
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type is the theme 
of this doctoral thesis. The main aim is to elaborate a design for the postanarchist 
figure, picking up its main characteristics from the work of the postanarchist Saul 
Newman. The argument also bears on two other authors: the post-structuralist Michel 
Foucault, considered a strong influence of postanarchism, and Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, the first author who labelled himself as anarchist and the first to embrace 
anarchy positively. Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari are introduced as mediators to provide deeper understanding of the main 
authors. 
The dissertation offers a novel theoretical revision of postanarchism through 
Michel Foucault and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. It notes the close similarities between 
Foucault and Proudhon - in terms of concepts of space, struggle, movement, necessity 
and consequently anarchy; establishes a conceptual net around them and uses 
Proudhon’s thinking to fill the “bibliographic gaps” in Foucault’s writings. The goal 
is to better understand the thought and the activist practice of Foucault in terms of 
anarchism and, in the last instance, to better grasp the postanarchism of Saul Newman 
in order to carve the postanarchist ideal type. 
Postanarchism is understood as the constitution of autonomous spaces; the 
notions of space and heterotopias - the Foucauldian space - are central in the 
dissertation. Accordingly, the thesis is structured by three hypotheses: (i) 
postanarchism is space constitution; (ii) the constitution of space is a struggle; (iii) to 
establish space is to survive. The sub-concepts of the dissertation are: movement, 
necessity, struggle, power subject, body, sign, truth and utopia. 
The thesis provides an interpretative analysis of primary sources - books, 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and manifestos - of the three main authors 
supported by secondary commentaries. It departs from conventions by adopting a 
theoretical approach inspired by Foucault’s solar and circular worldview (and 
Tommaso Campanella’s City of the Sun). This facilitates the fluid organization of the 
argument and avoids imposing linearity on the content, thus highlighting the 
interrelation between content and the structure of the argument. This thesis is an 
exposition, an interpretation that develops new knowledge through the connections 
and methods that enable us to better know who the postanarchist activist is.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Having as theme “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal 
type”, this thesis aims to study postanarchism in depth, constructing an ideal type. 
The dissertation’s goal is also to re-evaluate postanarchism, giving a novel theoretical 
perspective of the topic and understanding its genealogy.1 The concept of space or the 
Foucauldian heterotopias are the main concepts of the thesis, being postanarchism 
understood as the constitution of autonomous spaces. In order to ground and better 
grasp the meaning of the postanarchist concept of space we need to add other 
fundamental concepts or sub-concepts. These are: movement, necessity, struggle, 
power, subject, body, sign, truth and utopia. These concepts arose during the readings 
of the main literature and were chosen because (i) they showed to be intimately 
connected with the concept of space and (ii) they are fundamental to better 
understand this concept and generally postanarchism, the thesis’s topic.  
This dissertation is a philosophical and circular walk2 from postanarchism to 
postanarchism, visiting, in between, first of all, the main literature on the subject, then 
understanding postanarchism’s roots and its main concepts and after studying 
postanarchism in depth – the construction of the ideal type. Through this genealogical 
path we are going to meet mainly three authors: the post-structuralist 3  Michel                                                         
1  Genealogy is understood in this thesis from the perspective of Friedrich Nietzsche's “On the 
Genealogy of Morality” as a method that aims to challenge the dominant culture by deconstructing and 
understanding the concepts considered acquired truths by that culture. 
2 We adopt the Foucauldian concept of walk in this dissertation. For Foucault (2006:362,365,359), a 
walk is a “form of exercise” or a way “to know what the outside world is”. This knowledge about the 
world has spiritual and ethical consequences, as we are going to show in the course of the thesis 
(Foucault, 2006:362,365,359). For Foucault (2006:373), spirituality or spiritual knowledge is to 
understand the value of things and their place in cosmos. It enables the subject to see himself and his 
place - or space - in the cosmos; this knowledge allows the transfiguration of the subject’s way of 
being: the “displacement of the subject” (Foucault, 2006:373). 
3  Regarding structuralism and post-structuralism, we adopt as framework the definitions of the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. According to this encyclopedia, the term structuralism 
“emphasizes structures and relations”, but it especially designates a twentieth-century French school of 
thought that “applies the methods of structural linguistics to the study of social and cultural 
phenomena. Starting from the insight that social and cultural phenomena are not physical objects and 
events but objects and events with meaning and that their signification must therefore be a focus of 
analysis, structuralists reject causal analysis and any attempt to explain social and cultural phenomena 
one-by-one. Rather, they focus on the internal structure of cultural objects and, more importantly, the 
underlying structures that make them possible”. According to the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy post-structuralism is “a late-twentieth-century development in philosophy and literary 
theory” and a response to structuralism. Post-structuralism challenges “the assumption that systems are 
self-sufficient structures and (questions) the possibility of the precise definitions on which systems of 
knowledge must be based”. 
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Foucault, the anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the postanarchist Saul Newman. 
We will have also the aid of some secondary authors such as Immanuel Kant, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.  
Saul Newman points to Max Stirner as an important figure in postanarchism, 
but we decided not to include him in this dissertation for two reasons: (i) our 
intention is to study postanarchism in the framework of the poststructuralist French 
thinkers of the twentieth century critical theory, such as Foucault; (ii) Stirner’s ego is 
a polemical concept, which presents some issues for the modelling of the 
postanarchist ideal type. For instance, Stirner’s ego seems (a) to clash with the 
postanarchism plural self or space and its openess to the other; and (b) with 
postanarchist genealogy, for example, the poststructuralist Foucault and the anarchist 
Proudhon. In our opinion, Stirner’s controversial influence on postanarchism 
deserves another programme of research. We will return to Stirner’s egoism at the 
end of the thesis, once the postanarchist ideal type is outlined (Chapter V, pg: 229).  
Thus, in this thesis, we decided to walk with Foucault and Proudhon because, 
in our perspective, they help to deepen postanarchism’s roots. Foucault is considered 
a strong influence on today’s anarchism by the main literature, as we will observe in 
the next chapter - The State of the Art. Foucault also shares (or is very close to, as we 
will see in Chapter V - The Postanarchist Ideal Type - pg: 229) some fundamental 
concepts with postanarchism, such as space (or the Foucauldian concept of 
heterotopia) struggle, movement, necessity and power.  
In turn, we have chosen Proudhon because (i) he was the first author to 
embrace anarchy positively and label himself anarchist (Kinna, 2009:8,9; Préposiet, 
2007); (ii) there are many similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, for example, 
in terms of the concepts of space, struggle, movement, necessity, power and 
consequently anarchy. We discovered these similarities during the readings of the 
main literature of both authors; (iii) pursing these similarites, it appeared that 
Proudhon could have been an author that Foucault read, but did not talk about (Revel, 
2011:132,134). Looking for some of the bibliographic gaps in Foucault’s work during 
our research at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and Collège de France in Paris, 
we discovered that Proudhon filled the Foucauldian gaps and we show how in 
Chapter IV (pg: 135); (iv) Proudhon could be seen as a great influence on                                                                                                                                                                
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postanarchism, although the main postanarchist literature does not acknowledge him. 
In this thesis, we review critically this postanarchist stance, and show the value of 
Proudhon as an inspiration for today’s anarchism.  
In terms of genealogy, we intend to discover who the activist that inspires the 
postanarchist is, studying Foucault and Proudhon, and building the Foucauldian ideal 
type with Proudhon’s aid. The construction of this Foucauldian ideal type is based on 
Foucault’s life, activism and writings. Nevertheless, the personal life of Foucault as 
such is not the object of our research or interest. When we refer to Foucault’s 
personal life, for example, his alleged homosexuality, the goal is strictly to better 
understand his activism and his work. This thesis accepts Foucault’s resistance to 
labels (Foucault, 1976:51,60). Hence, this Foucauldian activist ideal type aims just to 
introduce the postanarchist ideal type, helping to better characterize and to know it. 
Thus, in terms of Foucault’s writings and activism, we will study mainly 
Foucault’s life after May 68. This historical event is a turning point in his political 
activism, although Foucault was in Tunisia during that time, where he followed the 
local students’ struggles closely as well (Eribon, 2011, 2016). Nevertheless, Foucault 
then came back to France where he witnessed intensively the aftermath of May 68. 
Although we stress the importance of May 68 in Foucault’s path, in this dissertation 
we consider his life and work as a whole, because Foucault was principally a 
wonderful researcher who left behind him works and papers in great quantity that 
complement each other (Eribon, 2016). 
In turn, in terms of anarchism, we do not intend to put a label on Foucault, 
stating: ‘Foucault is anarchist’. As we have affirmed, Foucault is completely against 
tags and we do respect his stance, although he admitted at least once he was a “left 
anarchist” (Foucault, 1976:51,60, Eribon, 2011). We just want to show the great and 
interesting similarities between Foucault and Proudhon in order to better understand 
both authors and postanarchism.  
Those similarities between Foucault, Proudhon and postanarchism are the 
main novelty of this thesis, which allow us (i) to discuss the mainstream academic 
literature on Proudhon critically, proposing a different perspective of his anarchism 
due to the proximity with Foucault; (ii) to show the compatibility between Proudhon 
and Newman that could disturb and question critically Newman’s perspective of 
classical anarchism; (iii) to better understand postanarchism, contemporary activism 
and horizontalism as being only anarchism. 
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Another original contribution of our thesis is to construct the postanarchist 
ideal type. Our doctoral dissertation aims to design this powerful, non-hegemonic, 
emancipated activist, also inspired by Nietzsche’s (2002) superman, extracting it 
from Saul Newman’s literature. This extraction work is something new, because the 
main authors4 working on postanarchism have not yet done it. 
What is an ideal type? As Weber (2012:24) argues, it is a theoretical and 
abstract concept and also a “methodological resource”. Its goal is to construct “a 
rational and teleological” figure – a set of actions - in order to characterize particular 
and individual patterns (Weber, 2012:24). Following Weber (2012:24), the ideal type 
shows how far the “concrete actions” of a particular (ideal) type are influenced by 
“irrationalities of all kinds” in real life. In other words, the ideal type, being a rational 
construction, contrasts with irrationalities or spontaneities of a concrete situation or 
individuality. Irrationalities always overcome or transgress the ideal type. And this 
contrast or transgression is necessary and fundamental because it helps us to better 
know and feel the world around us. For Weber, the ideal type is a tool or instrument, 
not a model of reality. There is a parallel in Foucault. Foucault (2006:392) argues, 
reason or “logos is what comes to aid us”; it is not what prescribes.5 Like Weber 
Foucault uses reason to help us understand the world. As we have already said, 
according to Foucault (2006: 359, 362,365,373), science is fundamental because 
science and virtue are intertwined. It is important to know the exterior world in order 
“to make the soul great and to release it” (Foucault, 2006:359). 
Bringing these ideas together in the thesis, we propose the postanarchist ideal 
type as an instrument or tool, a measure or a theoretical point of comparison or a 
theoretical reference – a rational one. The idea is its rational “univocity” or 
homogeneity to facilitate knowledge of the real struggles in social movements today: 
their desires, wills, emotions, irregularities and irrationalities (Weber, 2012:24). Our 
ideal type is not a generalization or a general conceptualization. Rather it is the result 
of inductive analysis – a synthesis – and it is designed to carve the postanarchist 
figure to enable its study through the construction of its main features. 
This Weberian ideal type is also a simplification (Weber, 2012). And, here, 
too, Weber, Proudhon and Foucault converge. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Michel                                                         
4 We are going to study those postanarchist authors in The State of The Art (pg: 23). 
5 Quoting Marcus Aurelius, Foucault (2006:369) says, “Who am I, what am I? Well, I am flesh, I am a 
breath, and I am a rational principle”. Foucault assumes the importance of rational principle. 
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Foucault also rely on simplifications. Proudhon (1965; Préposiet, 2007:209,210) 
claims a “simplification” of legislation, reducing all legislation to just one law: the 
“mutuality principle”. On the other hand, Foucault shows the “statement”, or the 
“enunciation”, is “the building block of all kind of ventures” (Kendall, Wickham, 
2003:75). For Foucault, there is always “the same organizational block”: to affirm, to 
tell. And it is a simple one (Kendall, Wickham, 2003:75). The three simplifications – 
the Weberian, the Proudhonian and the Foucauldian - seem to be a worldview or a 
political option,6 a way to facilitate or to organize life scientifically and socially.  
Nevertheless, Weber (2012:24) warns, this conceptual ideal type should not 
be interpreted as a “rationalist prejudice” or a “belief in the effective predominance of 
the reason over life”. So, in order to avoid those myths and prejudices, Weber 
proposes critique (Aron, 1963:28). Or in order not to rationalize research through 
theoretical work, Weber suggests the ideal type should be criticized (Aron, 1963:28). 
According to Weber, the ideal type could become a “mythology figure” if we 
considered the scientific “schemes” are real life, forgetting “the multiple senses of the 
spread of phenomena” (Aron, 1963:28). Following Weber, critique reminds us the 
fundamental “mystery of the supra-individual sets” (Aron, 1963:29).  
And, here, Weber, Proudhon, and Foucault again meet. For these authors, 
critique is a necessary device. Proudhon (1861:33,58) tells us about the divinal and 
sacred antagonism or war. Foucault (2012:9) talks about “the immense and 
proliferating criticality of things, institutions, practices, discourses; a kind of general 
friability of the soils”. And the same happens with the ego. There is also a fragility of 
the ego. According to Foucault, critique is the way to fight the types – or the 
identities - or the way to show the subjugation of the subject or the fascism of the 
ego. Thus, in Foucault’s (1977b) terms, we could almost say this ideal type is an ego 
or an objectification or a “subjectivity”. However, as Foucault also remembers: there 
is always the critique. For that reason, this ideal type is a subjective and revisable 
work also à la Foucault. With this subjective “objectification”, our goal is to generate 
circularly more resistance and critique and then new objectifications, new resistance 
and so on and so forth, as Weber also teaches.  
Thus, our thesis aim is not to create a political programme or a virtual 
concept, without a creator or a reality as a Frankenstein or an alien (Newman,                                                         
6 Perhaps this simplification is, in last instance, against state complexification and bureaucracy: the 
biopolitical nets.  
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2011:1). Our goal is not to establish a norm or a theory, or an essence, because, 
according to Michel Foucault, “any particular theory of what a person ought to be 
like by nature is false, and has effects of constraining human possibilities and 
marginalizing those who fall outside this ‘nature’” (Pickett, 1996:452). Or as Freud 
(nd) says, our work will not be an exercise of “free imagination” in which images 
“call one another, by association” without an agreement with reality. We agree with 
Arditi (2012:2), the new activism or “the insurgencies of 2011 were not about 
programs, (…) they are the plan, (…) their occurrence is already meaningful 
regardless of what they propose”. Or, according to McLuhan (1962,64:203), the 
medium - or the insurgencies - is the message. For McLuhan (1962,64:203), “the 
personal and social consequences of any medium – that is, of any extension of 
ourselves – result from the new scale that is introduced in our affairs by each 
extension of ourselves, or by any new technology”. 
So, we would like our work to be the medium and the message or to be 
always seen as a creative process, which illustrates what postanarchism is, or as a 
genealogical and aesthetic proposal of reflection, assumedly subjective, which 
contributes to thinking anarchism and actuality. As May argues (2011: 43, 44), “what 
the (researcher) can do is to provide the instruments of analysis”, because “the 
project, tactics and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting”. 
We join both. This thesis is already the fight and also provides an instrument of 
analysis. 
Hence, critique is a fundamental device and also the main proposal of this 
thesis. According to Foucault, critique offers the possibility of creating ‘other 
subjectivities’7 or ‘other types’ and this is our dissertation’s goal (Eribon, 2011). 
Critique reveals that typing is a way “to isolate” and to control “men of unreason” in 
our societies, such as the “homosexual, the magician, the suicide, the libertine” 
(Eribon, 2011:167). Foucault attacks these rational types. Nevertheless, he accepts the 
Weberian scientific type which welcomes particularly those “men of unreason”. In 
Weber’s perspective, these “men of unreason” are schematically or scientifically 
rational types or simplifications plus irrationalities or irregularities or abnormalities 
of the concrete person. And this junction of rationalities and irrationalities is made by 
critique. Weber wants to bring to light irrationalities and irregularities, as we have                                                         
7 In this thesis when we use only single quotation marks (‘...’), this means that it is our term or our 
expression. 
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stated above, in order to better know social phenomenon, for instance, capitalism. 
Foucault goes in the same direction. According to Foucault, we are all types without 
type or irregular/abnormal types; we are particular - although collective – 
constructions: works of art or ongoing constructions (Damien, 2009:22). Foucault’s 
goal also is to unveil these other types. 
We can now sum up the methodological, analytical and political importance 
of this postanarchist ideal type. Methodologically this construction underpins an 
inductive analysis that aims to build an abstract picture of the postanarchist. It is 
synthesis, a set of actions or concepts, which takes its main characteristics from a 
particular context: Saul Newman’s writings. Analytically, the construction of the 
ideal type offers a lens to examine postanarchism in depth and in a novel way. The 
approach allows us to to grasp the main concepts or features that compose Newman’s 
postanarchism, to look at them in turn, deconstruct them, discuss them and 
reconstruct them. In this the thesis follows Deleuze (2005:11) who says that the 
philosopher’s role is to discuss and to construct concepts. By synthesising all those 
concepts at the end of the thesis we will obtain an overview of postanarchism or a 
typical image for postanarchist design. Politically, the ideal type can be understood as 
an anarchist or postanarchist tool. Why? The answer is because the ideal type looks 
like an instrument that just works with an engine: criticism. As Weber warns, the 
ideal type is not a model, nor a “mythological figure”; it does not prescribe; its goal is 
to be criticized, overcome and transgressed by reality, in order to uncover 
irrationalities and spontaneities of the real world. The ideal type needs critique in 
order to work and to be useful and helpful for science and life. Without critique, the 
ideal type does not make sense nor serve any purpose.  Criticism is a fundamental 
tool of anarchism or postanarchism and we shall see during this dissertation, how we 
can infer that the ideal type is politically an anarchist or postanarchist device because 
it is a critical one. It is an ongoing transformation; it is open-textured and also a 
simplification of scientific analysis and of real life. 
Our ideal type is, on one hand, an exercise of political theory – a theoretical 
point of comparison - rather than an empirical study or a fieldwork and, on another 
hand, an aesthetic proposal, a construction, a fiction. This postanarchist ideal type 
intends to be an experience or, better, an invention. As Foucault (1980a) says, 
regarding his books: “this experience is neither true nor false. Experience is always a 
fiction; this is something that allows us to fabricate ourselves”. And this thesis or this 
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fiction is also a fabrication of ourselves inspired by the Foucauldian ‘aesthetics of the 
self’ or ‘the self-invention’ (Pickett, 1996:462). This thesis is about an aesthetic 
attitude that is also a spiritual, an ethical and a political one, as we are going to see. 
This dissertation will be a process of creation, the sculpting of an ideal type, a process 
of space opening based on the adopted literature. 
And this fiction proposes also another kind of political representation. This 
aesthetic path means also the emancipative/creative dimension of the postanarchist 
that is seen as a symbolic or representative process. And this is also an innovative 
feature of our study. This symbolic or representative dimension, inspired by Foucault 
and also Proudhon, means space creation, or creative work (Foucault, 2000). This is 
about taking care of ourselves and of the others, the people around us, as we are 
going to show in Chapter IV (pg:135). Our goal is to discuss this Foucauldian 
symbolic or creative perspective – the sign, the simplification and care - having as 
framework the cynic, the post-structuralist and postmodernist philosophical 
contributions, because the postanarchist authors do not explore this path. 
Another originality of this work is its main method: the solar or circular 
method. Foucault, Proudhon and the postanarchist circular worldview inspire our 
method. And this worldview is also the Nietzsche’s method or the child’s one. This is 
about playfulness, “innocence and forgetfulness”. As Nietzsche (2002:37) affirms 
“the child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a toy, a wheel that turns 
on itself, a movement, a holy affirmation”. For Nietzsche (2002:37), “for the game of 
creation ... we need just a holy affirmation” – again Foucault’s simplification - or we 
just need this “innocence and forgetfulness” or that joy that allows us to forget and to 
jump again and again into the new (see image 1 below).  
 
 
Image 1 
 
BIRTH 
DEVELOPMENT 
DEATH 
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Foucault (2012:40,62) talks about the permanent “beginning of history”: birth, 
development, death and re-birth and so on and so forth.  Foucault (2012:40,62) 
explains how this circular plan works: “the beginning of history... (is) physical vigor, 
force, energy, proliferation of a race, weakness of the other, etc.; series of chances, 
contingencies … : failures or successes of defeats, victories, revolts; successes or 
failure of conspiracies or alliances”. For Foucault (2012:17), we are beginning 
permanently, as the “sunlight”. This is the permanent solar revolution or the “cyclical 
movement of history” (Foucault, 2012:128,129). According to Foucault, we are living 
in the age of The City of Sun or in the age of the multiple suns, the multiple power 
spaces. So, The City of The Sun of Tommaso Campanella is the Foucauldian 
organizing concept and it is also ours (see below image 2).  
                                       
                                                                        Image 2 
 
According to Campanella (2002:59), the City reflects the organization of the 
celestial bodies and when the City was built “they tried to have propitious the four 
constellations of each of the four angles of the universe, which are also observed in 
the conception of each individual”. Our thesis plan also works regarding the same 
logic, reflecting the sun system. As we have explained, we are doing a walk from 
postanarchism to postanarchism, visiting in the meanwhile its roots. We are going, 
through antipathy, from the centre - the concept of postanarchism - to the periphery – 
its roots - and we return to the centre again, through sympathy, closing the circle. As 
Foucault (2009:18) says regarding the body, it is The City of The Sun and it is from 
the body, as by sympathy and antipathy, that all places radiate out: possible, real or 
utopian places. Our intention is that our thesis becomes a body or a microcosm linked 
to the universe around us, and reflecting it. As Foucault (2006:362) explains this 
circular method is an interesting way or path to look at the world around us and to be 
open to it in order to better understand what the postanarchist concept of space and 
the constitution of autonomous spaces or heterotopias are, as we have just studied. 
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Our centre is the concept of space or the postanarchist autonomous spaces 
(Newman. 2011). And, like Campanella’s City was protected and defended by seven 
circles of walls, our centre (the space) is also involved (or sub-divided) in seven 
concepts - movement, body, necessity, utopia, power, sign and truth - that constitute 
and explain this main concept of space (see below image 3).  
 
 
                                                    
    Image 3 
 
 
In the course of this theoretical walk, we will visit all of those concepts, in 
small circles, in order to return to the concept of space or the postanarchist 
autonomous spaces (see below image 4). 
   
 
                                   
                      Image 4 
 
The three main authors of our thesis - Proudhon, Foucault and Newman - will 
also do this circular walk with us. On this philosophical route, Newman starts jogging 
and meets Foucault who gives him the baton; Foucault then walks and meets 
Proudhon, receiving also his testimony; due to their similarities Foucault and 
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Proudhon share the same road and travel together; finally we conclude the circuit 
linking the three testimonials – Proudhon, Foucault, Newman - and constructing the 
postanarchist ideal type.  
So we adopt the postanarchist - also Foucauldian and Proudhonian - non-
foundationalist approach. This means postanarchism develops “a critique of 
essentialist identities and deep ontological foundations” (Newman, 2011:5). As we 
are going to see, postanarchism supports Levinas’s concept of “an-archy” (Newman, 
2011: 178). It does not contend there is an arche or some foundational principle, 
which would be the ground of knowledge. In this way, postanarchist “deconstructive 
tools are poststructuralist thought and elements of psychoanalytic theory” (Newman, 
2011:5). According to Newman (2011:6), postanarchism calls in to question the 
 
essentialist conception of the subject; the universality of morality and 
reason, and the idea of the progressive enlightenment of humankind; a 
conception of the social order as naturally constituted  (by natural laws …) 
and rationally determined; a dialectical view of history; and a certain 
positivism, whereby science could reveal the truth of social relations  
 
          For that reason, Newman (2011:5) explains, postanarchism interrogates 
classical anarchism and its alleged foundationalism. As we have shown above, our 
method is also a non-foundationalist proposal or a circular path, which has neither 
beginning nor end. Instead, it links beginning and end, inviting and defying us, and 
the community around us, to a new start.8  
Those are the challenges we are facing in this postanarchist walk that is 
oriented or conducted by three working hypotheses or intuitions that also move in 
circles. The hypotheses are: (i) postanarchism is space constitution; (ii) to establish 
space is to survive; (iii) the constitution of space is a struggle. These three hypotheses 
resume our initial circular intuition on postanarchism in the following way: 
postanarchism is a fight for survival that creates space and this creation of space is 
postanarchism. 
Those hypotheses inspire the plan of the thesis. The first one, postanarchism                                                         
8 Of course this thesis has a goal: to construct the ideal path. Nevertheless this path would like to be 
only a new critical beginning. With this purpose at the end of the dissertation (Chapter V, pg: 229) we 
are going to present a new research programme. 
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is space constitution, drives Chapter I, The State of the Art, where we start our walk 
through postanarchism. We are going to visit the main literature on the topic, the 
postanarchist authors and concepts oriented by the concept of space.  We are going to 
also study some variations of this concept as such: space constitution, state, non-
humanist space, nomadic space, rhizomatic space, micro-space, cyberspace, working 
space, utopia. 
This first hypothesis - postanarchism is space constitution - and the concept 
of space also guides Chapter II, entitled: The Concept of Space: The Framework. In 
this chapter we start our walk through postanarchism’s genealogy. We will meet Kant 
and walk with him for a while in order to design the Kantian framework of this thesis 
that helps to discuss Foucault and Proudhon’s concept of space as well.  
In the Chapter III – The Concept of Space: Proudhon and Foucault - we 
continue our genealogical walk through the postanarchist concept of space meeting 
Proudhon and Foucault. Nevertheless, we join two important concepts, movement 
and necessity, in order to understand, in the following chapter, who the Foucauldian 
activist is and what the similarities with Proudhon are. We add also another 
hypothesis: to establish space is to survive. The goal is to analyze the concepts of 
necessity and movement, having always present the spatial framework.  
Chapter IV – The Foucauldian Activist Ideal Type - aims to carve the 
Foucauldian activist with Proudhon’s aid. In this chapter we continue the walk and 
the talk with both authors, in order to better know this activist figure; how Foucault’s 
anarchism works and which are its similarities with Proudhon’s anarchism. We look 
at Foucault’s life and activism to understand in depth who the activist he gave us is. 
We join the concept of war or battle or struggle, a fundamental one, in order to enrich 
Foucault and Proudhon’s thought and practice. Consequently, we have again a 
working hypothesis helping us: the constitution of space is a struggle. We present 
this activist as a fighter or a warrior, a nomadic or mobile self, who constitutes space. 
In this chapter we also include all the concepts we studied previously: space, 
movement, necessity, sign, etc. The construction of the Foucauldian activist, being 
also a genealogical work, introduces the postanarchist activist. 
So, in Chapter V, the last one, called The Postanarchist Ideal Type, we are 
going to extract the postanarchist activist from Saul Newman’s writings, concluding 
our philosophical and circular walk. We meet mainly Saul Newman and we are going 
to confront him with Foucault and Proudhon’s ideas, concepts and practices. The 
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concept of space will be the main drive of the chapter. Nevertheless, the concepts of 
necessity, movement and war are also fundamental ones. For that reason, we maintain 
the three working hypothesis in order to guide the argument: (i) postanarchism is 
space constitution; (ii) to establish space is to survive; (iii) the constitution of space is 
a struggle. In this final chapter, we present also some clues for future work. We finish 
our philosophical and theoretical walk with a conclusion.  
In the next chapter, the first one, we will set out The State of the Art. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 23 
THE STATE OF THE ART 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, we are going to present The State of The Art of the PhD thesis that has 
as its theme: “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal 
type”. We start here our philosophical path through postanarchism in order to build 
the postanarchist ideal type. More concretely, this chapter aims to make a point of 
play on the chosen research topic: postanarchism. The goals are to give an evaluative 
account of the existing literature and thereafter to present a critical reading of the 
authors who work on postanarchism. This critical reading has the following aims: (i) 
to understand in depth, and in a contextualized way, what postanarchism is; (ii) to 
grasp the differences and the commonalities of postanarchist theory; (iii) to 
understand why post-structuralism is anarchist or why postanarchism is 
poststructuralist; (iv) to outline the differences between postanarchism and classical 
anarchism; (v) to extract from several works and authors the perspectives, concepts 
and ideas needed to build the postanarchist ideal type.  
So, in this State of the Art, we are going to expose the main ideas of those 
authors that work on postanarchism. The authors are, first of all, Saul Newman, our 
main postanarchist author, who coined the expression postanarchism9 and developed                                                         
9 The post-left anarchist theorist Hakim Bey included the term post-anarchism, in 1987, in an essay 
entitled: Post-Anarchism Anarchy (Adam, 2003). Bey was the first person that brought the prefix 
‘post’ to anarchism. For Bey (1991, 2010), this prefix has two meanings: (i) “post-anarchism” is a 
post-nineteenth century anarchism. Hakim Bey is largely critical of classical anarchism, or strands 
within it. For Bey  (2010), “anarchism staggers around with the corpse of a Martyr magically stuck to 
its shoulders — haunted by the legacy of failure & revolutionary masochism — stagnant backwater of 
lost history”; (ii) in another way, Bey’s “post-anarchism” means a ‘post-post-structuralism’ (our term). 
According to Adams (2003:6; Bey, nd), Bey says that his goal is to “pick up the struggle where it was 
dropped by Situationism in 68 & Autonomia in the seventies & carry it to the next stage … far beyond 
where the grassroots radicals, anarchists, existentialists, heterodox Marxists and poststructuralists have 
ever taken it in the past”.  
For Hakim Bey (1991, 2010), Anarchy is “chaos”, “excess” and a “criminal” and “wild” attitude 
beyond the law, the established. Bey (2010) says that “Anarchism ultimately implies anarchy — & 
anarchy is chaos. Chaos is the principle of continual creation...& Chaos never died”. According to Bey 
(1991, 2010), “post-anarchism anarchy” means the creation of a “Temporary Autonomous Zone” 
(TAZ). For Hakim Bey (1991), TAZ is the poetic act. It is a space/time of creativity or a space of art. 
Bey (1991) argues that TAZ “is the only possible ‘time’ and ‘place’ for art to happen for the sheer 
pleasure of creative play”. And “the artist is not a special sort of person, but every person is a special 
sort of artist” (Bey, 1991). TAZ is the creative act defined “literally”, a poem: “the TAZ is a 
philosophical thought experiment that can be, should be, and is often produced literally” (Generic 
Pronoun, 2013). In Bey’s perspective, anarchy is art or the creative act that is by nature transgressive 
and overcomes the established limits in order to create something new. As Bataille (2002:82) explains 
art is “transgression”, is “the sacred” that opens “spaces” or transcendences. Nevertlhess, unlike Bey, 
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the topic directly in several works10 and, in terms of genealogical framework, Todd 
May, Lewis Call and Richard Day. We have chosen the first three authors (Newman, 
May and Call) because, like us, they work on anarchism in a theoretical perspective, 
in the framework of the poststructuralist French thinkers of the twentieth century in 
critical theory. We have decided to work on this perspective because we believe that 
post-structuralism and postmodernism,11 inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, influences 
today’s anarchism, even postanarchism (Frank, 1098:20, Call, 2002:23). Call 
(2002:33) considers that Nietzsche creates the postmodern anarchist. Call (2002:35) 
says that after Nietzsche’s controversial, innovative and explosive thought, “the genie 
does not go back into the bottle”. In terms of framework, we have decided also to opt 
for the genealogical perspective of Richard Day, who investigates the logic of 
struggles, specifically the “newest social movements”, internally and externally, 
rather than opt for definitions or historical and chronological updates (Day, 2011: 
95,96). The author analyses the emergencies that he finds interesting for his ethical, 
political and theoretical commitments and welcomes new and different genealogies 
(Day, 2011:97). Like Day (2011:97), and, as already noted, we avoid “universal and 
objective narratives” that we consider do not fit into postanarchism, as we have just 
explained.  
When discussing the Richard Day’s work - the newest social movements - we 
will analyse the work of David Graeber and the anti-globalization movement and its 
relationship with postanarchism. In terms of the dialogue between postanarchism and 
post-marxism, we will study the work of John Holloway, very close to the Zapatista 
project in Mexico. As Jason Adams (2003) says, “the Zapatistas, while clearly 
‘antiauthoritarian’ in orientation, do not explicitly identify with anarchism as a                                                                                                                                                               
Bataille (1957:99) notes that to create is not a total disorder nor chaos, but the creation of another 
order. Bataille adopts the inverse perspective.  
Bey intends to carry post-structuralism to a “new stage” or to overcome post-structuralism, giving to 
‘post’ terminology the idea of paradigm shift. As we have decided in this chapter, The State of the Art, 
to work only postanarchist authors that could be situated within the concept of post-structuralism/post-
modernism, we have not analysed the writings of Hakim Bey in this thesis.    
10 See bibliography. 
11 Regarding the terms modern and postmodernism, we adopt as our framework the definitions of the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. According to this encyclopedia, the term ‘modern’ has mainly 
a historical meaning and is “understood as anything since medieval history”: Renaissance or 
Enlightenment. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines postmodernism as also “a historical 
term, indicating something that comes after modernity” (or Renaissance or Enlightenment). 
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‘tradition’ so much as they identify with its ‘spirit’”. We will point out the 
commonalities and differences between both authors and postanarchism and also the 
contributions they give to better understand the theme. 
Now, specifying the reasons for the choice of the four main authors in turn - 
Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day, - we choose, first, Saul 
Newman - our main author - because he coined the term ‘post-anarchism’. As Adams 
(2013) says, Newman developed the term in his book From Bakunin to Lacan: 
antiauthoritarianism and the dislocation of power. Newman (2001, 2011) shows how 
postanarchism works on the limits of classical anarchism, being a step forward or an 
update in terms of classical anarchist doctrines of the nineteenth century, precisely 
because it has poststructuralist roots.12 Newman “comes from within the anarchist 
tradition and tries to gain some insights from post-structuralism to create a more 
effective anarchist politics” (Evren, 2011:9). And this means that poststructuralist 
ideas are being thought through the framework of contemporary anarchism (Evren, 
2011:9). Newman assumes postanarchism as anarchism – not as poststructuralism or 
postmodernism - working the inverse perspective of Todd May and Lewis Call.  
We choose Todd May because he works on the concept of post-structuralist 
anarchism, assuming the opposite perspective of Newman. May highlights that 
poststructuralism contains anarchism, although the French authors do not present 
themselves as anarchists. As Evren (2011:9) concludes, “May is predominantly 
working on the politics of post-structuralism, while gaining some insights from 
anarchism to create a more effective post-structuralist politics”, although May’s 
expression “post-structuralist anarchism” depicts also “a marriage of post-
structuralism and anarchism” (Evren, 2011:9). 
We choose Lewis Call, because, following May, the author demonstrates how 
postmodernism itself contains anarchism, broadening the poststructuralist discussion 
through, for instance, Jean-François Lyotard and his “postmodern condition”, Jean 
Baudrillard and his concept of simulation, and also through the internet world, 
hypertext and cyberpunk. “Call depicts postmodern anarchism as an anarchism that 
seeks to undermine the very theoretical foundations of the capitalist economic order 
and all associated politics” (Evren, 2011:9). 
                                                        
12 We will develop those ideas later in Chapter V (pg: 229).  
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Notwithstanding the different anarchist perspectives and designations given 
by the three authors - Saul Newman/postanarchism, Todd May/poststructuralist 
anarchism, Lewis Call/postmodern anarchism, - all of them are considered post-
anarchist thinkers because they relate classical anarchism with post-structuralism and 
Nietzsche - as inspiration (Noys, 2008:115). 
In turn, Richard Day (2005:10) accepts the postanarchism term and works 
assumedly on the theme, like Newman but in a more practical perspective. Day writes 
to scholars and activists (Day 2005:10). The author makes the genealogy of the 
struggles of the twentieth century social movements and plots also the trajectory of 
the hegemony - hegemony of hegemony, - showing that the postanarchist actions are 
“something new”, regarding the old and new social movements of the twentieth 
century, being beyond these social movements and not fitting their analytical 
perspective. (Day 2011: 96). According to Day (2011:96), these actions have opened 
a new space, where postanarchism, or non-hegemonic activism, arises. 
Following the readings, and giving a motto to The State of the Art and the 
dissertation, we adopt here our first working hypothesis: 
 
Postanarchism is a space opening or a space occupation or a setting 
up of autonomous and emancipated space. 
 
Or more specifically, regarding the thesis subject: 
 
‘the postanarchist is a space creator or a space occupant or an 
autonomous and emancipated constituent of space’ 
 
And what does “to constitute” mean? For Negri (2013), to constitute means 
the ability to give birth or the “birth of something”; it is an “open device”. It is the 
constituent power. For Day, the constituent power means a “politics of the act”, “the 
self-valorisation”, a direct action, a “construction of affinities” (Day, 
2011:108,109,111). According to our initial hypothesis, postanarchism is this 
constituent power; it is self-valorisation and emancipation, to build up affinities, to 
act directly, to open up possibilities. And what does space mean? It is a non-
essentialist “outside” (Newman, 2001: 132). The space is relations, encounters with 
the other (Newman, 2011:7). The space born when we do “a structural renewal”, 
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when we self-valorise and “we (re)make our own connections to each other and the 
land” (Day, 2011:112). This is the space. And who does create this space? The 
subject of the constituent power does: the cyborg,13 a nomadic subject, “a labouring 
subject, a creative, productive, affirmative subject” (Day, 2011:112).  
This is the postanarchist panorama that has postmodernist and post-
structuralist roots. Manfred Frank (1989:20-23) explains that postmodernism was 
born with Nietzsche’s nihilism, when the ‘genie comes out from the bottle’, as we 
have mentioned above (Call, 2002:35,54). For Lyotard (1979:7,8), postmodernism 
means incredulity towards metanarratives or incredulity towards metaphysics. It is 
the crisis of the great heroes, of the great dangers and of the great ends, which are 
dispersed in clouds of language and narrative particles, each of them containing 
pragmatic originalities (Lyotard, 1979:7,8). For Frank (1989:20-23), postmodernity, 
or nihilism, starts with the end of the Enlightened Copernican revolution or the end of 
modernity, when human reason ceases to be “the supreme bastion that ensures the 
self-confidence of man”. According to Frank (1989:20-23), in postmodernity, the 
earth turns away from the sun; there are no longer references; existence loses its 
foothold and man has left himself. We are drifting in space. As Frank (1989:106) 
says, we need to rebuild the lost origin or our lost space. This is postanarchism. 
Postanarchism is the constitution of a new space of self-encounter and encounter with 
the other. This space is also our initial subject, the cyborg, and consequently also our 
initial hypothesis. 
Morover, according to Foucault (2000) and his poststructuralist framework, 
thought or the creative thinker is represented only by the externality of signs or 
creatures. It is transparent and does not hide anything in consciousness (or creative 
thought); there is a transparency, an immediacy, an absence of mediation and time, an 
eternity between thought and sign or representation - thought externalization (Frank. 
1989: 102, 103). The sign is thought or the medium is the message (Frank. 1989: 104; 
McLuhan, 1962,64). So, our goal is to distinguish between sign and simulation. 
Foucault’s (2000) sign is transparent and true. According to Baudrillard (1981:3), 
“simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’, the ‘real’ and 
the ‘imaginary’”. Simulation, as Frank (1989:106) says, means the loss of the origin 
or the immediate connection with the creators. Baudrillard speaks of hyperreality -                                                         
13 The cyborg is a kind of a disassembly and a reassembly of a personal, collective and postmodern 
self, a cybernetic personality (Call, 2002:131). 
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without reality or beyond reality. Call (2002:120) says we live within a “space suit”, 
drifting without references. In turn, the May 68 revolutionaries attack what they call 
the wrong representation, which is just symbolic, and blow graffiti on the walls (Call, 
2002:103,119). They choose micro-representation (Call, 2002:33,34). The 
cyberpunks plunge into the hyper-real, into an immediate, timeless fusion within the 
symbolic (Call, 2002:119). It is this fusion, this transparent, immediate and aesthetic 
micro-space that the postanarchists want to build up. Our thesis goal, that inspires the 
construction of The State of the Art, is also to study this Foucauldian sign or 
representation, this rhizomatic, multiple and Deleuzian root, carried out by cyborgs, 
the postanarchists, cybernetic multiple subjectivities, that recover the origin, the root 
and the creative act.  
According to the above, The State of the Art is oriented by our first hypothesis 
anarchism is space constitution and has three sub-chapters: (i) Postanarchism: the 
word; (ii) Postanarchism: space constitution; (iii) Other contributions;  
We start The State of The Art answering the question: what is postanarchism? 
 
 
1. POSTANARCHISM: THE WORD 
 
This sub-chapter aims to explain what postanarchism signifies, based, as we have 
mentioned in the Introduction, on the main authors of The State of The Art: Saul 
Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day. We also join other authors close 
to the topic, broadening the discussion, in order to better understand postanarchism 
and its main concepts.  
We are going to brainstorm definitions, concepts, and ideas on postanarchism. 
We use brainstorming because, as Lyotard (1979:86) says, it is a postmodern method 
that enhances researches. According to Lyotard (1979:97), postmodern science is 
useful because it gives birth to new ideas.  
The aim is also to undertake a review of the main ideas on postanarchism and 
to contrast perspectives and traditions, finding also ‘gaps’ in the literature.  
This sub-chapter and the following sections have as guiding principle the 
thesis theme – “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal 
type” - and our initial hypothesis: the postanarchist is a space creator. 
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For a genealogical understanding of postanarchism, in this sub-chapter we are 
going to study the word, breaking it down into its constituent parts: “post-anarchy-
ism”. The aim is to prepare the ground for the second sub-chapter, when we are going 
to discuss what postanarchism is, having in mind our initial hypothesis.  
So, in this sub-chapter, in the first section, we are going to study the word: 
‘anarchism’; in the second section, we analyse the prefix: ‘post’; in the third section, 
we discuss the suffix: ‘ism’ 
As we have seen above, we start this sub-chapter disassembling the word 
postanarchism, defining what anarchism is.  
 
Anarchism  
We are going to analyse briefly and in summary the meaning of the term anarchism 
that is, as we have said, a component part of the main concept of our thesis: 
postanarchism. In this section, we will work mainly on the perspective of classical 
anarchism, but at the end of the section we are going to distinguish between classical 
anarchism and contemporary anarchism for an improved framework of 
postanarchism. At the outset, we analyze intentionally the Greek etymology of 
anarchism for two reasons: (i) it is important for a better understanding of the 
practical and discursive content of postanarchism; (ii) we understand that 
postanarchism is a returning to the Greek Ancient episteme, in terms of Foucault’s 
influence as we are going to study in Chapters IV and V (Foucault, 2000; Frank, 
1989). Then, in this section, we will study the main components and derivatives of 
anarchism: anarchy and anarchist. We will do also a brief historical review on the 
word anarchy. At the end we will distinguish between classical and contemporary 
anarchism. 
Anarchism comes from anarchy which derives from the Greek anarkhos, 
meaning ‘without rulers’. For a better understanding, we hyphenate the word ‘an-
archy’: an means ‘no’ or ‘without’ and arkê means ‘rulers’ or ‘government’. Arkê 
means also ‘the first principle’, ‘the first truth’. As we will see, postanarchism is 
about an-archy or ‘an-archic deconstruction’ (Newman, 2011: 53). Postanarchism 
aims to interrogate the arké, the principles, the authority of the concepts and the 
essences (anti-essentialism) (Newman, 2011: 53).  
Anarchy is also the goal of anarchism and means: 
 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 30 
the society … described to be without government or without 
authority; a condition of statelessness, of free federation, of ‘complete’ 
freedom and equality based on rational self-interest, co-operation or 
reciprocity, or of resistance built on continuous action (Kinna, 2005:5) 
 
Regarding anarchism, in theory, it is the ideology of anarchy (Kinna, 2005:6). 
In practice, anarchism “has often lacked the ideological and political coherence of 
other political traditions”: “anarchism has always been heterodox and diffuse” and 
“anarchists have usually been more concerned with revolutionary practice” 
(Newman, 2011:1). Nevertheless, in sum, anarchism’s central claim is: “life can be 
lived without a state, without centralized authority” (Newman, 2011:1). According to 
Préposiet (2007:49), anarchism could be understood as also the bad conscience of 
authority, conserving, for that reason, “a background of religiosity, by its fight against 
evil on earth”, in a secularized world, although Newman (2011:181) labeled 
anarchism as the “most heretical form of radical (anti)politics”. So, theoretically, we 
can affirm that the anarchism is “a doctrine that aims the liberation of peoples from 
political domination and economic exploitation by the encouragement of direct or 
non-governmental action” (Kinna, 2005:3). In other words, and stressing the 
expression ‘without rulers’, anarchism is a doctrine or a political philosophy that 
requires the elimination of all forms of government, advocates the autonomy of 
politics and criticizes and deconstructs political authority (Newman, nd). However, in 
this deconstruction of political authority, classical anarchism has, according to 
Newman, an essentialist discourse, a rationalist, dialectical and reconciling view - 
social harmony - of History, seeing science as absolute and universal, having a 
positivist14 view of the social (Newman, nd). Anarchists are “those who struggle in 
the name of anarchism”, those who work to further this cause and their goal is 
anarchy (Kinna, 2005:4,5). 
Historically, the term anarchy has its roots in the French Revolution when “a 
group of revolutionaries known as the enragés (the fanatics) … demanded that the 
Jacobin government introduce draconian measures to protect the artisans of Paris 
from profiteers” (Kinna, 2005:7). The group did not call themselves anarchists, but 
                                                        
14 We read, here, ‘positivist’, as scientific and also programmatic, as having a programme. 
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their opponents did, because the enragés15 asked people “to take direct action against 
profiteers and … demand that government provides work and bread” (Kinna, 
2005:7). The leaders of the movement, Jacques Roux and Jean Varlet, “rejected the 
idea of revolutionary government as a contradiction in terms… associating anarchism 
with the rejection of revolution by decree” (Kinna, 2005:7,8).16 The legacy of the 
enragés remains and, 100 years later, inspired the French writer Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon who in his first book What Is Property? labeled himself as an anarchist. 
Replying to the question ‘What are you…?’ Proudhon said: ‘I am an anarchist’ 
(Kinna, 2005:8,9). Proudhon suggests that anarchy means “progress and harmonious 
co-operation”, because, for him, anarchy is “the natural counterpart to equality: it 
promised the end to social division and civil strife” (Kinna, 2005:9). Proudhon 
dismisses the ideas of social ruin and chaos that the term anarchy - “without rulers” - 
could imply, although some anarchists, as such Michael Bakunin, pick up the 
controversial anarchist aspect of chaos and “disorder order”, explaining that “the 
passion for destruction is a creative passion, too” (Kinna, 2005:9). Peter Kropotkin 
considers that order is servitude and disorder is “the uprising of the people against 
this ignoble order, breaking its fetters, destroying the barriers, and marching towards 
a better future” (Kinna, 2005:9,10). 
Distinguishing between classical anarchism and contemporary anarchism, we 
labeled ‘classical’, following Evren (2011:9), anarchism that starts in the nineteenth 
century and ends in 1939 with the defeat in Spain, and included authors and schools 
as such mutualism (Proudhon), anarcho-communism (Kropotkin), collectivism 
(Bakunin), individualism (Max Stirner, William Godwin, Henry David Thoreau) and 
Nietzschean anarchism (Emma Goldman), among others. 
Regarding ‘contemporary’ anarchism, we could say that the term includes the 
two last periods identified by Evren (2011:9): the second period that begins with the 
movements from 1960s and embraces May 68 and the third period that runs together 
with the anti-globalization movements.17 Postanarchism belongs to this third period 
or, as it is sometimes referred to, to the ‘third wave’ of anarchism (Evren, 2011:9). As 
Kinna (2005:3,4) confirms, “the origins of contemporary anarchism can be traced to                                                         
15 The name, enragés, was assigned because of the violence of their campaigns and their popular riots 
against starvation and the cost of life (Préposiet, 2007:35). 
16  The “dilemma between authority and revolution” reappears later, around Marxism (Préposiet, 
2007:39). 
17 Day (2005:4) considers that the anti-globalization struggle “speaks to important concerns about 
capitalism, colonialism and democratic accountability”. 
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1968, when … student rebellion put anarchism back on the political agenda”. 
Postanarchism belongs to this ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’ ‘fruitful family tree’, 
where we can find different types of anarchism and activism (Evren, 2011:7). Day 
(2005:4) adds that contemporary radical activism, to which contemporary anarchism 
belongs, found its pillars in the contemporary anti-capitalist movements of the late 
1990s and early 2000s, but “with roots reaching back to the new social movements of 
the 1960s – feminism, the US civil rights movement, Red Power, anti-colonialism, 
gay and lesbian struggles – as well as to ‘older’ traditions of Marxist and anarchist 
socialism”.  
 In the next section we will study the prefix ‘post’ of postanarchism. 
 
“Post”  
After studying the anarchism that constitutes the word postanarchism, in this section, 
we are going to analyze the prefix ‘post’. To get a better understanding of the concept 
of postanarchism, we are going to first study the prefix ‘new’ from the expression 
‘new anarchism’ and to find the differences and the similarities between both 
concepts.  
Evren (2011:3) remembers that the expression ‘new’ was coined by David 
Graeber’s article ‘The New Anarchists’, published in the Marxist oriented journal 
New Left Review, although “David Graeber rejects the honour”.18 As we have said, 
Graeber is close to the anti-globalization movement. So, at the outset, we could 
deduce that “new” anarchism has some proximity to the perspective of the anti-
globalization movement, that David Graeber associated with. 
Discussing the expression ‘new’ in further depth, Evren (2011:3) considers 
that the word signifies, in fact, “something new”, “a consensus” that there is “an-
anarchism re-emerging”, an “updated ‘contemporary’ anarchism” that is not “a 
reincarnation of nineteenth–century anarchism from the days of the First International 
or the Spanish anarchist revolution”. For Evren (2011:3), the “newness” of the new 
anarchism is “its spectrum of references”: “all the anarchistic principles employed 
(are) defined as consequence of actual activists’ experiences. There (is) no intention 
to describe the movement as an application of an anarchist theory (which is                                                         
18 Graeber explains that, although he never objects to it, the expression ‘New Anarchists’ has been 
made up by the review New Left Journal when his article was published. The first title of this article by 
Graeber was: “The Globalization Movement Some Points of Clarification” (Evren, 2011:15,16). 
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fundamentally anarchistic in attitude)”. Kinna (2005:4) confirms this “new 
anarchistic attitude”, in fact, influences contemporary politics and has real 
consequences, as we can see in many campaigns from “protests against animal 
vivisection, militarization and nuclear arms, to less well-known programmes for 
urban renewal, the development of alternative media, free education, radical 
democracy and co-operative labour”. 
So, briefly, we could say that this “late-twentieth and twenty-first-century” or 
new anarchism, inspired by Graeber’s title, corresponds to Evren’s “third wave” 
anarchism that, as we have defined, runs together with the anti-globalization 
movements, belonging to contemporary anarchism.  
And what does the particle ‘post’ of the term postanarchism mean?  
Saul Newman (2011:63) explains that the prefix ‘post’ “does not mean after 
or beyond”, but rather “a working at the conceptual limits of anarchism with the aim 
of revising, renewing and even radicalizing its implications”. According to Newman 
(2011:63), postanarchism is also anarchism but with the prefix: ‘post’, because 
“postanarchism is still faithful to the egalitarian and libertarian project of classical 
anarchism”. However, this anarchism is also ‘post’ and Newman (2011:63) explains 
why: because “the project is best formulated today through a different 
conceptualization of subjectivity and politics: one that is no longer founded on 
essentialist notions of human nature or the unfolding of an immanent social 
rationality”. This different conceptualization of subjectivity and politics corresponds 
to the poststructuralist conceptualization and shows ‘post’-anarchism’s “close fit” to 
‘post’-structuralism (Evren, 2011:4). Nevertheless, Evren (2011:10) notes that: 
 
postanarchism is better understood as an anarchist theory first and 
foremost rather than a post-structuralist theory. … Newman even 
describes it as a combination and composition of classical anarchism 
and contemporary anarchism, which means that post-structuralist 
qualities are being framed through the lenses of contemporary 
anarchism. 
 
‘Post’-anarchism is also related to the broader ‘post’-modernity that 
encompasses also ‘post’-structuralism, as we have already remarked in the 
Introduction by the analysis of Manfred Frank (1998). Postanarchism shares the main 
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principles of postmodern anarchism, as Call (2002:21) formulates it:  (i) the lack of 
meaningful revolutionary potential of the Marxist or classical-anarchist ‘radical’ 
position “which insists upon the primacy of economics and class analysis (Call, 
2002:21); (ii) the necessity to develop “a much broader critique of power by making 
the concept of hierarchy itself into an object of analysis, … by expanding the 
anarchist project into the cultural and linguistic realms” (Call, 2002:21).  
According to Evren (2011:9), the prefix ‘post’ also indicates a proximity 
between postanarchism and post-marxism, although some postanarchists are critical 
of Marxism: “the term postanarchism … directly brought to mind ‘post-marxism’, 
especially considering that the introduction to From Bakunin to Lacan was written by 
Ernesto Laclau”, considered a post-marxist. Adams (2003) agrees, “Newman’s 
conception is actually quite similar to the ‘postmarxism’ of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe”. There is a critical discussion between both currents and there are 
some similarities and some differences between both.  
Newman (2010:146) warns also that ‘post’ does not mean a difference 
between one anarchism that is “political or ‘leftist’ and one that is hedonistic, anti-
political and ‘post-leftist’”. Newman (2010:146,147) adds that: 
 
it makes no sense to me to see contemporary forms of anarchism as 
‘post-leftist’, if by ‘post-leftist’ is meant an abandonment of the radical 
horizon of emancipation. While contemporary anarchism might be 
‘post-leftist’ in the sense that it is no longer closely affiliated with the 
labour movement or the socialist tradition, it obviously still retains an 
anti-capitalist and egalitarian agenda 
 
As we are seeing, the particle ‘post’ is quite controversial and can have 
various meanings. For example, Jason Adams (2003), closer to post-struturalism and 
Todd May, deviates from Newman and notes that while postanarchism “is ‘post’ 
anarchist, it is also post ‘anarchist’”. For Adams (2003), this signifies that the prefix 
‘post’ “is not a complete rejection of classical anarchism, but rather a step beyond the 
limits defined for it by enlightenment thought”.  
But there are other interpretations. Evren (2011:9) mentions some anarchists 
who thought that the prefix ‘post’, applied to its new object, implies that anarchism, 
as thought and practice, is “somehow obsolete”. For instances, Cohn (2002) starts an 
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article asking: “What is Postanarchism ‘Post’?”, pointing out some “misreadings” on 
classical anarchist theory, for example, around the opposition between human 
subjectivity and power.  
The particle ‘post’ in itself, in fact, is polemical. Manfred Frank (1989:24), 
considers that this prefix ‘post’ seems to refer to something that is not concluded and 
cannot be assessed globally, something that is “undetermined”. Evren (2011:4) seems 
to agree when he says post-anarchism is something open: “an open-ended 
experimental approach to revolutionary visions and strategies”. For Evren (2011:4) 
this “open-endedness” and  “elusiveness” permit one to think about “rupture” from 
“classical anarchism” or about “a paradigm shift” (Evren, 2011:4). In turn, Rousselle 
(2011:VII) argues that “postanarchism is the radical contemporary equivalent of the 
traditional anarchist discourse”, bringing “traditional anarchism into new 
relationships with the outside world”. For Rousselle, (2011:VII), “a kind of post-
anarchist moment has arrived”. 
Beyond these controversies and particularities surrounding the prefix 
‘post’, as we have seen, ‘post’-anarchism belongs to anarchism’s third wave 
(or ‘new anarchism’), and, consequently, to the contemporary anarchism. So, 
what are the differences between the ‘new’ and the ‘post’? 
First, the ‘new’ is wider than the ‘post’, because as we have just seen, 
the ‘post’ belongs to the ‘new’. As Call (2002:21) states, there is not a 
“monolithic vision” of contemporary anarchism, but a “strengthened 
diversity”. So, postanarchism fits into this wider wave and represents only a 
single strain. 
Second, among this diversity in ‘new’ anarchism, as Day (2005: 4, 5, 
6, 8, 9) says, postanarchism is the ‘newest’. And why? Because, according to 
Day (2005: 4, 5, 6, 8, 9), the “newest social movements” are postanarchist. 
And what are the “newest social movements”? The “newest social 
movements” are the “non hegemonic movements” - and not “counter 
hegemonic”, reformists or against the power and the state, as the anti-
globalization movements - or the movements that do not want to take power, 
the ‘movements’ that do not fit the framework of social movements, because 
they bring “something new”. What is this something? These struggles “seek 
change to the root” and want “to address not just the content of current modes 
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of domination and exploitation, but also the forms that give rise to them” 
(Day, 2005: 4). 
Taking into account this ‘newness’ and this diversity of postanarchism, in the 
next section we are going to analyse the suffix ‘ism’. 
  
“Ism” 
In this section, we are going to define the suffix ‘ism’ of postanarchism to better 
understand the content of the concept. What does the suffix ‘ism’mean? 
Postanarchism evokes other similar expressions also ending with the same 
suffix ‘ism’: liberalism, socialism, Marxism. These expressions and these suffixes 
refer to ideologies or “coherent set of doctrines and beliefs that can be laid out 
‘positively’ as a bounded totality” (Adams, 2003). And is ideology acceptable or not? 
Call (2002:40) recalls that, for Nietzsche, the ‘isms’ represent a fragmented, a 
decadent and a dangerous culture. In turn, Baudrillard (1981:6) notes the ‘sacred’ 
dimension of ideology: “a theology of truth and secrecy”, something that manifests 
our will or imagination. 
And how does postanarchism deal with this ‘ism’? Is postanarchism an 
ideology? Here, there are also different evaluations. Adams (2003) answers ‘no’,  
“postanarchism is not an “ism” or an ideology or a “coherent set of doctrines”. And 
why not? For Adams (2003), because postanarchism is a “profoundly ‘negative’ 
term” that signifies, as we have just verified, a diversity, “a broad and heterogeneous 
array of anarchist and ‘anarchistic’ theories” and not a closed ideology. To Adams 
(2003), postanarchisms have been “rendered homeless by the overly normalized 
doctrinarity of most of the classical anarchisms such as syndicalism, 
anarchocommunism, and platformism as well as their contemporary descendants (like 
social ecology)”. For Adams (2003), postanarchism does not have “key thinkers” and 
there is not a postanarchist “canon” because postanarchism embraces the “borderless 
multiplicity of (smooth) theory”. 
Evren (2011:4) thinks differently. In his opinion, this picture does not mean a 
lack of ideology, because the new forms of organization of postanarchism are its 
ideology: horizontal and decentralized networks based on non-hierarchical 
democratic consensus, instead of top-down structures like states, parties and 
multinational companies (Evren, 2011:4). Evren (2011:5) sees postanarchism as “an 
explicit body of thought” or a “new and developing current in the world radical 
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scene, and also cultural studies”, emerging from the radical anti-authoritarian post-
structuralist theory, heir to the anarchistic May 1968 movements. Evren (2011:5) 
considers postanarchism as “an attempt to create the theoretical equivalent of the anti-
globalization movements”: (i) because the debates around postanarchism are linked to 
the “post-Seattle spirit”; (ii) because post-structuralism, which inspired 
postanarchism, is related to the Deleuzian “rhizomatic character of the new anarchism 
that is shaking the foundations of the globe” (Evren, 2011:5). In turn, Cohn (2002) 
concludes that Newman’s project is “the reconstruction of an anarchist theory within 
a poststructuralist framework”.  
Newman (2011:62) admits that postanarchism is not so much “a distinct 
model of anarchist politics”, seeing his work as a “field of inquiry and ongoing 
problematization” of the conceptual categories of anarchism. For Newman (2011), 
post-anarchism is “an ethical-political horizon”, “an openness to the other”. Newman 
(2001:1,2) advises against “the pernicious error of advocating a purer or more 
universal revolutionary theory that would seek to be more complete and sweeping in 
its paroxysm of destruction”. Maybe this practical, open ideology or, as Newman 
affirms, this “field of inquiry and ongoing problematization” is not a total 
contradiction of the ‘sacred’ epiphany or ideology or ideologies that manifests and 
extends our will or imagination, as Baudrillard suggests and Foucault argues, through 
the “eternal” alliance between sign and thought.  
After the decomposition of the word postanarchism, in the next section we are 
going to answer the question: What is postanarchism? 
 
 
2. POSTANARCHISM: SPACE CONSTITUTION 
 
Regarding our initial insight that postanarchism is space constitution, in this sub-
chapter, we are going to explore what postanarchism is, working on this hypothesis. 
We will see what the main authors of The State of The Art - Saul Newman, Todd 
May, Lewis Call and Richard Day - think on the topic. The goal is to contrast the 
various positions and to find the ‘gaps’.  
So, regarding our initial hypothesis - postanarchism is space constitution - in 
this sub-chapter we are focusing on the concept of space. We are seeing how the 
authors relate postanarchism and the notion of space. First, we are going to analyze 
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what the expression ‘space constitution’ signifies. Then, we develop this concept of 
space, studying the following subjects: the state, anti-humanist space, nomadic space, 
rhizomatic space, micro-space, cyberspace, working space and utopia.  
 
Space constitution 
Looking at the relation between postanarchism and space, Saul Newman discusses 
politics, autonomy and space. Postanarchism, he argues, is a “politics of autonomy”, 
a politics of “autonomous spaces”. And what does a politics of autonomous spaces 
mean?  
Starting with the term “politics”, for Newman (2011: 8), politics is “an 
ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain 
order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are potentially conflictual 
because they are affected by the dimension of the political”. But postanarchism is not 
a kind of “politics”. For Newman (2011: 4), “postanarchism is not a specific form of 
politics; it offers no actual programme or directives. It is not even a particular theory 
of politics as such”. Postanarchism is about “the political”. And what is this 
“political”? According to Newman (2011: 8), “the political” is “the dimension of 
antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social 
relations”. To do “the political” is (also) to explore and to interrogate existing limits 
and tensions (Newman, 2011: 7). Postanarchism is “as kind of deconstruction”, and a 
kind of construction, an ethical “openness to the Other” (Newman, 2011: 5,139). 
Postanarchism is an exploration of the limits or “the gaps between politics and ethics” 
(Newman, 2011: 10). “Ethics is … something which disrupts ... sovereign political 
identities, opens them to the possibilities of the Other” (Newman, 2011: 139). As 
Nietzsche (nd) states, ethics is “the fire eternally active” which builds and destroys 
“without any moral imputation on an eternally equal innocence”. 
Turning to the term: “autonomy”, Newman (2011:179) claims that it is “the 
horizon for radical politics”. And why? Newman sees autonomy as ‘ownness’. For 
Newman (2001: 68), “one should seek ownness”. And “ownness is a positive 
freedom, by which Stirner means freedom to reinvent oneself, because we are, as Call 
(2002:52) affirms, “selves-in process”. Ownness means that “one can be free even in 
the most oppressive situations”, because freedom starts with the individual, and the 
individual is always free to redraw itself (Newman, 2001: 68).  
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However, Foucault (1994a) argues that sometimes we forget our autonomy. 
For Foucault, autonomy is the “process that releases us from the status of 
‘immaturity’”. By ‘immaturity’, Foucault (1994a) understands “a certain state of our 
will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use 
of reason is called for”. In this case, Foucault (1994a) says, the individual is not 
autonomous. So, people reach adulthood or autonomy when they have the courage to 
know and to realize their ownness permanently and collectively or when they decide 
to be voluntary actors in society (Foucault, 1994a; Newman, 2001: 68). Franks 
(2008:43) concludes that “ownness is the creator of everything”, and, first of all, the 
creator of ourselves. And this capacity to create is the horizon of the politics of 
autonomy. 
 So what does ‘a politics of autonomous spaces’ mean? What does space 
mean? As we have just studied, the “political” is the dimension of antagonism that 
can take permanently many forms and emerge in different types of social relations 
(Newman, 2011: 8). These “forms”, or better, this “process” (May, 2008:31), this 
“emerging antagonism” or these “different relations” are the space or the micro-space 
that, as we have seen above, we occupy when we attain adulthood and start acting 
freely, reinventing ourselves individually and collectively. So politics of autonomy 
means the realization of our ownness and the creation of these open, free, and 
collective spaces.  
 
State 
We can see that, for Newman, to carve space is “a precondition of autonomous 
politics”. Nevertheless, Newman stresses, this space is carved “beyond the 
sovereignty of existing institutions”19 or beyond the state.  
For Newman, the modern 20 state is “the place of power” or the place of 
sovereignty. Newman (2011:10) explains, “the autonomy of the political invokes the 
idea of the politics of autonomy”: the idea that politics defines spaces of autonomy 
beyond the state, spaces where people determine their own lives, “free from the 
looming shadow of Leviathan”. And how is it possible? For Call (2002:75), as 
Foucault teaches, “power is everywhere”, “omnipresent and capillary” and “comes                                                         
19  In turn, Newman remembers that spatial autonomy is traditionally understanding as carving 
territorial or political space. 
20 In this thesis thesis, modern age means the Enlightenment as we have already stated. Nevertheless, 
for Foucault, as we will see, modernity starts after the nineteenth century. 
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from everywhere”. So, power is not exclusive of the state or rulers or dominant social 
classes (Call, 2002:75). Resistance is also power and cannot destroy power (Call, 
2002:75). Power delocalises politics from the state. For these reasons, postanarchism 
is about “what politics means outside of the ontological order of state sovereignty” 
(Newman, 2011:4). Postanarchism disrupts, through power, sovereign political 
identities. Postanarchism delivers sovereignty everywhere. 
In turn, for Newman (2001: 3,157), the state, being “a manifestation of the 
place of power”, is an essence or a fixed identity or a preconception. According to 
Newman, the (modern) state is ‘place’, something closed, a limited space, already 
defined, with rationalist and essentialist foundations. It is not space or “non-place”,21 
something open and non-essentialist. The state is not a process of ongoing definition. 
For postanarchism, the appropriate domain of power or politics is this “non-place” or 
autonomous spaces (Newman, 2011:9,11) and not the state. 
Newman (2011:9) adds also that the state is the place of “depoliticisation”: it 
“polices politics, regulating, controlling and repressing the insurgent dimension that 
is proper to the political” (Newman, 2011:9). According to Newman (nd), these 
spaces of resistance are, in fact, ‘insurgents’, they are political moments of creation 
and are autonomous spaces that exist in contrast to the state or the state of exception 
or the more actual “bio-political state”, the Foucauldian security state, controlling and 
ordering people’s space through biology and the body.  
For these reasons, for Call (2002:130), the solution is this “insurgent 
dimension” beyond the state rather than the revolution against the state.  
Newman (2011:13) explains: 
 
radical politics today should be conceived of in terms of rupture with 
the existing order. … However, the politics of the ‘event’, which this 
notion of rupture implies, should be conceived of in ways that avoid 
the violent, terroristic and potentially authoritarian revolutionary forms 
of the past. 
 
Postanarchism, “refuses to smash the state, … preferring instead to pursue the 
deeper project of semiotic liberation, … sketched by Baudrillard, Debord and the                                                         
21 We can also relate this ‘non-place’ with the ‘no place’ or utopia. Later in this chapter we will discuss 
the matter (pg: 48). 
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situationists” (Call, 2002:130). For Call (2002:42,51), the postmodern anarchist goal 
is this semiotic project with new creative languages and not “to reform the state or the 
seizure of power” (2011:51). Call (2002:52) remembers, by the way, the Nietzschean 
superman, or “the first true an-archist”, that creates his own values and “no longer 
needs the state or any other institution”. For Call (2002:74), this creative semiotic 
project presupposes “to abolish the conditions of thinking which make the state 
possible” (Call, 2002:74). These “new creative languages” are the solution. 
According to Call (2002:74), the problem is not properly the state, but the previous 
power relations: “no revolutionary theory has ever accounted for underlying power 
relations which exist prior to the state and which make the state possible”. For Call 
(2002:74), maybe “the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized 
abstraction”, maybe it is a “lot more limited than many of us think”. Maybe “what is 
really important ... is not so much the étatisation of society, as the 
‘governamentalization’ of the state” (Call, 2002:74). By ‘governamentalization’, Call 
means “the network of power relationships which make possible the modern state”. 
For Call (2002:74), an attack on the state institutions could be harmful, because it 
would mask these power relations that are “the crucial problem”.  
In Richard Day’s (2011:113) perspective, the postanarchist logic is to act 
‘alongside’ the state with different power relations and goals. This logic is:   
 
a desire to create alternatives to state and corporate forms of social 
organization, working ‘alongside’ the existing institutions; proceeding 
in this via disengagement and reconstruction rather than by reform or 
revolution; ... enabling experiments and the emergence of new forms 
of subjectivity; and finally, ... inventing new forms of community. 
 
So, these new forms of community or “new creative languages” beyond the 
state are the solution. 
 
Non-humanist space 
These new subjectivities and these new forms of communities are the non-humanist 
space. Call (2002:75) points out that the postmodern anarchist solution is “the revolt 
against humanism” and this revolt is a kind of “emancipatory project”. And what is 
humanism? As we have seen in the Introduction of The State of The Art, humanism is 
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the Copernican revolution that places human being at the centre of the world and sees 
the reason – logos - as the point of orientation (Frank, 1989:20-23). This humanist 
Man is a “religious ideal”, a “fixed idea” (Newman, 2001: 60). According to Call 
(2002:75), humanist thought believes there is a human essence, “an elementary 
nucleus”, “a primitive atom” and human beings need to emancipate this essence. Call 
(2002:74,75) remembers that, “for the modernist anarchist Bakunin, capitalism and 
state must be destroyed because they interfere with the liberation of an authentic 
human essence”.  
But, in terms of anti-humanism, Call (2002:75) notes, “there is no need to 
uphold man in order to resist” because there are not essences nor nucleus. For Frank 
(1989:20-23), the anti-humanist man was released in cosmos, in anti-humanist space 
without references. Regarding anti-humanism, there is “an anarchy of the subject” or 
“an anarchy of becoming” that “violently destabilizes” the Enlightenment subjectivity 
which, as we have seen, is the basis of classical anarchism and also of Marxism (Call, 
2002:33). This anarchy means a “perpetual project of self-overcoming and self-
creation, constantly losing and finding ourselves in the river of becoming”.  
For Call, (2002:33) we have a “fluid, dispersed, multiple and pluralistic” 
rather than “fixed and centred, singular and totalitarian” subjectivity. Newman (2001: 
60) agrees that this “fixed idea” restricts and oppresses open individuality. According 
to the anti-humanists, the individual is the “un-man” that “refuses to conform to 
human essence, to the ideal of man” (Newman, 2001: 61). The un-man is “the other 
of man, a Dionysian force that cannot be contained — both a creation of man and a 
threat to it” (Newman, 2001: 61). This “Dionysian force” is also the anti-humanist 
revolt against humanist fixed essences of man. As Newman (2011: 139) says, it is the 
ethical openness to the other that disrupts sovereignty and political identities” 
(Newman, 2011: 139). And this revolt against humanism does not mean to destroy 
power (Call, 2002:75). For Call (2002:75), as we have seen, power is ubiquitous, 
“comes from everywhere”. According to Call (2002:74,75), as we have noted, to fight 
against the state is to reinscribe previous power relations or the “problematic” 
network of power relationships that constitute the state. It would multiply “places” of 
power rather than create autonomous “spaces” of power or non-humanist spaces. So, 
Call (2002:75) concludes, resistance can fight everywhere against humanism, 
creating non-essentialist power relations (autonomous spaces).  
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Nomadic space 
For Call (2002:74), non-humanism is the nomos. In Greek, nomos, means the 
pasture and nomadic signifies the shepherd, who changes his place frequently due to 
herding. Yet in Greek, the word nomos also means the god or spirit (daimon) of law, 
which stands in contrast to other, an-archic, non-humanist meaning. Could we say 
that the nomadic space is the mix of these two Greek nomos, a permanently 
disordered order?  
For Call (2002:74), nomos signifies “the space outside the state” or non-
humanism. Humanism means the logos, reason in Greek, or the state’s reason or the 
space inside the rationality of the state (Call, 2002:74). So nomos is the space of 
“theoretical and political resistance” outside the state, a space without rulers: a 
stateless or “nomadic anarchy”. (Call, 2002:36,74,82). This nomadic anarchy is also 
the an-archy - without principles - of the subject: the non-humanistic subject that 
disrupts Enlightenment rationality, subjectivity and discipline (Call, 2002:82). As we 
have seen, this anarchic subjectivity signifies a perpetual self-overcoming, a self-
creation and a “fluid, dispersed, multiple and pluralistic” subjectivity (Call, 2002:33). 
Becoming a nomad means this need to respect multiplicity and to find permanently 
ways of action that reflect this complexity (Call, 2002:62). To be a resistant or 
become a nomad is a permanent ‘exceed-itself’. As Pickett (1996:447) asked: “What, 
then, is resistance against? Foucault’s answer is ‘limits’”. This is the goal of “the 
great social nomad”, the anarchic personality “who prowls on the confines of a 
docile, frightened order”, pushing and disordering the limits of this order (Call, 
2002:82).  
It is “the outlaw”, someone that is beyond the law, someone that shows that 
“the dominant discourse of our culture - that of rationality, science and 
Enlightenment - is not the only available. There are other, subterranean, outlaw 
discourses and spaces which plagues and torment (this) comfortable world”: the 
space and the discourse of “the departure from the norm, the anomaly” or the 
transgression (Call, 2002:63,82,83). But, as Bataille (1957:99) remembers, the 
transgression is not a total disorder: it is an assumed act with an intention. According 
to Bataille (1957:71-78), “the transgression has nothing to do with the first reality of 
animal life”. It is as a mix of rationality and irrationality. Transgression opens a space 
or “an access beyond the limits of the ordinarily observed, but it knows these limits” 
(1957:71-78). It is like a party or a carnival “in which no one takes it badly” 
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(1957:71-78). Pickett (1996:451) explains: “Transgression seeks to undermine or at 
least weaken any given set of limits in order to attenuate their violence. Transgression 
then is nothing less than the affirmation of negation”. Transgression transcends 
without destroying the profane world (Bataille, 1957:76). The transgression is the 
sacred world that complements the profane world, opening new spaces (Bataille, 
1957:76). For Call (2002:82), too, “the outlaw and the anomaly help to sketch out the 
space of the nomos”. So, Call (2002:82) affirms that we need to keep space for 
nonconformity, for transgression, for dissent and difference. The transgression or the 
violation of the law opens a space of radical difference, of multiple thinking, of 
nomadic and dispersed multiplicity (Bataille, 1957:71-78; Call, 2002:83, 84). It is a 
multidimensional or multilinear space rather than “an oppressively linear space, as 
the logos space (Call, 2002:71).22  Bataille (1957:72) explains how the transgression 
opens a space: we break the law when we have a positive emotion, when we have a 
negative emotion we obey. Bataille (1957:103) compares this positive emotion with 
the creative and violent explosion of eroticism, as Freud (nd:14) compares with the 
libido or Plato’s Eros. In turn, Call (2002:62) notes there can be no social change 
without this force that characterizes the nomadic subject.  We have to become 
nomads or “desiring, molecular, nomadic and multiple subjects” and we must start 
opening nomadic spaces: “experimentation, search and transition spaces” (Call, 
2002:62). As Nietzsche (2002) suggests: “you must have chaos within you to give 
birth to a sparkling star”. 
 
The rhizomatic space 
As we just have seen, this “nomad thought” is also “a decentred and multiplicitous 
thinking” or a “rhizomatic thinking” (Call, 2002:123). Call (2002:123) defines 
rhizome as “a non-hierarchical, centerless mode of organization”. The rhizome is a 
space “in which every point or node is linked to every other” (Call, 2002:123). This 
kind of multiple space is inspired by a root plant, the rhizome, which has horizontal, 
underground stems capable of producing the shoot and root of a new plant. An 
example of this rhizomatic space is the network space that is an anarchic and 
centerless space and mode of thinking, contrasting with the rooted, binary, logical 
state’s way of thinking (Call, 2002:123). The rhizome means there is not a centre                                                         
22 Here, Call refers the logocentrism or the history linearity of modern age, from Plato to Hegel and 
Marx. 
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where power is located, but several sites, where power comes from, and interlinks 
between these sites (May, 1994:11). 
The rhizomatic space settles Deleuze and Guattari’s “war machine”, that is 
“an assemblage that makes thought itself nomadic” (Call, 2002:123). And how 
thought remains nomadic? This machine is “a metaphor of war, rift, and antagonism”, 
used to open space, breaking down “the essentialist unity of human subjectivity, 
showing its dependence on the power it claims to oppose” (Newman, 2001: 6). As we 
have seen, power, or desire, is ubiquitous. So, this war machine is also a nomadic and 
desire machine that aims to flow freely and to threaten society’s structures of 
exploitation and oppression (Call, 2002:123). The postmodernist war is the 
Nietzschean war: the energy that makes things change permanently and become 
nomadic. For Nietzsche (2002), war is the desire that joins people together through 
antagonism. As Nietzsche (2002) says, “the friend is our enemy”. The war is the 
agonistic power that, through contrariness, is a vital part of self-creation (Pickett, 
1996:464). It is not our destruction, but “the creation of something entirely different, 
or a total innovation” (Pickett, 1996:464). As Nietzsche (2002) concludes, “the 
destructor is the creator”.  
So the war machine, settled on the rhizome, creates more rhizomatic space 
and more nomadic thinking. How? By generating successive lines of flight through 
desire, power and antagonism, outside the state, its sovereignty and its law. Through 
these lines of flight, agonistic power creates this multidimensional and multilinear 
space that disrupts “the subject-centered thinking which authorizes all modern states” 
(Call, 2002:123). The rhizome is this resistant space, where “people can make their 
own decisions, form their own movements, and reach their own objectives” (Pickett, 
1996:463). The rhizome is where, through agonistic power, we open our space and 
participate in society. 
 
Micro-Space 
What is this node through which each of us may participate in society? This is the 
micro-space. And why is this space micro? As we have seen, Frank (2008:143) writes 
that “ownness is the creator of everything”. Stirner (1901: 18) explains, “I am the 
creative nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything”. 
Foucault (1994a), quoting Kant, recalls that we start individually when we are 
autonomous and when we are autonomous we open our space: we occupy space. So, 
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if each of us is the nothing out of which we can create everything, this means we can 
do as we wish voluntarily (Frank, 2008). Frank explains (2008:143) “the individual 
should concentrate only on their ever-changing needs and desires, and take 
responsibility for constructing an account of the good which meets these desires: 
ownness created a new freedom”. In turn, for Call (2002: 52), “our primary duty is to 
reprogram or redesign ourselves, creating our anew as the kind of being who can 
legislate new values and inscribe new laws”. To redesign ourselves, as someone 
autonomous and able to create new values, our own law, as we wish, is the first goal: 
the micro goal.  
For Call (2002:51), this “micro goal” means also “becoming minoritarian” 
and it is a political option, different to the seeking of a majority in liberal democracy. 
Call (2002:51) explains: “this is the opposite of macropolitics … in which it is a 
question of knowing how to win or obtain majority”. The “becoming minoritarian” 
means “become those we are” (Call, 2002:51); it means to be a Nietzschean “enemy” 
or to choose political autonomy and antagonism, to participate in society opening 
space. Call (2002:51) adds, “becoming-minoritarian is a (different) political affair and 
necessitates a labour of power, an active micro-politics”. Power is the question here. 
As we have seen, power is ubiquitous. It is everywhere for all of us. And when we 
assume deliberately the power we have, we are autonomous and we do as we wish: 
we create. Newman (2011:62) adds that “any sort of emancipatory transformation of 
social relations must start with a transformation of power relations at an everyday 
micro-level”. So, emancipation is the creation of new agonistic micro power relations 
between autonomous individuals. Emancipation means to create oneself and means 
also the openness of collective micro-spaces by empowered people, interacting in the 
rhizome. These collective micro-spaces are the nodes of the rhizome through which 
each of us may participate in society. And, answering the initial question: for 
postanarchism, space is micro because it is opened by ownness, by autonomous 
individuals that create themselves responsibly, permanently and collectivelly. 
 
Cyberspace  
As we just have said, cyberspace, the network space, is an example of the rhizomatic 
space. As Call (2002:123) affirms, like the rhizome, the Internet is an anarchic space 
and mode of thinking, where “every point or node is linked to every other”. Call 
(2002:124,125) compares this “electronic matrix” to the “desire machine” of Deleuze 
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and Guattarri that disrupts the “suspect” centered systems and centered subjects. For 
Call (2002:125), more concretely, the rhizomatic Internet is a finite centreless space, 
where communication runs through neighbours; where channels of communication 
are not pre-existing to the communication but simultaneous; the individuals are 
interchangeable and defined by their position at a given moment. Following Call 
(2002:125), the computer network has a postanarchist “subversive sense”, due to its 
social and political functioning. For Call (2002: 24, 125), this desire machine is a 
ubiquitous power space: a ‘hallucinated’ net of power points where “any gesture, no 
matter how radical, is possible”.  
As Call (2002:125) argues, cyberspace is a set of “micro communities of 
Hackers”. For Call (2002:125), a community is an autonomous group, which creates 
and shares “certain recipes, rules or programs which govern behavior”. According to 
Call (2002:125), the Hackers are the Internet users that create cultures – values - and 
communities and who innovate permanently generating new combinations of net 
(Call, 2002:125). For Call (2002:137,138), the hackers reject also “an outmoded, 
bourgeois subjectivity” and manifest an anarchic subjectivity. According to Call 
(2002:131), Hackers look like the cyborg. It is a kind of disassembly and reassembly 
of the personal self (Call, 2002:131). It is a collective, postanarchist, cybernetic 
personality that inhabits and constitutes the centreless rhizomatic cyberspace (Call, 
2002:131).  
 
Working space 
As we are seeing, the postanarchist is an ongoing “disassembly and reassembly”; it is 
a permanent becoming. For Call (2002:51), the individual is not a finished being; it is 
a work in progress; it is “a work of art”: “become who you are and create yourself as 
a masterpiece”. This means carve yourself and carve your own law. And, as Call 
(2002:51) notes, “needless to say, this kind of radical individual legislation is hardly 
compatible with the legislative system of any statist order”. And why is it not 
compatible? Because the legislative system is about coercion and radical law is the 
result of an aesthetic work: “a work of art”, a creative work. And this creative work is 
the true work for Nietzsche. Nietzsche (2002) says, “the table of goods is the table of 
triumphs of their efforts; it is the voice of their will to Power”. And Nietzsche (2002) 
adds, “I love those who the soul overflows, I love those who work and invent”. In the 
Nietzschean perspective, our life, our values, our inventions are the result of our 
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desire or of our “will to power”. And to work is all of this process of creation. 
Newman (2001:59) affirms that our life is a construct. And Stirner (1901:18) 
explains, we are creative: “I am the creative nothing”. For Pickett (1996:462), there is 
a Nietzschean ideal of aesthetic self-creation and this ideal is connected to the idea of 
resistance. We create ourselves through antagonism - agonistic power. Nietzsche 
assumes that this becoming is not an easy way: “your work is a struggle. Your peace 
is a victory”. For Nietzsche (2002), the superman is a “brave”, not a “soldier”.  For 
Nietzsche (2002), the soldier just obeys. According to Nietzsche, work is affirmation; 
it is not ‘human labour’ that dominates “self-will”, as Newman (2001:60) recalls. 
Work is fight. May (2008:30), working on Rancière, says:  
 
Democracy23 is the community of sharing, in both senses of the term: a 
membership in a single world which can only be expressed in 
adversarial terms, and a coming together which can only occur in 
conflict. To postulate a world of shared meaning is always 
transgressive. 
As we have discussed above, to be “transgressive” or nomadic and ‘to 
postulate a life of shared meaning’ signifies an intention to disrupt limits and to 
affirm ourselves. Franks (2008:140) notes, “Nietzsche identifies how social forces 
play an important role in the construction of the aesthetic project”. We are the result 
of a fight between our will and other forces in social life. 24  And it is through 
participation in this struggle of forces that we constitute our space. All of us could 
fight and participate. According to Pickett (1996:462), “through practical 
engagement, it is possible to work up on the self, and to create more ‘space’ for self-
creation apart from the political world”. So, working is to fight: is the process through 
which we autonomously create ourselves and create a space and a law. So, all of us 
could be fighters and workers and could open a working space. 
 
 
                                                        
23 For Rancière (2008:173), Demo-cracy or “the power of the people itself is anarchic in principle, 
because it is the affirmation of the power of anyone or of those who have no title to it”. 
24 The social space is the set of all relationships that exist in society (May, 1994:53). 
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Utopia 
Do as you please, do as you think, do as you imagine (Frank, 2008). This is the 
postanarchist creative work. And this is also the postanarchist utopia now, as we will 
see. 
Taking the expression “Utopia now” and starting from utopia, u-topia means, 
in Greek, ‘no place’: u signifies no and topos signifies place. In turn, ‘now’ means, 
for Zúquete (2011:1,11), “the politics that does not wait”; the politics that “acts in the 
moment”; “the politics of the here and now”. Hence utopia now means “a sweeping 
drive for change” (Zúquete, 2011:1). 
Why is utopia now “a sweeping drive for change”, if utopia signifies a no-
place, something unattainable, as Thomas More (Morus, 2003) describes it? Or, being 
a drive for change, does utopia mean a revolution? If the answer is no, as Day puts it, 
how might we “continue to struggle against oppression without reproducing the 
modern fantasy or a final event of totalizing change (the revolution)”? Why does 
postanarchist utopia change the world without a “totalizing” happy end? The answer 
is because utopia now means the return of Foucault’s sign and Greek episteme 
(Foucault, 2000; Frank, 1989:102-109).  
May (1994:74) adds: epistemology is inseparable from politics, and 
postanarchism, through the Greek episteme, shows clearly this relationship between 
power and knowledge. And why? The Greek episteme has a fundamental 
epistemological dimension where the value or the sign is the truth, as Foucault states 
(Call, 2002:51; Foucault, 2000; Frank, 1989:102-109). And the sign is the truth, 
because, as we have seen, values, as signs, are the product of our thought, of our 
imagination or of our creative work (Nietzsche, 2002; Foucault, 2000; Franks, 
1989:109). Franks (1989:109) explains that the individual has an organizing 
subjectivity that presents itself as will to power, a productive force or as linguistic 
energy, having the ability to forge, and to modify the sign’s sense. The individual has 
the creative power to generate signs and values. Consequently, according to Foucault 
(2000), the signs are our thought or imagination. The signs are thought (Foucault, 
2000, Frank, 1989:102). There is an “imaginary coextensivity” between both 
(Baudrillard, 1981:1,2). Franks (1989:102) notes, thinking just represents itself by the 
externality of the signs; the idea – representation - and the object are the same thing. 
Zúquete (2011:12) adds, “imagination is the remedy. … The most powerful weapon 
that we have is our imagination”. The truth is the product of our imagination or of our 
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thought.  
Frank (1989:102,103,106) adds that there is an immediate link between 
representation or objects and thought; there is a transparency between both. As Koch 
(2011:35) notes, there is no foundation for truth beyond the individual. For Koch 
(2011:28), truth cannot exist apart from these who possess it. So, according to the 
Greek episteme, the signs are as an epiphany, a manifestation of the creators’ thought. 
The signs also are the creator (Foucault, 2000, Frank, 1989:102). The principle of 
equivalence manages the relationship between the sign and the real. There is no 
mediation or mediator (Frank, 1989:104); Foucault (2000:86,87) explains, “the 
relationship between signifier and signified inhabits a space where there is no more 
intermediate that ensures the meeting of both”. Foucault (2000:88,90) argues, “the 
sign is entirely transparent because the meaning is lodged inside the sign without 
residue and without opacity. … The sign have no other laws, except those who can 
govern their content”. So, the sign is the message or the emissary; it is the truth 
because it is the thought. And utopia now means such a truth and such a 
representation: something that is the immediate product of our imagination, being 
also exterior to it.  
For Zúquete (2011:9), utopia now is “a primal, creative, and Dionysian 
force”. May (1994:70,82) explains that all representation has a source: the libido or 
the “constitutive force”, Bataille’s transgression, the nomadic anarchy or the desire 
machine of Deleuze and Guattari. According to Zúquete (2011:9), utopia now is “an 
ongoing process of becoming”, the result of the imagination or the creative work that, 
as we have been studying, generates “space for all of us, … allowing us to be who we 
are – and who we really can be” (Zúquete, 2011:8). The autonomous spaces are a true 
representation. For Zúquete (2011:11), “liberated spaces … represent revolutionary 
acts in which the future is shaped and experienced in the present”. Autonomous 
spaces are the utopia now. 
So, we can say, postanarchism reverses liberal representation: state, 
government, parties. And this is the reason why utopia now is “a sweeping drive for 
change” (Zúquete, 2011: 1). It means the return of the sign: the true representation 
here and now. This representation is an achievable alternative world, “experienced, in 
a variety of ways, in the present” (Zúquete, 2011:7). Utopia now means to make 
utopia concrete or to make concrete “the world of our dreams (Zúquete, 
2011:4,10,11). And this is the transparent and immediate classical truth that contrasts 
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with “the tedium” of politics when “the adventure of changing the world is 
transformed into waiting for its change” (Zúquete, 2011:11).  
For Baudrillard (1981:1,2,6), this “tedium” is simulation or “false 
representation”. According to Baudrillard (1981:1,2) simulation is the modern, liberal 
and Marxist - vanguard party - representation that signifies “a model of a real without 
origin or reality: a hyperreal”. Simulation is when “the map precedes the territory”, 
when the map engenders the territory, when the territory no longer precedes the map 
(Baudrillard, 1981:1). In turn, Baudrillard (1981:1,2) notes the sovereignty of the 
territory (creator) engenders the poetry of the map (created).  For Baudrillard, with 
simulation this sovereignty disappears. “The charm of the territory, the magic of the 
concept and the charm of the real” have disappeared (Baudrillard, 1981:1,2). As 
Foucault (2000:63) imagines, “Don Quixote must fill in with reality the signs without 
narrative content”. 
For Call (2002:33,34), this simulation happens because “our politics remains 
stubbornly modern, trapped within the intellectual horizons of the Enlightenment”, 
the liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century, liberal states, epistemology and 
representation (simulation) of such states. On the other side, Call (2002:33) 
continues, stands “the postmodern politics of the millennium” that: 
 
are characterized by the commodification of political candidacy and 
the simultaneous decline of voter participation in most liberal states, 
the increasing irrelevance of nations-states in the face of globalized 
‘free trade’ agendas of multinational corporations, and the constant 
mystification of political issues by an ever more ‘spectacular’ mass 
media system 
 
This picture shows that political representation no more ‘represents’ our will 
and we distance ourselves from politics because it is no more what we want 
(Newman, 2011:32). For Call (2002:93), we live in a world of dead signs that have 
no relation to the real, to our desires, to our dreams.  
For many of these reasons, as May (1994:13) argues, classical anarchism has 
mainly rejected political representation. In the context of the enlightened Leviathan, 
the enlightened dictatorship of the proletariat and the enlightened vanguard party, 
anarchism of the nineteenth century has made a difference; it spread the struggle and 
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sought political intervention in a multiplicity of struggles or a multiplicity of 
representations (May, 1994:13; Newman, 2011:32; Rancière, 2008:175). Rancière 
(2008:175) notes, classical anarchism has “a certain organicist conception where the 
social cell as a living organism is opposed to political artifice”.25 This could mean 
that anarchism has always seen the state’s representation as the locale of oppression, 
as an artifice, as a simulation without reality. In turn, anarchism has offered a 
naturalist vision, opposing the oppression of state representation to the liberty of 
society, incarnated in the social group of producers and in tactics of direct expression 
of popular will, as spontaneous revolt, self-organization and direct action (Newman, 
2011:32; Rancière, 2008:175).  
In this way, classical anarchism offers a kind of utopia now, although, 
Rancière (2008:175) remarks, such natural society is apolitical, and Newman 
(Newman, 2001: 82) adds, it is also essentialist and humanist. Newman (2001: 81, 
82) comments:  
 
truth does not exist in a realm outside power, as anarchists and other 
classical political theorists believed. … ‘the political question ... is 
truth itself’. This argument is shared by Stirner, who … rejects the idea 
that truth is beyond the realm of individual perspective and struggle. 
There is not one Truth, but many truths, as many as there are 
individual perspectives. Truth is a weapon in a power game.  
 
Rancière and Newman are right: “the political question is truth itself’ and 
anarchists do not see nature as power. Nevertheless, anarchists distinguish between 
the oppressor state’s artifice or simulation and the true, natural, social production. 
And we can understand this natural multiple production as the utopia now. Here their 
natural world is closer to Nietzsche (2002) who says, “everything is body and nothing 
more”. And as we have noted, for Nietzsche, the body and man are a perpetual self-
overcoming, and not a closed organism (Call, 2002:33). 26  So, Nietzsche (2002)                                                         
25 Here, for Rancière (2008), there is proximity between anarchism and Marxism because anarchism 
stresses, “the opposition between production and exchange and the parasitism of forms of the State” 
and, according to Rancière, “this vision is quite close to the Marxist opposition between economic and 
social reality and politics as appearance”. 
26 For Lyotard (1979:24,25), the modern age has two methodological principles: (i) society forms an 
organic whole (functionalism, self-regulating systems, cybernetics); (ii) society is characterized by 
class struggle and dialectic. 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 53 
concludes “the work of people on fire is good and evil”. For Nietzsche, this body, 
this will to power, is the desire, the source of all power, of all creativity, of all 
production. So, these struggles and natural productions of the anarchists can be seen 
as the utopia now.  
For the aforementioned, utopia now is the real revolution or, better, the drive 
for change, because, as we have seen, it changes radically the organization of space 
and time and changes also the way people decide their ongoing organization from 
now on (Call, 2002:100).  
Utopia now is as an “insurrection of signs”; it looks like the explosion of 
graffiti on May 68 walls (Call, 2002:23,103). As Newman (2011:7) notes, utopia 
emerges in political struggles themselves, at localised points, in immediate actions of 
creating alternatives within the present, rather than waiting for the revolution. 
Newman (2011:7) completes the thought, as we have already studied: “imagining an 
alternative to the current order is not to lay down a precise programme for the future, 
but rather to provide a point of alterity or exteriority as a way of interrogating the 
limits of this order”. For Newman, the emergence of this point is the insurrection or 
the transgression of Bataille.  
Newman (2001: 66) explains that the insurrection starts “from men’s 
discontent with themselves”; insurrection is a rising of individuals. Insurrection is 
autonomy: it leads us “no longer to let ourselves be arranged”, but “to arrange 
ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on institutions” (Newman, 2001: 66).  
Insurrection is not the revolution that addresses new arrangements; it is not a 
fight against the established; it is not an armed rising (Newman, 2001: 66). If 
insurrection prospers, “the established collapses of itself” (Newman, 2001: 66). For 
Call (2002:102), insurrection looks like a party, a festival or a carnival, as Bataille 
states. Play, joy and enjoy now is the rule.  According to Call (2002:102), “play is the 
ultimate principle of the festival, and the only rules it can recognize are to live 
without dead time and to enjoy without restraints”. Call (2002:102) argues that the 
postanarchist revolution is like a gesture that might be artistic, political, satirical or 
subversive and, above all, it would be playful. As Nietzsche (2002) affirms: “man has 
been very little fun. This is the only original sin”.  
For Call (2002:38), the insurgent or the resistant is the Nietzschean superman: 
the life force that is active, creative and affirmative and rich in possibility. Utopia 
now is the will to power that allows us to open autonomous spaces free from 
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hierarchy, authority and oppression, where we can give wings to creativity and build 
ourselves.  
So, the postanarchist answer to the question of how might we “continue to 
struggle against oppression without reproducing the modern fantasy or a final event 
of totalizing change (the revolution)?” is: through utopia now. 
 
 
3) OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
As we have said in the Introduction, in this sub-chapter we are going to examine the 
contributions that David Graeber and John Holloway have made to postanarchism, 
being always mindful of our initial perception: postanarchism is space constitution. 
Neither authors assume postanarchism, although there seems to be some similarities 
and some differences that can be very useful to better understand postanarchism.  
First, we are going to analyse the contribution of David Graeber, an anarchist, 
close to the anti-globalization movement (Evren, 2011:10). Then, we will study John 
Holloway, a post-marxist or a neo-libertarian, as Noys (2008:115) defines him. 
So, in the next section, we start with David Graeber. 
 
David Graeber’s contribution 
 
In this section, we analyse the anarchism of David Graeber, having always in mind 
our initial hypothesis: postanarchism is space constitution. As we have already 
defined above the expression “new anarchism”, now we should just recall quickly 
that new anarchism belongs to contemporary anarchism, more concretely, to the 
anarchism of the third wave that has some proximity to anti-globalization 
movements. New anarchism is wider than postanarchism and the anti-globalization 
movement. Postanarchism is just a single strain in the diverse currents of anarchism 
today. Nevertheless, they are both anarchism and here we can find some similarities. 
We start from the global to the micro. 
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As we have said, Graeber is close to the anti-globalization movement27 and he 
works on a global perspective. His goal is to show that a new wave of anarchism is 
emerging through the anti-globalization movement. For Graeber (nd, 2002), 
anarchism is the heart and the soul of the movement: “everywhere, from Eastern 
Europe to Argentina, from Seattle to Bombay, anarchist ideas and principles are 
generating new radical dreams and visions”. And, according to Graeber (nd), these 
anarchist principles are: “decentralization, voluntary association, mutual aid, social 
networks, and above all, the rejection of any idea that the ends justify the means”. 
Graeber (2011:82,83) adds that, in an anarchist perspective, the anti-globalization 
movement aims also to bring about the demise of the nation state 28  and the 
elimination of national borders. Graeber (2002) shows that the anti-globalization 
movement has internationalist origins and demands:   
 
the three-plank programme of Ya Basta! in Italy, for instance, calls for 
a universally guaranteed ‘basic income’, global citizenship, 
guaranteeing free movement of people across borders, and free access 
to new technology.  
 
We can find some proximity between Graeber’s new anarchism and 
postanarchism. Newman (2011:181) agrees that there is a new global wave of 
anarchism today: “the radical struggles for autonomy appearing today on the global 
terrain indicate that … the anarchism moment has finally arrived”.  
Nevertheless, regarding the global perspective, Day (2005: 4) notes that the 
anti-globalization term does not cover “the entire spectrum of resistance to the new 
world order”. Day (2005:4) recalls that postanarchism seeks “change to the root”; it 
focuses the micro rather than the global. As we have seen, postanarchism is about 
openness of micro spaces of autonomy, self-determination and creative work.  
                                                        
27 The anti-globalization movement was arguably born during the manifestations of Peoples’ Global 
Action, in late 1999, in Seattle, United States of America, on the occasion of the Summit of the 
Organization World Trade Organisation. During and after this demonstration, the movement spread all 
over the world (Day, 2005:1,2,3,4). For Graeber (nd), the anti-globalization movement aims at, “rather 
than seizing state power, exposing, delegitimizing and dismantling the mechanisms of power while 
increasingly (creating) larger spaces of autonomy and participatory management”. 
28 For Graeber (2011:51), a nation state is a people who speak the same language that lives within 
certain boundaries and recognizes a common set of legal principles. 
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Regarding the micro, there are also some similarities between Graeber’s 
anarchism and postanarchism in terms of the principles that inspired the anti-
globalization movement: decentralization, voluntary action, social networks and the 
refusal that “the ends justify the means” - as we have seen, for postanarchism, the 
means are always the ends or the signs that are always thought. Along the same lines, 
Graeber seems to valorize the epistemological relationship between power and 
thought/imagination. Graeber (2011:43) points out “counter power”, or the inner 
contradictions or inner wars of society, which “sinks its roots in imagination”. 
Before analyzing imagination, regarding this “counter power”, despite the 
importance of antagonism or agonism for postanarchism, here, Day (2005:8) warns 
that, for postanarchism, there is a distinction between counter-hegemonic and non-
hegemonic movements. For Day (2005:7), hegemony means “a simultaneously 
coercive and consensual struggle for dominance”. So, he says about counter-
hegemonic movements, rather than “seeking to take the power, they seek to influence 
its operation through processes of pluralistic co-operation and conflict” (Day, 
2005:8). For Day, (2005:8), this means accepting the “hegemony of hegemony” or 
“to remain within the logic of the neoliberalism”. Noys (2008:115) adds, the counter-
summits of the anti-globalization movement are an example of this counter-
hegemonic power because they reflect and valorize the power summits they oppose: 
they are as mirrors. Noys (2008:116) suggests, “rather than waiting for them to 
decide where and when to meet, no longer running behind them, we’ll jump on the 
driver’s seat and decide this for ourselves”. And this jump on the driver’s seat is non-
hegemonic power. As Day (2005:8) explains, the non-hegemonic movements or the 
newest movements, that are not social movements because they have non-branded 
strategies and tactics, “seek radical change, but not through taking or influencing state 
power”. For them, “there is no single enemy” (Day, 2005:5,6), but “a disparate set of 
struggles, each of which needs to be addressed in its particularity”.  
Graeber (2011: 44) admits that this generic “counter power” is “an 
imaginative source” that is responsible for the creation of new social forms and the 
transformation of old ones. Without speaking about the symbolic or representational 
question, Graeber (2011: 44) notes, this imaginative source is constituent power 
which, as we have seen, is also what postanarchism affirms. The author stresses self-
determination and autonomy of these forms. Graeber (2011: 56) defines these forms, 
generically, as “autonomous communities” that constitute and reexamine themselves 
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continually and create their own principles of collective action. For Graeber (2011: 
56), these communities are by definition revolutionary acts. Graeber (nd) remarks 
that the revolution is not to seize power, but to build a new society “within the shell 
of the old one”. It is a long process presumably (Graeber, nd)  
The author seems also to have a rhizomatic vision of the new social forms of 
the anti-globalization movement. Graeber (2011: 51) points out that communities, 
associations, networks and projects, that arise at any scale, local or global, overlap 
and cross one another in every imaginable and unimaginable way. 
Graeber (2011:91,93) does not have a relation between this creative “counter 
power” and work, but considers that work is a fundamental subject. Graeber 
(2011:91,93) points out that the fight against work has always been central to 
anarchist organization and the main purpose of this fight is to abolish work as a 
relationship of domination. For Graeber (2011:91,93), in the short term, if work 
cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced. Graeber (2011:91,93) admits that if we find 
that work is necessary for having a comfortable and environmentally sustainable life, 
because there are many people who really enjoy their work, the situation can be 
greatly improved by eliminating humiliating aspects that a hierarchical organization 
of work involves.  
Another meeting point between Graeber and postanarchism is the question of 
the state. Postanarchism does not seek the demise of the nation state, but works 
beyond the state. As Newman (2011:181) affirms: postanarchism “consists in the 
invention or re-invention of spaces, movements, ways of life, economic exchanges 
and political practices that resist the imprint of the state and which foster relations of 
equal liberty”.  
With the above, on a micro scale, we could find some important overlaps 
between Graeber and postanarchism. But the difference is that Graeber does not focus 
on the micro. Graeber’s goal is not to develop, understand and discuss the self-
determination question or space constitution or work as a creative action through the 
lens of anarchism. Graeber’s focus is always the global anarchist forest. In turn, for 
Graeber, anarchism is a practical philosophy, being the ideology of the new 
movement, the form of its organization and its organizational principles (Evren, 
2011:10). As we have studied, Call, May and Newman are part of a different project, 
which combines anarchist theory with poststructuralist and postmodernist theories 
that are critical of modernity (Evren, 2011:10).  
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In sum, Graeber has a global approach on anarchism, different from the micro 
approach of postanarchism that aims for the determination of the individual, creative 
work and the openness of autonomous spaces. Nevertheless Graeber approaches 
many of the main questions of postanarchism, thinking about the anti-globalizatiom 
movement through the lens of anarchism.  
In the next section, we will present John Holloway’s contribution on 
postanarchism. 
 
John Holloway’s contribution 
 
In this section, we discuss John Holloway’s ideas on radical politics, having always 
in mind our initial motto: anarchism is space constitution. As we have said above, 
Noys (2008:115) characterizes Holloway as a post-Marxist or a neo-libertarian. 
Analyzing his post-Marxism, we can see Holloway is also a neo-libertarian, coming 
close to postanarchism. Holloway works on important questions for postanarchism as 
such rejection of the state and the party, the critique of revolution as an event and also 
the critique of the Marxist teleology or the revolutionary happy end. As a neo-
libertarian, the work of Holloway complements postanarchism. Holloway discusses 
working spaces, as we are going to see.  
Like Graeber, Holloway (2010) has always in mind the whole, the fight 
against capitalism - “Crack Capitalism”. But, like postanarchism, the author is mainly 
concerned with the particular: with space opening. Holloway (2010:261) explains that 
“crack capitalism” is a suggestion to fight from the particular, to fight from where we 
are: here and now. It is a suggestion to “create spaces or moments of otherness” 
(Holloways, 2010:261). And how does Holloway create these spaces? The spaces are 
created by the fetishism of Marx.  
Holloway (2010:88) recalls that, “Marx introduces the idea of the dual labour 
in his youthful work, the ‘1844 Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts’”. In this 
work, Marx (2005:31) considers there are two ‘labours’: capitalist labour and non-
capitalist labour or the “doing”. Holloway (2010:84) explains that labour indicates “a 
doing that is unpleasant or subject to external compulsion or determination”. The 
“doing” indicates “an activity that is potentially self-determining”, although Marx 
does not discuss this “doing”, as Holloway (2010:31,84) observes. So, according to 
Holloway (2010:88), in his work, “Marx turns to labour as it exists in capitalist 
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society, which he characterized as alienated or estranged labour. The object which 
labour produces – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power 
independent of the producer”.  
Holloway (2005: 31) explains that in capitalism production separates subject 
and object or separates the “doer” (producer) and the “done” (product). According to 
Holloway, the product of capitalist production is not ours, belonging to those who 
possess the means of production. This means that, on the one hand, the product 
belongs to the producer because he produces it. On the other hand, the product does 
not belong to the producer and is an alien that gravitates in the market with no 
connection to its creator. So, in Holloway’s (2010:88) perspective, this product is 
something alienated, “a power independent of the producer” (Holloway, 2010:88).  
Holloway (2005:27,31) explains, capitalist production breaks the “doing” or 
the “power to” or “our capacity to do” or to create. For Holloway (2005:28), power is 
‘can-ess’, capacity-to-do. According to Holloway (2005:29), when the “doing” is 
broken, the power-to becomes “power-over”, “a relation of power over others”. And 
this is the reason there are two labours: capitalist and non-capitalist. Our “doing”, 
non-capitalist labour or our capacity to create, is turned into labour or “the incapacity-
to-do”, or “the incapacity to realise our own projects, our own dreams” (Holloway 
2005:29).  
This “incapacity” to realize our desires and dreams, this incapacity to do as 
we wish is, as we have seen above, a fundamental point for postanarchism. For 
postanarchism, we need to recuperate the doing, as for Holloway. In postanarchism, 
we only open space when we self-determine and realise our dreams, when we do 
creative work. And, in this case, as Holloway affirms (2005:42), the “done” belongs 
to the “doer”. The done is not alienated, because, as Foucault states, the immediate 
and transparent link between the done and the doer, between sign and thought 
remains (Holloway, 2005:43). There is not a rupture of the doing or Marx’s fetishism, 
as Holloway (2005:43) adds.  
So, postanarchism is self-determination, the “drive” that permanently controls 
the flow of doing, and is not alienation, as Holloway (2010:39) says. For Holloway 
(2005:36), self-determination is also emancipation or “the struggle to liberate power-
to from power-over”, doing from labour, subjectivity from objectification. And here, 
Holloway meets the non-hegemonic power of Day (2005:8). “It is not a matter of 
power against power”, as Holloway (2005:36) clarifies. It “is not the struggle to 
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construct a counter-power” or “a power that can stand against the ruling power”. It is 
a struggle that builds up “an anti-power” (Holloway 2005:36). And this anti-power 
means “the dissolution of power-over, the emancipation of power-to” (Holloway 
2005:36, 37).  
In turn, Holloway (2010:58) recalls, anti-power signifies a doing beyond the 
state, because the state is part of alienation; it is “part of the process of separation of 
the done from the doer”. The state “relates to people not as subjects but as objects”: 
“as citizens, individuals abstracted from their social context” (Holloways, 2010:58).  
Turning to counter-power, for Holloway (2010:254), this means to destroy 
capitalism when the proposal is to refuse capitalism or to create the anti-power 
beyond capitalism. For Holloway (2010:254), to destroy capitalism would valorise 
and reproduce the power-over and “erect a great monster in front of us”.  This is why 
the doing is not about revolutions or “great fables” or “great parties with heroic 
leaders” (Holloway, 2010:254).  They are aliens against aliens. Radical politics is 
about ordinary people here and now (Holloway, 11, 254, 258). And ordinary people 
are not activists: some are, some are not (Holloway, 2010:77). For Holloway 
(2010:255,256), radical politics has no recipes and is about people that “think for 
(themselves), use (their) imagination, follow (their) inclinations and do whatever 
(they) consider necessary and enjoyable, always with the motto of against and beyond 
capital”. It is a negative and a positive movement: refusing and creating. Radical 
politics is about setting our own agenda (Holloway, 2010:259). And there are many 
examples: 
 
For some, this will mean throwing themselves into the preparation for 
the next anti-G8 summit.29 For others, it will mean trying to open up 
perspectives of a different world for the children they teach in school. 
Others will join with their neighbours to create a community garden, 
or take part in activities of the nearby social centre. Some will dedicate 
all their energies to organising opposition to the extension of a 
motorway that threatens the livelihood of thousands of peasants, some 
will devote themselves to permaculture or creating free software,                                                         
29 Holloway has a different perspective of the anti-globalization summits. The author does not see 
these activities as mirrors or counter power, unlike Day (2005:8) and Noys (2008:115). For Holloway, 
the activities of the World Social Forum are “doing”. They are a non-capitalist ways of doing. 
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others will just play with their children and friends, or write a book on 
how to change the world (Holloway, 2010:256). 
 
Holloway notes that these activities are always collective. The doing means a 
collective and multiple subject or “a multiplicity of forces”: a “we” (Holloway, 
2010:42,44). Holloway (2005:26) explains, the doing is social, plural, choral and 
communal; it is always part of a social flow and the pre-condition of my doing is the 
doing of others; the others provide the means of my doing. There is a mutual 
recognition and the recognition of the dignity of others (Holloway, 2010:39).  
For Holloway (2010:89), the doing is a “conscious life activity”, is “the lost 
truth of humanity”. Here, Holloway seems to have a humanistic perspective of doing 
and man. But Holloway (2005:7,26) explains, subjectivity is not something closed: it 
is “the identity and the non-identity”, “a historical construct”. We are always 
constructing our truth. The done is our truth. Holloway is closer to Foucault and the 
true collective sign. Holloway (2005:39,41) adds that this truth is process, self-
determination and ongoing antagonism between the doing and the labour or between 
the power-to and the power-over. We always fight to reject labour and to affirm the 
doing or our truth. And it is also the main goal of postanarchism: self-determination, 
agonism and a permanent creative work.  
So, Holloway says directly what postanarchism insinuates: the goal is to 
constitute a true space of emancipation and self-determination or, as Holloway 
affirms, setting up a working space, not a labour space.  
 
 
THE STATE OF THE ART: CONCLUSION 
  
The goal of our thesis is to build up a postanarchist ideal type (“The Postanarchist, an 
activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type”). As we have shown, this ideal type 
is an innovative proposal in terms of postanarchism because our main literature on 
postanarchism does not develop the subject on this perspective. The main authors - 
Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day - develop, analyse and 
discuss in depth postanarchism: Saul Newman studies postanarchism, Todd May 
works on post-structuralist anarchism and Lewis Call deepens postmodern anarchism. 
In turn, Richard Day presents a genealogical study of the twentieth century social 
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movements, showing that postanarchism is something new and beyond these social 
movements. No author aims to examine the profile of the postanarchist or outline a 
postanarchist ideal type. Our goal is to create the postanarchist figure having as 
background this State of The Art and focusing on the work of Saul Newman, the 
author that has presented the concept in depth theoretically, as we have explained 
above. We think this theoretical construction is an interesting complement or 
framework to understand the practical and real utility of postanarchism or anarchism 
and horizontalism today. 
In turn, as we have also stated, in this thesis, our intention is to develop the 
symbolic dimension – the productive or discursive activity or the truth - of Michel 
Foucault, because, as we have verified in The State of The Art, it is a fundamental 
way to understand the meaning of postanarchist space, action and work. So, we are 
going to discuss the sign and the concept of representation, because as we have seen, 
here there is also a gap in the main literature. No author develops this dimension. 
They address the question, but do not focus on the answer.  
Saul Newman (2011:32) assumes that “central to anarchism is the critique of 
representation”. For Newman (2011:32), liberal, parliamentary arrangements and 
Marxist revolutionary vanguard parties are “inadequate fashions” to represent the will 
of the people. Newman (2001: 82) admits also the true power of Foucault’s sign:  
 
for Foucault then, morality, truth, and knowledge do not enjoy the 
privilege of being beyond the grasp of power. They are not pure sites 
uncontaminated by power but, on the contrary, are effects of power: 
they are produced by power, and they allow power itself to be 
produced.  
 
Nevertheless, Newman’s (2001: 139) intention is to show that liberal and 
Marxist representation is impossible: “the subject is the subject of the lack: it is the 
name given to this ‘gap’ or void in the symbolic structure, this fundamental 
misrepresentation” (Newman, 2001: 139). Newman, then, turns the focus from the 
creative symbol to this misrepresentation or impossible representation: “there is, 
therefore, a lack between the signifier and what it signifies — an excess of meaning 
that eludes signification, and yet enables it to take place” (Newman, 2001: 139). 
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The same happens with Todd May. For May, representation is also this 
impossibility. May (1994:81,82, 83) works directly on representation; he recognizes 
the immediacy and the transparency of representation, like Foucault; he admits that 
the libido – desire - is the source of all representation, despite being beyond all 
representation (May 1994: 81,82,83). Nevertheless, May (1994:81,82,83), like 
Newman, turns the focus from transparency to impossibility, the Heideggerian 
excessive being never grasped by the sign. May works on Lyotard (1994:81,82,83) to 
show that representation or self-representation is always negative and does not 
disclose the essence. For May (1994:132), representation is not synonymous with 
truth due to this excessive being. May (1994:132) explains, for instance, that 
philosophical practice aims to create concepts that are defined by their effects and 
does not aim to achieve truths. May’s goal is to show why political representation 
must be rejected. May (1994:81,82,83) advocates non-representation, leaving the 
door open to our work on Foucault’s true sign.  
Lewis Call works mainly with symbols and simulations. As Baudrillard, the 
author distinguishes between the truth of the sign and the falsehood of the 
simulacrum. As Foucault, Call assumes the transparency and immediacy of the 
symbol and notes the importance of these new languages. However, Call’s aim is to 
work on the simulacrum and to show how we live in a world of dead signs that have 
no connection with reality. Then the author turns to radicalising the focus by diving 
into the alternative, radical, cyberpunk world of undead and new symbols (Call, 
2002:93). So, also Call does not look directly at Foucault’s true sign, freeing this 
working space. 
Day hits the target. Day (2011:108) says we need to go “through the fantasy” 
or through the utopia as we have outlined above. This is the secret:  
 
crossing the fantasy means surprising both oneself and the structure – 
by inventing a response which precludes the necessity of the demand 
and thereby breaks out of the loop of the endless perpetuation of desire 
for emancipation. This is what is being done by those who are 
participating in the forms of direct action (Day (2011:108). 
  
Day focuses on the core issue, nevertheless, his goal is, as we have seen, to do 
a genealogical work of twentieth century struggles, frameworking the differences and 
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particularities of postanarchism. So, Day provides the motto, but leaves the door open 
for those who want to focus on utopia or on this fantasy toward emancipation.  
Working on our dreams and fantasies is our focus or the postanarchist focus. 
It is the path we are going to take. Our goal is to carve our ideal type and to show its 
desiring, imaginative, creative, creator, representative and symbolic profile. And this 
carving will be based on our initial hypothesis that postanarchism is a politics of 
“autonomous spaces”. As we have seen in this State of the Art, postanarchism is the 
constitution of autonomous spaces that are beyond the State: non-humanist, nomadic, 
rhizomatic, micro, cybernetic, working spaces. They are the utopia here and now, 
where we realise our dreams and fantasies. Postanarchism is the construction of 
equal, free, horizontal, fluid, mobile, circular, non-authoritarian, non-opressive and 
non-repressive relations of people. These postanarchist frames and concepts are the 
devices that we need to start extracting our postanarchist ideal type from the main 
literature of our PhD dissertation. This is our conceptual starting point. 
The next chapter will be the outset of our genealogical walk through 
postanarchism with the creation of the Kantian spatial framework. 
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II. THE CONCEPT OF SPACE: THE FRAMEWORK 
 
Space: Introduction 
 
The main concept of this doctoral dissertation is space. This was the theme of The 
State of The Art. In The State of The Art we started our walk through postanarchism 
studying also postanarchist space in depth. Now, in this chapter, we continue to 
focus on the concept of space. The intention is to give a general and brief 
metaphysical,30 deontological31 and historical32 overview of the concept, having as 
background the first hypothesis of the thesis:  
 
Postanarchism is space opening or space occupation or a setting up of 
autonomous space. 
 
The aim of this chapter is also to prepare the way to meet Proudhon and 
Foucault. Why these authors? Our thesis’ goal is to show, through the anarchist 
Proudhon, and via the mediation of Foucault, that there could be many important 
unacknowledged similarities between some classical anarchists and postanarchism. 
The purpose is to criticize Newman’s gap between these two anarchist periods. We 
would like to demonstrate that classical and contemporary anarchisms are both in fact 
‘anarchism’, due to the similarities between Proudhon and Foucault (a great 
inspiration of new anarchism) and consequently between both authors and 
postanarchism.  
In order to start developing these similarities between Proudhon-Foucault and 
postanarchism, in this chapter, we would like to discuss the concept of space and to                                                         
30 We adopt a Kantian metaphysical perspective in this thesis because Kant was a strong influence on 
Foucault (1990), Proudhon (2009:135; 2014) and consequently for postanarchism. As we are going to 
show later in this chapter, Foucault (1990) dedicates a whole article to Kant: “Qu’est-ce que c’est la 
critique?”. In this article Foucault develops Kant’s fundamental contribution, explaining why the 
Kantian “today” is so important. Proudhon (2009:135; 2014) also adopts Kant’s methaphysics because 
his intention withdraws from the study metaphysical issues. Following Deleuze (1969:11) Kantian 
metaphysics “asks first of all: what is the fact of knowledge (Quid facti)” and Kant answers that “the 
fact of knowledge is that we have a priori representations (which allow us to judge)”. Kantian 
metaphysics is about knowing the a priori capacities we possess. 
31 In this thesis, deontology means a normative theory or a theory of duty, about questions of right 
(quid juris?) (Deleuze, 1969:13). 
32 In this thesis, History is the science that studies human beings and their actions in time and space. 
More, as we will see, human beings live in a time and space grid, having also a “historical a priori” 
(Jensen, 2016).  
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show that, in this thesis, inspired by postanarchism, we interpret space and time as the 
‘here and now’. ‘Here’ is space and ‘now’ is time.  
As outlined in The State of The Art, postanarchism is ‘the utopia here and 
now’. And ‘the utopia here and now’ means the will to power or the desire that 
allows us to open autonomous spaces free from hierarchy, authority and oppression, 
where we can give wings to creativity and rebuild ourselves ‘here’, where we are, and 
‘now’ immediately or in the present. We will adopt a Kantian idea of space and time 
as a framework. Although Proudhon and Foucault advanced some significant 
criticisms of Kant and distanced themselves from him, the Kantian background is key 
to understanding: (i) how Proudhon and Foucault’s desire (will to power) works and 
overlaps with Kantian a priori; (ii) how this desire is linked with the Kantian concept 
of “today” and (iii) how postanarchist’s space (‘the utopia here and now’) begins 
permanently or cyclically. 
As Foucault (1976:121,122) explains, we are powerful people; we have 
power. Power means “the multiplicity of force relations that are immanent in the 
domain in which they are carried, and are constitutive of their organization” 
(Foucault, 1976:121,122). So, our power or power relations are immanent or 
exercised “in the domain in which they are carried”: here where we live and now, in 
the present. For Foucault, this power, this desire or this force “is an action over 
actions” (Deleuze, 2012:77). We are acting people among people here and now. And 
this domain of exercise or action is mainly our body, the “element of power relations” 
(Foucault, 1976:141). Nevertheless, this force that has the body as a fundamental 
domain is not the body; it is immanent in the body, but it “is never singular. It is 
connected with other forces, although each force is already a relation, that is to say 
power - force has no other object or subject than force” (Deleuze 2012:77). For 
Foucault, “all we have is immanence, this precise instant of space–time in which we 
live, act and breathe, and because we are ‘it’ (this force without object and subject), 
we can change, reshape, and ultimately transform ‘it’” (Springer, 2014:3). Likewise, 
in this thesis, we are “it”, a powerful body, “this space and time” or here and now, 
this domain and “this precise instant”, that “we live and breathe”. It is ‘here and now’ 
that we need to decide, to act and to exercise our power, reshaping ourselves, 
transforming ourselves, in order to live or to survive. As we will see (Chapter IV, pg: 
145), Proudhon has a similar stance regarding power and immanence. 
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All we have, then, is that ‘necessity’ and that ‘capacity’ to survive here and 
now. As Kant (1969:26) argues, “necessity” is when something “could not possibly 
exist otherwise”. So space and time are that capacity and that ‘necessity’ to live and 
breathe that could not be ‘otherwise’. Space and time are “necessity”, the way we 
process the world that affects us, or the way we set the world - or the postanarchist 
space - to our measure or according to our needs. Space and time are “necessity”, so 
space and time are innate or ‘inherent’. They are also our body. According to Kant 
“space ... along with all its determinations, can be cognized by us a priori, … space, 
as well as time, inheres in us before all perception or experience” (Janiak, 2012). 
Space and time or the powerful body are the conditions of possibility of our world. 
They are a kind of compass or reference, as we will explore later. As Foucault says, 
this Kantian framework is a great inspiration for him. As affirmed above, for 
Foucault, this powerful body is also a compass in order to survive and Proudhon goes 
in the same direction, as we will analyse in Chapter IV (pg: 145). For both authors, 
the need is the measure of all things. With this Kantian explanation, we start also 
demonstrating our second working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive.  
Thus, space and time mean the power we have in order to survive. As we have 
said, all we have is that “immanence” or that ‘inherency’, that ubiquitous Foucauldian 
power or that ubiquitous and immanent Proudhonian “God”,33 this energy, this ‘here 
and now’ where and when we decide that we live or die, this “instant” that allows us 
to continue (Foucault, 1976:21,22; Proudhon, 1873; Springer 2014:3).  
So, what does ‘here’ or ‘where we are’ mean? ‘Here’ means space that, as we 
have just observed, is a necessity or is “necessary”. ‘Here’ is our space or our body or 
the “zero point”, the strategic point from which we create and we relate with the 
exterior world (Foucault, 2009:18). This strategic point is the “pure function” or the 
pure force 34 function, a “non-formal function, grasped regardless of the concrete 
forms in which it is embodied” (Deleuze 2012:78,79). For Foucault (2009:12), our                                                         
33 Proudhon welcomes Fourier’s notion of God. Proudhon (1973) writes, “according to Fourier, God is 
the soul, the universal life, the intimate and the all-pervading force, which, according to mathematical 
laws, agitates, animates and moves all beings. These laws, this mathematics, as Fourier says, preside 
over the divine operations are as pure intelligence and the mind of God”. We could find some 
similarities between Fourier’s concept of God, adopted by Proudhon, and the Foucauldian concept of 
power that is also an ubiquitous and widespread energy or force (Foucault, 1976:122). We will study 
the Foucauldian concept of power later in “Space: Introduction”. Regarding religion, Proudhon speaks 
also about a religion that “is inscribed in the coordinated practices of industrial action”, a ‘re-ligare’ 
(Damien, 2009:26). We will analyse this Proudhonian God or immanence later (pg: 84-86). 
34 Force also means power or energy. 
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body35 is a topia, a place. It is “the absolute space”: the little fragment through which 
we are present, although our body is also a ‘u-topia body’: a body that is linked with 
every place in the world, and beyond the world (Foucault, 2009:17). For Foucault 
(2009:10), the body is the reason why utopias emerge. As Foucault (2009:14,15) 
says, the body is the author and the receptacle of all utopias. Our body is real - and 
unreal - and it is also a reference. So, ‘here’ signifies this ‘necessary zero point’ - the 
compass - or our body with our needs and powers. 
And what does ‘now’ mean? ‘Now’, as we have just pointed out, means time 
or the decisive ‘instant’ we decide to live or to die. So, time, as space, signifies also 
body, a necessity or capacity or a power that allows us to know what succession or 
simultaneity is (Kant, 1969:47). Time is also as space a pure force function. Without 
time we could not know that “things exist together at one and the same time or at 
different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession” (Kant, 1969:47). 
Without time we could not have priorities regarding our necessities. Time, like space, 
is immanence. Time is the power or the capacity that permits us to organize our body 
priorities - internal needs or desires - in order to satisfy those priorities or needs or in 
order to survive (Kant, 1969:49).  
Deleuze connects the concept of immanence with ‘space-time’ and power:  
 
Gilles Deleuze viewed immanence as a liberatory space–time, precisely 
because it is obliged to create action and results, rather than establish a 
framework for transcendence, where to live well means to fully express 
one’s power in attendance with, rather than over others (Springer, 
2014:3) 
 
According to Deleuze, the immanence - or the Foucauldian ubiquitous power - 
is “a liberatory space-time” (Springer, 2014:3). Or, simplifying, ‘space-time’ is the 
power to live with the others and to build up our world or the power “to live well” 
(Springer, 2014:3). This immanence or power has a producer role - “it is obliged to 
create action and results”: to create space also a posteriori, as we will see later (pg: 
115,116) - and consequently it is a “strategic situation” (Foucault, 1976:123,124). 
Thus, identifying space-time with power and commenting those ‘transcendental’, ‘a                                                         
35 We will study the Foucauldian concept of body later in this chapter and in the Chapter IV (pg: 135). 
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priori’ and strategic concepts of Kant - space and time, 36  - Deleuze (1984:13) 
specifies: “‘transcendental’ qualifies the principle of necessary subjection of what is 
given in experience to our a priori representations, and correlatively the principle of a 
necessary application of a priori representations to experience”. So, to Deleuze, space 
and time, the Kantian transcendental a priori pure principles, are “principles of 
necessary subjugation”. Through these principles we could infer the Hobbesian and 
Proudhonian ‘war of all against all’ or Foucauldian agonism.37 So, for Kant and also 
for Deleuze, the exterior world affects us through our sensibility and we (acting on a 
defensive instinct, an “immediate intuition”, a necessity) organize the exterior world 
or create our world: the postanarchist space (considering our needs through space and 
time). As Kant (1969:44) asks: “what, then, must be our representation of space … ? 
It must be originally intuition. … But this intuition must be found in the mind a 
priori, that is, before any perception of objects, consequently must be pure, not 
empirical intuition”. Equipped with this non-empirical intuition or necessity/capacity, 
we are able to “go beyond what is given in experience” (Deleuze, 1969:11). As we 
have just said, this intuition is strategic and ensures our survival. Why is this so? 
Because, as Janiak (2012) notes, for Kant, “intuitions are singular, immediate 
representations”.                                                          
36  Regarding the transcendental and a priori concepts, Kant (1969:25) explains, “there exists a 
knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions. Knowledge of 
this kind is called a priori, in contradiction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, 
that is, in experience”. And Kant (1969:26) clarifies, “by the term ‘knowledge a priori’, therefore, we 
shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind experience, but such as is 
absolutely so of all experience”. Then, Kant (1969:41) explains that this a priori knowledge connects 
with experience through intuition: “In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may 
relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, 
is by means of an intuition. To this as indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition 
can take place only in so far as the object is given to us”. And Kant (1969:41) clarifies that our 
capacity to be affected by the exterior objects is called sensibility: “The capacity for receiving 
representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called 
sensibility”. And Kant (1969:42) adds that this sensibility has two forms: space and time: “there are 
two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori, namely, space and time”. 
So, for Kant, the exterior world affects us through our sensibility and we, like through a defensive 
instinct, an “immediate intuition”, a necessity, organize the exterior world - or create our world - 
postanarchist space - regarding our needs through space and time. As Deleuze (1969:11,12,13) says, 
space and time are not just a capacity quid facti that we have, but also a quid juris question, because 
through space and time we ‘subjugate’ or organize the exterior world  - create our law or our 
postanarchist space: “it is not enough to note that, in fact, we have a priori representations. We must 
still explain why and how these representations are necessarily applicable to experience, although they 
are not derived from it… this is the question of right”. And Deleuze (1969:13) concludes, “The 
principle by virtue of which experience is necessarily subject to our a priori representations is called a 
‘transcendental principle’”. 
37 We are going to study the concept of agonism later in Chapter III (pg: 126) and Chapter IV (pgs: 
146-148). We have already seen above that the Foucauldian power is force relations or “ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations” (Foucault, 1976:122). 
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To represent my desk in intuition is to represent it as something I point to, 
as that there. This does not indicate, of course, that this is a desk, my 
desk, a piece of furniture, made of wood, etc., but it does pick out a 
particular. It does so immediately at least in the sense that it makes use of 
no other representation (Janiak, 2012).  
 
So when we have intuitions, we point immediately to particular things, saying 
that there, in that space and that time, regarding my ‘zero point’, my necessity. For 
that reason, intuition is strategic, regarding ‘my needs’, ‘my survival’. 
As Deleuze (1969:11,12,13) says, space and time are not just a ‘metaphysical’ 
capacity quid facti that we have, but also a deontological or quid juris question, 
because through space and time we organize the exterior world. So, for Kant 
(1969:41), those transcendental principles, space and time, are aesthetic - 
Transcendental Aesthetic – principles. 38  They are the way (or the means or the 
devices or the coordinates) we have to create social space, collective space, 
postanarchist space or a different space. 
As Foucault (1994a) notes, Kant - as Foucault himself regarding the twentieth 
century - is concerned with his actuality, ‘the here and now’ or ‘the space and time’ 
of his epoch, modernity or the Enlightenment. For that reason, Kant decided to 
answer the question “What Is Enlightenment?”, publishing an article, in November 
1784, in the German periodical, Berlinische Monatschrift. Kant would like to reflect 
on the Enlightenment in order to create – an aesthetic dimension - a better present. 
And Kant (nd) affirms: 
 
When we ask, are we now living in an enlightened age? The answer is, 
No, but we live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand, it is 
still far from true that men are already capable of using their own reason 
in religious matters confidently and correctly without external guidance. 
Still, we have some obvious indications that the field of working toward 
the goal [of religious truth] is now opened. What is more, the hindrances 
against general enlightenment or the emergence from self-imposed                                                         
38  As Kant explains (1969:42) “The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call 
Transcendental Aesthetic”. 
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nonage are gradually diminishing. In this respect this is the age of the 
enlightenment and the century of Frederick [the Great]. 
 
Kant is engaged in his time and space (the Enlightenment in the century of 
Frederick, the Great, 1784, in Königsberg, Prussia) and he is concerned with ‘the 
needs’ of his time and space (also his needs). Kant notes these necessities: men are 
not “capable of using their own reason in religious matters” yet. And Kant feels 
something needs to be done to meet these ‘needs’. In this sense, the philosopher 
proposes ‘to go beyond’ these needs pointing the way or setting up the path: “the field 
of working toward the goal [of religious truth] is now opened”.  
Foucault (1994a), commenting on Kant’s article, confirms this contemporary 
Kantian concern (or necessity) or this Kantian “today”,  
 
 It is a reflection by Kant on the contemporary status of his own 
enterprise. ... It seems to me that it is the first time that a philosopher has 
connected in this way, closely and from the inside, the significance of his 
work with respect to knowledge, a reflection on history and a particular 
analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of 
which he is writing. It is in the reflection on “today” as difference in 
history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty 
of this text appears to me to lay. 
  
As Foucault notes, Kant is engaged “closely and from the inside” – necessarily 
- in his time and space. For that reason, he analyses ‘that there’ (“the Enlightenment 
in the century of Frederick, the Great, 1784, in Königsberg, Prussia”) which is (i) a 
particular moment (or now) and (ii) a specific place (here):  “the specific moment at 
which he is writing and because of which he is writing”. And Foucault underlies that 
this particular ‘today’ – necessity - leads Kant ‘to go beyond’ (quid juris) this 
‘today’ with a new task: “‘today’ as difference in history and as motive for a 
particular philosophical task”. So, according to Foucault, we could conclude that 
Kant is the pioneer of ‘the utopia now’, because Kant himself confirms the 
implementation of his utopia: “the hindrances against general enlightenment or the 
emergence from self-imposed nonage are gradually diminishing”. Or, as Kant 
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paradoxically answers: “Are we now living in an enlightened age? The answer is, No, 
but we live in an age of enlightenment”.  
We see that Foucault himself assumes this ‘utopia here and now’. For Foucault 
(1994a:569), criticizing – also as Kant did with his Critiques - is the new task or “the 
will of heroicizing the present”39 and this concern about the present is confirmed by 
the whole of his philosophical work. As Newman (2011:62) affirms, “Foucault’s 
thinking can be described in terms of continual problematisation of existing practices 
and institutions”. And Bounache (2013:140) adds that, for Foucault, to work 
personally and collectively is to assume an “untimely action”, a “fundamental attitude 
of thought”, of “resistance to the present”. 
In order to introduce the study of and the meeting with Foucauldian and 
Proudhonian space, and making the bridge to Kantian space, we start giving a brief 
historical overview of the concept of space, focusing mainly on two authors that were 
also discussed by Kant:  Newton and Leibniz.  
 
Space: Brief Historical Overview  
 
Having outlined the Kantian perspective of space and time, we will now examine 
Newton (1643-1727) and Leibniz’s (1646-1716) conceptions of space and time, 
which inspired Kant. Those modern40 perspectives (Newton and Leibniz) on space 
are relevant since they shape the Kantian framework, and in turn (as we shall see) 
influence Proudhon and Foucault’s concepts of space, necessity and movement and 
consequently Saul Newman’s postanarchism and the role of space in it. The modern 
framework on space also provides a way to better ground Proudhon and Foucault’s 
anarchism, melting those three concepts (space, necessity and movement), as we will 
show later.  
Newton and Leibniz’s analysis of space and time is contextualised by “the 
ontology of space and time” prevailing in the seventeenth century (Janiak, 
2012). This ontology might suggest that space and time are “substances in their own 
right, or else properties of some substance” (Janiak, 2012). The “ontology of space 
and time” leads modern philosophers to ask several questions:                                                         
39 We will return to the concept of critique (Chapter III, pg: 126-127; Chapter IV, pgs: 144-146, 193-
194, 197-198, 202-203, 242-243). 
40 As we have already explained, modern means from the Enlightenment. 
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Is space ‘real’, or is it ‘ideal’ in some sense? Is it a substance in its own 
right, or merely a property of some substance? Is it somehow dependent 
on the relations among objects, or independent of those relations? What is 
the relationship between space and the mind? And finally, how do these 
various issues intersect with one another? (Janiak, 2012) 
 
Inspired by those modern ruminations about space, Newton focuses his 
attention on the debate between absolutism - also called substantialism - and 
relationalism (Janiak, 2012). For absolutists, as Newton, “space and time exist 
independently of all possible objects and object relations” or “space and time points 
exist” (Janiak, 2012). According to Kant, Newtonians think space or spaces “as a 
kind of quasi-object” or “substances — in that they are independent of all objects and 
relations, on the one hand, and independent of the mind (and of intuition), on the 
other — and yet lack causal relations” (Janiak, 2012).  
By contrast, for relationalists, such as Leibniz, “space and time depend … on 
possible objects and relations”, or space and time do not exist (Janiak, 2012). 
According to Newton (absolutist), “space and time are actual entities”; for Leibniz 
(relationalist), space and time “are determinations or relations of things” (Janiak, 
2012). As Janiak (2012) explains, Newton, a mathematician of nature, defends the 
idea that “space and time ‘subsist’ on their own”; Leibniz, a “metaphysician of 
nature,” asserts that “space and time ‘inhere’ in objects and their relations”. Space 
and time “cannot exist independently of objects”. Nevertheless, both authors, 
absolutists and relationalists, are realists. For them, space is something real and not 
ideal. It exists a posteriori and not a priori, as Kant argues. 
Nevertheless, Leibniz questions materiality and absolutism: “space is nothing 
other than an order of the existence of things observed in their simultaneity. And 
therefore, the fiction of a material finite universe, moving forward in an infinite 
empty space, cannot be admitted” (Janiak, 2012). Taking the middle path, 
approaching Kant, Leibniz admits a certain ‘idealism’: “relations are ‘ideal’ because 
they are neither substances nor accidents, and are therefore not elements of reality” 
(Janiak, 2012). Leibniz asserts, “the mind ‘adds’ relations” (Janiak, 2012). Leibniz 
concludes, “since space is the order of the possible relations of objects, it is 
presumably ideal in some sense” (Janiak, 2012). Janiak (2012) explains the apparent 
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contradiction between Leibniz’s ‘idealism’ and realism: Leibniz is a transcendental 
realist and not a transcendental idealist as Kant. And what does transcendental realist 
mean? In Kant’s perspective, Leibniz is a realist because, for him, “space has a 
reality independent of intuition” (Janiak, 2012). For Leibniz, space is not an a priori 
‘necessity’ (which would be idealist or independent of the exterior world) nor is it 
strategic for our survival, as it is for Kant. For that reason, Leibniz is a realist and not 
an idealist, unlike Kant. Janiak (2012) explains how a relationalist could be also a 
realist:  
 
A realist can be a relationalist if she thinks space is the order of actual and 
possible relations among actual (and maybe possible) objects and she 
thinks those relations are real. This indicates, incidentally, that realists 
about space need not think of it as a kind of object: it can be perfectly real 
and the order of possible relations among objects”. 
 
As we have seen above, for Kant, thinking of space as independent of intuition 
does not make sense. According to Kant, space is not ‘real’, because the Kantian 
space is an a priori ‘necessity’ or the ‘strategic zero point’. Kant says: “if one 
abstracts from the subjective condition of our sensible intuition, it is nothing at all, 
and can be considered neither as subsisting nor as inhering in the objects in 
themselves (without their relation to our intuition)” (Janiak, 2012).  
Following Janiak we can see that those modern perspectives - the material, the 
transcendental and the relational - are interrelated and, as we are going to show in the 
following chapter (Chapter III), we can see this ‘intersection’ in Proudhon and 
Foucault’s notions of space: material, transcendental and social spaces. Does this 
‘intersection’ apply to postanarchism? How can we understand postanarchist 
space/time regarding the modern framework? What possibilities does postanarchism 
give us or open up, taking into account this modern framework of Newton, Leibniz 
and Kant? We are going to answer these questions later in the final chapter (Chapter 
V on postanarchism). For now, we use the questions to frame the following chapters. 
With this in mind, we are ready to continue our postanarchist walk, to meet Proudhon 
and Foucault and to discuss with them their concept of space, taking modern space as 
background.  
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III. THE CONCEPT OF SPACE: PROUDHON AND FOUCAULT 
 
As we have just explained, the concept of space or postanarchist space is the central 
concept of this thesis. Having provided an evaluative account of the postanarchist 
concept of space in The State of The Art and having given a brief, general 
metaphysical, deontological and historical overview of this concept in the previous 
chapter, we are ready to continue our postanarchist walk. We are now ready to meet 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Michel Foucault and study their concept of space. We 
intend also to analyse the concepts of movement and survival, which, in our opinion, 
are inherent in the concept of space. In the previous chapter we began the discussion 
of our second hypothesis, to establish space is to survive. So, this second hypothesis 
and our first hypothesis, postanarchism is space constitution, are both themes of this 
chapter.  
As we have explained earlier, Proudhon and Foucault are two of the three 
main authors of this dissertation - the other one is the postanarchist Saul Newman. 
We have chosen Proudhon for three reasons: (i) there are several similarities between 
Proudhon and Foucault, not only on the concept of space but also on the concept of 
battle or struggle, as we will see; (ii) research in Paris (at the Bibliothèque Nationale 
de France and Collège de France), suggests that Proudhon fills a bibliographic gap in 
Foucault’s work (Revel, 2011:132,134) and can be considered as an author that 
Foucault read, but did not discuss; (iii) Proudhon is the first author that labelled 
himself as anarchist and also the first to embrace anarchy positively; consequently, he 
is a fundamental author that helps us to better understand Foucauldian anarchism and 
postanarchism (Kinna, 2009:8,9; Préposiet, 2007). 
We have chosen Foucault because he is a strong influence on postanarchism, 
as we concluded in The State of The Art, and because the Foucauldian concepts of 
space and heterotopia are similar to postanarchist autonomous spaces, as we are 
going to study hereinafter.  
Given what has been said, in terms of space, in this chapter, we are going to 
work on three kinds of space: material space, transcendental space and social or 
political41 space. As we have defined in The State of The Art, postanarchism - our 
theme - is about the political and not politics. Postanarchism distinguishes the two                                                         
41 The terms ‘social’ and ‘political’ are synonyms in this thesis as we are going to see. 
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concepts. According to Saul Newman (2011:4), postanarchism “offers no actual 
programme or directives”, as politics does. For Newman (2011:4), postanarchism is 
about the political: “the dimension of antagonism that can take many forms and 
emerge in different types of social relations”. For Newman (2011: 5,7,139), the 
political is to interrogate existing limits and tensions; the political is a “kind of 
deconstruction” and construction and an ethical “openness to the Other”, assumed 
beyond politics. So, in this chapter, we are going to discuss these social antagonism 
or encounters with the other (this political or social or postanarchist space) with the 
aid of the material (influenced by Newton) and transcendental (influenced by Kant 
and also by Leibniz) concepts of space. In our opinion, these three kinds of space - 
social, material and transcendental - are interrelated, and we will see how in this 
chapter.  
This chapter will re-utilize Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze as secondary 
authors since they help us to understand better the sub-concepts of material, 
transcendental and social space. As we have already explained, both authors are 
fundamental to the study of Proudhonian and Foucauldian concepts of space, 
movement and survival. 
Thus, in this Chapter III, we continue using our solar or circular method, 
inspired by Tommaso Campanella’s City of the Sun and Foucault’s cyclic worldview. 
This cyclical movement is: (i) a method or a “grammar of production” for our thesis 
(Damien, 2009:22); (ii) a “producer alphabet” that allows us, by analogy, to better 
understand the postanarchist space which is also about this circular “grammar”, as we 
will see  (Damien, 2009:22). Moreover, as we have just explained, in this chapter we 
will be looking at the concept of ‘movement’ - in Proudhon and Foucault - and 
observe how this movement works cyclically, replicating our method. 
So, in this chapter, we are also working circularly between the concepts of 
space, movement and necessity: (i) analysing the concept of space micrologically or 
in depth and also its counterpart, the concept of movement - solar or circular 
movement - in Foucault and Proudhon (Deleuze, Guattari, 1977:26); (ii) discussing 
the sub-concepts that constitute both concepts - space and movement - especially, the 
sub-concepts of survival, necessity and desire. 
Our first aim is to know what space is for Proudhon and Foucault and why, 
for both authors, we constitute space. As we have already explained, the answer is 
that we have an initial intuition: we constitute space in order to survive. The concept 
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of survival inspires our second working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive 
and it is the driver of this chapter. We arrive at this intuition by considering that: (i) 
for Proudhon (1861: 117,118,359), the condition of survival or living in peace is to 
produce or to create collectively. When we produce collectively, we create social 
space; (ii) in turn, for Foucault (2012:184; 2013:XII) we recognise an ars erotica42 or 
an aesthetics of desire. For Foucault, when we are in need, our desire explodes and 
creates space or something that helps us survive.  
For Proudhon and Foucault, we create space when we are homeless or in a 
state of desire, in a state of revolution or ‘insurrection’,43 when our survival is at 
stake (Proudhon, 1851:11,12; Proudhon, 1861:176,177; Castleton, 2009:71; Foucault, 
2013:XII). In this situation, when we are ‘homeless or spaceless,’44 we need a space. 
Our desire fires when we feel that lack or feel overwhelmed. For both authors, space 
and survival are interrelated (Castleton, 2009: Foucault, 2012:184). That is to say, 
when space becomes repressive and no longer meets our needs, we feel in danger; we 
feel the presence of death; we run away and we create space again. As Proudhon’s 
idea of revolution suggests, although our survival is always in question, we do not 
feel the limit everyday (Proudhon, 1851:7; Préposiet, 2007:179). Revolution is a 
cumulative of lacks or crushings, which reaches a point of no return: the need for 
survival (Proudhon, 1851:8,11,12). At this point of no return, our desire or rage 
explodes and we are creative. We create our space, which is a new chance, a new 
network of relationships, a new virtual ball with many tips and many interconnected 
spaces, with permanent connections and disconnections (Rajchman, 
1998:117,118,121). So, we just fight when our survival is in danger. Moreover, we 
live in peace. Hence, as Proudhon (1861: 117,118,359) says, there is a difference 
between struggle or war (good and peaceful intentions: survival) and piracy (bad 
intentions: futility). As Proudhon (2012:257) points out, “life is a struggle, but this                                                         
42 Foucault talks about an ars erotica and a scientia sexualis. The ars erotica is what we are studying 
here, “an economy of pleasure” about free pleasure practice (Foucault, 1976:93). In turn, the scientia 
sexualis is "an ordered regime of knowledge” about this free sexual practice or "a complex dispositif ... 
to produce true sex discourses ... And it is through this complex dispositif that it has been possible to 
appear, as the sex and its pleasures truth, something like sexuality”, as we are going to examine later 
(Foucault, 1976:91). 
43 As we have discussed in The State of The Art, for postanarchism, the concepts of “revolution” (a 
totalized happy end) and “insurrection” (the fire of desire that emerges in localized points) are not 
similar, but, in this chapter, mainly for Proudhon, in a given perspective, as we will see, both terms are 
similar. For contemporary anarchism, the spectacle of revolution is replaced by the “ongoing course of 
insurrection” (Springer, 2014:2). 
44 This is our philosophical term.  
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combat is not a fight of man against man but a fight of man against nature and each of 
us has to pay for oneself”. So, our fight’s goal is not the other, but our survival or 
ourselves.45 
In order to affirm this hypothesis, to establish space is to survive, we need to 
probe several questions and we put these to Proudhon and Foucault individually: (i) 
How to define space? (ii) How to define movement? (iii) Are movement and time 
synonyms and why? (iv) Are space and movement two sides of the same coin? Why? 
(v) Is space movement and if so, why? (vi) Is movement space and if so, why? (vii) 
Does movement cause space? And why? (viii) Does space imply movement? And 
why? (ix) How to create space? (x) Why create space?  
After answering these questions, we ask another two: (i) what are the 
commonalities between Proudhon and Foucault in terms of space and movement? (ii) 
What are their differences in terms of space and movement?  
In order to answer all those questions and discuss those concepts, we have 
divided this Chapter III in two sub-chapters and a conclusion. In the first sub-chapter, 
we are going to work on the Proudhonian concepts of space, movement and 
necessity. In the second sub-chapter, we are going to study the Foucauldian concepts 
of space, movement and necessity. In conclusion, we are going to look for the 
similarities and differences between the two authors - Proudhon and Foucault - on 
space, movement and necessity in order to build common concepts and notions for 
the next stages. The goal of this conceptual net is, first, to construct the Foucauldian 
activist ideal type with the aid of Proudhon’s anarchism and, second, to better 
understand what postanarchist space is in order to carve out the postanarchist ideal 
type.  
In the next sub-chapter, we are going to study Proudhon’s concepts of space, 
necessity and movement. 
 
1. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: space, necessity and movement  
 
In this sub-chapter we are going to study the concepts of space, movement and 
necessity in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, having in mind our new working hypothesis (to                                                         
45 The Foucauldian agonistc act, being a transgressive act, aims to stimulate the other rather than to 
destroy the other. We will develop this idea later in Chapter III (pg: 126) and Chapter IV (pgs: 146-
148).  
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 79 
establish space is to survive) and as background our main hypothesis (postanarchism 
is space constitution). We will have also as framework the Kantian perspective of 
space and time, understood as the ‘here and now’.  
As we already stated, in this sub-chapter, we will analyse Proudhon’s concept 
of space in three perspectives: (i) the transcendental space, inspired by Kant, (ii) the 
material space - similar to Newton’s space and (iii) the social or political space. For 
Proudhon, those three spaces are interrelated. In our viewpoint, just through an 
overall vision of those three spaces, we could understand the social scope of 
Proudhonian space and connect it to postanarchist space, as this is our intention in the 
coming chapters. In this sub-chapter, we are going to define the three kinds of 
Proudhonian space separately in order to understand better the several concepts in 
question. We will discuss Proudhonian material space, then transcendental space and 
finally social space.  
We start with the Proudhonian concept of material space. 
 
Proudhon: material space 
For Proudhon, material space is a non-social space or a space not created by man.46 
There are two kinds of space that are not created by man: (i) matter or substance; (ii) 
‘a priori or transcendental space’. We will study material space first and 
transcendental space in the next section.  
Proudhon does not denominate matter as a space. Nevertheless, as we have 
already seen, in the modern age, matter or substance is defined by absolutism or by 
substantialism and by the mathematicians, Newtonians, as a space: material space. As 
we have stated above, the “ontology of space and time” in the seventeenth century 
defines space as “substance in its own right”. So, we could include Proudhonian 
matter in this substancialism. As we have seen, for absolutists, as Newton, space 
exists and is independent of “all possible objects and object relations”.  
So, what is matter or material space for Proudhon? For Proudhon, matter 
could be understood as the globe or the earth, as “everything undivided, indistinct, 
undifferentiated that cannot be conceived as ordered”,47 something that was created 
                                                        
46 In this thesis when we write created by ‘man’ or ‘men’ this means human being that includes woman 
and man. Those are expressions used by the authors  - Proudhon and Foucault - and we adopt them in 
order to facilitate the writing.  
47 Later (pg: 86 and note: 55) we will define the Proudhonian concept of order. 
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by God,48 and not created by man, as we have already explained (Proudhon, 1873). 
Proudhon (2009:240) defines what matter is:  
 
They [the workers] create a productive capacity that previously did not 
exist; but this capacity can just be created if a matter supports it. The 
ground substance remains the same; there are only its qualities and 
modifications that were changed. Man has created everything. Everything, 
except the matter itself.  
  
Thus, matter is the “ground substance” that was not created by man and that has 
unknown origin (Proudhon, 1873). According to Proudhon (1873), the error is to just 
aspire to know and to explain matter. For Proudhon (1873), “matter does not change 
with the figures that we print on it and with the uses that we give to it”: matter 
“remains the same”. It is always the substratum. Proudhon (2009:240) gives some 
examples of matter: fields, land for cultivation, the sea, water, air, rocks and stones, 
woods.  
For Proudhon, matter is the sine qua non condition for man’s production and 
creation (Proudhon, 1873). Following Proudhon (2009:255), two things compose 
work: the association between workers and matter. As Proudhon says, the productive 
‘capacity can just be created if matter supports it’. According to Proudhon (1873), 
matter is the substance “of any series, any organization; the principle of any inertia or 
resistance”. Proudhon (1873) adds, the cause or action “requires a substratum, a 
substance where it resides and where it soars”.  
And because matter is the condition of possibility of all creation, in order to 
create or to produce man can temporarily, while he is producing, occupy the earth: 
matter. According to Proudhon (2009:210), “occupation leads to equality and 
prevents property”. Proudhon (2009:210) explains,  
 
every man has the right of occupation just because he exists and he needs 
matter to explore and work in order to live. … So, occupation is always 
subordinated to the population; ... Possession, in law, can never remain 
fixed; it is impossible that it becomes property.                                                         
48 As we have already added, Proudhon (1973) welcomes Fourier’s immanent notion of God, defined 
as “an all-pervading force that agitates, animates and moves all beings”.  
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Thus, for Proudhon, this occupied matter is something “common” 49  or 
“collective” that could not be possessed permanently. Matter is no one’s property, 
because, for Proudhon, as we have already said, only what man creates can be 
possessed. ‘Creation’ is the sine qua non condition for possession. According to 
Proudhon, human creations have, as we have quoted above, “productive capacity that 
previously did not exist” or surplus value. Speaking about workers, Proudhon (2009: 
250) explains: “each of them adds to the matter, that passes through his hands, a 
certain value, and this value, the product of their work, is their property”.50 Then, 
according to Proudhon (2009:280), as matter is common, everyone can be occupier, 
creator or surplus value creator; possession is collective: 
 
As the traveller does not appropriate the great road on which he passes, so 
too the farmer does not appropriate the field on which he sows; If, 
however, by the fact of his industry, a worker can appropriate the material 
he exploits, every exploiter, in the same way, becomes an owner; So, all 
capital, whether material or intellectual, being a collective work, 
therefore, forms a collective property.  
 
For Proudhon (2009:276), property is collective because work, as we have just 
said, being an association of workers, is also collective or social: 
 
The man of talent contributed to produce … a useful instrument so he is 
co-owner; he is not the owner. There is at once in him a free worker and 
an accumulated social capital (Proudhon, 2009:276). 
 
Thus, according to Proudhon (2009:277) our intellectual capital is social capital: 
                                                         
49 For instance, Proudhon (2009:219,221) considers that water, air and fire are common things because 
they are necessary to survive, for instance, man without air could not survive. So, in this thesis, 
‘common’ means something that belongs to everyone, something that is neither public nor private. 
‘Common’ is the Proudhonian “negative community” or the “first stage of civilization”, although 
Proudhon (2009:406,407) criticizes communism: the ideology that defends community. For Proudhon 
(2009:409), communism is based on property. Nevertheless, “the community or association, in a 
simple mode, is the necessary end, the primordial effort of society, the spontaneous movement by 
which it manifests and raises”. We will discuss this later (see: Proudhon: social space, pg: 96). 
50 Proudhon criticizes mainly the concept of property, as we will see above (pgs: 80-81).  
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Whatever the capacity of a man, since this capacity was created, no 
longer belongs to him; like the matter that an industrious hand shapes, he 
had the ability of becoming. Society made it.  
 
If matter is common and our intellectual capital is social, so too all are workers 
- equality:  
 
All work produced by human hands, compared to the raw material from 
which it is formed, is of inestimable price; in this regard, the distance is as 
big between a pair of shoes and a walnut trunk as between a statue of 
Scopas and a block of marble. The genius of the simple artisan outweighs 
as much on materials he exploits as the spirit of a Newton on the inert 
spheres in which he calculates distances, masses and revolutions 
(Proudhon, 2009: 272). 
 
Regarding the equality of workers, Proudhon (2009:277) explains:  
 
Few masters, few years, few traditional souvenirs are required to form the 
farmer and the craftsman: the generator effort and, if I may use that 
language, the duration of social gestation are due to the sublimity of the 
capacity. But while the doctor, the poet, the artist and the savant produce 
little and late, the production of the labourer is much less lucky and does 
not expect the number of years. 
 
For Proudhon (2009:285,287,294), if matter is common, if the work is 
collective, if the workers are possessors and equal, so, individual property is 
“impossible”, it is a “metaphor”, it is unfair, it is the negation of equality, it is not true 
and it is useless. Proudhon (2009:363) justifies this view, “any consumption that is 
not reproductive of utility is destruction; Property, if it consumes, if it saves, if it 
capitalizes, is a producer of worthlessness, a cause of sterility and death”. Thus 
property is useless when it is not creative and it is not intended to satisfy human 
needs. It causes “sterility and death”. For Proudhon (2009:364, Damien, 2009:31), 
property is “nothing”; it is a “right of bargain”, “the right to produce without 
working”. And Proudhon (2009:349) adds, “property is the great cause of privilege 
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and despotism”. Property is “theft” and the thief is a “man who hides, takes, deviates 
something that does not belong to him in any way whatsoever” (Proudhon, 
2009:129,411). So, Proudhon (2009:350) asks, “What is the owner? It is a machine 
that does not function or, running for its own pleasure and according to its own 
caprice, produces nothing”. Proudhon (2009:437) concludes, “the owner, the thief, 
the hero, the sovereign, because these names are synonyms, imposes his will through 
the law, and suffers no contradiction nor control; that is to say, he pretends to be 
legislative power and executive power at the same time”.  
We can conclude that Proudhonian matter has political consequences. 
Because matter is common, Proudhon criminalizes private space or property - it is 
“theft” - and criticizes the public space or the space of liberal democracy that is 
similar to property. As quoted above, the sovereigns’ space or the space of the state is 
a machine that does not function or, running for its own pleasure and according to its 
own caprice, produces nothing. For Proudhon, in terms of production, private and 
public spaces do not exist. They are null. Proudhon fights also against liberal 
individualism (Proudhon, 1865; Damien, 2009:26). 51  According to Proudhon, the 
owner and the sovereign are thieves and “the government of man by man is illegal 
and absurd” (Proudhon, 2009:425; Damien, 2009:19).52 For Proudhon, just common 
space – matter - transcendental space and social space allow people to be creative, to 
meet their needs and to live in peace.  
Thus, as matter is a ‘common space’ and man could just possess collectively 
what he creates - the surplus value - regarding his needs, due to social capital, so 
possession is the right solution:  
 
Individual possession is the condition of social life; five thousand years of 
property demonstrate it: Property is the suicide of society. Possession is 
within the law; property is against the law. Remove property and retain 
possession and by this single change of the principle you will change all 
in laws, government, economy, institutions (Proudhon, 2009:437). 
                                                         
51 As we have already said, Proudhon (1865, 2009) fights also against communism – public space. As 
we have just said, we will study the Proudhonian critiques against communism in the section about 
Proudhonian social space (pg: 93).  
52 According to Proudhon (2009:425), “The more man is ignorant, the more his obedience, the more 
his confidence in his guide is absolute”. 
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For Proudhon, possession is the condition of social life and consequently the 
right solution because possession is interconnected with man’s necessity:  
  
“the dominion of man over things, like the dominion of man over people, is 
null: man has the right to draw things, provided he return them in the same 
currency, only when necessary for him to live (Castleton, 2009:71). 
 
So, necessity, in the Kantian sense, grounds material space possession and 
grounds also, as for Kant, the Proudhonian transcendental space. 
 
Proudhon: transcendental Space 
Proudhonian transcendental space, like material space, is also not created by man. In 
terms of our framework, we could say that Proudhon’s conception of transcendental 
space is very indebted to Kant. 53  Briefly, Proudhonian transcendental space is 
Kantian space - and time. Proudhon is also interested in Kant’s main philosophical 
questions -“What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” 
Notwithstanding his critiques of the Kantian a priori, Proudhon is occupied with 
those “problems that concerned his contemporaries: how to identify at once the place 
where the certainty of reason lies and to demonstrate the reason and the truths that 
constitute it?” (Castleton 2009:53). For Proudhon (2014), influenced by Kant, space, 
time and diversity 54  are “sensible intuitions and not real objects.” So, being an 
‘intuition and not an object’, Proudhonian transcendental space is transcendental 
idealism - defined above - inspired by Kant. Like Kant, Proudhon is convinced that 
those sensible intuitions - space, time and diversity - are something transcendental or 
created by God - not a human creation, as we have just said. They are immanences.  
So, why, for Proudhon, is space transcendental? Or, what does transcendental 
or immanent mean?  As we have argued earlier, transcendental means a priori - 
independent of experience - or universal and necessary. And Proudhon is inspired by                                                         
53 Proudhon (2009:135) says he does not believe in the innateness of ideas, forms and laws of Kant. 
Nevertheless his intention is not to do a critique of pure reason. Therefore, he adopts, as hypothesis, 
Kant’s vision: “our more general and necessary ideas, as time, space and substance exist primordially 
in our spirit” (Proudhon, 2009:135). 
54 Proudhon (2014) joins another a priori concept: diversity. Proudhon (2014) explains what diversity 
is: “We must distinguish diversity as an attribute or a predicable of quantity and diversity as an 
absolute condition of all phenomenality. So, the same objectivity, the same infinite character and 
necessity that are found in the concepts of space and time also belong to this concept that particularly 
reveals us the divisibility of matter and which is in itself the inevitable synthesis of space and time”. 
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those Kantian definitions of universality and necessity. As stated, for Kant, something 
is necessary when “it could not possibly exist otherwise”. In turn, universality, Kant 
explains, (1969:26) signifies “no possible exception”: “If … a judgment carries with 
it strict an absolute universality, that is, admits no possible exception, it is not derived 
from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori”. For Kant (1969:26), ‘necessity’ and 
‘universality’ are “inseparably connected”. So, for Proudhon (1873), as for Kant, 
transcendental space is a universal and necessary concept (as time and diversity also 
are) or an innate capacity/necessity (a priori or independent of experience). Like 
Kant, Proudhon sees transcendental space as the ‘here and now’ or the innate 
necessity to survive, the innate necessity to live and not to die. As Proudhon 
(2009:262) suggests, the need is the beginning: “the need gives the idea and the idea 
makes the producer”. And this “innate necessity” or this transcendental space is, as 
we have just affirmed, something a priori created by God, the immanence.  
Proudhon reveals what immanence is: “man is endowed with a moral and 
intellectual capacity, but he needs an external cause, acting through the senses, to 
illuminate his soul”. And, what does this cause or immanence signify?  
 
In the outset and during the process, the categories of ideas and 
consciousness are revealed by the presence of another spirit, which allows 
us to perceive them in the wake of sensation and in the perception of 
sensation. Communication is the sparking that allows categories of 
understanding to form themselves in spirit, because the phenomenal 
world is not enough. And, at the origin of this communication, there is a 
first revelation linking humanity with the perfect thought that is God 
(Castleton 2009:54). 
 
For Proudhon, immanence is power and communication, as we could verify 
through the following example about language:  
 
Language could be the work of man, but its formation proves that the 
necessary and adequate thought, that develops it, is obviously given to 
him because man does not speak naturally. Thus, the names of primitive 
things in Greek and Hebrew prove the presence of a pre-existing 
intelligence and proved a perfect revealed thought. … It is from this first 
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communication or revelation of thought, before any language, that we 
acquire our knowledge of all kinds (Castleton 2009:54).  
 
Thus, using Deleuze’s concepts, which we have already discussed, space is, 
first, a Proudhonian “metaphysical” capacity quid facti, given by God or immanence. 
Space is the innate capacity to communicate with the exterior world, according to our 
needs. And, second, like Kant, Proudhon poses the deontological or the quid juris 
question. Kant teaches, through space and time we “subjugate” or organize the 
exterior world (create our law or our postanarchist space). And Proudhon clarifies, to 
“subjugate” is to communicate with the world. Proudhon recalls why we need to 
apply our capacities and to communicate with the world: because we need to survive 
and matter produces nothing, matter is just the “ground substance”. 
 
The salt of sea, the water of fountains, the herb of the field, the wood of 
the forests are for him (man) as if they did not exist. The sea, without 
the fisherman and his net, does not give fish; the forest, without the 
woodcutter and his axe, does not provide firewood nor timber service, 
the prairie without the mower, does not provide neither hay nor renewal. 
Nature is like a vast field of exploitation and production; but nature just 
produces for nature (Proudhon, 2009:300,301). 
 
Thus, for Proudhon, space is a strategic capacity/necessity of communication - 
the Foucauldian zero point - in order to deal with the nature that “just produces for 
nature”. Space is “necessary for the formation of our ideas” and for our survival 
(Proudhon: 1873, 2014). As Proudhon (2009:262) explains,  
 
the need gives the idea and it is the idea that makes the producer. We just 
know that the excitement of our senses leads us to desire and what our 
intelligence asks; we strongly desire only what we conceive well; The better 
we conceive the more we are able to produce.  
 
 Hence space, the here, is necessity and desire that allows us to know and lead 
us to communicate, to create and to produce. For Proudhon (2014), without this a 
priori concept of space any perception of phenomena or any production would be 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 87 
impossible. Regarding these multiple perceptions of phenomena and these multiple 
communications and productions, Proudhon (2014) concludes, they are multiple, 
interrelated spaces – relationalism - and, quoting Kant, Proudhon (2014) says, “the 
transcendental space is as an aggregate of limited spaces that are all together and are 
also endless and spread in all directions”. 
So, if, for Proudhon, the “spirit of God” reveals to us space during creation, 
space is God’s energy/power or immanence in ourselves through our body. 
According to Proudhon, there is no “prior knowledge of body experience” (Castleton 
2009:54). Also for Proudhon, as for Foucault, the body is the zero point or the topia, 
and the transcendental space, being an innate potentia in the body, is activated by 
experience: “the nature of our ideas is determined by the non-self that are the objects 
of our perception” (Castleton 2009:55). 
Thus, the Proudhonian a priori space or the Proudhonian ‘here’ is a 
transcendental idealism very close to relationalism. Being innate, a priori and a God 
creation, transcendental space is a Kantian transcendental idealism. Being a priori 
and linked to experience and to the “non-self”, and being the condition of possibility 
of social communication and production of interrelated social spaces, the 
Proudhonian transcendental space approaches relationalism – “determinations or 
relations of things”, in Leibniz’s terms. For that reason, transcendental space is 
closely linked to social space.  
Considering this, we can conclude also that the Proudhonian transcendental 
space has political consequences. Transcendental space, meaning the immanence or 
the necessary energy of power, is spread in human’s bodies and not concentrated in 
just a place. And even this body, that has power, belongs to a man that, “by his nature 
and instinct”, has “always an inconstant and multiform personality due the permanent 
needs or limits of existence” (Proudhon, 2009:398, Castleton 2009:57). 
Thus, after analysing Proudhonian transcendental space, we can reaffirm our 
new working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive. For Proudhon, as we are 
discussing, the a priori space - and also time and diversity - is the way to organize the 
world regarding our needs here - and now. And to organize the world means to 
establish our social space in order to survive. So, what is social space?  
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Proudhon: social Space  
The Proudhonian social space is a space created by man and is not a space created by 
God, as matter and transcendental space are. Nevertheless, as matter, Proudhon does 
not denominate social space as ‘space’. As we have already outlined, there are some 
similarities between Proudhonian social space and Liebniz’s relationalism and the 
transcendental realism. For that reason, we can consider social space as a space.  
As we have observed above, for Leibniz, space and time “are determinations 
or relations of things” (relationalism) and are also “an order of the existence of things 
observed in their simultaneity” (transcendental realism). In turn, Proudhonian social 
space could be defined as postanarchist space (relations and “encounters with the 
other” or “an openness to the other”) and, consequently, characterized in the 
framework of relationalism à la Leibniz: “determinations or relations of things” 
(Newman, 2011:7; Day, 2011:112).  
In another way, for Proudhon, social space is also a creation of order. 55 
Proudhon (1873) says, “for our intelligence, … to create is to produce order: in this 
sense, we can say that creation was not limited to the six days of Moses and to the 
work of the seventh day; the great work of the eternal poet, the creation of order in 
society, is being accomplished”. So, for Proudhon, to create or to produce is to order 
and, here, Proudhon approaches Leibniz’s transcendental realism that considers space 
as “an order of the existence of things observed in their simultaneity”.  
This Proudhonian relationalism and transcendental realism is not in 
contradiction with the Proudhonian transcendental idealism, as we have noted. The 
three types of space for Proudhon (material, transcendental and social) are 
interrelated, as we have already explained.56 So, we could classify Proudhon as a 
substancialist regarding matter, as a transcendental idealist regarding transcendental 
space and as a relationalist and transcendental realist regarding social space. And the 
                                                        
55 Proudhon (1873) defines order: “I call order anything seriated or symmetrical .... Order is the 
supreme condition of all persistence of all development, of all perfection. Order, in its various 
manifestations, is series, symmetry, relation, being subjected to the conditions in which it can be 
decomposed, which are the immediate principle, the form, the reason, the meter. These conditions are 
called laws”. And Proudhon (1873) continues: “Order is not something real, but just formal; it is the 
idea carved in the substance, the thought expressed in every collection, series, organism, genus and 
species, as the word in writing. Order is all that man can know about the universe. About beings, we 
just know their relations” 
56  Proudhon warned, in advance, that the transcendental space of Kant does not convince him 
completely, in terms of formation of ideas, as we have just observed. For that reason, Proudhon is also 
a relationalist. 
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three Proudhonian types of space, being complementary, aid understanding of social 
space.  
For Proudhon, for instance, the creation of ideas or production, being social 
space, is a compound of three spaces: (i) substantial space: matter is the condition of 
possibility of all creation; (ii) transcendental space: our capacities are the condition of 
possibility of our ideas and knowledge and our survival, and we process, here and 
now, contact with the exterior world through space, time and diversity, regarding our 
needs; (iii) social space: we produce social space when we create ideas through signs, 
for instance, language. And these ideas and signs are the result of our “spirit efforts”, 
plus matter, plus collective or social knowledge and work. According to Proudhon, 
we are condemned to signs, language or representation57 or, as we have set out above, 
to communicate (or we are condemned to the other that communicates with us). 
Proudhonian signs aim “to identify and distinguish (to order) the phenomena caused 
by the sensations”, always with reference to our needs (Castleton, 2009:). As 
Castleton (2009:55) points out, for Proudhon, “language ... is the analysis of thought 
by speech”. Or, otherwise, the sign is a production of our spirit stimulated and 
wrapped by the exterior world - transcendental + matter + social. The sign could be 
oral language or it could be another kind of language or product (bearing on matter) 
created by our ideas (transcendental space + common or social knowledge), such as 
books, statues, paintings, movies, furniture, handicraft, industries etc. So, the sign is 
social space also due to matter (material space) and due to our needs and capacities 
(transcendental space).  
And, why is the sign social or, better, what does social mean? First of all, the 
word ‘social’ means also political, because, for Proudhon, political equality implies 
social equality. Proudhon (1865) says: “without social equality, political equality is 
an empty word … Political equality = social equality. This turn of mind is new; 
moreover it implies, as the first principle, individual freedom”. So, for Proudhon, 
there is no distinction between political space and social space, if the individual is 
free.58  
Secondly, according to Proudhon (2009:367), social means society that 
signifies a “set of relations, in a word, a system” or a group. For Proudhon, the word                                                         
57 We are going to study later (pgs: 214,216) Proudhonian political representation. 
58 We have already noted that Proudhonian power or immanence is universal and, for that reason, 
widespread and not concentrated. For Proudhon, everybody has power and could act or produce in 
society, if people are free to apply this power.  
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relation means “group” and this is “the only way we can conceive ourselves and 
represent being” (Castleton, 2012:114). Castleton (2012:114) explains the 
Proudhonian concept of group: 
 
The group could have the form of the animal, the vegetable and the 
mineral, of simple bodies and complex bodies. Its constitution is essential 
to being to be defined as a synthesis of the multiple and the one. Man is 
an organized group in which the spirit is born from the organization of the 
organs, ... the same goes with society ... the formation of collective unity 
within diversity of individuals.  
 
Proudhon rules out the notion of “simple substance” (Castleton, 
2012:114,115). The substance and man itself also are compounds (Proudhon, 
2009:384). Man is the one and the multiple; he is a set of organs and each organ is 
also another set. This set of organs recalls the Deleuzian and Guattarian “desire 
machine”. As the authors say, “each organ-machine interprets the entire world from 
the perspective of its flux, from the point of view of the energy that flows from it” 
(Deleuze, Guattari, 2013:16). Proudhon also notes the whole machine and its parts. 
As Castleton (2012:114) clarifies: “the relationship of the parts ... makes the 
condition of the being, gives reality to things, and allows us to grasp the concept of 
unity”. So, for Proudhon, society is a collective being, is a set of relations or a group 
or a set of groups and, consequently, is a concept that shows Proudhon is really a 
relationalist. 
Third, the space or the sign is social or political because, setting up a 
collective being and a collective reason, Proudhon defends a “social ontology” 
(Castleton 2012:103). 59  According to Proudhon (2009:367,368, Scelle, 1959:11), 
man is a “sociable animal” by instinct - negative community - and “everyday he 
becomes sociable by reasoning and by election”. As we have seen above, two things 
compose work: the association between workers and matter. And, we have 
furthermore said, regarding associative work, for Proudhon, intellectual capital is also 
social capital and our capacities and knowledge are always made by society. As 
Castleton (2009:70) summarizes, according to Proudhon, “man belongs more to                                                         
59 For Proudhon we are condemned to representation, as we have seen above, and representation is 
always collective, as we are studying now.   
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society than to himself”, because man “owes these abilities, his talent, his capabilities 
and his work” to society. In another perspective, according to Proudhon (2009: 245), 
the social whole is superior to the set of parts or, as Castleton (2009:105; Damien, 
2009:32; Préposiet, 2007:186,187) states, “the collective force being irreducible to 
the sum of individual strengths in production, all capital should be considered as 
collective due to the combination of efforts from different producers in the division of 
labour”. For those reasons, Proudhon (2009: 384) defends a social ontology and a 
social being and pictures what social space is: 
 
Man does with man a perpetual exchange of ideas and feelings, products 
and services. All that is learned and executed in society is necessary to 
him; but this huge quantity of products and ideas, which is given to 
everyone to make and to acquire on one’s own, is like an atom before the 
sun. Man is man just because there is society, which, for its part, is just 
sustained by the balance of forces and the harmony that compose it. 
 
So, in order to characterize social space, Proudhon highlights that: (i) the 
social space or men’s production, as we have already seen, bears on needs  - the here 
and now - that is the beginning of society; (ii) man is a social being or a “becoming” 
in social space – “man is man just because there is society”  (Préposiet, 2007:183); 
(iii) this “becoming” in social and through “industrial work” is, as Damien (2009:22) 
shows, an invention or a representation or a “plastic work” or an aesthetic of 
becoming; (iv) the Proudhonian social space, producing a “huge quantity of products 
and ideas” and “a perpetual exchange of ideas and feelings” is, Damien (2009:22) 
adds, a “positive metaphysics”, that “generates plural rationalities and multiple 
identities”; (v) in order to characterize social space, Proudhon utilizes the circular 
image of the solar system60 that resonates with the Foucauldian circular principle of 
the intelligibility of the world or the Deleuzian and Guattarian “wheel of continual 
birth and rebirth” (see image 2, pg:18) (Deleuze, Guattari, 2013:18).  
From the above we can infer that Proudhonian social space is also a social 
movement or an atomised personality or group that is like a solar system or a sun 
surrounded by ‘a huge quantity of products and ideas’ (see image 5).                                                          
60 As our circular or solar method, referred above. 
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Image 5 
 
Proudhon designs a social or solar space or social being composed by 
multiple groups and movements. For Proudhon, “in place of substances ... we need to 
put the groups in perpetual movement” (Castleton, 2012:115). 
How, then, should we define movement for Proudhon? Movement or social 
movement means creation or production. And, according to Proudhon, as we have 
already outlined, “to create is to serialize” or to order (Proudhon, 1873; Damien, 
2009:21). A series is “the figure, laws and relations, according to which every being 
created will be separated from the undivided whole” (Proudhon, 1873). So, we create 
through series and through series we can generate, as we have just written, ‘plural 
rationalities’, ‘multiple identities’ and products: social beings or social space. 
For Proudhon, this circular movement is made of material interests or needs - 
the here and now or the immanent power - and ideas. Both - needs and ideas - “rule 
society.”61 Castleton (2012:109) explains that Proudhonian material interests or needs 
are “mobile and unstable”, not “fixed and permanent”, and “subjected to continuous 
displacements”. In turn, ideas are also mobile, as interests, because they are subjected 
to opposition, contradiction and cannot be utterly destroyed but only substituted for 
other ideas (Castleton, 2012:110). Proudhon (1861:33,58) defends antagonism or 
perpetual war or our need to survive.62  
 
 In the state of nature, … that we can only suppose outside the religious 
institution, in this State where there is no legislature, where God never                                                         
61 We will develop this ‘an-archy’ or ‘necessity rule’ later (Chapter IV, pgs: 144-146, 175-176). 
62 We are going to study Proudhon’s war later (Chapter IV, pgs: 142-144). 
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more appears; no laws, no authority; where all is at war against all; where 
the distinction between good and evil does not exist, what can the human 
action rule? In other words, what can we imagine as the mobile ruler of 
his will, and therefore the law of his existence? It is obvious that he must 
do everything to prevent death and suffering. Common sense says, the 
preservation of his body and his limbs, by all possible means, this is for 
man in the state of nature, the only true law, the dictates of pure and right 
reason  (Proudhon, 1861: 176,177). 
 
According to Proudhon, (2009:404,405) this movement or battle or 
antagonism is an aesthetic and poetic war, because history and men are created daily, 
perpetually, with reference to their needs, as we have already described. For 
Proudhon (1861:42), existence results from this “divine struggle”. Thus, in 
Proudhon’s perspective, war or contradiction is the unavoidable first intelligibility 
principle of history, society, politics and economy: the first movement (Proudhon, 
1861:33,58, Castleton, 2012:110). And this first movement has an “unknown origin” 
or divine origin (Proudhon, 1861:33,58, Castleton, 2012:110). As we have observed, 
its origin is a priori; need: “the preservation of his body and his limbs, by all possible 
means”; this is the “only true law”. 
Hence, according to Proudhon, this ‘divine’ and circular movement composed 
by interests and ideas in society is also the revolution or, rather, the micro revolutions 
that just occur when man is in need – or overwhelmed. Proudhon (1851:7) argues that 
this war or revolt is not innate in masses (Proudhon, 1851:7). The revolution has its 
origin in the violence of needs, in the lack of bread and work (Proudhon, 
1851:8,11,12). As Proudhon (2009:90) argues, “every man has the right to work to 
live, and to live from his work”. The revolution is a force against which no other 
power, divine or human, can prevail. Its nature is to strengthen and to grow against 
resistance it meets, up to a point of explosive no return (Proudhon, 1851:5). 
Proudhon (2009:151,152) adds, “when, due to a physical, intellectual or social 
fact, our ideas ... change completely, I call this movement of the spirit revolution. If 
there is just extension or modification of our ideas, it is progress”. Thus, for 
Proudhon, revolution, as desire, is something circular and discontinuous that dies and 
is born again and again. And progress is a continuous and reformist line that never 
changes completely.  
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So, for Proudhon, movement is the same as time. As Castleton (2012:110) 
points out: “the Proudhonian concept of movement is the unique and essential form 
of reason. It is the condition of the whole experience and time is just its synonym”.  
In turn, for Proudhon, movement or time or creation is the other side of social 
space and vice versa. Time and space, the here and the now, are the power or the 
immanence that creates social space. For that reason, Castleton (2012:110) concludes, 
for Proudhon, the laws of movement or time - and space - are “eternal and absolute” 
or necessary and universal, as we have learned with Kant.  
The Proudhonian social space is also spiritual and providential - immanence. 
The social space is spiritual because, as Castleton (2012:123) explains,  
 
the physical relationships lead to purely organic relations, from the 
individual to the family, from family to society and from society to 
mankind. ... The spirit seems destined to progressively remove the body, as 
individuals become constitutive members of a superior person.  
 
 The social space is this “superior person” or a purified common body. For that 
reason, the Proudhonian social space is providential, because it looks like a new ‘re-
ligion’ (from the latin religare: re-ligare) that means ‘re-connection’ (or a “civil 
religion”) (Prichard, 2008:117,119,132,146). This civil religion is constituted by free 
and intelligent individuals who replace God by the immanent and creative power that 
crosses their body and the social space as a whole, creating new groups - spiritual and 
ethical relationships - and new social space or new pure organic relations (Prichard, 
2008:117,119,132,146). 
And, in order to create this spiritual and providential social space, Proudhon 
identifies three possibilities: mutuality, federation and anarchy. 
According to Proudhon (1865), mutuality comes from the French word 
mutuel, mutualité, mutuation, that means “reciprocal”; reciprocity comes from the 
Latin mutuum, which means “loan” – consumption - and, in a broader sense, “trade”. 
The original premises of mutualism63 are: “service for service ... product for product, 
loan for loan, insurance for insurance, credit for credit, bail for bail, guarantee for 
guarantee, etc.” The ancient Law of Talion inspires these principles: eye for eye, tooth                                                         
63 Mutualism is the thinking movement that advocates mutuality. 
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for tooth, life for life. Mutualism presupposes “free”64 and “fair”65 individuals and 
their goal is justice, “to become equal” and to “reject alms”. Mutualism claims 
freedom of labour, competition, solidarity, responsibility and equality of dignity 
(Proudhon, 1865).  
The aim of mutualism is also to “banish communism”, property and also “the 
liberal and individualistic vision”, in order to promote the concept of “participation” 
and the “principle of mutuality” - “one should treat others as one would like others to 
treat oneself” and “one should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be 
treated” (Proudhon, 1865). Proudhon (1865) compares mutuality and community. For 
Proudhon (1865), mutuality supposes, “sharing of land, division of property, 
independence of work, separation of industries, specialized functions, individual and 
collective responsibility, minimized general expenses, elimination of parasitism and 
misery”. In turn, community means “hierarchy, property, centralization, complication 
of machines, subordination of wills, loss of force, development of unproductive 
functions, indefinite increase of general expenses, parasitism and misery” (Proudhon, 
1865).  
According to Proudhon (2009:408,409), community bears on property, as we 
have said above, and signifies ruin, state property, a “beatified uniformity” where 
work is commanded, where there is “passive obedience” (Castleton, 2009:80; 
Préposiet, 2007:200,201). On the other hand, for Proudhon (1865), mutuality is 
“collective force” that aims “to dismiss any velleity, any possibility of speculation, to 
reduce the random element making the risk common, to systematically organize the 
principle of justice in a series of positive duties and material guarantees”.  
As Ritter notes, “this principle of justice” which defines a “series of positive 
duties and material guarantees’” is contract. With contract, Proudhonian mutualism 
“opens the way to unlimited liberation from outward coercion” (Ritter, 1967:470). 
How does it do this? The answer is: through a “universalized negotiation” (Ritter, 
1967:470). The idea is to engage in direct bargaining without mediation: “individuals 
and groups, unimpeded by hierarchy, law or market, bargain directly with each other 
for the things they want, without any intermediaries, until they arrive at mutualized 
acceptable terms of agreement” (Ritter, 1967:470).                                                          
64 The Proudhonian free man is “a person (that) must be ‘liberated from all internal and external 
coercion’” (Ritter, 1867:468). 
65 We will discuss the concept of justice or law later (this Chapter III, note 68: pg. 98; Chapter IV, pgs: 
152-153). 
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Proudhonian contract is the law: “when I negotiate for something with one or 
several of my neighbours, it is clear that my own will is my only law” (Ritter, 
1967:470). Thus, direct bargaining sets up the contract or the Proudhonian social law 
(Proudhon, 1951:123). Proudhon denominates this kind of justice, “the commutative 
justice”, which, as we have already seen, “imposes on each contender the supreme 
duty of giving to all others goods just as valuable as those which he receives from 
them. It obliges equivalent exchange” (Ritter, 1967:473). Proudhon’s goal is to move 
from distributive justice to commutative justice (Proudhon, 1851:122). Commutative 
justice is the kingdom of contracts, an economic and industrial system (Proudhon, 
1851:124). Redistributive justice is the realm of laws, feudalism, government or a 
military regime. The future of humanity is this replacement of distributive justice 
with or by commutative justice (Proudhon, 1851:124). 
In this way, Proudhon (1863) defends a commutative principle (“each party is 
committed to give or to do something that is regarded as the equivalent of what is 
given or done to it”, as we have defined above) and synallagmatic  (“the contractors 
are reciprocally obliged”) social contract that focuses only on exchanges, increasing 
freedom (Proudhon, 1851:127). The Proudhonian contract opposes government, 
because the producer is the negotiator or the ruler and his organization is 
incompatible with authority (Proudhon, 1851:139). So, the contract succeeds the 
government (Proudhon, 1851:140). According to Proudhon (2009:424), “the 
government of man by man is illegal and illegitimate”. Thus, the Proudhonian 
solution is “the organization of economic forces under the contract”.  
How should this political contract be designated? Proudhon answers: It is a 
“federation”. Criticizing the social contract of Rousseau, Proudhon defines federation 
as a “political contract” based “on mutualism that, therefore, should be synallagmatic 
and commutative”, as we have seen above. This political contract is a way to organize 
the groups externally and internally. It depends on the perspective that could go from 
micro to macro or from macro to micro. Proudhon (1863) specifies, through 
federation, “contractors, heads of families, municipalities, cantons, provinces or states 
… reserve themselves individually … more rights, freedom, authority, property, than 
they give up”. Proudhon (1863) highlights that federal contract, even in big groups, is 
“essentially restricted” and is not a government but an “agency”, having specific and 
revisable services, allowed by the contractors. Proudhon (1863) points out the federal 
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agency is “limited to special services”. The author adds, the bigger the number of 
contractors, the lesser its services “in number and immediacy” .66  
As Préposiet (2007:209,210) notes, in the framework of federation, through 
contract and mutualism, Proudhon (1965) advocates a “simplification” of legislation, 
as we have just said above. For Proudhon (1965; Préposiet, 2007:209,210), 
legislation could be reduced to just one law, the “mutuality principle”: “one should 
treat others as one would like others to treat oneself” and “one should not treat others 
in ways that one would not like to be treated”. As Préposiet (2007:210) adds, the 
“mutuality principle” is “the basic formula of justice, the rule of all transactions” in a 
federal space.  
We can see that mutualism, contract and federalism constitute the 
Proudhonian way to weave social ‘tissue’ or social space and that they have political 
consequences. As we have shown, they replace government. What should we call this 
new political reality? 
For Proudhon, “anarchy” is the political organization of people under the 
contract (Proudhon, 2009:428; 1851:145). Proudhon assumes himself as an anarchist 
and, consequently, “a great friend of order”67 and the author explains this relationship 
between anarchy and order or law (Proudhon, 2009:421,432,439). For Proudhon 
(2009:428,432,433), anarchy means “absence of master and sovereign” and is based 
on four principles: equality, law, independence and proportionality: equality signifies 
similar “conditions or means”; the law, as we have observed, is the commutative 
contract, which results from “the science of the facts” 68  and is based on need;                                                         
66 According to Scelle (1958:19,20), federalism, for Proudhon, is a “powerful synthesis”, of “authority 
and freedom, two antagonistic principles, however, necessary”, but this Proudhonian conciliation bears 
on “struggle, which is the basis of revolutions and wars”. Criticizing Proudhon, Scelle (1958:19,20) 
says, this Proudhonian conciliation is not balanced, because Proudhon gives "preponderance, 
sometimes excessive, to the principle of freedom over authority”. Therefore, Proudhon considers 
“most of the federalist competences must belong to the local authorities”. In his opinion, federal 
authority should have only competences such as "public education", a “federal army” and “the 
government of the banking system”. As we have found above, for Proudhon, we are condemned to 
representation, language, sign, communication or creation of space. This new kind of representation or 
mutualism is Proudhon’s proposal. As we have just said, we will further develop this Proudhonian 
political representation later (Chapter IV, pg: 135). 
67 As we have already studied, the Proudhonian order is series, symmetry, relation or the law that is the 
commutative contract, the manifestation of our common will. For Proudhon, to produce is to create 
order. 
68 For Proudhon, the law is the contract that is an expression of common will, as we have just 
discussed. So, the contract does not precede the experience, but succeeds it after practical verification, 
regarding the needs of those involved. Proudhon (2009:430) says, law signifies “to repeat an 
experiment, to observe a phenomenon, to state a fact”. As Préposiet (2007:190) affirms, “the law is not 
invented, it is discovered”. 
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independence means “the autonomy of the private reason” and derives from “the 
different talents and capacities”; proportionality belongs “to the sphere of intelligence 
or feelings and does not violate justice or social equality”. Proudhon (2009:433) 
summarizes, “anarchy is freedom” and freedom is also order or equality, law, 
independence and proportionality. And Proudhon (2009:433) concludes, freedom is 
anarchy because it does not admit “the governmental will, but just law authority, that 
is to say, necessity”. Then Proudhon explains, “right and duty are born in ourselves 
from necessity” and necessity means “the need to eat and sleep: to get the needed 
things to sleep and to eat is a right and it is a duty to use them when nature asks; to 
work in order to live is a necessity; it is a right and a duty”. So, here, we could 
confirm our working hypothesis, to establish space is to survive. We would add: it is 
a right and a duty.69 For Proudhon, to create social space is to create anarchy or 
powerful, free, ordered and autonomous groups, legitimated by our ‘necessity’ in 
order to survive - the Kantian here and now. In short, Proudhonian anarchy is the 
constitution of free, fair, localized and autonomous spaces here and now, regarding 
our needs, desires or dreams.  
In the next sub-chapter, we are going to study the Foucauldian concept of 
space. 
 
2. Michel Foucault: space, necessity and movement.  
 
In this sub-chapter, we are going to study the Foucauldian concept of space and also 
the concepts of necessity and movement. We consider the concepts of necessity and 
movement to be inherent in the Foucauldian concept of space (and we will show this 
in the following discussion).  
The Kantian framework also inspires this chapter. As we have already stated 
in the previous chapter, Kant is a great inspiration for Foucault and, according to 
Foucault, he was the first author who was concerned with his time and driven to 
contribute to it through his work. And, in turn, Foucault has helped us to better know 
this Kantian spatial framework understood as the here and now – the today. So, in 
this sub-chapter, we are closing the circle between Kant and Foucault and showing 
how Kant helps us to know Foucault. Our main goal is to analyse the Foucauldian                                                         
69 The Proudhonian necessity is not just a lack. It could be excess or a dream and it is mainly a right 
and a duty. 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 99 
space, movement and necessity through this Kantian framework, understanding the 
Foucauldian space and time as the ‘here and now’.  
Since it is also our intention to compare the thoughts of Proudhon and 
Foucault in terms of space, necessity and movement in the conclusion, at the end of 
this Chapter III, we will adopt the same structure used for the Proudhonian sub-
chapter here, with one small difference. As before, we will analyse the Foucauldian 
space in three perspectives: transcendental, social and material. Nevertheless, this 
time, we will start with the transcendental space because (i) the Kantian ‘here and 
now’ is a fundamental goal of Foucault’s work, as we are going to see; (ii) we have 
already analyzed some features of the Foucauldian ‘here and now’, in the discussion 
of the Kantian framework (Chapter II); and (iii) for Foucault, the social space and the 
material or real space is the same space. Both spaces are social, because power70 
relations or force relations constitute both spaces, as we are going to see. And both 
spaces are also material, because two parts constitute each of those relations: a formal 
one and a material one (Deleuze 2012:78,79). The formal one is, as we have 
discussed above, the a priori power, the “pure function” which is “grasped regardless 
the concrete forms in which it is embodied” (Deleuze 2012:78,79). The material one 
is “the pure matter, unformed,71 taken independently of the formed substances, the 
beings or qualified objects” (Deleuze, 2012:79). This “pure matter” is the matter 
before the action that will affect it.72 Thus, all social space is material space because 
“each force is defined by its power to affect other forces … and to be affected by 
other forces” (Deleuze, 2012:78). Beyond these pure form and pure matter that 
constitute power relations, in our perspective, this social or material space could also 
be divided in two ways: (i) the social-material or the ‘we’, designated just as ‘social 
space’; (ii) the material-social space beyond the ‘we’, designated just as ‘material 
space’. For that reason, in terms of argument organization, it is important to discuss 
them one after the other.  
So, this sub-chapter is organized in three sections. In the first part, we will 
study Foucauldian transcendental space. In the second, we will analyse Foucauldian 
social space. In the third part, we will discuss Foucauldian material space.  
We begin with Foucauldian transcendental space.                                                         
70 We will develop the concept of power later (pg: 218). 
71 We could find here some similarities with Proudhonian matter. 
72 For Deleuze (2012:79), this Foucauldian pure matter is “a physics of the first bare matter”. 
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Foucault: transcendental space 
In this section, we are going to study Foucauldian transcendental space. Perhaps, at 
first glance, Foucault would not identify himself with the title of this sub-chapter. For 
Foucault (1969:277,278), transcendental signifies the “crisis” of our time. According 
to the author, this crisis means the failure of phenomenology, Marxism and 
liberalism. And phenomenology, Marxism and liberalism failed because they 
identified themselves with this Kantian transcendental reflection (or transcendental 
subject). So, consequently, the transcendental concept failed too (Foucault, 2012b). 
Foucault (2012b, 1969:277) explains, the transcendental is linked with the questions73 
about the origins of knowledge, about the origins of discourse, about “hidden laws” 
or about big final events. Foucault (2014) clarifies, those “questions about the present 
have been comparisons between the present and the past, inquiries about our decline, 
about the “announcement of a new age”, or about “the arrival of the promised last 
days”. For Foucault (2012b, 1969:277), with those questions, the transcendentalism 
of Kant opened the door to phenomenology, to Marxism and to liberalism.  
 
During the years 1945-1965 (I am referring to Europe), there was a 
certain way of thinking correctly, a certain style of political discourse, a 
certain ethics of the intellectual. One had to be on familiar terms with 
Marx, not let one’s dreams stray too far from Freud. And one had to treat 
sign (systems - the signifier) with great respect (Foucault, 2013:XI) 
 
After the apogee of Marx, Freud, phenomenology and political representation 
(liberalism), the crisis and the critique of 1968 arrives to the European world: 
 
At the gates of our world, there was Vietnam, of course … But here, 
inside our walls, what exactly was taking place? … A movement toward 
political struggles that no longer conformed to the model that Marxist 
tradition had prescribed … (a movement) toward an experience and a 
technology of desire that were no longer Freudian. … The combat shifted 
and spread into new zones (Foucault (2013:XI)                                                         
73 We have referred the main Kantian philosophical questions above. 
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Facing the crisis and after the failure of “the Marxist end of the line” and the 
phenomenological “academic concrete”, in the same context of Kantian 
transcendentalism, Foucault wants to work another perspective on Kant, a May 68 
perspective, to explore the present, those “new zones”, and to find out or to set up 
‘other alternatives’, ‘other subjectivities’ or ‘other spaces’, as we are going to see 
later. Foucault (2013:XI) is not “concerned with why this or that” but “with how to 
proceed”74 or with the non-Freudian “desire”. And this non-Freudian desire is ‘desire 
here and now’, ‘the other’ Kantian perspective (the perspective of May 68) or the 
transcendental idealism of Foucault, as we are going to study below. 
Kant is, indeed, a strong influence on Foucault. And, Foucault (1994a, 2012b) 
embraces this influence. Foucault (1994a, 2012b) explains his whole work is inspired 
by the Kantian interrogation of the present - the reality of eighteenth century Prussia - 
or the Enlightenment. Foucault (2012b) argues to ask “what is enlightenment?” is the 
same as demanding, “what is happening around us?” and this is the question that 
inspired his work. With this Kantian question “philosophy acquired a certain task it 
did not have before” (Foucault 1994a, 2012b). According to Foucault (2012b), 
Kantian philosophy launched the search into “who we are”, “what is our present or 
our actuality?” and “what is it today?” (Foucault, 2012b). Foucault also searched in 
this way. 
As a result, Foucault supports the Kantian ‘here and now’ or the Kantian a 
priori ‘space and time’. Foucault (2012b) asks, “what is this ‘instant’ that is our 
today, the reality?” Foucault (2012b) answers, this “instant”, is a “fundamental 
intuition” (a priori). The author (2012b) contextualizes, according to Kant, “the 
consistency of his work is linked to a circumstance that belongs to all of us, to a 
‘fundamental intuition’”. So, this “fundamental intuition” is also the Foucauldian a 
priori that means necessity or desire - the non-Freudian desire.75 As we have just 
discussed, the Kantian a priori space and time is necessary and universal, or is that 
‘instant’, or the desire, here and now, to live or to die.76 Thus, for Foucault too, this 
intuition is universal and necessary, as we have just affirmed.                                                          
74 This “how to proceed” is neither a lack – a negativity - nor a explanation about the why, the 
fundaments, but an affirmation. 
75 Here we confirm our working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive. 
76  As we have seen above, this fundamental intuition is the concept that distinguishes Kant’s 
transcendental idealism from Leibniz’s transcendental realism (Janiak, 2012). 
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And why does Foucault consider this intuition universal? Foucauldian 
intuition is universal because it is linked to the body. For Foucault, everybody (every-
body) has a body, that is, as we just analysed above, the “zero point” or “the strategic 
point” from which we organize our life in order to survive. And this body is strategic 
because we have, a priori or innate, this ‘fundamental intuition’ that allows us to 
process the world that affects us in terms of space and time - pure form + pure matter. 
It is this body or this ‘fundamental intuition’ that permits us to ask about the actuality 
in order to have a better life and not to die. So, this body is universal because 
everybody has a body and, according to Kant (1969:26), as we have already said, 
universal signifies “no possible exception” or what ‘belongs to all of us’.  
Turning back to Foucault, why is this intuition necessary? The answer here is 
that, as we have just pointed out, this intuition is also a vital necessity or a capacity or 
a desire. And what does desire mean? For Foucault (2012), desire is a “force” or an 
energy that is explosive, a power that is widespread, multiple, ubiquitous and 
immanent.77  
For Foucault (2012, 2013:XII), as we have just seen, power signifies 
“relations between individuals - and not the Marxist superstructure - when one can 
determine the conduct of another, having a set of objectives”. Thus, Foucauldian 
necessity means desire or, better, an explosion of desire. And why is desire an 
explosion? As Kant (1969:26) teaches “necessity” is when something “could not 
possibly exist otherwise”, it is the point of no return (the Proudhonian revolution, as 
we have discussed above). So, when we are in need, we explode, because ‘it could 
not be otherwise’. We need to satisfy our necessities. Foucault (2012) explains, this is 
the ‘question of death’ and we do not want to die. This is our need of survival that 
leads us to act78 or to ask about the present, the here and now, as Kant and Foucault 
do.  
So, Foucault (2012,2014) supports Kant, in terms of space and time, utilizing 
the Kantian a priori ‘fundamental intuition’ as a method or an innate – immanent - 
capacity to organize his philosophical work regarding his necessity or the necessity of 
his epoch. Foucault (2012,2014) pretends to give a meaning to his individual present 
or to his philosophical task in order to contribute to a better social ‘today’ in the                                                         
77 We have identified above the Foucauldian power with the Proudhonian immanence. 
78 The concept of action and movement are fundamental in this thesis and, as we have said, they help 
to understand the concept of space. We will discuss them later in this sub-chapter. 
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western world. As we have written earlier, phenomenology, Marxism, and liberalism 
do not use this Kantian perspective. The difference between Foucault and the others 
is the approach he adopts. Foucault acts today and thinks in the present. The others 
look for the very beginning or the final goal. And Foucault (2012, 2013:XII) 
radicalizes this difference and considers that this new Kantian perspective has social 
and political consequences - as we are going to see later in Chapter IV (pg:135) - and 
has also three adversaries: (i) “the political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorist of 
theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse, 
bureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth”; (ii) “the poor technicians of 
desire – psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom”; (iii) fascism, 
the main adversary, “not only the historical fascism of Hitler and Mussolini … but 
also the fascism in all of us”.  In this point of view, we could conclude that Foucault 
is, like Kant, a transcendental idealist who works also on an a priori space and time, 
coming back to the source, the Kantian will to work ‘here and now’. Foucault 
proposes another trajectory from that a priori Kantian thought, taking into account 
the path already trodden by phenomenologists, Marxists and liberals. And this 
Foucauldian trajectory is “the analysis of practice” 79  here and now (Foucault, 
1969:277). Just like Kant wrote to the German periodical, Berlinische Monatschrift, 
so Foucault defines himself as “a journalist” or  “historian of the present”. Foucault 
(2014) wants to “have a certain role in the natural and spontaneous story of reason”. 
Through “his attention to the present” and through his “philosophy as a practice of 
‘radical journalism’, Foucault tries to transform the present reality” (Tazzioli et al, 
2015:1,2). This is his ‘transcendental’ spatial dimension. 
In the next section, we are going to analyse the Foucauldian concept of social 
space, including the Foucauldian concept of critique and movement. 
Foucault: social space 
In this section, we will study Foucauldian social space. We again utilise the Kantian a 
priori space and time, understood as the ‘here and now’. We are using our second 
hypothesis, to establish space is to survive, to contextualize our main hypothesis, 
Postanarchism is space constitution.  
                                                        
79 As Tazzioli et al (2015:1) remember, “whole Foucauldian work is about to “historicize power 
relations and to grasp them in their transformations”, for instance, in prisons, in hospitals, in hospices, 
etc 
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In this section, the Foucauldian concept of social is understood as the ‘we’ or 
the ‘a posteriori subject’80 (Tazzioli et al, 2015:2). Why is the Foucauldian social 
concept a “we” or an ‘a posteriori subject’? 
As we have said in the Introduction, the condition of postmodernity, which 
influenced Foucault’s thought, is the end of modernity or the end of the Enlightened 
Copernican revolution when human reason ceases to guarantee the self-confidence of 
man; in postmodernity there are no longer references; the earth turns away from the 
sun and man has left himself drifting in space (Frank, 1989a: 20-23). Nevertheless, in 
our perspective, for Foucault, we are not in postmodernity. We still are in modernity, 
although in his earlier works, Foucault “largely depends on notions taken from 
Nietzsche”, such as the idea of the subject, as unity, which is “dead” because it is 
created by “discourses, institutions and relations of power” 81  (Danaher et al, 
2000:116). Nevertheless, as Foucault (1980a) notes, his intention is really to step 
beyond modernity in a transformed way. With this goal, Foucault has recaptured the 
sun and now we are not drifting in space. And this intention to ‘exit from modernity’ 
causes, as Foucault (1980a) says, a “metamorphosis” or a transformation: we have 
found another kind of sun, another kind of subject or subjects. 
So, Foucault recaptures the sun and we recover the lost consciousness82 of 
ourselves, although “absolutely dependent” and as “somehow determined” (Frank, 
1989a: 90). As we are going to discuss hereinafter, Foucault recuperates the subject.83 
For Foucault, to be a subject has three meanings: subject, subjectivity and the 
subjectivation (Revel 2016).  
First of all, the subject is the sovereign facing an object, this object being 
another person or another being, for instance, the non-human beings or nature in 
general. However, Foucault criticizes this Kantian subject and also phenomenology, 
Marxism and liberalism which presuppose this sovereign, vertical and hierarchical 
subject far from his object. As Gros (2014:54) argues, Foucault is “the prophet of 
man’s death”. For Foucault, the vertical subject or “the man” is about to end. 
According to Foucault, “man has not always existed”; it is a “recent invention” and                                                         
80 Our philosophical term. 
81 The ‘I’ is a set of geography, history, society, politics, culture, arts and so on (Eribon, 2016). 
82 We understand here the term 'consciousness' in its modern sense, created by Kant (Libera, 2014). 
For Kant, consciousness, subjectivity, subject, a priori - space and time, we are studying -, 
transcendental, the self or ideality oppose to objectivity, the object, the a posteriori, the transcendent, 
the effectiveness or the real thing (Libera, 2014). 
83 We are going to develop the concept of subject or the ‘self’ later in Chapter IV (pg:133). 
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“should disappear soon”, as a “face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault, 
1966, Deleuze, 2012:131,139). For Foucault (1966), “man is not the oldest or the 
most constant problem that is posed to human knowledge”; “it was not around him 
and his secrets that, for a long time, obscurely, knowledge spun”. Man corresponds to 
“a new configuration of knowledge” that arises in the nineteenth century (Gros, 
2014:55). In Foucault’s (1966) perspective, man is “the effect of a change in the 
fundamental provisions of knowledge”, for instance, with phenomenology, 
capitalism, liberalism and Marxism, as we have noted above. Foucault shares with 
Nietzsche his stance on man. For Foucault (1966), Nietzsche does not only announce 
“the absence or the death of God”, but also “the end of man”. According to Foucault 
(1966), “the death of God and the Last Man are bound up”. 
Secondly, the subject can also be a “subjectivity”, an essence or an identity 
(Revel, 2016). This “subjectivity” is the subjugated person that becomes an object. 
For Foucault (1982), to subjugate is to make the subject an object or a crystallization, 
a definition, something that does not evolve, as we have already studied. All of 
Foucault’s work is about this “objectification of the subject” and its “dividing 
practices”, for instance, “sharing between the mad and the sane man, the sick and the 
healthy individual, the criminal and the ‘nice guy’” (Foucault, 1982).  
So, thirdly, Foucault’s main goal is to fight those divisions in order to unveil 
something different, new ways of life (Bounache, 2013:139). As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1977: 27) say, Foucault’s intention is “to express another potential 
community” and “to forge the means for another consciousness”, for “another 
sensibility”. Foucault criticizes the vertical subject and proposes an ‘other subject’ 
that has an equal and free relation with the other beings, whether human or 
nonhuman, as we have seen. It is an ongoing definition or a subjectivation. This 
‘other consciousness’ or ‘other subject’ could be understood, for instance, as the 
emergence of the abnormalities or, in the last instance, of “the monstrosity”. The 
monster is the subject that “undermines the prohibitions of the civil, religious and 
divine law” and “forces the law to question its very foundations”, because the 
monstrosity “alludes to another reference system” (Foucault, 1999: 59). “It creates 
disorder in order”, the man dies and the Nietzschean superman - the monster - is born 
(Bounache, 2013:139; Foucault, 1999:59).  
And Deleuze (2012:131,139) adds, “it can be predicted that forces in man 
cannot combine necessarily in a man-form, but can invest up differently, in another 
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compound, in another form”. And this new compound could be the Nietzschean 
superman indeed (Deleuze, 2012:131,139). Deleuze (2012:139) explains, “Foucault is 
like Nietzsche, he indicates just drafts, in an embryological sense, not yet functional. 
Nietzsche said: man imprisoned life, the superman is he who frees life in man 
himself, in favour of another form”. So, for Foucault, this death of man is not a 
“tragedy”, but a “liberation regarding the humanist ideology” (Gros, 2014:56). 
Foucault affirms, “for all those who still have questions about what man’s essence is 
... we can only oppose a philosophical laugh” (Gros, 2014:56).84 
This ongoing definition or a subjectivation or combination of forms shows 
also the subject is dependent or has a dependent body. Both, subject and body are as a 
constitutive nothing or a process or a devir. They depend absolutely on the exterior 
world to realize themselves. In another way, we could summarise that, for Foucault, 
the recovered consciousness of ourselves has four main features: it is ‘dependent’, 
‘free’, ‘determined’ and ‘not sovereign’.  
Consciousness is ‘absolutely dependent’ because, in ontological and 
epistemological terms, “the self is the basis of its own self-knowledge, but not the 
basis of its own Being (and not even of the Being of its self-knowledge)” (Frank, 
1989a: 90). Consciousness ceases to be its own foundation and starts being the 
foundation of its own projects (Frank, 1989b: 87). 85  
And what does this ontological path mean practically, in ethical and political 
terms? It means that, ethically, the subject is limitlessly free. As Heidegger adds, this 
“inescapable dependence of Dasein presents no limit to its freedom” and to “its own 
projects” (Frank, 1989a: 87,88). The consciousness is “necessarily situated and 
dependent”, because there is a ‘not’ which is constitutive of this self and “the 
character of this ‘not’ as a ‘not’ may be defined existentially” (Frank, 1989a: 88,92). 
The self is essentially “nullity-nonetheless”. As Frank (1989a: 88,92) concludes, as 
‘nullity-nonetheless’, “the self … we are does not possess itself;86 one could say that 
it ‘happens’”. So, its projects ‘happen’ with no limit, freely, and, it is “irrelevant” 
how the self determines itself (Frank, 1989a:  87,88,90). All possibilities are opened. 
Politically, this means the self has not “the exclusive and instantaneous right” 
to sovereignty, because consciousness, as we have just said, being a dependent “not”                                                         
84 Here Foucault criticized Sartre (Gros, 2014:56). 
85 As we have just said, we are going to develop the ontological and ethical path of the Foucauldian 
subject later (Chapter IV, pg: 135). 
86 This possession here means property. 
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or a dependent “nullity-nonetheless”, does not possess itself (Foucault, 1969: 283). It 
needs to determine itself. In his later works Foucault draws further this non-sovereign 
subject. Foucault (1984:91) explains that the subject has a “self control” - maitrise de 
soi - and this self-control is like a “possession”, but this possession is not “a mastered 
force”, an established identity or essence or a “sovereignty over a potency that is 
ready to revolt; it is a pleasure one takes in oneself.” This is a “work of art”: “life 
should be lived and performed – determination - as a work of art”87 (Danaher et al, 
2000:117). For Foucault (1984:91), this self-possession or self-control just exists 
because the other and the exterior world exist as conditions of possibility. This 
possession means a “perpetual and serene” self-possession88 and a plurality, as we are 
going to explore later in the Chapter IV (pg135). 
And how does the self determine itself in society? The subject determines 
himself 89  through the sign. As for Proudhon, Foucault also sees the ‘subject’ 
completely condemned to signs or representation in a novel way. For Foucault, the 
exterior world is the sine qua non condition of the subject, as we have already said. 
And, according to Foucault, the sign inhabits this sine qua non outside world, and 
also the interior dimension of thought, the a priori, the strategic or transcendental 
space or power. Foucault’s sign is the true way we can realise ourselves, create and 
work. For Foucault, there is a close relationship between power  (a priori) and 
knowledge (a posteriori) and the sign illustrates this relationship - this mix. 90 
Foucault considers that the sign, being a consequence of power, is the truth (Call, 
2002:51; Foucault, 1994; Frank, 1998b: 102-109). For Foucault, in terms of sign, the 
political or power dimension is the other side of the epistemological dimension. So, 
what is Foucault’s sign? How can it be the truth?  
                                                        
87 We will explore this aesthetic perspective later in Chapter IV (pg: 133) 
88 We will develop this idea of self-possession in Chapter IV (pg: 133). In turn, as we have just said, 
the Foucauldian self as “nullity” does not possess itsef. It is dependent and non-sovereign. 
Nevertheless, as we are going to see, for Foucault, just ‘my self’ can be an object in relation to ‘my 
self’ in terms of dependent self-government. The other ‘selves’ should not be objects or should not be 
subjected to ‘my self’. They should not be slaves, because, as Bernaz (2014:244) explains, “Foucault’s 
power constrains insofar as it succeeds in producing, in the very act of coercion, the subject on which 
it exercises itself”. So, if ‘my self’ was an object for ‘me’, ‘I’ could possess ‘my non-sovereign self’ in 
order to produce ‘myself’ as free subject - always in a dependent and serene way.  
89 We use the masculine form in this chapter and in the next chapters because it is the form adopted by 
the authors (Proudhon, Foucault and Newman) who do not develop the gender issue nor have a 
feminist perspective, as we will analyze in Chapter IV (pg: 133) and Chapter V (pg: 229). 
90 In terms of novel representation, Foucault presupposes an “audio-visual battle”, as we are going to 
study below in this section (Deleuze, 2012:119). 
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We begin by answering the first question: what is Foucault’s sign? For 
Foucault (1994: 58), in classical age, the sign could be defined according to three 
variables:  
 
first the certainty of the relation: a sign may be so constant that one can 
be sure of its accuracy … but it may also be simply probable … Second, 
the type of relation: a sign may belong to the whole that it denotes or be 
separate from it … Third,  the origin of the relation: a sign may be 
natural … or conventional. 
 
According to Foucault (1994:63,64) these variables show the close relation 
between sign and thought:  
 
these variables show that the relation of the sign to its content is not 
guaranteed by the order of things in themselves. The relation of the sign 
to the signified now resides in a space in which there is no longer any 
intermediary figure to connect them: what connects them is a bond 
established, inside Knowledge, between the idea of one thing and the 
idea of another”…. In fact, the signifying element has no content, no 
function, and no determination other than what it represents: it is 
entirely ordered upon and transparent to it 
 
Sign depends on thought - the inside.91 Thought is its content. In turn, thought 
depends on the sign to realize itself, as we have already outlined above and as the 
second quote shows.92 As Foucault (1994:64) recalls, “in its simple state as an idea, 
or an image, or a perception, associated with or substituted for another, the signifying 
element is not a sign. It becomes a sign only on condition that it manifests … the 
relation that links it to what it signifies”. For this reason, sign and thought 
communicate in a “space without intermediary”. Their relation is immediate and 
transparent. Thought communicates through sign. The sign is an extension of 
thought.                                                          
91 This ‘inside’ is an a priori that is already outside. We could say that thought is the need or the 
strategic a priori + ideas stimulated by the exterior world (pure form + pure matter). 
92 This mutual dependence is the audio-visual battle, we have already referred above and we are going 
to study from now on. 
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In another way, for Foucault, the sign is the “to be - to know” that could be 
subdivided in two ways: a “being-language” and a “being-light” 93  (Deleuze, 
2012:119). The “being-language” is the “enunciation” and the “being-light” is the 
“visibility” (Deleuze, 2012:119). They are different, but they are also “interlaced”, 
not “chained”, because there is not an “intentionality” (sovereignty) between the two, 
rather than a “strategy” (a power strategy) or a “reversible intentionality” in “both 
directions” (Deleuze, 2012:119,121). For Foucault, “to see and to say is to know”, but 
“we do not see what we say and we do not say what we see” (Deleuze, 2012:117). 
For Foucault, there is a “battle” between these “irreducible opponents”, the audio-
visual battle, although Foucault considers that the “enunciation” has primacy over the 
“visibility” (Deleuze, 2012:74,119). So, the sign or the space - our creations - is this 
permanent battle between the ‘to say’, the enunciation, and the ‘to see’, the visibility, 
being the sign primordially enunciation.  
Now we turn to the second question: how can the sign be the truth? The sign 
is the truth because, as we have just said, the sign is an extension of thought (a priori 
or need + ideas + signifier) or a “being language”. For Foucault, to tell the truth is to 
communicate our thought. For Foucault (2008:9), telling the truth is parrhesia - the 
truth telling - that, etymologically, is the Greek “activity that consists in telling 
everything”. To practice parrhesia is “to hide nothing and to tell what is true” 
(Foucault, 2008:10). According Foucault (2008:11), “the parrhesiast gives his 
opinion, he tells what he thinks - he does not lie - he personally signs, as it was, the 
truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he is consequently bound to it and 
by it”.94  
So, according to Foucault (2008:11), “parrhesia, the act of truth, requires: 
first, the manifestation of a fundamental bond between the truth told and the thought 
of the person who told it; (second), a challenge to the bond between the two 
interlocutors - the person who tells the truth and the person to whom this truth is 
addressed”. Parrhesia or the act of truth is also a collective act, as we are going to see 
later (Chapter IV, pgs: 159).  
To sum up, the sign is the truth and when we create signs, for instance,                                                         
93  As Deleuze (2012:121) points out, the Foucauldian “being” is threefold - “three ontologies”: 
“knowledge”, “power” and the “self. 
94 For Foucault, the sign is a signature that bonds and represents what we think or our agreement. The 
signature - the sign - ‘signifies’ our truth, because to tell the truth – Parrhesia - means to communicate 
or to represent what we think.  
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Foucault’s books, we are telling the truth because we fabricate ourselves, we 
determine ourselves according to our will, need or desire, as Foucault (1980a) says: 
 
The people who read me, especially those who appreciate what I do, 
they often say to me, laughing: ‘Basically, you know that what you say 
is fiction’. I always answer, ‘Of course, there is no question that this is 
anything other than fiction’.  
 
And Foucault (1980a) continues: 
 
the essential issue is not whether the observations are true or historically 
verifiable, but rather the experience that the book can offer. But this 
experience is neither true nor false. Experience is always a fiction; this is 
something that allows us to fabricate ourselves. It is something that does not 
exist before, but exists afterwards. That is the difficult relationship to truth.  
 
Thus, we ‘need’ fiction (signs + thought) in order to say the truth, satisfying our 
‘necessity’, our strategies or our a priori will. We need representations of our will 
(the truth) or, we could say, we need an aesthetic (cultural) and spatial dimension. 
The sign and the truth are synonyms of the subject determination or of the 
subject de-individuation. As we have just studied, the sign and the truth are a 
collective practice, a practice that depends on the other (the exterior world) and, at the 
same time, allows our self-creation (aesthetic dimension). The production of signs is 
a direct - immediate and transparent - production (Foucault, 1994: 63,64). To create 
signs means to open transparent direct and virtual spaces without intermediaries, and 
collectively, spaces where we express our thinking, our imagination, our utopias and 
our dreams. Sign allows thought to materialize95 itself and to determine itself. Or, to 
put it in another way, the subject depends on sign - exterior world - because the sign 
is the ‘self’ - or the subject - that determines himself in a transcendent way through 
language – sign - or through the signified being. Or, in another way, the being of the 
self, that is a devir, determines himself through sign (Frank, 1989b: 89,90).  
                                                        
95 We are going to study the spiritual dimension of the self later in Chapter IV (pg:133). 
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The subject is dependent because he “interacts symbolically in order to 
perceive objects, to relate them to other objects, to differentiate them from other 
objects: in short, to determine and differentiate his world” (Frank, 1989a: 92). These 
signs are the conditions of possibility of the subject existence or “the conditions of 
his production” (Frank, 1989a: 91). Foucault (1980a) gives again an example how the 
books or the signs - that are the ‘self’ that determines in a transcendent way - 
transform himself or his being: 
 
I never think quite the same for the reason that my books are for me 
experiences, in a sense that I want those experiences the fullest possible. 
Experience is something that gets you out of yourself ... I write them 
because I do not know yet exactly what to think on this thing I would 
like so much to think. So, this book transforms myself and transforms 
what I think. Each book transforms what I had thought when I finished 
the previous book. 
 
As Foucault says, the signs are ‘experiences’ here and now. Through signs we 
transform the other and transform ourselves.  
In turn, “the signs, through whose application we theoretically and practically 
survey – articulate - reality, (transform) and determine ourselves, are put at our 
disposal by structure96 that is exterior to us” (Frank, 1989a: 93). We do not create the 
sign in its entirety. It is created by us - our thoughts - and by society. This is the 
reason the subject is not “the proprietor or primary authority of the discursive field” 
or of the signs (Frank, 1989a: 92). There is joint authorship. The subject is not 
‘proprietor’ (it is dependent) because there is “a certain order of discourse”97 (the 
signs, the exterior world or the culture of a certain time) which is exterior to the                                                         
96 For Foucault (1984a) structuralism is “the effort to establish, between elements that could have been 
connected on a temporal axis, an ensemble of relations that makes them appear as juxtaposed, set off 
against one another, implicated by each other - that makes them appear, in short, as a sort of 
configuration”. This configuration or set of relations is the structure. According to Foucault, this kind 
of effort has the subject as centre or is an affirmation of the primacy of the modern subject, which 
Foucault wants to dissolve. In question, for Foucault, as we have seen, are Marxism, existentialism and 
phenomenology. 
97 For Foucault (1994:XX), order is “given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that 
determines the way they confront one another, and also that has no existence except in a grid created 
by a glance, an examination, a language”. The order is a relationalism or aprioristic relations between 
people, animals and things, the Kantian space and time strategic grid that allows us to organize the 
world. 
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subject (Frank, 1989a: 91). This “order of discourse” implants into the subject “the 
gaze for (his) world” (Frank, 1989a: 91). The society - “a certain order of discourse” - 
or the others give us the needed devices - “the gaze” - which allows us to create the 
world and ourselves. 
According to Foucault (1969:283), the signs or the conditions of possibility of 
the discourse are not “determinations that are imposed from the outside into the 
individual thought, nor do they inhabit it previously”. For Foucault, the signs - that 
inhabit outside the self - are neither oppressive nor impositions. They are “the set of 
conditions under which a practice is exercised” and “through which this practice 
gives rise partially or totally to new statements, through which this practice can be 
modified”; the signs do not impose “limits onto the subject initiatives”; those 
conditions are “the field where these practices are articulated” freely, the rules that 
these initiatives utilize and the relationships that support these practices; the signs are 
stimulus and reciprocities (Foucault, 1969: 283).  
Foucault (1969:283) just aims to show the “complexity and thickness” of 
discursive practices. According to Foucault (1969:283), speaking is not just 
expressing what we think and know; it is not also playing with the structures of a 
language: speaking is to put together a statement in an existing set of statements. It is 
“a complicated and costly gesture” which involves conditions and rules (Foucault, 
1969: 283). Foucault (1969: 283) aims to show that changing the order of speech is 
not only to add new ideas, a bit of creativity, invention and another mentality; it is 
more than that. It means changing a practice and possibly the neighboring practices 
and their common articulation (Foucault, 1969: 283). For Foucault, “changing the 
order of speech” is to create a new provisional order. So, Foucault does not deny the 
possibility of transformed speech. Foucault (1980a) gives writing books as an 
example. Treating Foucault’s books as an experience, as we have just seen, this 
experience allows the Foucauldian transformation, his realization or his 
determination, and more than that, the transformation and the realization of others, or 
better, others can have this experience too. So, the subject can intervene, participate 
and transform society and it is, as we have just observed, “a complicated and costly 
gesture” or a ‘fight’98  (a force relation or pure form vs. pure matter) or an agonistic 
                                                        
98 We are going to study this concept of ‘fight’ later in Chapter IV (pgs: 133, 139-141). 
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gesture that creates new spaces or new orders that are also changeable (the 
Foucauldian cyclical vision) (Foucault 1969: 283; Pickett, 1996: 464).  
For Foucault, the sovereign subject is an “impossibility” because there is an 
“experience limit” or an excess that prevents the contours of any subject; the subject 
has no identity and he is as an “eternal return” (again the cyclical vision); subjectivity 
pops and dissociates itself by proposing “another way of speaking, acting and 
thinking” (“de-individuation”) (Fernández, 2010:43). 
In turn, Foucault wants to remove the “instantaneous and exclusive 
sovereignty” of the subject. Foucault (1969:275) pretends “to free the history of 
thought from its transcendental subjection”. Foucault does not support the a priori, 
sovereign and independent Kantian subject, because, as we have analyzed before, for 
Kant, the subject and its knowledge are independent of the exterior world. As we 
have already examined, the conditions of possibility of knowledge for Kant are the a 
priori, the universal and necessary forms of sensibility, space and time or the here 
and now, that which we are working on; they also refer to the categories of 
understanding and the ideas of reason that are beyond the scope of our thesis. This set 
of Kantian possibilities is internal to the subject and does not depend on experience. 
Nevertheless, for Foucault, the subject is a posteriori or dependent of the exterior 
world and no sovereign. We will complete this idea of Foucault’s subject in Chapter 
IV (pg: 135). 
The Foucauldian goal is, first, “to let the history of thought unfold through 
anonymity,”99 because the creator shares propriety and because to create is mainly a 
collective experience, as we have just seen. For Foucault, as above noted, the subject 
is not proprietor of its knowledge, but co-proprietor. It always shares its knowledge 
and its creations with the other and the exterior world, because the other and the 
exterior world are the conditions of possibility of its knowledge and of its creations, 
as we have been saying. Second, Foucault aims to prevent the imposition of the 
subject form by a transcendental constitution. Foucault pretends to avoid the self-
                                                        
99 According to Danaher et al (2000:8), this anonymity or “death of the author” is an influence of 
Nietzsche, as we have said above, and also of structuralism. For structuralists, ideas and activities are 
produced by structures and, for that reason, people are not really free. In our opinion, Foucault does 
not coincide with structuralism. For Foucault, the subject is free and is not dead as we are going to see 
in Chapter IV (pg:133). As far as Foucault is concerned, (i) structuralism cannot explain everything’s 
meaning; it can just analyse the “relevant” relationships (for instance, structuralism cannot explain 
what has been repressed); (ii) structuralism is not aware of “change and discontinuity”; (iii) 
structuralism can explain the rules, but not people activities (Danaher et al, 2000:8,9). 
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sufficiency or the totalitarianism of the a priori Kantian subject. In terms of 
sovereignty, as we are going to study later (Chapter IV, pg: 135), for Foucault, the 
subject has power, but this power is an effective power just when the subject 
exercises it a posteriori or through practice. In brief, Foucault (1969: 275) pretends to 
deprive “all transcendental narcissism”. For Foucault (1969: 275), man is not the 
centre of the world as Kant and his successors argue.   
So, according to Foucault, “consciousness is a feature of relations between 
elements” and not between a central I and an object (Frank, 1989a: 96). There is not a 
pure human consciousness or essence or a closed identity disconnected from the 
world. For Foucault, there is this “feature of relations” and this devir in the human 
consciousness. For that reason, Foucault (1969:277) departs from anthropological 
thought and humanist ideology and instead of questioning the human being, he turns 
to the analysis of practice and the experience with the other. 
As Foucault explains, the goal is to decentre the absolute or a priori subject or 
the centered subject. According to Foucault (1969:278), the aim is to accomplish “a 
decentering which leaves any center without privileges”. Nevertheless, an a 
posteriori subject, a ‘decentering’ centre, still exists. Foucault recaptures the sun that 
is a ‘decentering’ sun, an ‘explosive’ sun. As Foucault (1980a) illustrates, 
“questioning the subject means to experiment something that would lead to his real 
destruction, dissociation, its explosion, his returning into something else”. And 
“something else” means the a posteriori subject.100 
In The Order of Things, in the purpose of the sixteenth century similitude101 
and aemulatio,102 Foucault (1994:20) explains that:  
 
It pertains to the firmament of man to be ‘free and powerful’, to ‘bow to 
no order’ and ‘not to be ruled by any other created beings’. His inner 
sky may remain autonomous and depends only upon itself, but on 
condition that by means of his wisdom, which is also knowledge, takes 
                                                        
100 We will continue to study the development of this “subjectivation” – the spiritual and ethical path - 
in the Chapter IV (pg: 133). 
101 According to Foucault (1994: 17), similitude is a kind of resemblance that, in the sixteenth century, 
is the drive that “organize the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and 
invisible and controlled the art of representing them”. 
102 For Foucault (1994:19) Aemulatio is a kind of similitude or “a sort of ‘convenience’ that has been 
freed from the law of place and is able to function without motion from a distance”. Aemulatio has 
“something of reflection and mirror” (Foucault, 1969:19). 
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it back into himself and thus recreates in this inner firmament the sway 
of that other firmament in which he sees the glitter of the visible stars. 
  
For Foucault, the subject is not an Absolute because man reflects the various 
relationships of the world. As Foucault says, the subject exists as “inner sky”, as a 
mirror that reflects “the sway” and “the glitter of the visible stars”. In political terms, 
for Foucault (2013:XIV), to deprive “all transcendental narcissism” or the 
decentering or the explosion of the sun means an encounter with the other or a “de-
individualization”:103 
 
What is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and 
displacement, diverse combinations. The group is not the organic bond 
uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-
individualization. 
 
For Foucault, the individual is not a closed organism, but an opened set or an 
element of several groups that create permanently another set of opened groups. 
Foucault (2013: XIII, XIV) aims to free political action from fascism and “all forms 
of totalizing paranoia”, because “the individual is the product of power” and, for the 
author, we should “not become enamored of power”. So Foucault (2013: XIII) asks:  
 
How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one 
believes oneself to be revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech 
and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret 
out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior? 
 
Foucault (2013:XIV) then writes the recipe: we should “prefer what is 
positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile 
arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but 
nomadic”.104 We need to understand ourselves as a “we” or a ‘mobile or nomadic I’. 
So, as Foucault (1984:2) explains, the subject (a posteriori) belongs to “a certain                                                         
103 In his later works, Foucault concludes this idea of “de-individualization”, showing how this “de-
individual” is an “other subject” or a changeable subject. We are going to study this in the Chapter IV 
(pg:135). 
104 We have studied the nomadic space in The State of The Art. 
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‘we’, a ‘we’ that belongs to a distinctive cultural group of his own today”. Tazzioli et 
al (2015:1,2) add, Foucault, as a historian of the present, establishes himself as a 
“we” and introduces an “ontology of ourselves”. As we have seen, Foucault, as a 
radical journalist and as a philosopher, inspired by the Kantian here and now, intends 
to transform the actual, social and collective reality, leaving, for that reason, “the 
boundaries and the meaning of the pronoun ‘our’ quite elusive” (Tazzioli et al, 
2015:1,2). For Foucault, “the present we belong to … is … what needs to be 
produced and re-enacted from time to time, not simply as singular subjectivities but 
along with the others who share ‘our present’” (Tazzioli et al, 2015:1,2). And ‘to 
share our present with others’ is, in fact, the Foucauldian goal. Foucault (2012b) 
admits that, facing today’s crisis, his intention is to contribute to a ‘new light’ in the 
western world: “there is a moment where the evidences are fogged, the lights turn off 
and the evening falls. People realize they act in darkness and a new light is necessary, 
a new illumination, new rules of behaviour”. Foucault, as a ‘we’, wants to start again 
and, with his writings and work, to enlighten his present and the present of his 
contemporaries. Thus, for Foucault, ‘social’ means a collective, elusive and shared 
“we”. 
And space, what does it signify to Foucault? As we have stated before, for 
Foucault, space means ‘here’. And, translating this ‘here’ to social language, this 
‘here’ or space means also ‘we’ (‘here’ or the body or topia + exterior world = a 
posteriori subject). For Foucault, social and space are synonyms, meaning ‘we’. For 
Foucault, the space is always social and virtual. As Foucault (1984a, 2001: 1572) 
defines, space is a set of relations of proximity between points or elements or 
neighbourhood relations described as “series, trees, or grids”.105 For Foucault (2001: 
1573,1574), this is  
 
(the) outside space … by which we launch out ourselves, where 
precisely takes place the erosion of our lives, our time and our history, 
this space that erodes us and puckers us, it is also a heterogeneous 
space. We ... do not live in a kind of void ... we live inside a set of 
relations … that are irreducible to one another and absolutely not 
superimposable.                                                          
105  According to Danaher et al (2000:7), the Foucauldian concept of relational space could be 
influenced also by structuralism that understands the “meaning” as “relational”.  
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It is this outside106 space, or social space or “we” that we are studying in this 
section.  
And, as we have just concluded, this Foucauldian social-ontological position 
about space has political consequences. The conceptual ‘we’ is fundamental to 
understand Foucauldian thought about space and its political dimension, as we are 
going to probe right now. 
Thus, we could say that the ‘we’ solves the Foucauldian paradox that seems to 
exist in relation to the transcendental question. On the one hand, Foucault criticizes 
the transcendental a priori subject of Kant. On the other hand, Foucault adopts the 
Kantian ‘fundamental intuition’ - here and now - as inspiration of his philosophical 
task, also claiming a transcendental space. How could Foucault use something that he 
disdains and criticizes? How does the conceptual ‘we’ solve the Foucauldian 
paradox? 
As we have shown, Foucault advocates an a posteriori subject, completely 
dependent on the outside world due to the question of survival or death. As we have 
explained, “the self is not the basis of its own Being”; “the self … does not possess 
itself; … it ‘happens” (Frank, 1989a: 88,90,92). Nevertheless, for Foucault, this a 
posteriori subject has also a ‘fundamental intuition’, an ubiquitous and omnipresent a 
priori power, as we have just learned. And Foucault wears the skin of this 
paradoxical ‘transcendental a posteriori’ subject, when he says he is a ‘historian of 
the present’  (transcendental: survival) and he wants to participate (a posteriori: 
practice) in his time, contributing to a ‘new light’ in the society in which he lives (a 
posteriori world). Therefore, the Foucauldian ‘we’ personifies and solves this 
paradoxical ‘transcendental a posteriori subject’, which combines the a priori need to 
survive with the a posteriori world that also constitutes us. We have the need to 
survive in the world with the other. 
As Proudhon says, it is not worth trying to explain what is not created by 
man: a priori power (Paixão, 2015). 107 There are fundamental paradoxes that we do 
not understand but we must “conserve”, respect and let them to be as they are                                                         
106 We have already studied the Foucauldian concept of the inside or the transcendental space + ideas 
stimulated by the exterior world. And we will continue the study on this ‘inside’ later (Chapter IV, pg: 
135). For Foucault (2001:1573), the inside or unreal space is “the space of our first perceptions, of our 
dreams, of our passions” so far in this thesis. 
107 Paixão, Pedro, in: Elogio da Preguiça, Facebook, 2015. 
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(Paixão, 2015). Foucault has the same concern when he criticizes the 
phenomenologists, Marxists and liberals and questions the ‘origin’ and the ‘end’. It is 
not worth explaining the origin of this ‘fundamental intuition’ or Kantian power, this 
‘divine’ or immanent power that was born with the man but was not created by him. 
And here is the meeting point of Kant, Proudhon and Foucault. Kant is right; the 
‘intuition’ is a priori. And Foucault and Proudhon agree. However, it is this 
fundamental and inexplicable ‘intuition’ or ‘need’ that throws us to the exterior 
world, to others - civil religion - and leads us to create space in order to survive. This 
fundamental ‘intuition’ makes us ‘relationalists’ like Leibniz, Proudhon and Foucault. 
Digging this paradoxical intuition, such as phenomenology, Marxism and liberalism 
do, leads to the creation of a sovereign, vertical and hierarchical subject – principle - 
who falls into crisis as we are now observing. For Foucault, it is worth remembering, 
we are a Heideggerian dasein or a “being there”, a being in the world. 
After all, the sovereign, hierarchical and vertical subject, far from his object, 
is no longer sovereign or is no longer ‘proprietor’ (Foucault, 1969:275; Frank, 1989a: 
92,93). He was overthrown; He lost his place and he urgently needs a ‘light’ in order 
to build up a space. The sovereign subject is homeless and he needs to rethink and set 
up himself otherwise in order to survive.  
And it is here that the Foucauldian way of May 68 appears, as we have talked 
about above. It is here that the “other subjectivities” of Foucault arise (Foucault, 
1999:38,39,40; 2012:8,12,13; Bocquet, 2013:124; Bounache, 2013:139, Chevallier, 
2014:32,33). And Foucault shows those “other subjectivities” through this conceptual 
“we” or, as we have just studied, dependent, determined, free, and not sovereign a 
posteriori subject. The conceptual ‘we’ is a set of relations and this set of relations, 
for Foucault, is called ‘space’ and also ‘power’, the other side of space - the 
reconciliation of a priori and a posteriori. Tazzioli et al, (2015:7) highlight this 
relation of space and power: “Spaces of power: relations of power are always 
inscribed in space and contribute to the shaping of a certain spatial economy. By the 
same token, in Foucault’s view, spaces are eminently productive – of borders, of 
disciplining mechanisms and of differentiations: power of spaces”. And Foucault 
(2001: 1573,1574), as we have quoted, describes, what the ‘space’ or the “we” is: 
“this space that erodes us and puckers us, it is also a heterogeneous space. We ... do 
not live in a kind of void ... we live inside a set of relations … that are irreducible to 
one another and absolutely not superimposable”. Foucault (2013:XIII; 2013b:139) 
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summarizes, space is a set of positive, multiple, different, fluid, mobile, nomadic and 
productive relations that Foucault calls heterotopias, ‘other spaces’.  
And, what does the word heterotopia mean? Etymologically, hetero-topia 
comes from the Greek hetero or other and topos or place. So, heterotopia means 
‘other spaces’ (Foucault, 1984a). Foucault explains that heterotopia - or other spaces - 
is a kind of contestation of the space where we live; it is a real 108 space that is 
“something like counter-site” where “the real sites, all the other real sites that can be 
found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” 
(Foucault, 1984a). Heterotopias are “absolutely different from all the sites that they 
reflect and speak about” (Foucault, 1984a). Nevertheless, heterotopias work through 
relationships with the other sites that surround them (Foucault, 1984a). Heterotopias 
are places “outside of all places” (Foucault, 1984a). Foucault (1984a) gives an 
example of a heterotopia:  
 
The mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction 
on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I 
discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over 
there. Starting from this gaze that is, as it was, directed toward me, from 
the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I 
come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward 
myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror 
functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I 
occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once 
absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through 
this virtual point which is over there.  
 
So, the mirror gathers the four characteristics of the heterotopia: (i) it is real; 
(ii) it is a site of contestation, because, as Foucault says, the mirror comes back 
towards himself and reconstitutes himself or we could say that there is a 
confrontation of the space in which Foucault lives; (iii) it connects with the space that                                                         
108 Regarding the term ‘real’, as we have defined above, we adopt here the Kantian sense of the word: 
something related to the empirical word, related to experience. In turn, regarding the term ‘unreal’, we 
are going to problematize it and we are going to adopt the term in Foucauldian sense. As already said, 
it is something relative to the human mind, but always dependent on the order of things. 
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surrounds it; (iv) it is a virtual site or a space “absolutely different”. As Foucault 
remembers, the mirror could also be seen as utopia, since it is a placeless place. 
Foucault distinguishes between utopia and heterotopia, although, for Foucault 
(2009:23), heterotopias are utopias that have a precise and real place and a 
determined time. According to Foucault (2009:23), “each human group, whatever it 
is, likely cuts-out in the space it occupies, where it really lives, where it works, 
utopian places, and, during the time it works, cuts-out uchronic moments”. So, 
heterotopias are real utopias and ucronias. And what does the author mean by utopia 
and ucronia? 
Etymologically, u-topia means in Greek no-place, as we have just seen. And 
u-cronia means in Greek no-time. As, in this thesis, space is the central concept, we 
are going to explore mainly the concept of utopia. 
For Foucault (2009:23), “there are countries without place; towns, planets, 
continents, universes that it would not be possible to meet them on any map or in any 
heaven, just because they belong to any space”. These places born “in men’s minds or 
… in the interstices of their words, in the thickness of their stories or yet in the place 
without place of their dreams, in the emptiness of their hearts; in short, they are the 
sweetness of utopias” (Foucault, 2009:23). So, we could say that these no-places or 
no-spaces, these places without real existence are utopias or dreams.  
Foucault (2009:23) explains that those utopias are places of “consolation”: a 
“fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities 
with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though 
the road to them is chimerical”. Utopias are a consolation or a compensation for 
man’s life; they are dreams or chimeras; they are unreal and they contrast with 
heterotopias that are “disturbing”, “undermining” and real. As Foucault (1994:XVIII) 
explains: 
 
Utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of 
language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; 
heterotopias … desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the 
very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and 
sterilize the lyricism of our sentences. 
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In this sense, perhaps we should consider, these “compensatory” and 
“fabulous” u-topias (no-space) are eu-topias (good-spaces) remembering that the 
origin of the utopia term is ‘good-place, no-place’ (eu-topia and ou-topia reduced to 
utopia). These ‘compensatory’ and fabulous sites are good unreal spaces or good 
discursive spaces (Defert, 2009:40). Defert (2009:40) outlines that this language of 
utopias is also space, in a Foucauldian sense. According to Defert (2009:40), utopias 
sing a different place that does not exist, but they implant themselves in an imaginary 
space or they localize themselves in a discursive space because since ancient times 
the language intersects space. For instance, as the Bible (John 1:1) says: “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”. Here 
we see the Word or the order - in opposite to Chaos - or God, as the Creator of the 
world: we see language intersecting space or language creating space. 
Defert (2009:41; Foucault, 1994: XXII, XXIII) recalls, Foucault considers we 
cannot think without the support of a “space of order” or without this “middle zone” 
or without the sign, which Foucault calls “space of knowledge”, 109  where the 
conditions of possibility of this knowledge are constituted. This zone is located 
“below our perceptions, our discourse, our knowledge, where we articulate the visible 
and enunciable: the language, the look and the space” (Defert, 2009:41). It is from 
this “space of knowledge” that the a posteriori consciousness and also its dreams and 
its utopias rise up, as we have studied above.  To sum up, we could affirm that, for 
Foucault, utopias are space, better, unreal or fabulous space inspired by real space, 
the space of knowledge. We could say, for Foucault, utopias are unreal heterotopias 
or unreal other spaces. 
In turn, according to Foucault (2009:24), the localized and real utopias are 
heterotopias and, for instance, children know very well these localized utopias. They 
are “the garden background”, “the Indians’ tent” or the big parent’s bed, the place 
where we realize all dreams and utopias:   
 
It is on this big bed that we discover the ocean because we can swim 
through the blankets; and then this big bed is also the sky because we 
can jump on the mattress; it is the forest, because we can hide there; it is 
the night, because we become ghost through the sheets; finally it is the                                                         
109 We will study this “space of knowledge” or material space in the next section (pg: 126). 
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pleasure, because when parents return, we will be punished (Foucault, 
2009:24). 
 
As we have seen above, real utopias or heterotopias are not reserved for 
children. Adults can also realize their dreams and utopias, creating heterotopias. 
Foucault (2009:25) recalls, children learn utopias and heterotopias from adults.  
Foucault gives some examples of adults’ heterotopias. There are two main 
categories of heterotopias: (i) crisis heterotopias: in primitive societies, they are 
“privileged or sacred or forbidden places reserved for individuals who are, in relation 
to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: 
adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc”; (ii) heterotopias 
of deviation: in our society, they are “those in which individuals whose behavior is 
deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest 
homes and psychiatric hospitals and of course prisons” (Foucault, 1984a). The 
boarding schools, in the nineteenth century, or the military service for young men or 
the “honeymoon trip” are also examples of deviation heterotopias 110  (Foucault, 
1984a). 
These are the two main heterotopias but, as Foucault (1984a) mentions, “the 
heterotopias obviously take quite varied forms, and perhaps no one absolutely 
universal form of heterotopia would be found”. Foucault (1984a) affirms that every 
human group has diverse forms of heterotopia. This diversity and ‘no universal form’ 
are the first principle of the heterotopology. And what is heterotopology? It is the 
Foucauldian (2009:25) dream. Foucault would like to be a heterotopologist and he 
assumes he is about to create this “science” 111 (Foucault, 2009:25). For Foucault 
(1984), the heterotopology is “the systematic description” of heterotopias in a given 
society or, in turn, the object of the heterotopology is the study, analysis, description, 
and ‘reading’ … of these different spaces, of these other places”: the heterotopias 
(Foucault, 1984a). 
The second principle of the heterotopology is that a “society, as its history 
unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia work in a very different way”. As an                                                         
110 These two types of adult heterotopias – crisis and deviation – lack the imaginary of the child spaces. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see in the following lines, for Foucault (1984a), there is not a “universal 
form of heterotopia” and, for instance, the theatre, the cinema or the traditional Persian gardens are 
adult heterotopia with this kind of imaginary. 
111 Foucault did not realize this dream. Nevertheless this is another research tip Foucault left. 
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example, we shall take the heterotopia of the cemetery that changes and has many 
forms over time (Foucault, 1984a). 
Regarding the third principle of heterotopology, heterotopia is as a 
juxtaposing of places in a single “microcosm”, as the theatre, the cinema, the 
traditional Persian gardens, for instance. Foucault (1984a) illustrates: 
 
Heterotopia is able to juxtapose in a single real place several spaces, 
several sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus … the theater 
brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series 
of places that are foreign to one another; thus … the cinema is a very 
odd rectangular room, at the end of which, on a two-dimensional screen, 
one sees the projection of a three-dimensional space, but perhaps the 
oldest example of these heterotopias that take the form of contradictory 
sites is the garden … The traditional garden of the Persians was a sacred 
space that was supposed to bring together inside its rectangle four parts 
representing the four parts of the world, with a space still more sacred 
than the others that were like an umbilicus, the navel of the world at its 
center - the basin and water fountain were there; and all the vegetation 
of the garden was supposed to come together in this space, in this sort of 
microcosm. 
 
Foucault adds magic carpets. The author (Foucault, 1984a) explains carpets 
were originally “reproductions of gardens (the garden is a rug onto which the whole 
world comes to enact its symbolic perfection, and the rug is a sort of garden that can 
move across space)”.  
The fourth principle of heterotopology sees heterotopias linked to slices in 
time: the heterochronies. Foucault (1984a) enumerates three types. According to 
Foucault, the heterotopia functions “at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of 
absolute break with their traditional time”. This is, for instance, the case of the 
cemetery. By contrast with this “absolute break” with time, there is the will to 
“accumulate everything, of establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose 
in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes” (Foucault, 1984a). For 
Foucault (1984a), we could find this “sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of 
time in an immobile place”: museums and libraries. In turn, we have the time in its 
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flowing, transitory, precarious aspect, not oriented toward the eternal: the festivals or 
the fairgrounds, “these marvelous empty sites on the outskirts of cities that teem once 
or twice a year with stands, displays, heteroclite objects, wrestlers, snakewomen, 
fortune-tellers, and so forth” (Foucault, 1984a). 
The fifth principle of heterotopology, always presupposes heterotopias as a 
“system of opening and closing that isolates them and makes them penetrable” 
(Foucault, 1984a). The heterotopias are not accessible like a public place: “the entry 
is compulsory, as in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual 
has to submit to rites and purifications” (Foucault, 1984a).  
In terms of the sixth principle, heterotopia’s role is to create “a space of 
illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is 
partitioned, as still more illusory” (Foucault, 1984a). For Foucault (1984a), for 
instance, brothels had this function. In turn, heterotopia’s role is “to create a space 
that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is 
messy, ill constructed, and jumbled”. This latter type would be the heterotopia of 
compensation, and, for Foucault (1984a), certain colonies functioned somewhat in 
this manner. 
For Foucault (2009:36), the heterotopia par excellence is the ship: 
 
Civilizations without boats are like children whose parents do not have a 
large bed on where they can (jump and) play; dreams dry up, espionage 
takes the place of adventure and hideous policemen take the place of the 
sunny beauty of corsairs. 
   
We could say, for Foucault, the ship brings together the main features of 
heterotopias. Its place is diverse (not universal) and nomadic. 112  It is always in 
movement. For this reason, the ship is a juxtaposition of places in a single 
microcosm; it is also a system of opening and closing and is both an illusion and a 
perfect space in our imagination, that exposes and contradicts the space surrounding 
it. 
So, Foucault (1994:XVIII) adds, “heterotopias are disturbing … because they 
secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that,                                                         
112 We note the wanderer – the explorer – is either way in nineteenth century literature where the 
nomadic movement emphasises the idea of home, even if it cannot be located. 
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because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in 
advance”. For Foucault (1994:XVIII), heterotopias or people who build up 
heterotopias are as aphasics that “create a multiplicity of tiny, fragmented regions in 
which nameless resemblances agglutinate things into unconnected islets”: heretopias 
are these fragmented nameless regions. 
We can see that, for Foucault, heterotopias are ‘other spaces of power’. As 
Defert (2009: 53,54) affirms, Foucault assumes a “phenomenology of the anarchic 
dispersion of power”. Defert suggests Foucault has an anarchic view of space and 
power. Indeed, Foucault plans to write a history of the spaces or a history of powers; 
Foucault wants to be heterotopologist, as we have said (Defert, 2009:56). For him, 
the problem of space is a political problem. Foucault speaks about a “policy of 
spaces” or a “spatialization of power” (Defert, 2009:56). As Defert (2009:53,54) 
recalls, “the non-place of power is at the center of a multitude of heterotopic 
locations”. Power is ubiquitous or it is everywhere. It crosses this “multitude” of 
heterotopias. Space and power go side by side: “thinking about and organizing space 
is one of the pre-occupations of power” (Brabant, 2009). Power wants to give an 
order or form to matter. Power creates spaces or forms or orders. For Foucault, what 
characterizes power is the way that “its internal complexity goes hand in hand with a 
multiform intervention on the plane of space” (Brabant, 2009). Power creates 
relations or spaces that are sets of relations. Thus, heterotopias are other spaces or 
anarchic spaces: sets of relations in a permanent fight against rules or rulers in order 
to create new rules and rulers in a cyclical eternal movement. Heterotopias are spaces 
where our inner power manifests itself in a good way and this good way is an 
ongoing de-individuation or the “we”. 
Foucault (2001:1571) considers that we live in a “space epoch”:  
 
we are in the era of the simultaneous, we are at the time of the 
juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and the far, the side by side, the 
dispersed. We are at a moment when the world feels less like ... a great life 
that would develop through time than a network that connects points and 
intersects its skein.  
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For Foucault, we live in the epoch of The City of Sun or, we could say, the age 
of the multiple suns,113 multiple power sites, multiple relations and heterotopias.  
And these heterotopias or relationships are fluid and nomadic because they 
are a mix of power that is also movement (a priori) and exterior world (a posteriori). 
So the “we” or the social space means also movement. For Foucault (2013:XII), 
movements are ‘multiplicities, flows, arrangements and connections”. According to 
Foucault (2013:XII), movement signifies also ‘desire’ or “the relationship of desire 
(or power) to reality”, which means “art” (ars erotica, ars theoretica, ars politica’) or 
an aesthetic proposal or production of ourselves, as we have just written (Foucault, 
2013:XII). As Tazzioli et al, (2015:2) remember, “the ‘we’ of our present needs to be 
constantly produced and transformed”. And it is through our explosive desire - or 
power - that we are permanently starting in a circular movement, as we had said. And 
Foucault assumes this circular movement when he wants to start again with a new 
light. Foucault (2012b) explains, this circular vision spreads the cyclic form of social 
movements and groups or autonomous spaces that are born, die and grow again. They 
are as an eternal return, a cyclic or circular struggle, as the movement of the planets 
around the sun or as “sunlight illuminates the territory” (Foucault, 2012:129). As we 
have pointed out earlier, this circular movement inspires also our thesis method. This 
is the Foucauldian “philosophy of the cyclical history” or the “philosophy of the 
cyclical time” or the “solar revolution”. So, for Foucault, desire means doing or 
producing as we wish and dreaming cyclically through signs, as we have studied 
above.  
In turn, movement also means critique (and here Foucault again meets 
Kant)114 and that signifies resistance, struggle, revolt or agonism. The agonism or the 
agonistic act is “a will of domination that does not seek to destroy the other” 
(Chevallier, 2014:57). The agonistic act stimulates the other. 115  This fight is the 
Foucauldian anarchy and it is similar to the Hobbesian state of nature; this is “the war 
                                                        
113 This seems to be the Foucauldian worldview or spatial worldview. In turn, Foucault (2001:1571) 
does not deny the time; he explains that his way is just a different way to deal with time and history as 
we are going to study right away. 
114 Kant did three main writings on critique: Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, 
Critique of Judgment. 
115 As we have already studied, the force is composed by a pure form and by a pure matter: the power 
to affect and the power to be affected. This fight can be understood as the creative act (Deleuze, 
2012:78). 
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of all against all” (Foucault, 2012:62,129,130). So, movement signifies the critique or 
a reciprocally stimulating fight in order to establish our space or our “we”.116 
For that reason, this critique or fight has also a spiritual dimension. The 
mystic in Middle Ages thinks directly (the Scriptures); this attitude means not to 
accept the dogmas and the mediation and the pastor: material dimension (Foucault, 
1990:59,60). The spiritual resistant “does not want to be ruled” – this is the question 
of governamentality. He affirms himself directly and opens a space or a “possibility” 
in society collectively (Foucault, 1990:59,60; 1994a: 564,565). So, as Proudhon says, 
the ‘we’ is less body or more spirit117 than an ‘I’. 
As Kant says, through critique, man has ‘to become major’. And, in our view, 
for Foucault, that majority has two senses: (i) ‘major’ means bigger: the man or the 
‘we’ becomes bigger or larger because he occupies more and more relational space or 
the ‘we’ tends to increase; (ii) man becomes ‘major’ à la Kant or man reaches 
majority when man criticizes and determines himself freely, ruling himself and not 
being ruled - also the question of governmentality in a large sense (Foucault, 2012b). 
In another perspective, according to Deleuze, the man who rules himself goes 
towards a “minority”. For Deleuze, when the “non-sovereign”, a posteriori subject 
determines his space, he becomes “minor” localized, giving rise and bringing out 
“minorities” or “other spaces”, “other subjectivities” or  ‘other wes’ that were hidden 
or had not manifested yet. Foucault (1969:278) explains what this “minor” work is: 
“it is to deploy a dispersion that can never be reduced to a single system of 
differences ... it is to operate a decentering that leaves no privilege to any centre … It 
is to bring up the differences”. Foucault (2014), explains, the man who rules himself 
“takes care of himself,”118 in a decentralized way concerned with the present. The 
man who rules himself becomes minor and constitutes himself as “we” here and now 
(Foucault, 2014). 
For Foucault, the constitution of this conceptual ‘we’ is, as we have seen, an 
“art” of living collectively against fascism. And Foucault (2013: XIII, XIV), once 
again concerned about the present, suggests some principles of this art of collective 
creation of social spaces. For Foucault (2013: XIII, XIV) social spaces should be: (i) 
“free of all unitary and totalizing paranoia”; (ii) spaces of “desire by proliferation,                                                         
116 We are going to develop the concept of critique in Chapter IV (pgs: 143-147, 240-241). 
117 The concept of spirituality will be explored in more depth in Chapter IV (pg: 133). 
118 We will discuss “the care of the self” in Chapter IV (pg: 133). 
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juxtaposition and disjunction”; (iii) positive, multiple and different spaces and not 
negative related with law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna; (iv) happy spaces because “it 
is the connection of desire to reality … that possesses revolutionary force”; (v) space 
of “political practice”, as “an intensifier of thought, and also spaces of analysis, as 
multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action”; (vi) 
spaces of ‘de-individualization’ “by means of multiplication and displacement, 
diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting the 
hierarchized individual, but a constant generator of de-individuation”; (vii) spaces 
where people must “not become enamoured of power”. 
Those are the ‘simple’119 principles or features of the Foucauldian ‘we’ or the 
Foucauldian social spaces or heterotopias. And those social spaces or heterotopias are 
summarily relations of participative happy and desirous people, attentive to their 
present - or survival -, which determine themselves collectively, freely, horizontally, 
transparently, locally, cyclically in a non-fascist and non-totalitarian way. So, this 
social “we” has also political consequences. As Defert (2009:53,54) says, the 
Foucauldian social spaces or heterotopias are an “anarchic dispersion of power”: they 
are anarchic - without rules and rulers - multiple and widespread spaces of power.  
We now turn to Foucauldian material space. 
 
Foucault: material space 
In this section we will study the Foucauldian material space; we are working in the 
Kantian framework, as in the previous sections, and always inspired by our 
hypothesis, to establish space is to survive and, postanarchism is space constitution. 
As we have learned, Foucault is influenced by Kantian transcendental idealism, 
seeing the self as a subjectivation – a work of art – that is moved, a priori, by desire 
or necessity or power that crosses this subjectivation or self or body – the zero point. 
Nevertheless this desire is desire only when it effects itself (or creates itself) in the 
world, a posteriori, positively and collectively (relations of people that invoke 
Leibniz’s relationalism) as a “we” or a space or a heterotopia (social space). These 
arguments help us to better grasp the genealogy of postanarchism understood as the 
constitution of autonomous spaces in order to ensure our necessity of survival. Thus,                                                         
119 Foucault works, for instance, on two simplified and decentralized solutions of government: the 
Iranians (Revolution, 1979) and the Franks. We will study these both cases later in the Appendix (pg: 
275). 
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in this section we will study the Foucauldian material space or the Foucauldian “order 
of things” or the matter where the power or desire effects itself collectively as a “we”.  
As we have already stated, material space is also social space. Nevertheless, 
Foucauldian material space, in our perspective, is a social space beyond the “we” - 
although this material space is always part of the “we”, as the study of the concept of 
the sign showed - (Foucault, 1969:283; 2001:1573). This section thus complements 
or extends the previous one.  
What does it mean: a material space ‘beyond’ the “we”? This means material 
space is, first of all, exterior or a real space that exists beyond the a posteriori subject 
and beyond the transcendental space. Secondly, material space is neither 
transcendental space nor unreal space, nor “the space of our first perceptions, of our 
dreams, of our passions”, nor the ‘personal’ space of our signs and creations 
(Foucault, 2001:1573). Third, material space is the exterior world or the ‘outside 
space’ or the space of knowledge, this zone that Foucault intends to understand and to 
describe in the Archaeology of Knowledge through the enterprise he calls 
‘archaeology’ (Foucault, 2009:41; 2001:1573; 1994:XXII, XXIII). 120   Why? For 
Foucault, the material space or the ‘other’ or other a posteriori subjects surround a 
certain a posteriori subject - or the topia, the strategic zero point. So this material 
space is exterior - although also interior -121 to a certain a posteriori subject. Fourth, 
the material space is a social space, because it is a space made of relations, created by 
people. As Foucault (2001:1573) says, we ... do not live in a kind of void ... we live 
inside a set of relations”. Thus, the material space is this “set of relations” or social 
space, because people always create material space, concerned with their present.  
By the foregoing, Foucault seems again to be a relationalist: we live in a set of 
relations. In turn, Foucault seems not to be a substantialist, because, as the author 
says, the ‘void’ or a substantialist space does not make sense.                                                          
120 Archaeology is a descriptive analysis that (i) defines discourses as “practices that obey rules”, 
treating documents in their opacity, impossible to represent; (ii) defines discourses in their specificity, 
showing how the game rules they use are irreducible (archaeology is a differentiated analysis of the 
modes of discourse); (iii) defines types and rules of discursive practices that cross individual works 
(archaeology does not see the worker as a sovereign figure nor face the creating subject as the raison 
d'être of a work or as the guarantor of its unity); (iv) systematically describes a speech-purpose and 
aims not to try to repeat what was said in the creative act (Foucault, 1994). 
121 In our perspective, an important Foucauldian question about the self resides in this tension between 
interior-exterior: for Foucault, is it possible to reach the self (or to conclude the self’s path), although 
the Foucauldian self is always a virtuous walk or openness to the other (as we are going to show in 
Chapter IV, pg:135)? Where does the self finish? And, consequently, where are limits of the self 
placed? Those questions will be answered in a future research as we are going to propose in Chapter 
V. 
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So, in terms of content, what is this material space? As we have already 
answered, the material space is social space, a set of relations that exists beyond the a 
posteriori subject. Foucault (1969:283) defines this exterior set of relations as 
“positivities”. And these positivities are the “archives” or the condition of possibility 
of the practice of the “we” or the a posteriori subject. For Foucault (1969:283), these 
positivities are defined as: 
 
 All the conditions under which a practice is exercised, according to 
which this practice gives rise to partially or totally new statements, 
according to which it can finally be changed. ... This is the field where a 
practice is based (without constituting the centre), the rules it uses (not 
having been invented or formulated by it), the relationships that serve as 
support to it (without being the last result or the convergence point).  
 
According to Foucault (1969:283), this material space or “positivities” is “a 
pre-existing set of statements” which involves “conditions and rules”. Those 
“positivities” are “the field where a practice is based”. Those “positivities” are the 
we’s field. And studying those “pre-existing set of statements”, Foucault (1969:283) 
just wants to highlight those discursive practices or creative practices “in their 
complexities and their thickness”, as we have just analysed. According to Foucault 
(1969:283), speaking or creating social space or changing the present is not just 
expressing what we think and know. As we have seen before, to create social space is 
to put together a statement or a practice in a preexisting set of statements and 
practices and it is “a complicated and costly gesture” (Foucault, 1969: 283).  
Because creating social space is a costly gesture, as Foucault (1969:39) points 
out, our “manifest speech would be finally the repressive presence of what it does not 
say”. Foucault explains that the “we” could not say all it thinks, although, as we have 
quoted, it could “give rise to partially or totally new statements”. As we have 
affirmed above, the ‘positivities’ are “conditions of possibility”; they are conditions 
and they are opportunities as well; they are not “determinations stressed from the 
exterior”, nor “impositions that inhabit the individuals thought internally”, nor “limits 
imposed on the subjects’ initiative” (Foucault, 1969: 283). Despite these conditions, 
individual creativity is free and has no limits, as we have studied. Thus, those 
“conditions” are, for instance, the Foucauldian agonism, the mutual and stimulant 
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fight of all against all. Lefevbre (207:366) adds, “heterotopias (are) mutually 
repellent spaces”; they are “repellent” or repulsive or “counter-sites”, but they are 
also mutual and reciprocal. The “we” could take part, participate or change the 
present, although it is a ‘costly gesture’. As Rigal (2015) notes learning to live is “the 
most beautiful and the most difficult task”; this is to learn to be on places that are 
essentially “irreducible spherical extensions, surrounded by a ring of abandoned and 
distant things”.  
And, this entire field, constituted by spaces or “spherical extensions, 
surrounded by a ring of abandoned and distant things”, that conditions and stimulates 
the “we” (also a spherical extension) being exterior (and also interior) to it, is, in our 
opinion, the Foucauldian material space (Foucault, 1969: 283). And, as Rigal (2015) 
observes, if the “we” wants to live or change the present, it must learn how to deal 
with this material space or must “learn to be on places”, because even “the abandoned 
and remained at a distance things” participate in this material and spherical space.  
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF SPACE - PROUDHON AND FOUCAULT: CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, we have studied the concepts of space, movement and necessity on 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Michel Foucault and we have found some important 
similarities between them.  
We have observed that for Proudhon and Foucault, space and time are inspired 
by Kant’s space and time or the ‘here and now’ or the utopia now, a concept also 
adopted by postanarchism. This Kantian framework has enabled us to open up new 
lines of thought between Proudhon and Foucault and also between both authors and 
postanarchism, as we are going to confirm later (Chapter V, pg: 229).  
Kant is an important meeting point for Proudhon and Foucault. His 
transcendental idealism – space and time – is key to understanding the anarchism of 
Proudhon and Foucault. Both authors quoted Kant and adopted transcendental idealism, 
despite their critiques and detachment from it. Proudhon and Foucault assume we have 
a Kantian a priori or strategic necessity/capacity - quid facti. This a priori or necessity 
is the need to survive in the present. It is fundamental – a key - because it is the 
measure of all things: the law. Necessity is the reference we have in order to live a 
harmonious and balanced life today. Necessity legitimates our actions, productions or 
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creations of space. Nevertheless, for Proudhon and Foucault, this necessity/capacity, 
although fundamental, is not enough in order to understand our “today”. For Proudhon 
and Foucault, there is something beyond Kant: a quid juris. As studied, this necessity or 
power needs to operate in the exterior world, a posteriori. 
Hence, there are more similarities between both authors, beyond this Kantian a 
priori: (i) the relationalist vision of space – relations of people - discussed by Leibniz; 
(ii) the substantialist space or matter – the world around us - discussed by Newton. 
Proudhon and Foucault relate the a priori with the a posteriori:  
 
Necessity + relations of people + world 
 
For Proudhon and Foucault, the Kantian a priori space and time - quid facti- 
leads people to create space here and now - quid juris – always collectively. According 
to Proudhon and Foucault, spaces are relations of people in the world: collective spaces. 
So, this necessity (N) - a priori – implies movement (M) or the action in the world – a 
posteriori - which constructs that collective space (S) - a posteriori. In turn, for 
Proudhon and Foucault, this necessity, movement and space are the same thing or are 
interrelated. They are power (P) or immanence - with unknown creator - that leads us to 
act always circularly: 
 
 (N=M=S=N=M=S=N) = P 
 
Thus, necessity explains also the Proudhonian and Foucauldian interest and 
engagement in their actuality: the need to survive here and now. Proudhon criticizes the 
regime of his epoch, a liberal democracy, and also Jacobin; he assumes himself as 
anarchist/mutualist/federalist and proposes anarchy and the contract as the alternative 
fair way to rule society collectively.  
Moreover, Foucault is strongly engaged in his epoch, influenced directly by 
Kant, dedicating his whole work as philosopher to think the present. For Foucault, his 
today is in crisis too. According to Foucault, the present needs a “new light”. And 
Foucault’s intention is to contribute with his writings, talks and actions. Like Proudhon, 
Foucault (2012; 2013:XIII, XIV) criticizes liberal democracy and Marxism, and, not 
wanting to be a “prophet”, writes some recipes “to everyday life”, in order to contribute 
to a better today. Those Foucauldian recipes are “the art of living counter to all forms of 
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fascism” here and now. This anti-fascist “art” presupposes the constitution of “positive, 
multiple, different, fluid, mobile, nomadic and productive relations”. And this kind of 
Foucauldian relation is named heterotopia or “other spaces” or “counter-sites”. So, also 
for Foucault, the Kantian transcendental space, to live here and now, has social and 
political consequences, contributing to the constitution of the powerful social space. As 
Defert (2009: 53,54) affirms, the Foucauldian heterotopias are “the anarchic dispersion 
of power”.  
In another way, for Proudhon and Foucault, the Kantian transcendental space 
justifies the constitution of social space, which is also our plural self or “we”. This 
plural self is an ongoing transformation in order to survive and to satisfy our needs that 
change all the time. So, Proudhon, like Foucault, is neither an essentialist nor a 
humanist. He is against essences and sees man as a becoming and a group – a plural 
self. And, in our opinion, this perspective could open a new relationship between 
classical anarchism and postanarchism. This solves or overcomes the main barrier of 
The State of The Art: the essentialism and humanism of classical anarchists. In this 
chapter we have shown Proudhon, the first person from the nineteenth century that 
labelled himself anarchist, is neither essentialist nor humanist. He is very close to 
Foucault - a great influence on postanarchism - in terms of space, movement and 
necessity. So, this is the greatest novelty of this chapter. There is, at least, a classical 
anarchist, Proudhon, the first one, who is neither essentialist nor humanist. 
So, Proudhonian and Foucauldian anarchism and postanarchim seem to have a 
similar anarchist perspective, the constitution of plural and dispersed spaces of power – 
or heterotopias - as we are going to verify later in Chapter V (pg: 229). Nevertheless, 
before confirming these similarities, taking into account Kant’s perspective we could 
conclude now that Proudhonian anarchism and postanarchism are ‘anarchisms from 
today’. They try to solve their need to survive and to have a better life in their epochs. 
We could also state that there is a great and fundamental proximity between Proudhon 
and Foucault in terms of space, necessity and movement. The work of comparison 
regarding the other concepts that feature in the Foucauldian activist will be done in the 
next chapter where we are going to construct the Foucauldian ideal type with 
Proudhon’s aid. Our intention is to construct a conceptual network with both authors - 
Foucault and Proudhon. We would like to (i) better understand Foucault and 
Proudhon’s thought in terms of anarchism, (ii) fill Foucault’s bibliographic ‘gaps’ with 
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Proudhon’s concepts and also (iii) give a novel perspective and interpretation of 
postanarchism, our thesis topic, situating it within anarchism.  
In this chapter we have also confirmed our new working hypothesis: to 
establish space is to survive. As we have shown, for Proudhon and Foucault, the 
constitution of space here and now is a necessity. Inspired by Kant, both authors 
consider, to constitute space means to create regarding our needs or wishes or 
dreams.  
So, the questions that launch the next chapter – The Foucauldian ideal type - 
are: (i) having as framework the Proudhonian and Foucauldian concepts of space, 
movement and necessity, is Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a 
becoming – a movement - or a subjectivation, having as a criterion or rule just 
necessity?  (ii) Being a “we”, is this Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist or 
anarchist or plural self a constitution of space or a heterotopia? If yes, what are the 
political consequences of this?  
Regarding Chapter V – The Postanarchist Ideal Type – the questions are: (i) if 
there are so many similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, is Proudhon as close 
to postanarchism as Foucault is? (ii) If the Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist was 
a heterotopia, would the postanarchist activist or self also be a heterotopia? (iii) For 
the postanarchist, is to create space as we wish or need in a non-fascist way the 
postanarchist utopia here and now, as it is for Proudhon and Foucault?  
In order to answer those questions, in the next chapter we are going to 
construct the Foucauldian activist ideal type, with Proudhon’s aid.   
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IV. THE FOUCAULDIAN ACTIVIST IDEAL TYPE 
The Foucauldian activist: Introduction 
In this chapter we will design the Foucauldian activist ideal type. We will carve this 
Foucauldian ideal type, based on Foucault’s writings and activism, with the aid of 
Proudhon. As we have observed in the previous chapters, Foucault strongly 
influenced postanarchism and there are many similarities between Foucault and the 
anarchist Proudhon, not valorised by postanarchism, as we have just verified. In our 
perspective, this close affinity between Proudhon and Foucault is an interesting lens 
to better understand postanarchism and horizontal activism today, as we will confirm 
in Chapter V (pg: 229).  
Thus, this conceptual network joining Foucault and Proudhon’s ideas is the 
basis for Chapter V (pg: 229), the postanarchist ideal type, the main aim of this 
thesis, bearing on Saul Newman’s work. In this chapter, our intention is to show that: 
(i) Foucault and Proudhon are a strong influence of postanarchism; (ii) there are 
continuities and many similarities between Newman’s, Foucault’s and Proudhon’s 
work; (iii) postanarchism is an anarchism like classical anarchism, because, as we 
have demonstrated, at least, Proudhon, the first anarchist of the nineteenth century, is 
neither essentialist nor humanist as postanarchism attests.  
As we indicated in the previous chapter, the questions that launch this chapter 
are: (i) is Proudhon’s and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a 
movement - or a subjectivation, having necessity as the only criterion or rule?  (ii) If 
Proudhon’s and Foucault’s self is a “we”, will this Foucauldian and Proudhonian 
activist - or anarchist or plural self - be a constitution of space or a heterotopia? If 
yes, what are the political consequences of this?  
 As we have started to see in the previous chapter on space, there are many 
overlaps between Foucault and Proudhon. The authors share important concepts, 
perspectives and influences, for instance, in terms of subjectivation, space, movement 
and necessity (and Kant influences both authors). Notwithstanding the proximity 
between these thinkers, there seems to be a silence surrounding Proudhon in 
Foucault’s writings. As Judith Revel (2011:132) explains, there are “bibliographic 
gaps” or silences in Foucault’s work. And Foucault confirms those “gaps”. Foucault 
assumes there are three categories of philosophers in his writings: “philosophers that 
he talks about, those he does not know and those he knows but he does not talk 
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about” (Revel, 2011:134). In our perspective, Proudhon seems to be one of those 
authors that Foucault knows but he does not talk about or, as Revel (2011:134) 
describes, the “great absentees”. For Revel (2011:134), these silences in Foucault’s 
work are as “ghosts” or “challenges” launched deliberately by the author to his 
followers. According to Revel (2011:134), Foucault’s idea would be to lead his 
successors to discover these “gaps” and to complete or develop his work. On our part, 
we have accepted Foucault’s challenge and we are researching this “great absentee” 
who is Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Our goal is indeed to fill those Foucauldian “gaps” 
with Proudhon’s thought and to build up, as we have already said, a conceptual 
network between both authors. 
In order to construct that network and the Foucauldian activist ideal type, we 
have read Foucault with several questions in mind: who is the Foucauldian activist? 
What does activism and activist mean in Foucault’s thought? Was Foucault an 
activist? If so, what kind of activist was Foucault? As it is our thesis goal also to 
reflect on contemporary activism, horizontalism and, in the first place, postanarchism, 
we have also asked: what does resistance mean in Foucault’s thought and life? And, 
finally, what are the characteristics of the Foucauldian activist?  
After reading several of Foucault’s works,122 after studying the Foucauldian 
concepts of space, movement and necessity in the previous chapter and after trying to 
answer those questions, we have arrived at a primary conclusion and another 
intuition. First, we have demonstrated our first and second hypothesis: the 
Foucauldian activist is mainly a creator of space here and now; and he establishes 
space in order to survive. As we have explained, Foucault’s intention is to turn on a 
new light to improve our contemporary condition. Secondly, we have intuited that, in 
order to carve space here and now, the Foucauldian activist is also a fighter or a 
‘being-in-struggle’. 123 For Foucault (2012:116), to be a fighter means to be in a 
permanent struggle, war, “conflict” or in an ongoing “problematization” in order to 
open personally - maitrise de soi  -124 and collectively space125 in society. Thus, the 
concept of struggle is also a Foucauldian fundamental concept in order to understand 
the concept of space.                                                          
122 See this thesis Bibliography. 
123 Our philosophical term. 
124 We are going to study this maitrise de soi later in this chapter (pg: 157). 
125 As we have defined previously, for Foucault (1984a; 2001: 1572-1574) space is “a set of relations” 
that are “irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable”. Foucault has a non-essentialist 
perspective of space. 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 137 
And why is the concept of struggle a fundamental concept in Foucault’s 
thought? As Deleuze (2012:78) explains, for Foucault, this concept of struggle bears 
on an a priori or immanent force or power that crosses and animates the human 
being. And this force or power is prepared in itself for that struggle. And how? As we 
have studied above, that force is in itself constituted by two parts in order to fight: a 
pure form or a power to affect and a pure matter or a power to be affected. Foucault 
(1984:19,21,22,47;1985:46) goes further and considers that force means a biological 
and reproductive struggle, a pleasure or sexual battle, a difference male-female126 or 
an active force and a passive force - dominant-dominated, winner-loser. Foucault 
(1984:44,47,48;1985:46) explains the masculine organ, anagkaion, is a “necessary 
element”: “one that is constrained by the needs and by its strength the others are 
constrained”. The anagkaion signifies a set of relationships and activities that fix the 
individual status in the city. Foucault (1984:44,48;1985:46) sees penetration as a 
strategic and biological game of domination-submission, which is a “driving force”, 
being above the primordial creative order of discourse. According to Foucault (1984: 
44), the sexual act, being a physical act, has also a social and an economic plan: (i) 
socially, it might concern social relationships of superiority-inferiority; (ii) 
economically, it concerns expenses (or energy expenditure) and profits (benefit or 
pleasure). Nevertheless, this pleasure or sexual battle could also be seen in an ethical 
perspective. This biological or sexual agonism might be virtuous, if virtue and the 
care of the self - maitrise de soi - controls that desire and achieves a social balance 
between those two positions: the male active biological force and the female passive 
biological force (Foucault, 1984:90).127   
For that reason, in this chapter we will start by studying the concept of 
struggle in order to launch the other features of the Foucauldian activist. With this 
objective, we have advanced a new working hypothesis that will orient our study                                                         
126 As we have already said, we do not work the gender perspective in this thesis. In our interpretation, 
Foucault is against a gender analysis. Foucault sees gender as a consequence of capitalism. In our 
opinion, Foucault just has a biological perspective about sexual issues. Foucault accepts naturally the 
biological or sexual division man/woman. Foucault looks like Rousseau (2009:516,519) who talks also 
about this natural division as “nature order” or nature “law”. Foucault admits, nevertheless, there are 
uncommon sexual cases, for instance, people that born with two sexes. Regarding gender, Foucault is 
mainly against identities or ‘sexual species’ or “sexual heterogeneities” that, in his perspective, are a 
creation of capitalism (Foucault, 1976:51,60). In that sense, Foucault distinguishes between “sex 
nature” - man/woman -, which is an “element of the living being’s system, an object of biology”, and 
“sex history” or “sex signification” or “sex discourse” - gender perspective -, a product of capitalism 
and biopolitics (Foucault, 1976:56,60,102). 
127 We will develop this idea later in this chapter (pgs: 167-171). 
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here: for Foucault, constituting space is a struggle. Beyond this third hypothesis, we 
are going to analyse the concept of struggle, having also always in mind our initial 
hypotheses: postanarchism is space constitution and to establish space is to survive.  
In terms of method, we continue our conversation with Foucault and 
Proudhon, nevertheless we enter a new circle in this dialogue, from the concept of 
space to the concept of struggle in order to come back again to the concept of space 
in the next chapter on postanarchism.  
So, in this chapter, our goal is: (i) to study the Foucauldian concept of 
struggle or war with the aid of Proudhon; (ii) to launch a philosophical bridge 
between both authors, departing from the concept of war or battle; (iii) to find the 
common points between both authors’ concepts; (iv) to build up a network of other 
concepts and notions around their ideas of war/struggle/confrontation; and (v) to 
construct the Foucauldian activist ideal type with the aid of Proudhon, presenting its 
main features, based on that conceptual network.  
As Proudhon was an anarchist or, more concretely, the first thinker who 
labelled himself ‘anarchist’ (Kinna, 2009:8,9), our intention is also to investigate 
whether or not, both authors - Foucault and Proudhon - have a similar anarchist 
perspective. The aim is to check in the next chapter whether the relationship of 
Foucault to Proudhon complicates the postanarchist relationship to Foucault. As we 
have just affirmed, the final goal is, through the design of the Foucauldian activist 
ideal type, to better characterise and introduce the postanarchist activist. 
 
The Foucauldian activist: main features 
Who is this Foucauldian activist? Or how shall we characterize it? At the outset, and 
taking into account our third hypothesis, for Foucault, constituting space is a 
struggle, we would see this Foucauldian fighter and creator of spaces as an ‘other-
political-being’.128 For that reason, we already laid the Foucauldian ontological path 
in the previous chapter. This path showed us this ‘other’ (being) is a “we”, a set of 
“plastic” relations - a space - without previous definition or essence. In order to 
design and to understand who this Foucauldian ‘other-political-being’ is, always with 
                                                        
128 Explaining this expression (‘other-political-being’): (i) we use the word ‘other’ in Foucauldian 
sense, meaning ‘alternative’, ‘different’, as “other spaces”; (ii) regarding the concept of ‘the political’, 
in The State of The Art we have defined it; (iii) the Foucauldian activist is a ‘being’ because it is a 
devir or an ‘ongoing’ definition or determination. 
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the aid of the anarchist Proudhon, we start imagining a biological129 human figure 
that is divided in three parts: the legs, the torso and the head. 
 
 
Image 6 
 
We are going to work on those parts separately, as if we were making a work 
of art.130 In the beginning, we will sculpt the legs, then the torso and, lastly, the head, 
in a bottom-up movement. In our opinion, and starting to answer our first question (is 
Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or 
a subjectivation, having as criterion or rule only the necessity?) Foucauldian 
‘anarchism’ 131 is mainly a spiritual path (from the body to the spiritual body or 
corporal spirit), 132 “une ascèse de soi” (self-asceticism) through which Foucault 
pretends to free himself from sexuality or, in other words, to ‘delete’ the body133, the 
main target of biopolitics134 and capitalism (Foucault, 2014:46; Eribon, 2011:512).                                                         
129 Although the Foucauldian subject is a set of ‘plastic’ relations without definition, Foucault accepts 
the biological or natural perspective of human being and just criticizes the historical one, as we have 
already explained and as we are going to develop later in this chapter (pgs: 164,165). 
130 For Foucault, we are all works of art, as we will study later in this chapter (pgs: 193-196). 
131 Foucault just once assumed, and informally, he was a “left anarchist”, when he said to his friend 
Jules Vuillemin: “Fundamentally, you are a right-wing anarchist, and I a left wing anarchist” (Eribon, 
2011:229). As we have already explained, Foucault was against fixed identities and labels. He 
considered they are an effect of capitalism and biopolitics. So, in our opinion, it could be not fair to say 
that Foucault was an anarchist, fixing him a label or an identity. Nevertheless, our intention is only to 
show the similarities between Proudhon and Foucault, mainly in his last writings, and, consequently, 
to better understand postanarchism.  
132 This Foucauldian spiritual path remembers Plato’s path: from the body to the soul. Nevertheless, 
Foucault’s spirit is not an “ethereal soul”, but an “engaged” or corporal spirit or a spiritual 
subjectivation, as we are going to develop in this chapter (pgs: 142-143, 167, 200-201) (Gros, 2014b: 
67).  
133 As we have just said, the Foucauldian body is the “zero point” where everything begins, the 
referential, and a fundamental point in order to eternalize the individual (Foucault, 1985:139). As 
Nietzsche (2002:47) affirms, “everything is body and nothing else; the soul is only the name of 
something in the body”. 
134 For Foucault (1976:185,188), biopolitics are a set of power techniques that go beyond the state and 
are present “at all levels of society and used by a variety of institutions - the family or the army, the 
school or the police, the individual medicine or the administration of communities”. Biopower means 
“the subjection of bodies and population control” and this biopower is “indispensable to the 
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Nevertheless, Foucault adopts a Nietzschean perspective. For Nietzsche (2002:50), 
the body just wants “to create, overcoming himself. It is what he most desires. This is 
his whole passion”: to be a “superior body” (a superman or a virtuous self). Foucault 
seems to agree. Foucault’s intention is not literally to delete the body (but the ego). 
His goal is to use the body virtuously in order to live in a harmonious and virtuous 
way. And when we achieve this virtuous stage we achieve the (always collective and 
open) self, as we are going to see later in this chapter (from pg: 163,164).135 For 
Foucault, the body explains why utopias emerge. The utopian’s goal is to erase the 
body or to make it beautiful, limpid, transparent, bright, powerful and infinite - 
purified, as Proudhon suggests (Foucault, 2009:10). So, the first Foucauldian utopia 
is the will to get “an incorporeal body”, because utopia - or eutopia -, as we have 
studied, is a place out of all places, where we find a body without body (Foucault, 
2009:10). As Foucault (2009:10) contends, in order to realize this utopia we just need 
to be a body (our zero point or reference). It seems that to overcome the body or, 
better, to take a spiritual or purification path is Foucault’s utopia or might this be his 
main (corporal) heterotopia (assuming the body)?  
Hence, in order to answer that first question, 136  we start sculpting the 
Foucauldian activist from the legs that symbolize action, movement and struggles. 
Then, we will carve the torso or the arms that means the work or the construction of 
“other spaces”. And, finally, we will draw the activist head that signifies anarchism or 
the Foucauldian spiritualism which is not, as we have already noted, a Cartesian 
division of mind and body.  
In the next section, we will sculpt the legs. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
development of capitalism” (1976:184).  According to Andrés and Gros (2014:48,49), “the biopowers 
solve the fundamental equation of liberalism: how to govern less without losing control” over the 
widespread and ubiquitous power of bodies. In question is “the politicization of life”, for instance, 
“laws on euthanasia, on pensions, food or health scandals, politicization of sexuality with debates on 
prostitution and homosexuality”. 
135 As we have already asked, for Foucault, when you achieve virtue we achieve the self? We think 
Foucault does not give a closed answer to this question. Nevertheless, at least, to find this virtuous 
path is to achieve a better and happier life, as we are going to see later in this chapter (pg: 164,165). 
This is matter for another research as we will propose in the Chapter V.  
136 This question joins the other two we have covered at the start of the chapter: (i) is Proudhon and 
Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or a subjectivation, having as 
criterion or rule just the necessity? (ii) If the Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist was a heterotopia, 
would the postanarchist activist or self also be a heterotopia? 
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THE LEGS | The fighter, the activist, the movement  
 
                                       
                                                                  Image 7 
 
In this section we are going to sculpt the legs of the Foucauldian activist, with the 
help of Proudhon’s anarchism. The legs symbolise the permanent fight and 
movement of the Foucauldian activist.  
 Taking into account our third hypothesis, for Foucault, constituting space is 
a struggle, the Foucauldian activist is fundamentally a fighter or a being-in-struggle, 
as we have just affirmed. Why? We start answering by using the concept of struggle 
or war and then we will analyse the concept of being.  
Regarding the concept of struggle or war, the Foucauldian activist is a fighter 
because, as we have already argued, his life is a constant struggle in order to survive 
and to open its space in society, here and now.137 According to Foucault, (2012:184; 
Bounache, 2013:140) struggle is the daily fight for survival now. For Foucault, war is 
the first intelligibility principle of history and, as we have pointed out before, it 
means power, desire, force, movement, creation or “perpetual action”. 138 So, the 
fighter is an agent or an activist, a person who acts in order to survive. Foucault 
(2012:184) explains, “every moment, we go from rebellion to domination, from 
domination to rebellion”, and it is this “perpetual agitation”, war, that permits an 
understanding of history and the subject. 
Proudhon has a similar understanding of the activist or the subject and his life. 
As we have learned above, for Proudhon, the human being is also mainly a fighter. 
According to Proudhon, in the beginning there is always perpetual war. Proudhon 
(1861:33,58) also considers war to be the unavoidable first intelligibility principle of 
history, society, politics and economy, because to fight means to act or action - 
activism  (Proudhon, 1861: 75). Proudhon (1861:45) adds, the “war is the condition 
of all creatures”. So, the creature or the subject is a fighter. Foucault agrees.                                                          
137 For Foucault, to survive = to open space here and now. 
138 We have already studied the Proudhonian and the Foucauldian concept of movement or action. 
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We could say that all of Foucault’s work, his genealogies and his 
archaeologies, 139  aim to understand this perpetual fight between forces and to 
understand his own life that also was a perpetual fight. As we have just shown, 
Foucault as activist or philosopher140 or as fighter has a dual task: (i) to contribute to 
the present, (ii) fighting against that present in order to give a new light: to open the 
possibility of being otherwise. In other words, Foucault pretends to establish the 
conditions of possibility of our present in order to transgress it and to have a different 
experience (Fernández, 2010:30,36). 141  Jean Birnbaum says, Foucault is “a great 
illuminator” that wakes us permanently, that illuminates “our political condition, our 
daily lives” (Birnbaum, Artières, 2016). In Foucault’s vision, this ontological 
illumination of the present is a political and resistant choice inspired by the 
“excluded” and the “silenced” - the madmen, the prisoners, the “new plebeians”, the 
“Marxist lumpenproletariat”, “the margins of wage-labour” - in order to understand 
our culture, the experience of ourselves and the possibility to invent new ways of 
being (Fernández, 2010: 31,43 Golliau, 2014; Zamora, 2016). Foucault wants “to 
give voice to the ‘infamous’ men, giving dignity to madmen and rejected people”: the 
people of his time “who do not have language yet” (Eribon, 2011:190; Golliau, 
2014:7). This is his main fight. 
The same is in Proudhon, as we have studied before. Proudhon (1861:9) is 
concerned with his present and writes about his time. And why? Proudhon is also an 
illuminator who wants to give a new light. Proudhon had a “fleeting light” when he 
investigated lawyers, historians and ordinary people and, after seeing this light, he 
decided to write, for instance, War and Peace (Proudhon, 1861:8). Proudhon 
(1861:9,10) wrote about his time, fighting against his time, and suffering the                                                         
139 Foucault distinguishes between archaeology and genealogy. As we have already seen, archaeology 
is Foucault’s method in order to study “the formation of discourses” about “madness, medicine or 
human sciences”; the goal is to identify “the structures of knowledge and power that impose a certain 
discourse in a given place and time”; Foucauldian archaeology, for example, wants to know “why 
people are enclosed in the eighteenth century” (Andrés, Gros, 2014:48). In turn, the Foucauldian 
genealogy refuses “any historical goal” and also the “singularity of places and times”; it has a “more 
militant” aim (Andrés, Gros, 2014:48). 
140 Foucault says he cannot define himself as a philosopher because philosophy is a “practice” or an 
experience, something that does not have definition (Adler, Laure, 2016). Foucault prefers the 
expression “specific intellectual” - as we are going to study later in this chapter, pgs: 211-215 - that 
means an activist philosopher or an “engaged thinker” (Fassin, 2014:80). We could consider that 
Foucault has an ‘active’ perspective on Philosophy. As Eribon (2016) remembers, Foucault stresses, 
for instance, that his book Discipline and Punish, a “sage book”, “was born from the struggles and 
would return to the struggles”. For Foucault (2014b:47), his books are “instrumental” or “toolboxes”. 
141 This experience is an ontological and critical gesture: the “ontology of the present (Fernández, 
2010:30,36). 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 143 
consequences of his actions.142 Proudhon is also a fighter against the present. As we 
have already noted, for him (Proudhon, 1861: 75,117,118), war means action, 
“struggle” - “resistance” - here and now, just as for Foucault.  
Regarding “being”, what does life or “to be” mean for Foucault? In brief, we 
could say, for Foucault, life means struggle and struggle means life. Nevertheless, life 
is a huge concept in Foucault’s thought. Life means power and also power over life or 
“biopower” that presupposes death, body, blood, molecules, micro-powers, naked 
life, desire, pleasure and also resistance (Foucault, 1976:180,181,185,196,197). As 
Bounache (2013:140) explains, for Foucault, life is “a set of forces that resist”. As we 
have just studied, power transverses bodies and is in itself a dual force (active and 
passive). This human force is primordially biological or sexual, as we have stated 
above. And the sexual force is also plural: feminine and masculine. For that reason, 
our life is never completely controlled by biopower, because it “always produces 
resistance” (Danaher et al, 2000:80). As Danaher et al (2000:81) exemplify, the rules 
produce some people as normal or healthy and others as excluded and that distinction 
- between normal and abnormal - ensures opposition and resistance between both 
parts, as effects. At stake is “the transgression of normality by excess”,143 because life 
is transgressive144 in itself or “ab-normal” (Fernández, 2010:28). Or, in another way, 
as Oleg Bernaz (2014:244) explains, the Foucauldian body is “both a subjected force 
and the location of an emancipatory force: the body exceeds from inside the power 
space that instrumentalises it”. This “excess”145 is the resistance against power. Or, 
life is excessive – abnormal -, for that reason, man’s power is able to defy his culture 
limits by transgression. And also, its dual power would allow man “to put himself at 
stake”, joining, for instance, “laughter and sovereignty”, “profane and sacred” 
(Fernández: 2010:47). We could summarise, for Foucault, life is a set of forces that 
resist and are affected by other forces.  
                                                        
142  For instance, his censor accused him of attacking the emperor’s policy, law, people and 
jurisprudence, but the author denied saying he just intended to show “the perfect regularity of the last 
war” (Proudhon, 1861:9,10).  
143 For Foucault, excess is what goes beyond the norm or the need, as we shall see in the following 
lines. 
144 Trangressio (lat.) means “the action to pass to the other side” (Fernández, 2010:47). 
145 We could say that the Foucauldian excess is good and bad. The excess is good when it helps the 
subject to transgress biopower in order to satisfy his needs. The excess is bad, when man lives a non-
moderate life, beyond his needs, or when an excessive attitude transgresses his needs. We are going to 
further develop the concept of moderation later in this chapter (pgs-171-175). 
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For Proudhon, life is force and fight, as we have just argued. And Proudhon 
has also this plural and sexual understanding of force: feminine and masculine. For 
Proudhon (1875:5) feminine force is “beauty” and masculine force is just “force” and 
they are “equivalent” because woman and man have each other their own, particular 
and “special prerogatives” - force and beauty. It is like the “form and matter”, an 
active force and a passive force (Proudhon, 1875:8,9). For instance, the marriage is 
this union between form and matter or “the union of strength and beauty” (Proudhon, 
1875:8,9). Proudhon considers, “beauty is the correlative of strength, power and 
virtue” (Proudhon, 1875:7). Although his critics call him a patriarchal thinker or, as 
postanarchists characterise, an essentialist and humanist thinker, Proudhon says, 
“beauty guides force” because “the beauty in women is more effective and more 
creative than the force in her partner”. For Proudhon (1875:5,7) “the woman is the 
living representation of the ideal”. Nevertheless, woman and man are “equal”, “the 
balance of their rights and duties should be reached so that there is between the two 
sexes welfare and honour equality”. Likewise, for Proudhon, life is also a balance of 
forces that resist: active and passive, form and matter, man and woman. 
Thereby, to be a being-in-struggle presupposes (i) a body and (ii) a “critical 
attitude”. As we have observed above, for Foucault, the body is the ‘zero point’, the 
little fragment through which we are present. In turn, to have a body means to be 
mortal or the chance to live or to die permanently, circularly: to be a survivor. As 
Deleuze (2012:102) says, we have a “multiple death” - a cyclical death or movement 
-and “life is only to take a place, every place, in the ‘one dies’ cortege” - the eternal 
return. And this battle or cortege of battles is “the life of infamous men” (Deleuze, 
2012:102,103). The “infamous men” are the ‘homeless’ - the madmen and the 
prisoners, etc - the dead person or the person that lost its place inside the system. 
Foucault assumes himself as an infamous man146 or “an anonymous life that just 
manifests itself when it crashes against power, when it fights against power with brief 
and strident words and then come back into night” (Deleuze, 2012:102). Foucault felt 
this “night”, for instance, when his prison movement, GIP - Prison Information 
Group - failed and lost its place and in many other personal and activist 
circumstances (including as regards homosexuality), as we will see later in this 
chapter (pgs: 168,169 note: 182; 189-191) (Deleuze, 2012:101). For Foucault                                                         
146 As Éric Fassin (2014:81) argues, those Foucauldian infamous men, the madmen, the prisoners, 
could be understood as “metaphors” of Foucault’s homosexuality. They are almost biographic.  
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(1999:198), the body is the site of this battle or “cortege” because the body is crossed 
by power and by need - desire, sexual impulse, pleasure. The body is the site of this 
“multiple death” or “the place that opposes the silence and the cry to the speech rule” 
and “the involuntary revolts to the obedience rule”. For that reason, for Foucault, the 
main state goal is its power over bodies (Eribon, 2011:443).147  
 Regarding the body, Proudhon has a similar stand. As we have studied 
earlier, according to Proudhon (2009:398), the immanence or the necessary energy 
and power is spread in human’s bodies and not concentrated in just one place 
(Proudhon, 2009:398). So, for Proudhon, the body is a “group” or a “synthesis of the 
multiple and the one”. It is also where everything begins - the rule. According to 
Proudhon, there is no “prior knowledge of body experience” (Castleton 2009:54). 
Proudhon (1861:38) adds, “it is on the enemy’s body, shot down by him – man – that 
he first dreams about glory and immortality”. 148  As we have already seen, for 
Proudhon (1861:176,177), the conservation of the body and limbs is the “only true 
law” or the “law bases”. 
On the other hand, as we have seen before, to be a fighter or rebellious is also 
a “critical attitude”149 in order to survive. For Foucault, critique is a child of war. 
Critique also means movement and signifies creation or production, as we have 
studied earlier. To resist is to criticize or to be a critic (Foucault, 1990:59,60). And to 
criticize is “a constant verification”, a problematization about “what (human beings) 
are, what they do, and the world in which they live” (Foucault, 1985:10).  For 
Foucault, to criticize is also a “revolt” - “the historical, practical uprising” - or a 
“spiritual” attitude.150 
Proudhon also assumes this critical attitude, inspired by the spirit of war. For 
Proudhon, war is also the origin151 of the critique. According to Proudhon, as we 
have discussed earlier, this critique is an “antagonism” or the beginning of 
movement; it means creation or production. This antagonism is a “state of war” that 
preserves society “worthy, moral, pure, generous, even laborious” (Proudhon, 
                                                        
147 We will develop this idea later in this chapter (pgs: 199-200). 
148 We note that Proudhon (1861: 75,117,118; Préposiet, 2007, 95) is a pacific person and does not 
support violence. Although he discusses the concept of war, war is the first intelligibility principle of 
life and the first step of a spiritual way, as we have just pointed out. 
149 Through the Kantian notion of critique, Foucault shows that he does not reject the Enlightenment 
totally (Danaher et al, 2000:10). 
150 We will develop this critical and spiritual attitude later (pgs: 159-160).  
151 Again the war is the first step of the spiritual path, we have noted before. 
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1861:62). According to Proudhon 1861: 86), “it is through the diversity of opinions 
and feelings and through the antagonism … that a new world is created above the 
organic, speculative and affective world” (Proudhon, 1861: 86). Proudhon (1861:61) 
adds, “there is no justice, no jurisdiction, no authority, no law, no politics, no state, 
outside that antagonism”. Hence, this critique or antagonism is “eternal” and war is 
an essential point, a reciprocal stimulus or a constructive and creative “antagonism” 
that means, in that sense, the same as Foucauldian agonism (Proudhon, 1861: 77).  
For Foucault, the agonism is the battle, critique and also the intelligibility of 
history. This is a “perpetual agitation” (Foucault, 2012:184). Foucault (2012:184) 
explains, “the field in which the power unfolds is not a ‘dreary and stable’ 
domination: we are all fighting”. As we have already noted, for Foucault (2012:184), 
“every moment, we go from rebellion to domination, from domination to rebellion”. 
Nevertheless, as we have stated above, this Foucauldian agonism is about force, not 
about violence; it is a pacific way, as Deleuze (2012:77) explains: 
 
The balance of forces exceeds singularly violence, and cannot be defined 
by it ... violence focuses on body, objects or certain beings which are 
destroyed or their form changed by violence, while the force has no other 
object than other forces, and not other beings, only that balance of 
forces.152 
 
Man might fight force with force. The body is not the target of force. Foucault 
is against violence. With this purpose, for instance, as Eribon (2011:446) remembers, 
Foucault participated in a press conference against piracy in 1981, in Geneva. The 
Foucauldian agonism is a stimulated, reciprocal and positive battle and not a 
destructive one. The struggle is the way to open harmonious space in society. 
And Proudhon has a similar pacific position. Proudhon (1861: 75,117,118) is 
really a non-violent man, as Préposiet (2007, 95) characterizes him; he presents 
himself as a man against “banditry”. Proudhon (1861: 117,118) writes, “the feelings 
that wake up war are diametrically opposed, regarding the morality of the fact, to 
those that would inspire the spectacle of a pilgrims caravan attacked by a gang of                                                         
152 Here Deleuze describes a situation where “the force has no other object than other forces”. Deleuze 
refers to a spiritual stage, a balance of forces, which is some steps forward from the idea of the 
“enemy's body”, we have quoted before. This stage does not delete the body, nevertheless uses its 
spiritual force in order to achieve a harmonious level. 
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thieves” (Proudhon, 1861:117,118). According to Proudhon (1861:54), the difference 
between war and violence is the “forms, laws, rituals” of war. War has a “virtuous 
and chivalrous character” (Proudhon, 1861:78). For instance, taking into account 
those rituals, “the warrior who insults his enemy and uses illicit weapons is a 
murderer” (Proudhon, 1861:77). According to Proudhon (1861:54), those laws make 
war “the first and most solemn jurisdiction from whence came the entire system of 
law: War and Peace Law; International law; Public Law; Civil law; Economic Law; 
Criminal Law”. For Proudhon, war is a spiritual breath or the immanent power.153  
Proudhon (1861: 33) just wants to highlight this “universal, speculative, 
aesthetic and practical character of war”, because man’s last goal is peace: 
 
Peace … without the war does not make sense; it does not have anything 
positive and true; it has no value nor meaning; it is a nothingness. 
Nevertheless humanity makes war and tends with all its strength to peace 
(Proudhon, 1861: 26). 
 
As we have learned, war is a peaceful path because it is “divine”. And what 
does divine mean? Proudhon (1861: 34) answers, “I call divine everything in nature 
that proceeds immediately from the creative power, in man from the spontaneity of 
the mind or consciousness”. So, divine means creativity and war is divine because it 
is creative power: “the divine imposes itself by living force” (Proudhon, 1861:34). 
The divine is the creative and spontaneous force. For Proudhon (1861:25), war is 
“primordial and essential to life, to the production of man and society”; it constitutes 
“the universality of human relations”. Déjacque (2015) also helps us to understand 
the difference between violence and the harmonious force:  
 
If you wanted to do violence to your neighbour, male or female, your 
neighbour answers you with violence, and, you know, his force is almost 
equal to yours; free all your appetites, all your passions, but do not forget 
that it needs to exist harmony between your force and your intelligence, 
between what you like and what pleases others. And now go: earth, in this 
condition, will be for you the garden of the Hesperides (Déjacque, 2015).                                                         
153 For Proudhon, the element that distinguishes the force – war – from violence - banditry - is the 
‘order’ or the agreement – the Law of War and Peace – accepted by the belligerents, like a contract.  
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Hence, Déjacque remembers that force is a peaceful path because it is also a 
way of equality that provides harmony. Crowder (1991:78) adds, for Proudhon, “the 
instinct of revolt is only a partial expression of man’s nature, the totally of which 
embraces a moral life in the society of his fellows”.  
So, Foucault and Proudhon have a similar perspective on agonism. For 
Foucault (2012:61), “the war of all against all” means we are all equals and fighters - 
critics. According to Foucault (2012:61), war is equality. We have all the right to 
criticize or to make war: “an equal war, is born from the equality and takes place in 
this equality” (Foucault, 2012:61). For Proudhon (1861: 54.135), too, war or 
antagonism generates equality. The author argues that everyone has the right to make 
war – to criticize - that gives the right to act or to work to those who do not have this 
right (Proudhon, 1861: 54.135). And this right to act or to work is Foucault’s main 
intention. The fighter is also a worker, as we will see in the next section about the 
Foucauldian other worker. 
 
 
THE TORSO | The ‘other worker’ 
 
 
    
                                                           Image 8  
 
In this section, we will sculpt the torso or the arms of the Foucauldian activist. The 
torso means in this thesis the work or the construction of “other spaces”. For that 
reason, in this section we will have always in mind our third hypothesis, for Foucault, 
constituting space is a struggle, and also our main hypothesis, postanarchism is 
space constitution. 
As we have said, for Foucault, to fight means to work, to experiment, to 
invent, to create or to act. Foucauldian agonism is a constructive battle. For Foucault, 
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to work is to assume an “untimely action”, a “fundamental attitude of thought”, of 
“resistance to the present” (Bounache, 2013:140). The reason is our survival. We 
work in order to survive now. Proudhon has the same focus on the present, based on 
need, as we have analysed in the previous chapter on space. In turn, in Foucault’s 
perspective, this concept of the present leads to the concept of critique, to Kant and to 
Enlightenment that influence him. Foucault shows this relationship between critique, 
Kant and Enlightenment when he quotes Kant’s article “What Is Enlightenment?” in 
his article “What Is Enlightenment” (Foucault, 1994a). For his part, Proudhon talks 
about antagonism, instead of critique, but the meaning is similar in both authors, as 
we have studied above. Proudhon aims to “preserve the becoming” and “the 
antagonistic development of forces” (Damien, 2009:18). Moreover, for Foucault 
(1994a:568), critique signifies an “ethos” that means, as we have examined above, an 
“attitude facing the present”, a “deliberate choice”, a “way of thinking and feeling, a 
way of acting and conducting”. According to Foucault, modernity154 is the “voluntary 
and difficult attitude of criticizing or trying to capture something eternal and heroic 
that is not beyond the present nor before the present” (Foucault, 1994a:569). 
Proudhon agrees. For him, we are heroes or fighters and this fight – our work - here 
and now, is divine or eternal, as we have explained before. For Foucault, criticizing is 
the new work or “the will of heroicizing the present” (Foucault, 1994a:569). And 
why is this present heroic and eternal? 
This present is heroic and eternal because it implies (i) a heroic act and (ii) an 
eternal result here and now - an apparently contradictory eternalization of the 
ephemeral.155 
(i) The act is heroic because the hero, the ‘other worker’, made it, for instance, 
the Nietzschean “superman” - super because he transcends and creates himself, as we 
have outlined in The State of The Art (Nietzsche, 2002:12). The hero or the warrior – 
or the superman - is the “creator”, who “works and invents”, who “harvests and has 
fun” (Nietzsche, 2002:17,30,31). The hero does as it dreams. The ‘other work’ is the 
“lightning” and the “delirium” (Nietzsche, 2002:16,19,26). It is a warrior act,156 as 
we have already analysed. According to Foucault (1976:211,208), it is a courageous 
and hard gesture of critique, a “counterattack” that signifies also an “other economy                                                         
154 For Foucault, Modernity starts after the nineteenth century. 
155 As we have seen above, we could say that Foucault has a solar or ephemeral worldview, as the daily 
sunlight. Nevertheless, for Foucault, there is an eternity in the ephemerality, as we are going to argue.  
156 The warrior act is a corporal and a spiritual act, as we have argued above. 
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of bodies and pleasures”, as we are going to see later (pgs: 154-158). For Nietzsche 
(2002:17), the superman or the ‘other worker’ is “the great worshiper”, “the arrows of 
desire”. In Negri’s opinion, to work means an alternative attitude or an ‘other way’ of 
doing directly, as we wish or desire, with pleasure. Negri (2011:200) adds, “the 
struggles are what takes the needs and the viewpoints, the projections and the wills, 
the desires and the expectations”.  In a struggle or through the critique, there is not 
delegation to anything or anyone. As an explosion, the ubiquitous solar power, made 
of body, dreams and pleasure, is “led to the network of acts that constitutes it” (Negri, 
2011: 200,202). Dèjacque (2015:78) explains, the idea is the strength, the “beginning 
of whole movement”, as a “volcano”, an “uncontrollable energy” (see the image 9 
below).  
 
                                              
                                               
          Image 9 
 
For Foucault, to work is a mixture of power and pleasure. Foucault explains 
how power links with pleasure: “pleasure and power do not cancel each other, do not 
turn one against each other, they follow one another, entwine one another and 
relaunch themselves. They link together through complex and positive mechanisms of 
excitation and incitement” (Foucault, 1999b:48). This link constitutes the heroic act, 
the ‘other work, that is creative and a pleasure. As Dèjacque (2015:152,153) 
concludes, “work is pleasure and pleasure is work”.  
For Proudhon, the heroic act is also creative. To work is a heroic and poetic 
attitude. Proudhon speaks about an aesthetic war. For him, history or men’s history 
are created daily and perpetually by war, victories and defeats. Creation, existence 
result from this “divine struggle” (Proudhon, 1861:42). So, “the poet is a hero” and 
vice versa (Proudhon, 1861:63). We are all heroes and poets because we create 
ourselves permanently. This is our work: a work of art. Proudhon (1861: 33,59) 
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assumes his intention is to highlight this alternative work, this “universal, speculative, 
aesthetic and practical war”. 
Moreover, Foucault (1999:176) points out, the creative or heroic act (to do as 
we wish and dream) implies the concupiscence that “begins by a certain body 
sensation that is produced by Satan”.157 Foucault (1999:177) explains how it works: 
“first we have an impulse (the first thought that leads to the evil or transgressive 
performance), then the consent and after the delight (pleasure of the present - which 
is followed by pleasure) delight of looking at the past (or complacency)”. Finally, this 
creative and heroic act is “a will of domination that does not seek to destroy the 
other” (Chevallier, 2014:57). What does it mean? It means the ‘other worker’ or the 
hero is the “devil” or a “transgressive” person - a sinner - beyond the norm and the 
rule. Nevertheless, this other worker or hero, when he wins, creates another rule or 
another space here and now. Hence, the hero or the worker is also a lawmaker. For 
Foucault (2012:177), “the elliptical and dark god of the battles must lighten the long 
days of the order, work and peace”. This ‘other worker’ is a heroic figure, a darkness 
fighter or the Kantian enlightened critic that, through the battle (agonism), occupies 
space and invents an ‘ab-normal’ or evil way of acting, creating or working now. The 
‘other worker’ is a hero, a critic and a lawmaker. As Nietzsche (2002:30) says, the 
superman is the “creator” that inscribes “new values or new tables” (space) having 
fun.  
For Proudhon (1861: 133), it is the same: the strength – that leads to the 
heroic or transgressive act - is the first right. War produces the law, solves 
misunderstandings and creates discipline and peace between individuals (Proudhon, 
1861:62,119,127). So, war and peace are “the alternative conditions of people’s life” 
(Proudhon, 1816: 91). In another way, Proudhon elucidates, “the peacemaker (or the 
legislator) is a conqueror (the hero), whose reign is established by the triumph”                                                         
157 Satan is the Cartesian evil (Descartes, 1979:75,79,83) or the Devil of ‘the possessed’, that inspires 
also the monster (Foucault, 1999:59,192). For Foucault (1999:192), “the possessed is not as the witch 
that is a docile servant of the devil. The possessed will be under the power of the devil - she is a devil 
receptacle -, but this power will find a resistance. The possessed is one that resists the devil”. She is 
also the Devil. In another way, the possession is a “flesh escape”, a “counter-power” that the Church 
needs to control. For that reason, the possessed resists and she does not make a pact with the devil, as 
the witch makes (Chevallier, 2014:60). In turn, the Foucauldian monster is “the nature form of the 
unnatural” (Foucault, 1999:52). It is a “mix”: a “mix of animal kingdom and human kingdom, a mix of 
two species, a mix of sexes, a mix of forms (Foucault, 1999:58). The monster is the “transgression of 
natural boundaries, classifications and law (Foucault, 1999:58,59). Foucault has a metaphoric vision of 
the Devil, because, for him, as Nietzsche (2002:25) says, “there is no devil, nor hell”. The Foucauldian 
devil could be seen in a positive way. The devil is the creator, the person that invents something new 
beyond the borders of the existence. 
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(Proudhon, 1861: 91). The victory sets up the reign or our law. This presupposes 
domination, sovereignty, power and warrior legislation (Proudhon, 1861: 133,140). 
For Proudhon (1861: 134), legislation means conquest, occupation and creation of 
space (Proudhon, 1861:134). This signifies peace that leads to a new struggle – 
transgressive act - or work. 
(ii) And why is this ‘other worker’ or lawmaker eternal? What does eternal 
mean? The result of this battle or ‘ab-normal’ way of working now is eternal because 
it is the sign and its truth.158 As we have argued above, for Foucault, the sign is the 
result of our wishes and dreams.159 It is the truth or our it is our thought. According to 
Foucault (1999b:60), to tell the truth is to say “what we are, what we do, what we 
remember and what has been forgotten, what we hide and what is hidden, what we do 
not think and what we think inadvertently”. It is to confess. 160  The sign is an 
enunciation of ourselves, “an affirmation about what we find deep in ourselves”, as 
we have observed (Foucault, 1999b:59). For that reason, the sign or our production is 
eternal. Eternal means there is an immediate relationship between the sign and us, as 
we have already set out. There is no time between the thought and the sign. There is 
not an intermediate between our creations and our thought. There is eternity, 
identification now. The worker and his production are eternal. 
According to Proudhon, we also utilize signs in order to produce ourselves 
and those signs are our space or our creations. They are a mixture of our thoughts or 
ideas and the outside world. They are social space, as we have studied above. And, 
for Proudhon, these ideas and signs are the result of our “spirit efforts” or the product 
of our work, as we have discussed. According to Proudhon, our “spirit efforts” are 
warrior attitudes. And the war is divine and eternal, because it is “the highest 
manifestation of justice” or a product of force - or man’s creation. So, the sign, the 
product of our work, is also eternal (and just) (Proudhon, 1861:29,38,41). In turn, 
although, for Proudhon, we are condemned to representation - the sign - we create our 
products, our signs, our laws - the contract - or ourselves without intermediation, 
directly. For that reason, our creations are eternal. Proudhon gives the example of the 
contract: individuals bargain directly until they achieve a common ground (Ritter,                                                         
158 We already discussed both concepts in the previous chapter. 
159 It is the ‘utopia now’, as we discussed above. 
160 We could say, for Foucault, there are two kinds of confessions. One is an obligation, an imposition, 
and Foucault is completely against it, as we have already seen. The other one is a voluntary confession 
or an act of insurrection, as we are studying now. 
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1967:470). In Proudhon’s perspective, for that reason, they achieve an eternal (and 
just) common ground. 
According to Foucault, those ‘direct actions’, to confess or to tell the truth, are 
agonistic acts, as we have just noted. They are revolts or insurrections. For Foucault 
(2012:39,177), the “truth is the result of a power struggle”: a “truth-weapon”. For 
Foucault (2012:177), the “truth works as a weapon”, because it is “the strategic and 
perspective truth” or the strategic power, that allows “the victory”. For Foucault 
(2012:177), the heroes or warriors win when they affirm their truth directly. As we 
have seen, this truth is our rule, our values, our justice, “a singular right marked by 
conquest, domination or antiquity: a race right, 161  the right of the triumphant 
invasions or the ancient occupations”. When we tell the truth, we occupy space 
without intermediates. For Foucault, to tell the truth is to work or to create ‘other 
working spaces’ or heterotopias, as we have discussed in the previous chapter.  
For Proudhon, too, law and justice depend on the war and antagonism (critique), 
as we have pointed out. Proudhon (1861:61) argues, “there is no justice, no jurisdiction, 
no authority, no law, no policy, no State, outside that antagonism”. And this antagonism 
and this law spring from our “feelings”, from our most intimate will directly. Foucault 
would say this law is our truth. Proudhon adds: 
 
The notion of what is just is ... both an idea and a feeling. Since feeling is 
the first expression and principal force in my life ... instead of making my 
duty and law depending on the more or less precarious state of my reason, I 
decided to subject my reason and opinion to my feeling of duty and law 
(Crowder, 1991:111). 
 
The Proudhonian law is the result of our deepest will and feelings. We create 
our law being faithful to our own being. It is the affirmation of our truth, the 
Proudhonian warrior conquest, an occupation of space. As we have just studied, 
Proudhon’s mutualist contract has that ability to establish our will with others, setting 
directly an “essentially reciprocal” agreement for “equal exchange”, which 
corresponds only to our will and desires, without the existence of any authority or 
                                                        
161 We will discuss the Foucauldian concept of colonialism later (pg: 199). 
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intermediary (Crowder, 1991:105). For Proudhon, to work is to fight in order to 
affirm our truth reciprocally. 
Nevertheless, this space, that is our victory, is also an exteriority “under our 
eyes” (Foucault, 1984:90,91). It is a dependent exteriority – our product, our creation 
- and, at the same time, it is a sovereign exteriority. This sovereign exteriority means 
another battle, an audio-visual battle, as we have just referred to it (Foucault, 
1984:90,91). In other words, our productions or our signs have an immediate link 
with us. They are our discourse, as we have observed above. They are part of 
ourselves because they are our enunciations. But, in another way, those productions 
are something else that imposes on us and defies us. They are creatures that turn 
against the creator.162 There is a battle between what we say - the audio - and what 
we see - the visual, as we have affirmed before. The audio and the visual never 
coincide. They are in a permanent fight. This means also our products are not ours. 
For Foucault, we are not their proprietors. Or, better, each of us is just the owner of a 
“myself”, a point of resistance - a sovereignty not sovereign or an a posteriori subject 
- which contributes to the final product. Nevertheless this “myself” is also in a 
permanent battle with itself, as we are going to show in the next section (pg:158). 
Hence, we tend to an almost anonymity, as we have already explained. Those 
products, signs or spaces are first of all a collective production or work that 
transcends us - the Foucauldian social space. The Foucauldian victory is just the 
beginning of another struggle or work - critique.  
Proudhon goes in the same direction. According to Proudhon, the worker is just 
a possessor. He possesses just the surplus value. All the rest is not from him. As we 
have studied in the previous chapter, Proudhon is against property which he considers 
“theft”. As Crowder (1991:85) explains, Proudhon is mainly against “unearned” 
ownership. We could say, for Proudhon, the worker is the owner of the surplus value 
he creates: 
 
Proudhon … does not attack all ownership but only that species of it which 
is characteristic of the bourgeois system … the ownership he opposes is 
basically that which is unearned – he sometimes uses the word aubaine or                                                         
162 They are like Frankenstein, as we have compared before, a monster that could be seen here also as 
the Foucauldian ab-normal - beyond the norm. Just to remember that Foucault distinguishes between 
the monster and the abnormal. The ab-normal is less monster than the monster. For Foucault (1999:52) 
“the monster is the law breaking taken to the extreme”. 
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windfall – including such things as interest on loans and income from rents. 
This is contrasted with ownership rights in those goods either produced by 
the work of the owner or necessary for that work, for example, his 
dwelling-house, land, and tools (Crowder, 1991:109).163 
 
So, for Proudhon, our creations or productions do not coincide with the final 
product. We are not the owner of the collective final product. We just possess the 
surplus value we create. There will always be a misfit - a battle - between what is said 
and produced and what is seen or the final product, because the work is always 
collective. Proudhon does not use the expression “audio-visual battle”, but shares the 
same perspective. 
Nevertheless, as Foucault emphasises, this critical and collective work 
realizes our desires and dreams. This is the heroic and eternal Foucauldian ‘other way 
of working’, an aesthetic economy164 and a non-capitalist way of creating space. As 
we have noted, this ‘other space’ implies an “innovative production” and another 
knowledge or epistemological perspective – the Foucauldian truth (Negri, 2011:203). 
Foucault suggests true and eternal commodities (Negri, 2011:203). Those eternal 
commodities are healthful products through which we also create ourselves165 - as a 
work of art or aesthetically - with pleasure according to our needs and dreams.  
For Foucault, capitalism causes mental illness or alienation: “we are alienated, 
we are sick” (Eribon, 2011:120). According to Foucault, alienation means to be 
subjugated, oppressed, not to be a critic, not self-ruled, to have a work that destroys 
us. According to Foucault, capitalist social relations provoke alienation through 
“competition, exploitation, imperialist wars and class struggles” (Eribon, 
2011:120,121). People become amorphous and unresponsive, become crystallized. 
However, according to Proudhon and Foucault’s cyclical perspective, excessive 
pressure or oppression can always lead to such an initial explosion and a new                                                         
163 This Proudhonian possession is something that does not exist in reality due the right to private 
property and Proudhon found great resistance when he presented his proposals. So, in our perspective, 
this Proudhonian strong critique on private property could be seen as a device used by Proudhon in 
order to better understand we are collective beings, opened to the other, and all we give and have is 
‘just’ a contribution or a surplus value. To understand it is to better know ourselves and the way to live 
better, happier and balanced with the other in the world, valorising just what is worth it. This is a 
fundamental stage in order to be able to do the spiritual path we are going to study in the next section 
(pg: 156). 
164 We do not develop in this thesis the economic perspective. 
165 We are going to develop this idea in the next section (pg:159). 
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beginning or a new work.166 Foucault (2012:120) points out, for instance, the struggle 
between the small artisans and the big industrials: The aim of this industrial 
knowledge is 
  
to annex, confiscate, and take over smaller, more particular, more local, and 
more artisanal knowledges. There was a sort of immense economico-
political struggle around or over these knowledges, their dispersal, or their 
heterogeneity, an immense struggle over the economic and power effects, 
its dispersal and its secret  
 
Furthermore, Foucault (2012:120) says, biopolitics is a “fascism” that excludes 
and exterminates the “politically and ethnically dangerous and impure” - the smallest 
knowledges. According to Foucault, the solution or the therapy for this “fascism” is 
to create a “new relationship with the environment”167 or “to disalienate” (Eribon, 
2011:121). And these solutions are the true, heroic and eternal economy through 
which we create ourselves in harmony with the other.  
Foucault finds inspiration for those anti-capitalist solutions in the hospices 
and prisons, as we have already said. These polemical stands give him, for instance, 
the epithet of “the father of anti-psychiatry” (Eribon, 2011:220). Nevertheless, 
Foucault considers people who are in psychiatric hospitals or the non-capitalist 
mental patients as “the wonderful manifestation of madness or more exceptionally as 
the spark of poetic geniuses”. For Foucault, madness is a “cultural phenomenon”, 
created by capitalist societies and biopolitics (Eribon, 2011:220,221,388). And the 
alternative solutions come from those “poetic geniuses”, from the margins, where 
those “geniuses” glimpse and create different and non-capitalists ways. Negri 
(2011:203) argues, “Foucault sees capitalism as a prison and he is surprised by the 
revolt, the communication, the self-esteem that come from the prisons”- explosions of 
revolt. For Foucault, work is about this revolt that also comes from the prisons and 
from the psychiatric hospitals because work aims at welfare and freedom.                                                         
166 From Proudhon’s and Foucault’s perspective, these extreme situations allow to distinguish between 
force and violence. Before a desperate situation of big oppression, we can witness moments of 
violence – a big and uncontrolled explosion. Before a daily situation of pressure managed 
agonistically, we will have just the needed force to restore the balance of forces – small explosions. 
167 The main new relationship is the “death of man”, as we are going to study in the next section (pg: 
156) (Foucault, 1994b, Gros, 2014:54,55,56). Proudhon would say the solution would be the death of 
property that leads to the “death of man”, as we have noted. 
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Proudhon has a similar anti-capitalist position. The author does not use the 
concept of alienation, nevertheless he tells us about “hierarchical organisation” and 
the “oppressive nature” of wage labour (Anarchist Writers, 2010). Proudhon asks, 
“do you know what is to be a wage-worker? It is to labour under a master, watchful 
for his prejudices even more than for his orders... It is to have no mind of your own... 
to know no stimulus save your daily bread and the fear of losing your job” (Anarchist 
Writers, 2010). Proudhon is well aware of the alienated nature of wage labour, 
although he does not describe it as such. The author stresses, the wageworker does 
not have a ‘mind of his own’; the wageworker does not have critical spirit, the main 
device to exit from nonage168 – this is alienation - as Kant and Foucault teach. And 
Proudhon adds, “the property owner who hires him (the wageworker) says: What you 
have to make is none of your business; you do not control it” (Anarchist Writers, 
2010). Proudhon concludes, this is a “precarious” work, because “the worker (only) 
maintains his job due to the free will and necessity of his boss-owner” (Préposiet, 
2007:187). It is a work that bears on an “injustice” and on a “fraudulent denial”: the 
boss refuses to give the worker the value he created or the surplus value produced by 
his work (Préposiet, 2007:187).  
In order to end that “injustice”, Proudhon (1861:11,12) proposes to rekindle 
“the warrior spirit, slandered by the industrial spirit”. Proudhon (1861:62) 
remembers, “society preserves itself worthy, moral, pure, generous, even laborious 
through the antagonistic state, through the state of war ... it is the same with poetry 
and literature”. Proudhon suggests an aesthetic solution: wealth and economy depend 
on the creative genius. According to Proudhon (1861:65), “wealth ... receives its 
value from the genius which manages it, from the heroism it serves, from the poetry 
that gives it illustration” (Proudhon, 1861:65). For Proudhon, industrial work must be 
an aesthetic work or a plastic work like the work of any producer (Damien, 2009:22). 
And, according to Proudhon, this poetic and also ethical solution is the workshop, a 
solution from below. For Proudhon, the workshop will be “the main focus of moral 
regeneration” (Crowder, 1991:103). The workshop is a “collective” solution that is 
neither “individual” nor “familiar”.  Proudhon clarifies, “in learning to cooperate in 
the workplace the individual learns to put aside his self-interest and to see his own 
dignity as a self-directing being reflected in the people around him” (Crowder,                                                         
168 For Foucault (1990:40), minority is the “inability to use your own understanding without another 
person’s direction”.  
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1991:110). This is Proudhonian non-capitalist work, a collective path of freedom and 
adulthood. Proudhon explains, “liberty is man’s right to make use of his faculties, and 
to do so as he pleases” (Crowder, 1991:87). And the Proudhonian liberty means also 
moderation, a law of “simplicity of wants considered ‘the principle of our 
happiness’” (Crowder, 1991:104). So, Proudhonian ‘other work’ is a collective path 
and a personal fight for moderation and self-direction, also a struggle – a revolt - for 
dignity, harmony and happiness. 
From what has been said, we confirm our third hypothesis to constitute space 
is a struggle, from both a Foucauldian and a Proudhonian perspective. For both 
authors, to work is to struggle and when we win the war, we create space in order to 
have a better life or in order to survive. 
In the next section, we are going to draw the head of the Foucauldian activist. 
 
 
THE HEAD | The ‘other political subject’ 
 
 
Image 10 
 
In this section we are going to sculpt the head of the Foucauldian activist, or his 
anarchism, always with the aid of Proudhon. We identify the head with anarchism, 
because, in our perspective, Foucauldian anarchism is mainly the construction of an 
interiority - the we. It is an ethical and reflexive path, as we are going to study in this 
section. Proudhon has a similar understanding. His anarchy is the self-direction and 
the creation of a virtuous war or antagonism or a permanent collective devir. 
According to Proudhon, we live in a solar society that presages “the wheel of 
continual birth” of Deleuze and Guattari. As we have observed, Foucault shares this 
solar ethical path, which inspired also this thesis’s method.  
So, in this section we focus on the questions that launch this chapter: (i) is 
Proudhon and Foucault’s anarchism an ethical path or a becoming – a movement - or 
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a subjectivation, taking necessity as criterion or as the only rule?  (ii) Being a “we”, is 
this Foucauldian and Proudhonian activist or anarchist or plural self a constitution of 
space or a heterotopia? If yes, what are the political consequences of this?  
So, in order to answer this question and to understand who this Foucauldian 
other political being is, we will start tracing the ethical path. Then we will study his 
aesthetic dimension, because the Foucauldian subject is also a work of art. Finally we 
will feature the political side of the Foucauldian other subject. 
We commence with the ethical path, explaining why the ethical path of this 
aesthetic subject is politically an anarchism. 
 
THE ETHICAL PATH 
In this sub-section we are going to start explaining who this Foucauldian political 
being is, with the aid of Proudhon. This Foucauldian political being is, first of all, a 
being in movement. He is a person that opens an ethical itinerary, walking this path. 
And what is an ethical path? It is a path of moderation or a virtuous collective option 
or a self-direction or adulthood or a critical attitude. Critique, we have studied in the 
previous section, is the Foucauldian key to design his ‘other subject’ or for the 
subject to design himself and the society where he lives. For Foucault, the ‘other 
subject’ is an “author” and can be invented by this critique or by “truth telling”, 
parrhesia, as we have studied before (Foucault, 2011b:161; Danaher et al, 
2000:150,152). Foucault (2011b:161) explains what this “truth telling” or the critique 
is:  
 
This discourse which gives an account of oneself must define the visible 
figure that humans must give to their life. … This truth-telling now faces 
the risk and danger of telling men what courage they need and what it will 
cost them to give a certain style to their life. 
 
This critique or truth telling is the discourse that constructs each of us. It is 
also a painful act of “courage” - a struggle - as we have already studied. This act of 
courage has spiritual or ethical consequences and, consequently, aesthetic (self-
stylization), epistemological (the truth), and political (the other as polis) aspects, as 
we are going to observe. As we have planned, in this sub-section we are studying 
mainly the ethical perspective. 
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 So, ethically, the Foucauldian moral self-direction, being a spiritual attitude - 
virtuous and critical - has two main characteristics: (i) it is an adulthood, as we have 
started to see, and (ii) it is also a virtue, an interiority or a “third dimension” - le pli or 
the folding (Foucault, 1982; 1985; 1990:59,60; Deleuze, 2012:113,114,115). These 
are interlinked. 
 
To be adult 
To be adult means to rule oneself - self-direction - as we have pointed out. Foucault is 
inspired by cynicism, by the mysticism in the Middle Age, as we have already said, 
and also by Kant. Regarding the mystical, Foucault says, he reads criticially and 
thinks directly about the Scriptures and this means he does not accept dogmas and 
material mediation, 169  as we have studied above (Foucault, 1990:59,60). For 
Foucault, some ascetical practices of Christianity are closely related to “the exercise 
of a personal liberty” (Vintges, 2004:289). And, this “personal liberty” means to 
“take care of one’s own salvation independently of ecclesiastical institutions and of 
the ecclesiastical pastorate” - independently of Christian dogmas (Vintges, 
2004:289). The mystic takes care of himself alone, without a guide. He speaks 
directly to God. The mystic rules himself and has a parrhesiastic or critical attitude. 
As Foucault (2011b:337) notes: “it seems to me that the long and difficult persistence 
of mysticism, of mystical experience in Christianity, is nothing other than the 
survival of the parrhesiastic pole of confidence in God”. And this mystical behaviour 
or direct link with God or direct confidence in God, beyond dogmas and mediation, is 
the adulthood that inspires Foucault.  
In fact, Gros remembers, Foucault is fundamentally an “anti-dogmatic” 
person, for instance, when he assumes he could not define himself as a philosopher, 
because the philosophy is an “experience”, as we have just written, cannot tell “what 
day and night are” (Defert, Gros, 2016).  The Foucauldian philosopher is someone 
that experiments directly without dogmas or closed definitions. And this experience is 
a “de-identification”, a “becoming other”, a becoming adult (Le Blanc, 2016). The 
philosopher is the adult. According to Foucault (2011b:203,204), the philosopher 
looks like the Cynic that stylizes itself permanently, telling the truth to the others “on 
street corners, in the lanes, at the doors of the temple”. Foucault (2011b: 294) adds,                                                         
169 It is not a material, mediated attitude. 
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the philosopher is like the sun which gives light to the world and sets 
everything in motion, great and small; the philosopher is like the bull who 
advances and fights (militancy); the philosopher is also like someone who 
can command men, just as Agamemnon commanded against Ilium; finally 
the philosopher is capable of withstanding the hardest battles against faults 
and vices, just as Achilles was capable of fighting Hector. 
 
For Foucault, philosophy is this cynical, truth telling – critique - which also 
inspires the author. Philosophy is the courageous act of the adult - the philosopher - 
who is a “sun”, 170 a “militant”, 171 a “commander man”, 172 a “fighter” against its 
faults and vices. And, for all those reasons, Foucault is a philosopher as well, 
although it is not possible to define what a philosopher is. According to Foucault, 
philosophy is a struggle and also an “askesis”, a “spiritual exercise”, which is “the 
sign of the Cynical mission” (Foucault, 2011b:298; Vintges, 2004:282). Foucault 
explains what spirituality is:  
 
by spirituality I mean … the subject’s attainment of a certain mode of 
being and the transformation that the subject carry out on itself to attain 
this mode of being. I believe that spirituality and philosophy were identical 
or nearly identical in ancient spirituality (Vintges, 2004:283).  
 
So, to be philosopher or adult or a spiritual person means also to do some kind 
of exercise such as “meditation, dialogue with oneself, examination of conscience, 
exercises of imagination and of styling of daily behaviour” and those kind of 
exercises transform “one’s mode of being, not just one’s thought” (Vintges, 
2004:282).173 These exercises are the critical attitude, the practice of the fighter or 
spiritual resistant: the one or the author who produces himself and becomes other; 
“the one who does not want to be ruled” (Foucault, 1990:59,60; 1994a: 564,565). 
According to Foucault (1990:59,60; 1994a: 564,565), not to be ruled by a master, but                                                         
170 Foucault wants to give a new light to his present, as we have just noted. We will return to this 
fundamental concept of “sun” or solar revolution later (pg: 219). 
171 We come back to this “militancy” later (pgs: 208-211). 
172 The commander man is the ‘other representative’ or the ‘other politician’. We return to this later 
(pgs: 211-216). 
173 We will develop and explain better this kind of spiritual exercises later. 
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to rule oneself is “the individual refusal of governmentality”.174 Here, Foucault is 
really influenced by Kant and the Enlightenment (Danaher, 2000:10). As Kant (nd:1) 
explains, adulthood defined by critique, to have the courage to use our one’s own 
understanding or to rule oneself: 
 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the 
guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack 
of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the 
guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere 
aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! 
 
Thus, for Foucault (1994a:565), inspired also by Kant, “adulthood” or the 
Enlightenment signifies bravery or “having the courage and the audacity to know” 
and to rule oneself. Adulthood is an act of personal courage and will. For this reason, 
according to Foucault, (1994a:565,566), when people become adult, people can obey, 
because “they obey and reason as much as they want”.  
Consequently, through that critical attitude, the adult affirms directly and 
collectively through the statement, the cry or the silence and opens a “possibility” - a 
space - in society in order to survive (Foucault, 1990:59,60; 1994a:564,565). 
According to Foucault (2011b:160,161), truth-telling, “role and end”, is “to give 
form” to life and this form occupies space; this form “defines” the “visible figure” of 
the existence, as we have argued above. So, adulthood means parrhesia or “fearless 
speech”, a brave act of occupation of space. As we have seen, the cynic is charged 
with “veridiction”, with “announcing the truth”; and this cynical “manifestation” of 
the truth occupies space. Why? It is a relation with the other. To occupy space or to 
tell the truth is an act of “courage”, because it is a “collective175 process” (Foucault, 
2011b:309, Balibar, 2016). As we have studied, the cynic tells the truth, for instance, 
“on street corners”, publicly in society.  To tell the truth always implies another 
person, hence, it is a “risky attitude”, as we have already studied (Foucault, 
2011b:183; Balibar, 2016). It is an “irruptive, violent, scandalous” mode of life that                                                         
174 For Foucault, governamentality means the “new rationality” of the classical age, which is called 
“the reason of state and of police”. This new rationality adopts “political technologies” with the aim to 
increase the state dominion (Foucault, 2012:180). 
175 As we have seen above, for Foucault, the statements are always collective.  
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could “displease” the other and could lead to “errors” (Foucault, 2011b:183; Balibar, 
2016). To occupy space is to have the courage to fail facing the other. To be adult is 
to rule oneself engaged with the other through discourse and acts. As Danaher et al 
(2000:161,162) comments, for Foucault, to be an author or a creator of space is to be 
a “we”, an ‘other subject’: 
 
Certainly there is a degree of self-interest in our attempts to apply an 
aesthetics of existence: we write to be beloved. … But … art and 
judgments of taste aren’t divorced from the wider community, and the arts, 
or practices of the self are ‘not something the individual invests by 
himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are 
proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his 
social group’ 
 
To become adult is to become an a posteriori subject, influenced and created 
also by society, as condition of possibility, as we have discussed before. It is a 
reciprocal act from the self to society and from society to the self. And that reciprocity 
has political consequences. As Vintges (204: 286) argues, Foucault accepts the subject 
that speaks “for himself in the first person as such”, but adds that “being occupied 
with oneself” is to be linked with the “polis” and with the “world”; it is to engage in 
“political activities”, as we are going to study later (pgs: 211-2013).  
Proudhon has also a critical and a self-critical perspective, as we have already 
studied. The Proudhonian activist is a critic who also treads an ethical path. Proudhon 
(2009:142,143) asks, what is deepest in man? And the author answers, “the man 
himself, that is to say, the will and the conscience, the free arbiter and law, opposed 
in a perpetual antagonism. The man is at war with himself”. For Proudhon, this 
“perpetual antagonism” or non-dogmatic adulthood or free arbiter is a “paramount 
commitment to freedom understood as moral self-direction” (Crowder, 1991:29). 
This perpetual antagonism and moral self-direction and adulthood are the 
Proudhonian ethical path. And Déjacque (2015:20), close to Proudhon, complements 
the idea: man ceases to be a slave or a youth and becomes adult, when he revolts 
against the force. To be adult is also a protest or critical act against force or the 
oppressive power. This critical attitude is his main point. According to Proudhon, 
social life is “conflict and the interplay of opposing inseparable and irreducible 
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forces”: war (Castleton, 2012:110). Thus, for Proudhon, this force or critique could 
also be seen in a dual way, personally and collectively: it could be our own self 
against whom we fight in order to govern ourselves - self-direction, interiority. It 
signifies also the fight against the other in society, a reciprocal encounter that 
generates a collective subject and also has political consequences, as we are going to 
see later (pg: 198-200). It is a struggle against “modern civilized society” which is 
pictured by Proudhon as “destructive of moral self-direction” (Crowder, 1991:29).  
 
The virtuous path 
According to Foucault, to be adult implies also a virtuous and spiritual path: a fold. 
And this fold is the Foucauldian care of the self, the critical work each can do in order 
to sculpt the interiority or self now, having our needs as reference. This care of the 
self is self-stylization, we have explained above. This care of the self happens when 
our “formal power” (force) fights against our “material power” (force) and sculpts 
our self (force). The Foucauldian self cares for himself or fights against himself 
because he “does not want to be subjected” by the others and by his passions, but 
rather to rule himself, creating his “subjectivation” (“self-invention”) (Foucault, 
1985:73; Fernández, 2010:29; Revel, 2016). For Revel (2016), through this 
spirituality, the Foucauldian subject breaks its subjectivity, its “fixed point”, its 
identity; it ceases to be temporarily a “subject”, in order to be an ongoing 
“subjectivation” or invention of itself. 
Proudhon explains also this creative fight between forces is the way to avoid a 
“Meta-Subject” or the “essentialisation of forces taken at the Absolute”, such as “a 
universal class, a higher state or an absolute ownership” (Damien, 2009:17). 
Déjacque (2015) adds a complementary idea: “earthworm, ignorant, slave, cretin, the 
man would be all of this today if he had never rebelled against the force. And here he 
is great, giant, God, because he dared everything!” For Proudhon this self-critical 
attitude is divine and spiritual, as we have just explained above. Foucault agrees.  
Thus, in order to counteract that absolute subject, Foucault proposes care of 
the self as a personal and collective work. We care for ourselves or we rule ourselves 
and, at the same time, we prepare ourselves to encounter the other. As Foucault 
(2011b:313) adds regarding the cynics, “the care of others thus coincides exactly with 
the care of the self”. And, for that reason, this care of the self is a virtuous path, a 
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source of peace and harmony. According to Foucault (1985:73), the care of the self is 
the route to worthy social life, 
 
this epimeleia heautou, care of the self, was a precondition that had to be 
met before one was qualified to attend to the affairs of others or lead 
them, included not only the need to know (to know the things one does 
not know, to know one is ignorant, to know one’s own nature), but to 
attend effectively to the self, and to exercise and transform oneself.   
 
 For Foucault (1985:76), “governing oneself, managing one’s state, and 
participating in the administration of the city were three practices of the same type” 
and they are linked reciprocally. So, the care of the self is not an egoistic path, but a 
collective one, as we are seeing. 
The Foucauldian care of self is mainly an ethical path. For Foucault (2011b), 
this ethical path means “its privileged, essential object [is] life and the mode of life”. 
And this Foucauldian “mode of life” is the constitution of an interiority and a virtuous 
relation to the other. According to Deleuze (2012:109), Foucault finds this ‘ethical 
and beautiful path’ in his last works, for instance, in The Uses of Pleasures that 
“represent a kind of turn regarding the preceding books”, as we have started studying 
above. In his last works, in the very end of his life,176 Foucault “discovers the relation 
to himself - rapport à soi - as a new dimension which is irreducible to power relations 
and to knowledge relations that were the object of his previous books”177 (Deleuze, 
2012:109).                                                         
176 Those last Foucauldian works were published just some weeks before his death (Gros, 2014b:67). 
177 In the two last volumes of History of Sexuality, it seems Foucault concludes his subject design, 
drawing the head of the figure or the inside - the interiority - or the spiritual and ethical path of the self. 
Foucault stresses something that is already embryonic and almost subjacent in his previous works, 
namely, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, when in the end of the book Foucault clarifies that the 
subject is not suffocated by power and knowledge relations, but stimulated by them. Those relations 
are the condition of possibility of his determination - the aesthetics of the self, as we have already 
explained. So, it seems, first of all, Foucault designed the exteriority of the subject - its conditions of 
possibility - and, then, eight months before his death, he drew the inside of the self. And it was also a 
personal experience. As Eribon (2011:531) tells us: “during the last eight months of his life, to write 
his two books played for him the role which philosophical writing and private diary played in ancient 
philosophy: that of a self-work, a self–stylization”, as we have already studied. In a different sense, 
Clare O'Farrell adds, this Foucauldian ‘design’ of the self and his latest works have as goal the contrast 
between “Greco-Roman techniques of the self with those of early Christian monastic culture in order 
to uncover, in the latter, the historical origin of many of the features that still characterize the modern 
subject” (Foucault, 2015a). Taylor, Vintges (2004a:3) complements, the ancient Greek “aesthetics of 
existence” or “care of the self” or “practices of freedom” are “key elements in a ‘counterattack’ against 
modern (normalizing) form of power”. For Foucault, the introduction of those practices today 
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Virtue and sexuality  
And why is this new spiritual dimension irreducible to power and knowledge 
relations – the Foucauldian historical dimension? It is because, as we have just noted, 
the “relation to oneself” or the “care of the self” has “a selective link with 
sexuality” 178  and “it is in sexuality that this new ethical dimension sets up and 
realizes itself” (Deleuze, 2012:109). As far as we understand, this care of the self has 
its root beyond history. Sexuality is first of all something a priori, as we have studied 
in the previous chapter. The care of the self starts with power. That means sexual 
power too or a sexual impulse or desire. Power crosses us and gives us strength in 
order to fight with this same power - the fold - and to follow a beauty and a virtuous 
path or to create a beauty or a virtuous relation with ourselves and with the others, as 
we are going to show. According to Foucault, that sexual power leads to the 
aphrodisia. As Foucault (1985:43) explains, the aphrodisia is an “ethical experience” 
that presupposes the “ontology of the force”: the human being is a sexual “dynamics” 
or movement made of desire, action and pleasure reciprocally linked.179 The human 
being has to deal spiritually with this force or sexual “dynamics” in order to live 
virtuously, as we are going to observe. 
Inspired by the Greeks, Foucault (1985:48) has a positive understanding of 
sexuality as something “natural and necessary”.180 According to Foucault (1985:48), 
for the Greeks, he says: 
 
the sexual activity tended toward the restoration of the highest state of the 
being that man had achieved. In general, sexual activity was perceived as 
natural (natural and indispensable) since it was through this activity that                                                                                                                                                               
“produces something new” and also rids modern forms of power from their “elitist character” (Taylor, 
Vintges, 2004a:3). In another way, we could say that, for Foucault, these “Greco-Roman techniques of 
the self” are ‘other paths’ of being, different from the modern and capitalist subject. They are the 
ultimate Foucauldian proposal and inspiration for today or for new ways of life here and now 
(Foucault, 2011b:151). 
178 The Foucauldian concept of sexuality is the Greek aphrodisia, “’things’ or ‘pleasures of love’, 
‘sexual relations’, ‘carnal acts’, ‘sensual pleasures’” (Foucault, 1985:35). Foucault (1985:35) explains 
that our idea of sexuality is not so wide because the Greek concept implies a “diet” and an “economy”, 
as we are going to see in the following lines. Foucault (1985:40) resumes, the aphrodisia are “acts, 
gestures, contacts, which produce a certain form of pleasure”. 
179 Foucault (1985:43) tells about a sexual “dynamics” that joins in a circle “the desire that leads to the 
act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire”.  
180 In the previous chapter on space, we have already studied the concept of necessity and we have 
concluded that power is necessary, universal and strategic. We have also confirmed our second 
working hypothesis: to establish space is to survive.  
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 167 
living creatures were able to reproduce, the species as a whole were able 
to escape extinction, and cities, families, names, and religions were able 
to endure far longer than individuals, who were destined to pass away. 
 
Foucault (1985:48) adds,  
 
the desire that led to the aphrodisia were classed by Plato among the most 
natural and necessary; and the pleasures that could be obtained from the 
aphrodisia had their cause, according to Aristotle, in necessary things that 
concerned the body and the life of the body in general. 
 
Foucault (2011b:265) notes, the body (bios), for Cynics, means “animality” and 
it is something fundamental in human being’s life, as it is for Cynics materially and 
morally. 
 
This animality, which is the material model of existence, which is also its 
moral model, constitutes a sort of permanent challenge in the Cynic life. 
Animality is a way of being with regard to oneself, a way of being which 
must take the form of a constant test. Animality is an exercise. 
 
For Foucault, this animality – body - is the condition of possibility for an 
ethical life; it is a “material” and a “moral model”, as we are going to examine in the 
following lines; it is a “permanent challenge” and a “test” in terms of spiritual 
experience. And Foucault (1985:48) concludes, “finding that sexual activity was 
deeply and harmoniously grounded in nature (in the body), there was no way that it 
could be considered bad.”181  
Although sexual activity is a natural and necessary thing, for Foucault 
(1984:90), this spiritual “relation to oneself” through sexuality is not immediate. It is 
a path, a learning process. Proudhon (2009:402) tells us about a “progressive and 
painful education of our instinct” and “a slow and insensitive transformation of our 
spontaneous perceptions in reflected knowledge.” For Foucault (1984:90), care of the 
self arises along an agonistic path: a “victory over forces that are difficult to tame”,                                                         
181 Ferguson (2004:32) notes that like Emma Goldman, Foucault merges Eros and knowledge. 
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starting from the glutton - like a propaedeutic. According to Foucault, “the 
constitution of an inside, an interiority, is first of all a food issue rather than a sexual 
issue” (Deleuze, 2012:109). For Foucault,  
 
the free man’s relation to himself as self-determination presupposes 
sexuality in three ways: in the simple form of a ‘Dietary’ of pleasures, in 
order to govern oneself and to be able to actively govern its body; as a 
composed form of an ‘Economy’ of the household in order to be able to 
govern the wife, and she reaches herself a good receptivity; in the form of 
an unfolded ‘Erotic’ of boys in order to make boys also learn to govern 
themselves, to be active and to resist the power of others (Deleuze, 
2012:109,110). 
 
The Foucauldian interiority or spirituality is shaped by the “transformation of 
one’s whole mode of existence, including body, heart and soul” (Vintges, 2004:284). 
The body is already the soul when we work on it and control its excesses or satisfy its 
needs. As we have defined above, spirituality is the control of the body’s needs. So, 
diet and bodily care play a key role in spiritual learning and are already forms of 
spirituality and control of oneself. Thus, to have the ability to resist, as a battle - the 
fold - and to tame food, familiar and sexual excess is the Foucauldian spiritual, 
virtuous or philosophical path.  
 
Human nature is divided, man (is) perpetually ‘at war with himself’, his 
higher rational and moral nature constantly struggling to control his lower 
animal desires and inclinations. The free man is contrasted with those who 
are at mercy of their animality, ‘beasts of burden, whose whole business is 
to drink, eat, sleep and fornicate’ (Crowder, 1991:79,80). 
 
Although Foucault admits the possibility of achieving a different state of 
consciousness with the help of “yellow pills or cocaine”, Foucault finished his life 
believing that the attainment of the spiritual path beyond sex did not require drugs 
and could be achieve through a natural “askesis”. And this “askesis” is the 
Foucauldian political and philosophical path or inheritance. As we have argued, for 
Foucault (1985:244), this “askesis” is achievable through a natural “economy of 
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pleasures ensured by the control that is exercised by oneself over oneself” - self-
agonism. As the Greeks recommend, the soul practices a regime of moderation or “an 
orderly regimen that is possible because she is ‘mistress of herself’ and she is 
‘heedful of measure’, she has ‘subjected the power of evil’ and ‘liberated the power 
of virtue’” (Foucault, 1985:244). Nevertheless, this virtuous mode of life or this 
moderate soul, that could also be beyond sex or not, presupposes always “animality”, 
the body as an ongoing challenge, as we have seen.   
This personal path of moderation by need - the body - is spirituality or the 
spiritual path of truth that is also social and political. In other words, this path of truth 
is the virtuous path that satisfies the needs - the truth; it is the expression or the 
representation of our needs - opening space or creating signs in society or in polis. 
We are going to develop this political side later. 
 And here Foucault meets again Proudhon. As we have already argued, 
Proudhon is also concerned with the primitive instincts, with the dietary and bodily 
care. Proudhon warns, “the animal in man is never wholly obliterated or defeated; it 
must be kept in check by continually renewed effort of reason and moral will” 
(Crowder, 1991:80). For Proudhon, the body and the animality are fundamental 
conditions of possibility of the self-direction or are its measure. 
 
Virtue: man and woman 
And, according to Foucault, this “continually renewed” spiritual attitude, through 
dietary regime, family and sexuality, creates the relation to oneself - rapport à soi - 
that is, as we have already said, a social, virtuous, free and beautiful path, rather than 
a patriarchal, vertical, repressive and egoistic one, as it could seem. And why is this 
Foucauldian “relation to oneself” not patriarchal and repressive, despite the warrior, 
masculine force? 
For Foucault (1985:46), as for Proudhon, as we have just noted, in the practice 
of sexual pleasures and in the reproductive function two roles and two poles can be 
clearly distinguished: man and woman182 or the subject and the object183 (Foucault,                                                         
182In the Use of Pleasures Foucault bases his argument on the biological division of two sexes, 
man/woman, in order to study and ground the “care of the self”. Nevertheless, in The True Sex, 
regarding the “medicalization of sexual uncommon” of a nineteenth century French hermaphrodite, 
Foucault (1980) accepts the existence of the sexual uncommon – hermaphrodites, as we have referred 
above. And Foucault (1980) asks: “do we really need a true sex?” Then, Foucault (1980) answers that 
a hermaphrodite does not need a “true sex” - to be male or female -, admitting, for that reason, there is 
also a world of an uncommon “one sex”: 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 170 
1985:46). According to Foucault, the male is an active force. This means he has an                                                                                                                                                               
 
Alexina … want neither one nor the other. She was not crossed by this great desire to 
join the ‘other sex’ experienced by some who feel betrayed by their anatomy or 
imprisoned in an unjust identity. She liked, I think, this world of just one sex where all 
her emotions and all her loves were, being ‘other’ without ever to have to be ‘the other 
sex’, neither woman loving women nor man hidden among women. Alexina was the 
subject without identity with a great desire for women; and, for these women, she was a 
point of attraction of their femininity and for their femininity, and nothing forces them to 
leave their all-female world. 
 
For Foucault, that sexual uncommon is also a biological morphology, not a historical one, as 
homosexuality (Fassin, 2014:80,81). As we have already written, Foucault does not develop gender 
topics (Fassin, 2014:80,81). We will develop the homosexuality issue (pgs: 189-191).  
183 In The Use of Pleasure Foucault does not say explicitly that he adopts this Greek biological division 
man-woman or active force-passive force as his own vision. There are different interpretations about 
this point. For instance, according to Nussbaum (1985), Foucault changed his mind on this subject, 
maybe because he wrote last volumes of History of Sexuality “while already dying”. Nussbaum (1985) 
notes and criticizes Foucault’s “departure from views about the inseparability of ideas from social 
institutions that have been his most valuable legacy to modern philosophy”. Nevertheless even 
criticizing The Use of Pleasures, Nussbaum (1985) underscores that this “work deals with the thinker’s 
deepest personal and political concerns” and Foucault, a “serious and courageous thinker”, wanted to 
show “the possibility of other ways of life.” Also Taylor and Vintges (2004a:3), commenting the late 
Foucault, argue that with his last two books the author intentionally “creates a theoretical framework”, 
the ancient Greek “aesthetics of existence” or “care for the self” or “practices of freedom”, with a 
specific propose: to “counterattack” modern (normalizing) form of power” and to produce “something 
new” (Taylor, Vintges, 2004a:3). For Taylor and Vintges (2004a: 3), Foucault identifies himself with 
the Greek “aesthetics of existence” as a way to get rid of biopolitics. Furthermore, in 1978, Foucault 
was interviewed by D. Trombadori about the method of his book, and Foucault answered (as quoted 
above: pgs.111, 112) that his wrintings are “experiences”.  For Foucault, a book “is something that 
allows us to fabricate ourselves. It is something that does not exist before, but exists afterwards.” And 
Foucault (as quoted above: pgs.111, 112) goes further: 
 
I never think quite the same for the reason that my books are for me experiences, in a 
sense that I want those experiences to be the fullest possible. Experience is something 
that gets you out of yourself ... I write them because I do not know yet exactly what to 
think on this thing I would like so much to think. So, this book transforms myself and 
transforms what I think. Each book transforms what I had thought when I finished the 
previous book. 
 
My contention here is that Foucault identified himself with his books. He wrote his books in order to 
clarify his thinking about a certain subject. Foucault explains: “I write them because I do not know yet 
exactly what to think on this thing I would like so much to think”. His writings transform what 
Foucault thought before. So, we could infer that this Foucauldian in depth research on Greek sexuality 
was a way that Foucault had in order to clarify his ideas on this relationship between man-woman and 
also his practice or his experience on sexuality. As Eribon (quoted above: pg 166, note: 177) explains, 
the two last volumes of History of Sexuality played, for Foucault, “the role which philosophical writing 
and private diary played in ancient philosophy: that of a self-work, a self–stylization”.  
So, in this thesis, we treat this biological distinction man-woman as one of Foucault’s own positions, 
perhaps the position he adopted most clearly during his final years. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to explore fully the complex issues of authorial intention and Foucault’s conception of method and his 
approach to the history of ideas. The argument here is that this Foucauldian study of Greek sexuality is 
suggestive and can be treated as an alternative that Foucault offered to us. In the context of the method 
adopted in this thesis, it provides a way of re-thinking resistance. As Taylor and Vintges (2004:8) point 
out, there are “a wide range of strategies for resisting modern forms of subjection” or for criticizing 
capitalism or, better, for living beyond it, as we will see later on (pgs: 178-192).    
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energy that could be applied sexually (a biological perspective) and also in a virtuous 
and freeway (the ethical perspective) essentially, when man controls his excesses and 
temptations and is not passive, nor a slave of his passions, and when man fulfils his 
active and masculine role (his fighter role). For Foucault (1985:128,139), this man’s 
battle implies “tumultuous forces” (Foucault, 1985:128,139). The aphrodisia “is 
really the most violent of all pleasures and is, for that reason, mainly masculine”. 
According to Foucault (1985:128,139), woman is a passive sexual force, 
 
in the act itself, the women’s pleasures is much less intense than that of 
the man, because in the case of the latter the excretion of fluid occurs 
abruptly and with much greater violence. In the case of the woman, in the 
other hand, the pleasure begins at the start of the act and lasts as long as 
intercourse itself. Throughout intercourse her pleasure depends on the 
man; it does not cease until ‘the man releases the woman’; and if she 
happens to reach orgasm before him, this does not mean her pleasure ends 
– it is only experienced in a different way (Foucault, 1985:128,139). 
 
Foucault’s intention seems just to take the impulse of the “violent” male 
energy, to use it, to make it useful and social, in order to build up a virtuous self and a 
harmonious life in common. For Foucault, the man who takes care of himself is a 
“gentleman” and, for that reason, he teaches his wife when she could not access 
education and information (Foucault, 1985:154,155).184 Foucault (1985:154,155) sees 
woman’s role or skills as a supervisor or a manager “in accordance with her fitness”, 
as we have just said. For Foucault (1985:154,155), as for Proudhon, woman has 
naturally finer abilities than man. She is beauty and man is force, the violence of 
desires. If we observe with attention from a non-capitalist perspective, Foucault has a 
matriarchal point of view. Woman is the family ruler, the basis of society, and man, 
as fighter, has the harder tasks in the polis. As we have said, she would be mindful of 
her family provisions in order to educate their children well, make them good citizens 
                                                        
184 Foucault (1985:154,155) talks about Xenophon’s times when girls married very young, for instance 
at 15 years old, with low knowledge and education and lack of life experience. From Foucault’s words, 
we deduce that an educated woman does not need man as her pedagogue, just assuming her duties in 
accordance with her biological abilities whatever they are and taking care of herself.  
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and to achieve a harmonious household and city. Woman and man are a partnership. 
Foucault (1985:155) explains his non-feminist position.185  
 
He had trained her so well and had made her such a valuable partner that 
he could put the house in her care while he went about his work, whether 
this was in the field or in the agora – that is, in those places where male 
activity ought to be exercised in a privileged way. 
 
For Foucault (1985:153), “to manage the oikos is to command,186 and being in 
charge of the household is not different from the power that is to be exercised in the 
city”.  
So, this moderate way has consequences in the polis, as the behaviour of the 
Greek Nicocles shows:  
 
unlike so many tyrants, he has not used his power to possess himself of 
other men’s wives and children by force; he has been mindful of how 
attached men are to their spouses and their progeny and of how often 
political crises and revolutions originated in abuses of this nature (Foucault, 
1985:172).  
 
 In the context of the oikos or the economy - the art of managing the oikos -, 
according to Xenophon’s thought, man has an aristocratic 187 governmental 
responsibility or, as Nietzsche puts it, a “happy action”.  Foucault (1985:178) 
explains, 
 
the association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; the man rules in 
accordance with his fitness, and in those matters in which man should                                                         
185  Foucault talks about the virtuous man, the carer, and also at another time, about Antiquity. 
Nevertheless, Foucault is not a feminist and criticizes feminism. 
186 We would say to be a manager or an ‘eco-nomist’ in a mutual perspective, as Proudhon defends. 
187 Here Foucault seems to have an ethical-political or aristocratic perspective influenced by Plato and 
Nietzsche. For Plato (1958:545) the man who is “just and good” is aristocratic or is “like aristocracy”. 
For Nietzsche, aristocracy means freedom, happiness and health. Nietzsche (2006:17) affirms, “the 
chivalric-aristocratic value judgments are based on a powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even 
effervescent good health that includes the things needed to maintain it, war, adventure, hunting, 
dancing, jousting and everything else that contains strong, free, happy action”. As we are going to 
argue later, this aristocratic Foucauldian man is also anarchist. 
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rule; which implies, as in every aristocratic government, that he will 
delegate to his wife the part she is suited to play (if he tried to do 
everything by himself, the husband would transform his authority into an 
‘oligarchy’).  
 
Foucault points out that the noble or virtuous man, for the Greeks, is an 
aristocrat or a warrior, in Nietzsche’s terms, and not an oligarch or patriarch. Its 
nobility or virtue leads him to delegate tasks to women in order to make his wife a 
“co-worker”, because she has the tranquillity necessary to govern the household, due 
her biological constitution (Foucault, 1985:155,178) 
Proudhon shares this perspective. For Proudhon (1875:3,5), as we have stated 
above, man and woman are “equivalent” and each one has a “special prerogative”: 
man is the force and woman is beauty.  According to Proudhon (1875:7), beauty 
balances strength and power. Proudhon (1875:II,III) specifies, in terms of force, “man 
is for woman in the ratio of 3 to 2”. So, for Proudhon, the man’s force is also a kind 
of motor of virtue and society as it is for Foucault. Notwithstanding, despite man’s 
force or ‘man-engine’, women’s beauty guides this force - the motor - because beauty 
is “more creative” than force. For that reason, Proudhon (1875:8) celebrates in 
woman “the eternal and celestial beauty”. In his perspective (1875:3,4,7), the “honest 
women” are “the beautiful half of humankind”; they are “the living representation of 
the ideal”. Proudhon (1875:11) writes, “woman, incarnation of the ideal, seems to 
have a superior nature than man who just has the strength”. We could say, as in the 
Bible, woman offers knowledge of sensuality – sensibility – to man: the apple. The 
Proudhonian woman seems to be the utopia now or the Foucauldian heterotopia - “the 
living representation of the ideal” - or the space where man creates life - the nest. She 
is the space of man’s eternity. Thus, despite their different features, according to 
Proudhon (1875:4,5), man and woman are “equal”, each with its function. For the 
author (1875:5), “the balance of their rights and duties should be made”, because 
there needs to be “welfare and honour equality” between both sexes. According to 
Proudhon (1875:5), the rights and dignity of woman should be recognized; woman 
might feel “emancipated and safe”, because this is the condition to have a harmonious 
society.   
Thus, for Foucault, the virtuous man assumes his sexual activity or energy, his 
biological features; he denies passivity and controls the excesses of his energy. He is 
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not a slave of his desires, but a warrior. And this attitude has important consequences 
personally and socially - in the polis. Foucault explains human beings are always 
working on the limit of their force. For Foucault (1985:50), “this force (is) potentially 
excessive by nature, and the moral question (is) how to confront this force, how to 
control it and to regulate its economy in a suitable way”.  
 
The virtuous law: need 
For Foucault, inspired by the Greeks, there are no moral rules in order to control 
force. Foucault (1985:252) explains,  
 
Greeks neither inherited nor developed a belief that a divine power has 
revealed to mankind a code of laws for the regulation of sexual behaviour; 
they had no religious institution possessed by the authority to enforce 
sexual prohibitions. Confronted by older and richer cultures, more elaborate 
than their cultures which nonetheless differed greatly from each other, the 
Greeks felt free to select, adapt, develop and - above all – innovate. 
 
Then, Foucault adds (1985:50), this human force is always on the “point of 
overshooting the objective”. And what is the objective? How to know when the 
excess begins? How to know we are below the objective? Foucault (1985:49,55) talks 
about the “strategy of needs”188 that is the criterion. Our “animality” or our body with 
its necessities is the measure. As we have said above, this “animality” is a “moral 
model” and “constitutes a sort of permanent challenge”, as happens in the Cynic life. 
That is to say, for Foucault, the “satisfaction of needs” is the moral law: after this 
satisfaction the excess begins and before this satisfaction we are in need - in a passive 
or feminine way (Foucault, 1985:49). Foucault (1985:49,50) explains,  
 
people were led to go beyond the satisfaction of needs and to continue 
looking for pleasure even after the body has been restored. The tendency 
to rebellion and riotousness was the ‘stasiastic’ potential of the sexual 
appetite; and the tendency to exaggeration, to excess, was its ‘hyperbolic’ 
potential.                                                         
188 In the previous chapter, we have already studied the concept of ‘strategy’ in terms of space, time 
and also necessity. 
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 To rebel and to riot is a good thing or a natural thing - the ‘stasiastic’ potential 
- in order to satisfy needs and to be happy, as we have just outlined. In turn, to fight 
against excesses is also a peaceful or harmonious way of life, because excess is a bad 
thing - the ‘hyperbolic’ potential. For Foucault (1985:52), question turns on the “right 
use” of this force and pleasure. This is the chresis aphrodision or “the use of 
pleasures” (Foucault, 1985:54). And this chresis is adjustable regarding need or the 
here and now, as we have set out in the previous chapter. As Foucault (1985:54) 
clarifies,  
 
it is more a question of variable adjustment in which one had to take 
different factors in account: the element of want and natural necessity, 
that of opportuneness, which was temporal and circumstantial, that of the 
status of the individual himself. Chresis had to be decided on the basis of 
these different considerations. 
 
Then, Foucault (1985:56) explains,  
 
need ought to serve as a guiding principle in this strategy … The strategy 
made possible an equilibrium in the dynamics of pleasures and desire: it 
kept this dynamics from ‘running away’, from becoming excessive, by 
setting the satisfaction of a need as its internal limit; and it prevented this 
natural force from revolting, from usurping a place that was not its own, 
because it provided only for what was necessary to the body and was 
intended by nature, and nothing more. 
 
Foucault (1985:56) points out that to have need as referential is the way to 
avoid immoderation, slavery or an unnatural way. Inspired by the Greeks, Foucault 
(1985:57) clarifies, moderation is “an art, a practice of pleasures” and a self-
limitation based on need through the “use” of those pleasures. We “use” the pleasures 
as this is “intended by nature, and nothing more”. This is moderation or to know 
bodily necessities.  
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The virtuous person 
The relationship to desires and pleasures is self-agonism: we fight against ourselves. 
As Foucault (1985:67) explains, “the relationship to desires and pleasures is 
conceived as a pugnacious one: a man must take the position and role of the 
adversary with respect to them, either according to the model of the fighting soldier 
or the model of the wrestler in a match”. For Foucault (1985:70), to be virtuous is to 
be a fighter, divine, or a moderate person.  
Hence, this moderation implies also some “poverty”, that signifies a striving “to 
get back to the ground of the absolutely indispensable” (Foucault, 2011b: 258). 
“Poverty” signifies here to have just what we need. This means, as we have observed, 
the moderate individual is one who desires “not more than he should, nor when he 
should not”. As we have written, to have more than we should is “usurping a place 
that was not its own”. This is an unbalanced way, a reason for revolts. 
As we have seen, Proudhon also advocates moderate living. Crowder (1991:80) 
remembers, “the need to moderate desire for the sake of true freedom is a favourite 
Proudhonian theme, reappearing in many different contexts”. For instance, in terms 
of economy, Proudhon defends also a “law of poverty” that signifies “man should 
always want sufficiently to be obliged to work”, for two reasons: (i) work absorbs and 
dissipates the passions; (ii) a true or moderate consumption always generates utility 
or new production. So, production should not generate a greater capacity of 
consumption, because it would lead to economic crises and losses (Crowder, 
1991:80). According to Proudhon (2009:305), in a fair or moderate economy, there 
will always be an “equation between production and consumption”. Proudhon 
(2009:308) argues,  
  
economists see all unproductive consumption as an evil, as a theft made to 
mankind; they are never weary to exhort owners to moderation, to work, to 
savings; they preach them the need to be useful allocating what they 
receive to production; they fulminate luxury and laziness with the most 
terrible imprecations. This morality is very beautiful, certainly; it is a 
shame it did not meet the common sense.  
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For Proudhon, the free individual is not slave of his passions, “luxury” and 
“laziness”; he controls his desire and is not excessive. The free individual is a 
moderate person and not a slave. Proudhon argues, 
 
who is not free, who is not governed by the authentically human part of his 
nature, is not truly a man; where there is no freedom, there is no humanity. 
Outside ‘the society of free men there is only a ‘society of savages’; 
‘liberty is an absolute right (Crowder, 1991:80). 
 
In turn, according to Proudhon, liberty is “a sine qua non condition of 
existence” and it is also “war”, as we have already shown (Crowder, 1991:80). The 
battle is fundamental to Proudhonian thought. In terms of ethics, Proudhon affirms, 
virtue will be challenged permanently and “the individual must be armed with his 
own moral strength in order to assert his freedom and humanity” (Crowder, 1991:80). 
As we have studied, according to Proudhon, we are in a permanent fight with 
ourselves in order to control our animality or our primitive instincts. And this is a 
fight against excesses and lack that includes woman and man. Woman could be also a 
virtuous being. For Proudhon, as we have studied, woman should know her animality, 
its natural features and her appropriate and useful task in order to construct an 
harmonious and balanced society. Her task is not pre-determined. Just her needs or 
animality - the law - could fix it. 
We could conclude, this Proudhonian and Foucauldian - sexual and ethical -
path is moderation, freedom, and equality, rather than a repressive, tyrannical, 
hierarchical and patriarchal way personally, socially and also politically (Foucault, 
1985:80). Foucault (1985:80,81) highlights,  
 
in order not to be excessive, not to do violence, in order to avoid the trap 
of tyrannical authority (over others) coupled with a soul tyrannized by 
desires, the exercise of political power required, as its own principle of 
internal regulation, power over oneself. Moderation, understood as an 
aspect of dominion over the self, was on an equal footing with justice, 
courage, or prudence; that is, it was a virtue that qualified a man to 
exercise his mastery over others. The most kingly man was king of 
himself. 
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Woman should also “avoid the trap of tyrannical authority (over others) coupled 
with a soul tyrannized by desires”. She has also a political task or a task in polis or 
political power. According to Foucault (2012:16,17) and Proudhon’s non-feminism 
and non-capitalism, woman could not have the force and the abilities to participate in 
the Agora’s affairs because “politics is the continuation of war by other means”. And 
also because both authors – Foucault and Proudhon - are looking for new ways of life. 
But, as we have argued, woman would have the abilities and the skills to be a 
supervisor or a manager controlling her excesses and deficiencies. We will develop 
those ideas in the next sub-header. 
 
The virtuous polis: equality and freedom 
For Foucault (2011b:277), each of us is “king by nature” personally and politically. 
Foucault adds (1985:79), everybody is equal and could be “king” or free:  
 
the freedom of individuals, understood as the mastery they were able of 
exercising over themselves, was indispensable to the entire state. 
Consider that passage of Aristotle’s Politics: ‘a state is good in virtue of 
the goodness of the citizens who have a share in the government. In our 
state, all citizen have a share in government’.  
 
This ethical or sexual – aphrodisiac - battle’s goal is moderation or to live 
harmoniously, freely and in peace - to be peaceful - with ourselves and with the 
others. And all of us could participate in this fight. According to Foucault, for 
instance, man and woman could be either “kings” or warriors regarding their excesses 
and lacks. According to Vintges (2004:287), Foucault “wants everyone to have access 
to the domain of freedom practices” that are, for this reason, “universal”: “freedom 
practices for all”. Foucault (2011b:302) refers to “an ethical universality”. It is not 
“the political universality of the group”, but “the universality of all men”: man and 
woman.  
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And because this ethical battle or path is mainly a sexual one, in terms of the 
marriage, for example, Foucault (1985:156) believes, spouses are also “partners”189 
notwithstanding their biological differences; man and woman, both care for 
themselves ethically: 
 
the respective contribution of each does not have to be taken into 
consideration, but only the way each acts with a view to the common 
goal, which is ‘to keep their substance in the best condition but also to 
add as much as possible to it by fine and just means’.  
 
Foucault says that, to be married, for the Greeks, is an ethical attitude: it is to 
take care of the self in order to achieve a balanced common goal. Foucault (1985:157) 
explains, this “common purpose” of the marriage 190 has a “dual finality”: (i) the 
children and (ii) the “maintenance” and the “dynamics” of the household. And, as 
Foucault (1985:156) points out, there are no fixed rules between husband and wife, 
but freedom;191 there is just the way husband and wife act in order to construct that 
common goal through “fine and just means”. For Foucault (1985:157,158) again, the 
need or the nature of each partner is the criterion that governs the household and each 
nature or need is necessary and complementary – sufficient - in order to have a 
harmonious oikos: “each of the two marriage partners has a nature, a form of activity, 
and a place, which are defined in relation to the necessities of the oikos”; the “two 
roles are exactly complementary and the absence of one would make the other 
useless.  
And here, Foucault (1985:157,158) meets Proudhon again, when the latter uses 
men and women to show how his anarchy works. Proudhon specifies, there are “two 
places, two forms of activity, and two ways of organizing time” defined physically or 
biologically. Inspired by the Greeks, Foucault also underlines, the objective is to 
utilize this available energy and the natural abilities of both, man and woman, in a 
useful social way in order to organize society. Foucault (1985:158) explains,                                                          
189  According to Foucault, the equality or equivalence between man and woman manifests also 
sexually. For Foucault (1985:127,128), there is “a general isomorphism between the man’s sexual act 
and that of the woman”. Foucault (1985:128) states, there are “the same mechanism and the same 
terminal act of ejaculation”. 
190 This is not a legal marriage, but a virtuous one, as we are going to see. 
191 Proudhon underlines also the importance of freedom between husband and wife, as we have already 
seen. 
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the gods endowed each of the two with particular qualities … first of all: 
for man, who must work on open air ‘plowing, sowing, planting, 
herding’, they have the capacity to endure cold, heat, and journeys on 
foot; women, who work indoors, were given bodies that are less resistant.  
 
Foucault (1985:158) continues,  
 
Woman has a natural fear, but one that has positives effects – it induces 
her to be mindful of provisions, to worry about losing them, to be in dread 
about using them up. Man, on the other hand, is brave, because he is 
obliged to defend himself outdoors against everything that might cause 
him injury.  
 
For Proudhon too, marriage is a complement or “the union of strength and 
beauty” that is comparable to “form and matter”, as we have studied (Proudhon, 
1875:8,9). It is a “free union” and “solid marriages” are the base of a “virtuous 
society” (Proudhon, 1875:10). So, beyond its biological function, the Proudhonian 
marriage is a “pact of absolute devotion” or a spiritual, virtuous and social path and 
union, where “pleasure just figures at a second plan” (Proudhon, 1875:9). As 
Crowder (1991:80) notes, the Proudhonian “marriage represents the freedom ‘from 
the tribulations of the flesh”. For that reason, Proudhon criticizes “all courtship cares” 
and the “romanticism as an effeminate cult of unruly sentiment” (Crowder, 1991:80). 
Proudhonian marriage also bears on the care of the self and, for that reason, partners 
are free ‘from the tribulations of the flesh’”. For Proudhon, to convince the other by 
loving techniques or “courtship cares” is not to control oneself; it is to betray one’s 
nature - or need as law; it is not to understand that just desire makes sense or is the 
measure.  
For that reason, like Proudhon, Foucault (1985:161) highlights the 
equivalence of those differences between husband and wife made by Greeks and “the 
partnership that must be established between them”. Foucault (1985:161) considers 
that “partnership” as a “community” (Koinonia) or a “threefold community”:  a 
community of property, a community of life and a community of bodies. Foucault 
(1985:161) clarifies, a community of property signifies that “each partner ought to 
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forget the share he or she has contributed”; a common life has as objective “the 
property of the estate” and a “community of bodies”.  
 
An ‘other’ virtuous way 
This free and equal “community of bodies” is another way to organize life and 
society, in a non-capitalist way. We can summarise: Proudhon and Foucault have a 
similar position, a non-capitalist vision of woman, marriage and society.  
At first glance, we could say Proudhon is anti-feminist or patriarchal, as several 
argue (see: D’Hericout, 1860; Déjacque, 2003; Guérin, 2005 and Arni, 2001). But 
observing in a non-capitalist perspective, we can discover a “puritanist” or an idealist 
stance in Proudhon’s thinking, as his critic Daniel Guérin (2005) notes, or even a 
matriarchal stance. Proudhon is an idealist and very exigent in terms of spiritual path, 
mainly regarding women, who in his time had no access to information and education 
(Guérin, 2005). A century later, Foucault shares the same puritanical viewpoint and 
the same exigency in terms of ethical and spiritual paths to both man and woman. 
Both do this same exigent way. As we have written, Proudhon says the spiritual, 
informed and educated woman and her beauty guide man’s force, because woman’s 
beauty is “more creative” or is the “ideal” - the utopia now. So, we can state briefly, 
for Proudhon, the female guides the male ideally. Nevertheless, Proudhon assumes 
his idealism is very hard to achieve due to women’s status in society. For instance, 
regarding Greek wives, Proudhon admits they faced very tough social conditions. The 
patriarchate does not allow them to develop according to their nature or necessity 
having a good and happy life. Proudhon says,  
 
Such wife, at the end of the Heroic Age, whose civilization would have to 
make, nevertheless just gave her pride, the triviality of her occupations and 
his importunate lasciviousness that repressed hardly the troubles of 
pregnancy and marital rebuffs. Love flew from the morning after the 
wedding night, and the heart was left deserted. There was not a bit of love 
in the harem, says Plutarch energetically. 
 
Although Proudhonian woman is beauty and should realise herself according to 
her needs, the author considers in reality woman is neither ideal nor beauty. Society is 
patriarchal and neither stimulates women nor gives her the love she needs in order to 
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learn to take care of herself – to follow the Proudhonian self direction or the ethical 
path. As Guérin (2005) stresses, for Proudhon, “conjugal life is deprived of ideal and 
love”: “marriage is the tomb of love”.  
Proudhon (1875:12,13) explains that the goal for woman is to achieve, the 
conditions she deserves and needs to become as free and spiritual as man:  
 
I do not want (women in) politics because politics is war; I do not want 
(women in) political or governmental functions, because it is always war. I 
say that woman’s reign is the family, that the sphere of her influence is the 
family home; it is because woman must not love man’s beauty but his force 
that allows man to develop his dignity, his individuality, his character, his 
heroism and his righteousness; and it is in order to make man more valiant 
and just and his wife therefore increasingly queen that I attack 
centralization, bureaucracy, financial feudality, governmental exorbitance 
and the permanence of the state of war. For that reason, since October 1848 
I have protested against the restoration of the Empire that I have considered 
a national prostitution and I have not ceased to demand economic reforms 
in order to make pauperism, rebellion and crime less frequent and less 
intense; reduce gradually the number and duration of magistratures, leading 
little by little the social order to the outright freedom which means the full 
restoration of family and the glorification of woman (Proudhon, 
1875:12,13). 
 
Rousseau also talks about an ‘other empire’. Rousseau (2009:520) explains, 
although “woman’s reign is the family”, or “the family home”, we live in “the 
woman’s empire” that is not given by man, but by “nature”. For Rousseau 
(2009:525), nature “wants them (women) to think, to judge, to love, to know, to 
cultivate their mind and their figure; these are the weapons it gives them to supply the 
force they lack and to lead our own”. Nevertheless, Rousseau (2009:525) adds, due 
this lack of force, woman’s empire depends on man: woman depends more on man’s 
force than man on woman’s. For Rousseau (2009:525), men survive better without 
women than women without men. According to Rousseau (2009:526), man depends 
only on himself. Rousseau (2009:526) concludes, 
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All the education of women must be relative to men: to please them, to be 
useful to them, to be loved and honoured by them, to educate them when 
they are young, to care for them already adults, to comfort them and to 
make their life pleasant and sweet. 
 
Nevertheless, Rousseau (2009:526) highlights, only the “man of merit” and the 
“truly loving man” deserves this kind of treatment. “These pleasant little ones who 
dishonour their sex and the one they love” do not deserve to be loved and cared in this 
way (Rousseau, 2009:526). So there is really a “woman’s Empire”, because although 
dependent, they are responsible for men’s virtue in the last instance.  
Proudhon (1875:9) clarifies this ‘other Empire’ or this non-feminist or non-
capitalist or non-commercial proposal. Proudhon criticizes the “prostitution” of 
capitalism and also the liberal politics that symbolizes the degradation of humanity: 
“centralization, bureaucracy, financial feudality, governmental exorbitance and the 
permanence of the state of war”. For that reason, Proudhon advocates another kind of 
society, where force and beauty are different and complementary, as we have said 
above, where force and beauty “do not pay reciprocally”; they complement each 
other naturally and, for that reason, they differ from “civil and commercial union” 
and its “profit” goal.  
For Proudhon, in a capitalist society, man and woman are just a workforce. 
They both are force and objects or subjugated subjects - not virtuous people - as 
Foucault would say. Capitalism does not distinguish feminine beauty from the 
masculine force in terms of work; woman and man are completely similar and their 
biological particularities and abilities and skills do not matter. In capitalism woman 
loses her beauty or her skills and, as she is not so strong - she has less force - than 
man biologically, she produces less theoretically and has lower wages in reality. And 
this is something unacceptable, in Proudhon’s perspective.  
For that reason, Proudhon is against feminism. The author warns, feminists 
also do not distinguish between beauty and force. For them, both woman and man are 
force or working force. As Vintges (2004:276) notes, for some authors, feminism 
presupposes the “values of western Enlightenment and liberalism”. Those authors 
have the same capitalist perspective of woman as an object in two ways:  
Firstly, some feminist authors create an oppressed feminine essence or an 
object that cannot care for itself nor develop historically its needs; some feminists 
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defend ‘woman’ as kind of “liberal cage” or essence or disciplinary “species”, as 
Foucault would argue, from where she has to be liberated (Vintges 2004:275). 
Foucault, like Proudhon, proposes an alternative way. For Foucault, to be woman is a 
biological feature. Vintges (2004:275) adds, the Foucauldian idea is to “unravel and 
deconstruct the fixed meaning of femininity” – subjectivity - and to open a space that 
allows woman to take care of herself and to shape “new ways of thinking and living” 
- subjectivation.  This is to say, to be a woman biologically is a historical becoming - 
a subjectivation, and not a subjectivity. To be woman is to have an “ethical, spiritual 
way of life”, shaping her whole life freely according to her needs (Vintges 2004:293). 
And this is a hard and exigent gesture in society, but also a simple and happy one, for 
Foucault and for Proudhon as well. We will return to Foucault’s anti-feminism later 
in this chapter (pg: 186). 
Secondly, for Proudhon, feminists defend woman inside the workforce, just as 
force or an object, trying to treat woman and man alike in a capitalist perspective. 
Proudhon (1875:8) explains his standpoint sarcastically: “it can happen that women 
whose figure seduces us, are really ugly, so ugly they have the privilege of becoming 
detestable in wanting to resemble men”. According to Proudhon (1875:5,6), woman 
is humiliated when she resembles man because woman is also a “moral creative” 
becoming. Proudhon (1875:5,6) affirms, “it is unacceptable that woman, reasonable 
and moral creature, man’s partner, be treated as if your sex deserved humiliation” or 
does not exist.  
This humiliation also points to prostitution. For Proudhon (1875:2,3), 
“emancipation of women” seen as workforce and “free love” is linked to tyranny and 
prostitution; this is not moral self-direction; it means not to respect women’s 
biological particularity and necessities: beauty, and the virtuous and spiritual link 
with men that puts sexual pleasure on the back burner, as we have already pointed 
out. Capitalism, for Proudhon (1875:2,3), is a “pornocracy” to woman and to man as 
well. According to Proudhon (1875:9), “the exchange of wealth” between men and 
women is “mutual prostitution”. It is to forget our spiritual potential. As an 
alternative, Proudhon proposes an “economy of existence” that is composed by 
“production” and “consumption”; the former, which is ruder, is for man, the latter, 
which is easier and more joyful, is for woman. And both works have the same value: 
to do what one needs in order to have an harmonious life in common; both works are 
surplus value, as we have studied before. Both occupations take into account their 
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biological abilities and needs that are not objects nor exchangeable by money. We 
cannot exchange or sell what is necessary and fundamental to our survival. 
As we have argued before, Foucault does agree with this complementarity or 
community between woman and man, this non-capitalist or anarchist solution, this 
freedom path or “universal” aesthetic of the self that balances and considers 
“spiritual, biological and social dimensions” and differences, as Vintges (2004:291) 
features. 
So, this way of moderation or the agonistic way is not a man’s exclusivity, but a 
universal path. Foucault (1985:83) highlights, although this “agonistic contest with 
oneself” and this struggle in order to control desires is a warrior role and an “ethical 
virility”, this does not mean “women were not expected to be moderate … Where 
women were concerned, this virtue was always referred in some way to virility” 
(Foucault, 1985:83). Nevertheless, this virility or warrior path has a social 
justification. As Foucault (1985:83) adds, 
 
moderation was imposed on (women) by their condition of dependence in 
relation to their families, their husbands, and their procreative function, 
which ensured the perpetuation of the family name, the transmission of 
wealth, and the survival of the city. 
 
Man has also this social duty. For Foucault, there is a symmetry between man 
and woman “each on their own account”. They are both dependents and with the 
same need for moderation. Foucault (1985:169) underlines, “it is because they have a 
certain role to play for the common purpose – that of father and mother of future 
citizens - that they are bound exactly in the same way by the same laws, which 
impose the same restrictions on both”. 
Then, Foucault asks because love is an important stage in this virtuous and 
plural ethical path, how it is possible to choose a right partner? The answer is: we do 
it naturally through animal attraction. To choose a partner is not something random. 
Desire, animality or the body are always the criteria - the rules. Foucault says: “the 
attraction that should come into play between husband and wife is the one that 
expresses itself naturally”. And how to be sure that attraction does not fade away? Or, 
for instance, as Foucault (1985:162) questions, how does the wife maintain beauty 
and guard against being supplanted by someone younger and prettier? In the 
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Foucauldian perspective, the some question could be posed to man: how does the 
husband maintain vigour? How does someone stronger not supplant him? 
The answer is “the household and the government of the household will be the 
crucial factor”. This presupposes the care of the self (Foucault, 1985:162). According 
to Foucault (1985:162), the wife’s beauty is  
 
guaranteed by the household occupations, provided that she goes about 
them in the right way … she will stand, she will observe, she will 
supervise, she will go from room to room checking the work that is in 
progress; standing and walking will give her body that certain demeanour, 
that carriage which in the eyes of the Greeks characterized the physique 
of the free individual. 
 
So, at stake again is freedom or the care of the self or the care of the household 
that includes marriage, as an ethical and aesthetic practice that sculpts the body, 
bringing beauty with it. Foucault (1985:162) points out, “by virtue of the forms of 
physical beauty that is indissociable from her privileged status and by virtue of her 
unconstrained willingness to gratify, the mistress of the household will always be 
preeminent over the other women of the household”. 
Thus, as Proudhon also explains and Foucault agrees, there are no norms of 
fidelity between husband and wife, 
 
there is no illusion to the sexual faithfulness of the wife or to the fact that 
her husband should be her only sexual partner: this is taken for granted as 
a necessary principle. As for the self-restrained attitude of the husband, it 
is never defined as the monopoly over all his sexual activity, which he 
would concede to his wife. What is at stake in this reflective practice of 
marital life, what appears as essential to the orderliness of the household, 
to the peace that must reign within it, and to the woman’s expectation, is 
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that she is able, as the lawful192 wife, to keep the preeminent place that 
marriage has assigned to her (Foucault, 1985:163).193 
 
Wife and husband must be able to give the norm of fidelity a “preeminent 
place”. This is the virtuous attitude that links both. As Foucault says, conjugal fidelity 
- or partnership - is the “reflective practice of marital life” or an ethical path linked to 
the “mastery of the self”: 
 
conjugal fidelity can be associated with a moral conduct that aspires to an 
ever more complete mastery of the self; it can be a moral conduct that 
manifests a sudden and radical detachment vis-à-vis the world; it may 
train toward a perfect tranquillity of soul, a total insensitivity to the 
agitation of the passions, or towards a purification that will ensure 
salvation after death and blissful immortality (Foucault, 1985:28). 
 
 So, for Foucault (1985:169) conjugal fidelity does not mean, “husband and 
wife are held to ‘sexual fidelity’ by a personal bond that would be intrinsic to the 
matrimonial relation and constitute a mutual commitment”. Rather, between husband 
and wife there is a voluntary bond - a voluntary partnership - as Foucault (1985:169) 
explains,  
 
 their compliance must be voluntary, the result of an internal persuasion; 
but the latter does not involve an attachment they should have for one 
another. … The relation of the individual to himself and to his city in the 
form of respect or shame, honour or glory – not the relation to the other 
person – is what imposes this obedience. 
 
 For Foucault, this harmonious love or partnership is a friendship or philia - not 
a patriarchal relation between wife and husband - rather than just love. Duties are 
shared by both, as we have just studied. This results in the common good and prevents 
“political crises” and “revolutions”. Friendship is a peaceful path.                                                          
192 Here we understand “lawful” as ‘the one’. 
193 So, we could affirm the same for man, he is able, as the lawful husband, to keep the preeminent 
place that marriage has assigned to him, when he takes care of his self, as we shall see in the following 
lines. 
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 For Foucault (1985:231), the Greeks distinguished between two loves: the first 
aims at “the satisfaction of its desires (slavish one)” and the second one “desires 
above all to test the soul (a free and equal love)”. The latter is the philia and, 
according to Foucault (1985:234,236,237), “every relationship must be based on the 
constituent element of friendship”, because love is just an “intermediate” that is 
characterized by “deficiency” since “it does not possess the beautiful thing that it 
desires”. The love of the soul is the “true love” that “seeks in friendship the principle 
that gives value to every relation”: the truth (Foucault, 1985:233). And, as Foucault 
explains, to love the soul is just to love the truth. According to Foucault,  
 
it is not the other half of himself that the individual seeks in the other 
person; it is the truth to which his soul is related. Hence the ethical work 
he will have to do will be to discover and hold fast, without ever letting 
go, to that relation to the truth, which is the hidden medium of his love. 
 
Thus, for Foucault, friendship or true love, as a self-agonism, is a spiritual 
movement or a “work upon oneself”. Foucault (1985:243), adds, this erotics “tries to 
determine the self-movement, the kind of effort and work upon oneself, which will 
enable the lover to elicit and establish his relation to true being”. This true love is also 
a creative act: “a work upon oneself” or a stylization. It is God’s love, an act of 
creation – “in the beginning was the Word” - a parrhesiatic act. Foucault (2011b:328) 
explains, “when God is endowed with parrhesia, it is insofar as He speaks the truth, 
but also insofar as He manifests Himself and His love, His power, and possibly His 
anger”. For Foucault, moral rules do not exist, just this creative and parrhesiatic 
“relation to true being.” 194  Foucault (1985:243,244) does not separate what is 
“honourable” from what “brings disgrace”. Once again the author uses moderation by 
need as the criterion. For Foucault, “the progress of desire – with its difficulties, its 
ups and its downs, and its setbacks – leads to the point where it reencounters its own 
nature”, its creative nature: the truth (Foucault, 1985:244).  
In turn, as Proudhon also defends the Foucauldian idea that erotics is neither 
centred on “courtship practice nor on the recognition of the other’s freedom”, but on 
“an askesis”, a spiritual path, that is the subject’s “common access to truth” or to                                                         
194 As we have already studied, the Foucauldian truth or “veridiction” is a subjective truth, rather than 
an objective one. It is a statement or an enunciation that is created according to our will or desire. 
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“true love”. Foucauldian friendship and asceticism have a general and a personal 
focus. In a general perspective, Foucault (1977b) talks about an ascetic tendency that 
says “no to the sex-king”. For Foucault (1977b), there is in society a “rumbling ‘anti-
sexo’”, we would say, a non-capitalist trend, in order to “make other forms of 
pleasure, relationships, coexistence, links, loves, intensities”. According to Foucault 
(1977b), it is because, since Christianity, in the West, sexuality is the place through 
where power is exercised. Foucault (1977b) argues that for so long we said to 
women: “You are nothing but your sex”. Or Western thought states: “in order to 
know who you are, know what your sex is” (Foucault, 1977b). For Foucault (1977b), 
in western societies “sex has always been the home where our truth as human 
subjects has been forged, along with the future of our species”. For Foucault, 
capitalism is scared of sexual power and wants to control or organize it. 
And, like Proudhon, Foucault also criticizes feminist movements. For Foucault, 
feminist movements took up this sexual challenge of western societies and continued 
to define themselves sexually (Foucault, 1977b). Feminists draw the consequences of 
this capitalist sexual obsession and reinvent their own type of existence, “politically, 
economically, culturally” (Foucault, 1977b). Or, in another way, they fit the woman 
into “sexual species” or cages, as Foucault characterises, created historically by 
capitalism in order to control society, as we have mentioned. Foucault (1977b) 
explains, the feminists assume they can define their identity sexually and include 
themselves in the same western sexual movement: “from that sexuality in which 
woman is colonized” and subjugated. For that reason, Foucault (1977b) reveals, a 
movement is now emerging toward an askesis, a care of the self or against this sexual 
colonization, contradicting the demand “always more sex”, the “always more truth in 
sex”. 
Personally and also politically, through this askesis and friendship, Foucault’s 
aim seems to be to find a way to free himself from this sexual cage, although for him, 
sexuality is also something natural and necessary,195 as we have already affirmed 
(Eribon, 2011:512,513). Foucault attaches a fundamental and decisive importance to 
the body, to animality or to need as moral rules. Nevertheless, Foucault really tries to 
achieve a state beyond sex, for instance, with the use of drugs, as we have already 
shown. Foucault explains, “orgasm ... seems to me to be a way to locate the sexual                                                         
195 We could say, for Foucault, sex is almost a paradox: sex is the way to free oneself from sex. 
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possibilities of pleasure that things like yellow pills or cocaine allow to burst and to 
spread throughout the body. The body becomes the global place of a total pleasure 
and, to that extent, we must get rid of sexuality” (Eribon, 2011:512). Can this sexual 
clearance - “get rid of sexuality” - through friendship be the way Foucault solves and 
understands, in the last months of life, his relationship with ‘homosexuality’ or 
sexuality?  
Eribon answers affirmatively. Foucault seems really to have embarked on 
Greek “philosophical life” - the spiritual path. Eribon (2011:538) tells:  
 
in his last two books, Foucault’s writing changed significantly: it became 
calm, dispassionate “appeased”... sober ... almost neutralized. As if the 
approach of death and the feeling he had about it since few months ago 
would lead Foucault on the path of serenity, following the ‘philosophical 
life’s model ... Foucault seems to have internalized this Ancient wisdom.  
 
Eribon (2011:52) adds, Foucault’s last books are his “personal ethics, won over 
himself” or his “archaeological base”. And this victory over himself could be seen as 
a way to solve his ‘homosexual’ discomfort that seems, at the same time, to have 
been a propaedeutic to better understand life. Eribon (2011:56) continues, although 
Foucault gave his personal testimony about his homosexuality several times, he never 
“confessed” or assumed it, because he had always some “allergy” to “confessions”, 
“an allergy that could be interpreted as a resistance”. And, for Eribon (2011:56), we 
find traces of this personal and political “resistance” “in the entire effort developed by 
his texts of the seventies in order to refuse this injunction to speak, to talk, to make 
talk”. In turn, Eribon (2011:49,50) suggests, in his youth, Foucault felt 
“uncomfortable with himself”, having “bizarre” behaviour, “attempting suicide 
several times”. Perhaps, Eribon argues, Foucault’s period of “happiness” and freedom 
in USA and, then, being ill, those last days of writing allowed him to solve and to 
better understand that sexual “discomfort” and “allergy”, through the concept of 
friendship. As Foucault says,  
 
homosexuality has become a problem ... because friendship is gone ... 
while friendship had represented something important, no one realized that 
men had, between them, sexual relations. Once the friendship disappeared, 
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as a culturally accepted relation, the question is asked: 'But what do men 
do together?’ (Eribon, 2011:513).  
 
And according to this argument, in his last writings, Foucault (1985:199) 
explains that in Ancient Greece the physical affection and pedagogical love between 
master and disciple - two men - should be transformed into friendship or spiritual 
love. This happens when the disciple begins to have a beard - “the first bear” - and 
becomes a man, an active being and not a passive one (Foucault, 1985:199). From 
this stage, the master’s physical love by the disciple becomes spiritual love - through 
self-agonism. According to Foucault (1985:190), there is in Ancient Greece “a 
disqualification of effeminate men” that do not assume their ‘activity’.  
Furthermore, Foucault talks about bisexuality196 or sexuality without definition. 
Foucault (1985:190) says, in Ancient Greece, “the enjoyment of boys and of women 
did not constitute two classificatory categories between which individuals could be 
distributed; a man who preferred paidika did not think of himself as being ‘different’ 
from those who pursued women”. Foucault (1985:192) continues, Greeks “believed 
that the same desire attached to anything that was desirable – boy or girl”. 
Nevertheless, they guessed a different ethical form was required when one loves a 
woman or a man; each kind of love required a “special stylistics” that gave rise, 
between Greeks, to an “extraordinarily complex problematization”. For instance, the 
Greeks and Foucault too have a different approach to sex between man and woman 
and sex between men. Sex between man and woman could continue all life long. The 
goal is to manage this kind of love with moderation and according to the nature of 
each lover, because sex is natural and necessary. The Foucauldian question seems 
really to be here about sex between men without philia. So, as Eribon (2011:513,514) 
shows, this ancient stance on friendship or spiritual love - care of the self - seems to 
solve Foucault’s sexual or ‘homosexual’ discomfort, ridding Foucault of sex and 
reconciling the author with himself.  
As we have just stated, Foucault’s personal askesis is also a political question – 
‘other’ virtuous way. Foucault blends erotics and politics, as we have already shown. 
This sexual askesis is also the way Foucault gets rid of capitalism or biopolitics - 
                                                        
196 Our term. 
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sexual and corporal control. This sexual liberation is related with his political 
militancy and with his political worldview, as we will show later (pgs: 211-213). 
Proudhon also advocates a spiritual path that has a double perspective. It could 
be individual and collective. Individually, the spiritual path is the consequence of the 
battle or the creative power, as we have already stated. In turn, collectively, Proudhon 
talks about a “collective being” constituted by free individuals, supporters of moral 
self-direction. For Proudhon, this spiritually is a kind of a paradoxical liberation from 
the body, assuming this body is a necessary permanent existence (Castleton, 
2012:123). As we have seen, Foucault goes in the same direction. This Proudhonian 
spiritual path is “above all intellectual”, “more spiritual than material”; it is formed 
by “relations of free and intelligent individuals”, which “it overcomes in spontaneity, 
conscience and reason” (Castleton, 2012:123).  
Proudhon defines this collective being as a “civil religion” (from the Latin 
religare), as we have outlined. This “civil religion” is a social ontology - a we - and a 
social capital both constituted through mutualism, as we have developed before. 
According to Proudhon, the social being or social space is a superior being; it exists 
primarily as “providence” rather than as “animal and flesh” (Castleton, 2012:117). 
For Proudhon, “the ontology of the composed beings” sees society as “something 
superhuman and supernatural that has many God-like features” (Castleton, 2012:118). 
Proudhon talks about a “spiritualization of humanity”, a “general movement from the 
object to the subject, from the thing that is made to the person who makes it, from 
matter to spirit” (Castleton, 2012:116). For Proudhon, “the collective being sanctifies 
itself through the mutations of its form - and not through an essence. Its reading is 
made diachronically through the different revolutions of history - not biologically as 
an organism (Castleton, 2012:123). This is also the ‘other’ virtuous way. 
 
The virtuous construction of space 
This Foucauldian “relation to oneself”, individually and collectively, this battle, 
could result in “glory” or conquest, in two ways. First of all, as we have already 
outlined, war or self-agonism signifies the glory of peace, moderation and beauty.197 
Secondly, this glory signifies possession, that means to have an “in myself”, a 
“mine”, a sui juris                                                          
197 Foucault seemed to achieve this beauty and this peace in the end of his life, as we have studied 
above. 
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that is exerted on oneself as a power that nothing limits or threats: one 
holds the potestas sui, but through this political and legal form, the 
relation to oneself is also defined as a concrete relationship that allows to 
enjoy oneself as one thing that simultaneously we have in possession and 
that is under our eyes (Foucault, 1984:90,91). 
 
As we have analysed above, we possess an “in myself”, an interiority, that is a 
power, a potestas sui, an ability to resist or a power to be virtuous. For Foucault, we 
are free persons and freedom allows us to have a relation to ourselves – the myself - 
that resists codes and powers - the ‘myself’ is a resistance point (Deleuze, 2012:111). 
Nevertheless, this “myself” escapes us permanently. The Foucauldian power is, on 
the one hand, a ‘myself’, a point of resistance or sovereignty and, on the other hand, a 
dependent point that is another sovereignty or an exteriority “under our eyes - the 
audio-visual battle, as we have discussed above.  
So, Foucault completes the picture and the cycle and returns also to his 
previous works. As we have already noted, according to Foucault, 
 
the relation to myself does not remain the reserved and refolded zone of 
the free man, independent of any ‘institutional and social system’. The 
relation to myself will be grasped in power relations, in knowledge 
relations. It will reintegrate the systems he has started drifting apart 
(Deleuze, 2012:110). 
 
As we have said, according to Foucault, this relation to myself, this self-
agonism, and this ethical battle presupposes power and the other or the exterior world 
as a condition of possibility in order to open a place in society. For Foucault, there are 
“three ontologies”: knowledge (the exterior world or episteme);198 power (ubiquitous 
energy) and the self (the fold and interiority). They are all interlaced (Deleuze, 
2012:119,121,122). In this way, Foucault breaks with the phenomenological and 
vertical concept of “intentionality” and adopts the concept of “strategy” (Deleuze, 
2012:116,119,120). When you open space in society there is that egalitarian and                                                         
198 Episteme, which means Science in Greek, is a Foucauldian term that signifies “all relationships 
between science and discourse in a certain epoch” (André; Gros, 2014:49). 
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audio-visual battle between our enunciations and the “visibilities” or the episteme or 
“the order of things that organizes everything, makes some things possible and others 
impossible, permits us to say certain things but makes other things unthinkable” 
(Deleuze, 2012:119; Danaher et al, 2000:16,17). There is a battle in two directions or 
there are two strategies, as we have already explained. Using the man-woman 
example, we could say that man creates space in woman’s receptacle – woman: the 
utopia here and now. But woman is a visibility that always escapes him (Deleuze, 
2012:119,120). 
This Foucauldian self-power-knowledge relationship is also the new 
epistemological attitude: “every true statement constitutes a certain power”, a certain 
“possibility”, “strategy” or space - sign (Foucault, 1990:56). To create space is to 
know, it is to affirm our truth, so that this fighter is also powerful and true, as we 
have just studied. And critique - we return to critique - plays an important task here. 
For Foucault (1990:39), criticism is “the movement by which the subject asks the 
truth and its effects as power and the power effects as truth” - the ‘veridiction’ issue. 
Critique questions real power and, at the same time, affirms its power. As we have 
already said, criticism - battle - is the main device in man’s spiritual path. Critique 
aims mainly at the “de-subjugation” – adulthood - in “the game called the politics of 
truth” (Foucault, 1990:39). As Foucault points out, to criticize or to fight is the art of 
affirmation (the “true statement”) of “voluntary inservitude” (mastery or self-control: 
maitrise de soi) the “reflected indocility” (to be indocile) in order to participate in the 
‘here and now’ or in order to open a space today – the “true statement” as a power 
effect (Foucault, 1990:39).  
As we are seeing, this spiritual struggle for truth is neither a solitary one nor a 
“narcissist individualism”, but a collective or social path (Gros, 2014b:68). The 
ultimate goal is the harmony of the city. Foucault speaks about a “subject that 
reconstructs his relationship with others from a critical government of himself” (Gros, 
2014b:69). This care of the self is from the very beginning a collective way (in polis): 
a struggle between the twofold of power and also between man and woman or master 
and disciple. And Foucault (1985:244) remembers,  
 
the struggle has been able to sustain oneself against the violence of 
appetites, one would not have been able to conduct oneself without a 
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twofold relation to truth: a relation to own desire questioned in its being, 
and a relation to the object of desire recognized as a true being. 
  
As Bernaz (2014:244) says, for Foucault, there is a “pre-subjective libidinal 
force” – desire or sexual force - that makes the subject a “we”. 
Proudhon has also a collective perspective of the subject as a “we” or group or a 
social capital, as we have discussed above. For that reason, for Proudhon, the 
individual is always a co-owner or a possessor. Foucault and Proudhon share and 
interlink these two concepts: possession and social ontology. Propriety is something 
we share in an ongoing agonism with ourselves – moderation of excesses and 
impulses - and with the others. For Proudhon, we are just owners of the surplus value 
we create, as we have studied earlier. According to Proudhon, property escapes us 
permanently because we are collective beings and our reasons or foundations are “a 
posteriori” (Castleton, 2012:120). Also for Proudhon, we are plural beings or spiritual 
ones in a constitutive agonism against our passions, treading an ethical and virtuous 
path with the other: the constitution of virtuous spaces.  
 
THE OTHER (POETICAL) SUBJECT 
  
For that reason, Foucault defends an ‘other subject’ that is mainly a “de-subject” or a 
“de-subjugated subject”. Free and adult, he is a “subjectivation”, a “self-invention” or 
the Nietzschean superman, as we have highlighted above (Revel, 2016). For Foucault 
(2002:19,20), “the subject in his unity and sovereignty disappears. We can admit 
subjects or we can admit the subject does not exist” And why?  
As we have already studied, Foucault teaches that the modern self has 
exploded and other configurations have been created (Eribon, 2011:275). Foucault 
explains:  
 
The 'I' has exploded ... it is the discovery of the ‘there is’ (du ‘il y a’). There 
is an ‘it’ (il y a un ‘on’). In a certain way, we return to the perspective of the 
seventeenth century, with a difference: we do not put man in the place of 
God, but we see him as an anonymous thought, a knowledge without 
subject (Eribon, 2011:275). 
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So, this explosion of the “I” has aesthetic consequences and is caused by the 
spiritual-sexual path or the “economy of pleasures ensured by control”. This 
aesthetics presupposes a “technique of existence” that distributes sexual acts “in the 
closest conformity with what nature demanded”: towards a spiritual life liberated 
from the capitalist sex. For Foucault (1985:138,139), as we have already seen, 
aphrodisia is “the most violent of all pleasures; it is the “game of life and death”, and 
this “techniques of existence” allow the individual “to control, limit and apportion” 
those “tumultuous forces” in the “right manner”. For Foucault (1985:139), these 
aesthetic techniques are a “privileged domain” for the ethical formation of the self, as 
we have already noted. This techne - technique of existence - allows the self to form 
himself as “a subject in control of his conduct” - the subjectivation - and “to make his 
life into an oeuvre that would endure beyond his own ephemeral existence” 
(Foucault, 1985:139). Those are the “arts of existence”,  
 
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set 
themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to 
change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an 
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic 
criteria (Foucault, 1985:139). 
 
Foucauldian care of the self is also an “art of life” - a stylization (Gros, 
2014b:67). The individual “sculpts the shape of his existence”, answering, for 
instance, the questions “how should I live?” and “who am I?” (Gros, 
2014b:67,68,69). And sexuality, as we have shown, is the “privileged entryway” to 
answer aesthetically those questions carving the spiritual and poetic199 path (Foucault, 
1985:13; Gros, 2014b:69).  
And Foucault (1985:28) specifies how a “relationship with the self” or an 
ethical dimension involves an aesthetic action:  
 
self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’ (is) a process in which the individual 
delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral 
practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and                                                         
199 For Foucault, poetic means creative or aesthetically determined. 
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decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And 
this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and 
transform himself. 
 
 Proudhon has also a poetic or aesthetic appreciation of the battle or the 
antagonism that shapes people and societies. For Proudhon, the battle is a creative 
act, as we have already seen. According to Proudhon (1861:58) without war man 
“would be deprived of his aesthetic skill, he would not know to produce and to taste 
the sublime and the beautiful”. According to Proudhon (1861:58), war is the 
principle that pulls man “from the treasure of his conscience and his reason” 
(1861:58). It is our interiority - “conscience” and “reason” - or our needs or treasure 
that pulls us to the exterior in order to conquest our space or construct or create 
ourselves. Also for Proudhon, ethics and aesthetics are linked. 
Through this spiritual and aesthetic way Foucault glimpses other forms: an 
anonymous thought, a knowledge without subject, a theory without identity. And, as 
we have shown in the previous chapter, those Foucauldian new configurations have a 
“general principle”: “every form is a composite of force relations”. Each form is a 
plastic form. Each form could take ‘another form’ or to form another space. Thus, the 
Foucauldian activist, being a fighter, is always ‘another form’, a new combination of 
forces and a creator of space. The other subject is a heterotopia, a set of relations in 
permanent mutation. The being is a mutant. The ‘de-subjugated subject’ is the free 
subject, the adult, and the critic, rather than an object, as we have said above. To fight 
is to take care of the self, it is to criticize ourselves permanently, in order to survive 
harmoniously and to find new ways of life - new spaces. For Foucault, “life appears 
as resisting the power with the aim of creating; life is the existing ‘potentia’ that leads 
to other configurations” (Bounache, 2013:140). For Bocquet (2013:124), in 
Foucault’s work, power and life are connected and form resistance and to resist is to 
invent new forms of life: “other subjectivities”. For Foucault, as we have already 
analysed, those “other subjectivities” open ontological and aesthetic perspectives: 
ontological because we “diagnose what we are”; aesthetic because we create a 
“virtual fracture”, “a possibility of fiction”, 200 or “invention of ourselves” as a work 
                                                        
200 Foucault’s books are self-experiences. 
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of art (Chevallier, 2014: 32,33). We are a poetic project. As we have already defined, 
poetic means creative or aesthetically determined. 
Proudhon sees also man as a mobile subject, a set of relations, a “we” or a 
group or a space, as we have just affirmed. As Dèjacque (2015:85) says, “man is 
essentially a revolutionary formed by movement and light” - versus borders. For 
Proudhon, being is the “synthesis of the multiple and the one”. As we have written, 
being “sanctifies itself through the mutations of its form” (Castleton, 2012:123). As 
for Heraclitus, so too for Proudhon, “everything is in flux, and in its most 
fundamental terms, this constant change takes the form of give and take between 
forces opposed to one another” (Crowder, 1991:81). According to Castleton 
(2012:119), as we have already explained, Proudhon is not an “organicist”; the author 
compares the various organs of the human body to the various beings of the collective 
being.  So, as we have said, according to Proudhon, the human shape is in a 
permanent mutation and the author admits ‘other’ forms and ‘other’ figures, as the 
Nietzschean superman. As we have studied, for Proudhon, the warrior is a hero. And 
the word hero, for Proudhon (1861:83) means “the strong man, devoted, without fear 
or reproach. A god is with him, a god presides over all his performances. He is the 
son of the gods, he took the two natures”. Hence, Proudhon also claims for ‘other 
subjectivities’ - a mixture of two natures: human and God - as Foucault does.  
We could affirm, for Foucault, we have a ‘virtual’ self and, for that reason, a 
poetic self. Why virtual? What does virtual mean here? Virtual comes from virtus that 
means potential or force (Rajchman, 1998:117). Virtual signifies “the multiple 
potential” (Rajchman, 1998:117). But here the virtual is more than the potential, the 
possible or the potentia, in Aristotelian terms (Rajchman, 1998:117,118). In turn, the 
virtual is not the act or the actual as it is to Aristotle; it is not equivalent to realize the 
potential (Rajchman, 1998:118). The virtual is as an intermediate between the 
potentia and the Aristotelian act: it is “the real not being actual and the ideal not 
being abstract” (Rajchman, 1998:118). The virtual is all acts we do not realize when 
we opted to follow one way, but they stay with us. The ‘virtualities’ are the fallen 
ends that we left behind us on the path of life. It is the virtual that we can activate at 
any time, making new connections, new poetry. These virtualities are “singular points 
that allow the most complex connections” or forms here and now (Rajchman, 
1998:121). Those permanent complex connections and disconnections – virtualities - 
form our virtual self or our heterotopia  
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And this virtual self is the “abnormal”, the transgressive, or the monstrosity, 
which is beyond the capitalist norm - the law - or the normal, as we have already 
developed (Foucault, 1999:38,39,40; 2012:8). Those other subjectivities constitute 
the  “knowledge of the anomaly”; they are the “crazy”  (Foucault, 1999:40; 2012:8). 
As we have also studied, Foucault is interested in the knowledge of the crazy or 
“people knowledge”, “particular knowledge, local, regional knowledge, differential 
knowledge, incapable of unanimity” and generator of resistance (Foucault, 2012:11). 
In front of the “centralized humanity, we must hear the roar of the (local) battle” 
(Negri, 2011:201). As Foucault (2012:11) concludes, “criticism is made by the re-
emergence of those disqualified knowledges”. Critique creates “the historical 
knowledge of the struggles” or the knowledge of the “insurrection” of the people 
(Foucault, 2012:11, 12). The Foucauldian goal is this “battle” or movement that 
signifies also the “de-subjugation” of these ‘minor’ struggles, making them free 
(Foucault, 2012:12,13). Foucault (2012:12,13) is interested in the creativity of those 
struggles; they are ‘other subjectivities’, or virtual, abnormal, crazy, transgressive and 
poetic subjectivities.  
As Chevallier (2014: 31,32) concludes, “the originality of the Foucauldian 
project is that the critique allows a “new experience of ourselves”, the “openness of 
new fields of possibility” or “new fields of unprecedented transformation”. And this 
means, “working to no longer be oneself and become other”, having “the audacity to 
invent oneself” – heterotopia -, as a work of art: as an ‘other subject’, an ‘other 
worker’, and an ‘other political being” (Chevallier, 2014:32).  
 
THE OTHER POLITICAL BEING 
 
The ‘other political being’ is the critic: the person that has critique as his main 
political tool. Foucault, himself, is a critic or an ‘other political being’, as we are 
going to see. To criticize is the “new task” or Foucault’s main task or his 
philosophical work, as we have studied above. The critic is the Foucauldian “will of 
heroicizing the present”, creating space here through a perpetual movement - the 
‘now’ or the time.  
For Foucault, the aim of critique is not to be governed, because critique is the 
alternative to government, as we have already seen. When we asked “how not to be 
governed?”, the answer is: through critique (Foucault, 1990:37,38, Eribon, 2011:11). 
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First, Foucault (1990:38) explains, the “critical attitude” is “the art of not being 
governed or the art of not being governed … at such a price” (“l’art de n’être 
tellement gouverné”). This art signifies, for instance, the practice of revolt or refusal 
to accept real government or the concept of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1990:159). 
And that art could be understood as a type of anarchism. At the end of his conference 
on critique, 201  Foucault (1990:159) noted that he was silent on “fundamental 
anarchism”: not being governed at all. Nevertheless, Foucault (1990:159) clarified, “I 
did not talk about this, but it does not mean that I exclude it absolutely”. Foucault 
does not oppose anarchism or the desire of “not being governed at all”. And, as we 
have explained, the author concludes his life, his last months, working on this 
anarchy or on this critical, spiritual and ethical path in order to achieve a self-
collective government without fixed rules: care of the self.  
Critique is anarchism or the anarchist device; critique allows care of the self, 
adulthood or self-collective government, as we have seen. Critique aims mainly to 
“de-subjugate” - “subjectivation” (Foucault, 1990:39). And the de-subjugated subject 
governs himself collectively and lives in anarchy without rulers or “fixed rules”, for 
example, moral rules and norms of fidelity between husband and wife. According to 
Foucault, there is just fidelity to oneself, to its body, as we have studied. For 
Foucault, care of the self “resists codes and powers”, having necessity or animality as 
referential. Déjacque (2015:28,145) says, “the mouth and the belly need makes man” 
or “leads man to move”. Nietzsche (2002) adds, there is an “I that creates, wants and 
gives measure and value to things”.  
Foucault brings together both thoughts: this self-collective government – 
anarchy - by need, has no rules, but is “an orderly regimen” of moderation, based on 
the “right use” of force and pleasure. As we have written above, the ‘soul’ is 
“mistress of herself” and “heedful of measure”. For Foucault, this “orderly regimen” 
or anarchy is really ordered and organized. It prevents excesses, “political crises” and 
“revolutions”, because the subject achieves perfect tranquillity of soul and becomes 
totally insensitive to the agitation of the passions, solving his problems with 
moderation, as we have studied above.  
Hence, for Foucault (1990:162), this critical and ethical attitude is also a 
political one; an “attitude of resistance” in order to take care of oneself and live with                                                         
201 Foucault (1990:159) “Qu’est-ce que c’est la critique?”, see Bibliography. 
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the other. For Bocquet (2013:109), Foucault looks like an “anarchist”, because, for 
him, “the moral and political are united together”. Chevallier (2004) talks about the 
Foucauldian “political spirituality” - la spiritualité politique. The care of the self - an 
ethical and spiritual path - as a political option. It is the basis or the way we choose to 
act - a behaviour or an ethos - to relate to ourselves and with others. And this political 
choice influences the way we organize society or the polis. Foucault (1990:46) 
remembers his moral and critical perspective has a historical and political framework; 
this critical attitude inspired by Kant arises in a certain political context, as a reaction 
to the “formation of capitalism, the constitution of the bourgeois world, the 
constitution of the state system, the foundation of modern science, the organization of 
a confrontation between the art of being ruled and not being ruled”.  
So, Foucault seems to point out an anarchist and political path against the 
state, capitalism and Marxism. As Zamora (2016) argues, Foucault “found anti-
statism and desire to de-statify French society seductive”. For instance, he challenges 
“social security” and is “seduced by the alternative of the negative income tax” 
(Zamora, 2016). The idea would be to make the state pay a “benefit to anyone who 
finds themselves below a certain level of income”, in order to combat poverty 
(Zamora, 2016). On the other hand, Foucault compares the mechanisms of social 
assistance and social insurance with the “prison, the barracks, or the school” (Zamora 
(2016). For Foucault, those mechanisms are “indispensable institutions ‘for the 
exercise of power in modern societies’” (Zamora, 2016). According to Foucault, “the 
welfare state fulfils the dream of biopower” (Zamora, 2016). 
For Foucault, the state is synonymous with liberal democracy or “police 
equipment”, “repressive techniques” and also big parties - big apparatuses or small 
states. Nevertheless, Foucault (2015) clarifies his main battle is something beyond the 
state. And why? For Foucault, the state is more than a set of apparatuses nowadays. 
Foucault explains what the state is: “the state, with its big judicial, military and other 
apparatuses [appareils], only represents a guarantee, the reinforcement of a network 
of powers which come through different channels, different from its main apparatus”. 
For Foucault (1976:118), those diffuse “networks of power” that constitute the 
biopolitics or the disciplinary power of capitalism and liberalism work behind the 
state. They are capitalist “civilization” which started producing a “temperate social 
order” or the “disciplinary work”, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - the 
Kantian period - which is linked to industrialization (Danaher et al, 2000:108,109). 
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This capitalist order or civilization is based on various institutions and “modes of 
governmentality”, such as “schools, workhouses, family life”. This disciplinary order 
also involves surveillance, “inquiries and surveys into the conditions of life and moral 
values of the people living in the emerging urban slums associated with 
industrialization” (Danaher et al, 2000:109). 
For Foucault, this capitalist or industrial civilization or ‘new’ state has three 
other features: (i) it is like a big prison; (ii) it is racism; (iii) it is colonialism. 
Foucault explains this disciplinary society is a “carceral continuum”, constituted by 
“techniques of prison” that are widespread in the whole society, for instance, 
surveillance cameras or the surveys we have mentioned above (Danaher et al, 
2000:108). And this “carceral continuum” means also racism. According to Foucault, 
race is not about skin colour, as we have already explained. Race means a particular 
worldview that is imposed on people, in this case, through this “carceral continuum”. 
Foucault (2012: 54) clarifies his concept:  
 
There are two races when there are two groups who, despite their 
cohabitation, are not a mix because there are differences, asymmetries, 
barriers that are due to privileges, customs and rights, the division of 
fortunes and the manner in which power is exercised.  
In Foucault’s perspective, this imposed civilization or racism through which 
“power is exercised” is also colonialism. And this colonial question, as the racist 
question, is not again about skin colour, but disciplinary forces that shape bodies all 
over the world (Danaher et al, 2000:106,110).202 
By the foregoing, Foucault (1976:118; Bocquet, 2013:109) argues that the 
former state is a reality in extinction and “we live in a disciplinary society”, because, 
as Foucault depicts, “the state has been replaced by science since the king’s 
decapitation. From there state theory has been dying”. For that reason, Foucault 
(2015) notes he is interested in the state but “differentially [différentiellement]”. 
According to Foucault (2015), his main struggle is “to attempt an analysis of the 
different levels of power in society”, which “assure the hegemony of a class, an elite,                                                         
202 As Danaher et al (2000:106) explain, “when Foucault wrote about colonialism, he rarely did so 
directly. For example, there are no books of his on the implications of the French colonial occupation 
of Indo-China, the Pacific and Africa, for example”. The question is the disciplinary power, as we are 
studying.  
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or a caste”, because “the state occupies an important place in this, but not a 
preeminent one”.  
Critique is the Foucauldian tool to analyse and fight against this disciplinary 
power. Critique or the care of the self is the alternative or the other side of this 
ubiquitous repressive and widespread power. For Foucault, as we have observed, 
critique or care of the self or adulthood or anarchy is the way to escape from this 
disciplinary and repressive society where we are all minors. So, Foucault warns, 
“beyond the state’s power over bodies, there is also the resistance of individuals who 
know how to say no” to this disciplinary power (Eribon, 2011:443). And Foucault is 
one of them, as we are seeing. 
In this sense, there is here a close resemblance between Foucault’s fight 
against this spreading state and the Proudhonian anarchist fight. Both authors propose 
an anarchist alternative, care of the self or Proudhonian moral self-direction to fight 
against the state or the coercive, vertical, oppressive and disciplinary power. 
Proudhon gears also his anarchy toward an ongoing critique or antagonism. As 
Préposiet (2007) says, Proudhon proposes a “critical anarchism”. For both authors - 
Proudhon and Foucault -, the unique law is the body or necessity.  
Proudhon also criticizes distributive justice, which is, as we have already 
written, the realm of laws, feudalism, government or a military regime. Proudhon 
proposes commutative justice or anarchy based on freedom. 
So, critique or struggle is the way to fight disciplinary power (Foucault, 
1977b). According to Foucault (2012:37), this strategic model looks like “a 
battlefront (which) crosses the whole society, continuously and permanently”; 
Foucault (2012:62,130) adds this warrior model once generalized appears like the 
Hobbesian203 “war of all against all” or the “state of nature”, an “anarchist” political 
option that has beneficial consequences, as we are going to discuss from now on.  
This battlefront puts all of us in one camp or another. We are engaged fighters 
or critics. For Foucault (2012: 37), there is no neutral subject; we are obviously “the 
adversaries of someone”. And why? We need to survive and to construct a space. 
According to Foucault (2012:39), “the more I accentuate the balance of forces, the                                                         
203 Foucault (2012:62) criticizes the Hobbesian state of nature as an artificial or “diplomatic” way to 
justify the birth of the state. According to Foucault (2012:62), the Hobbesian war is not a “natural and 
brutal” war, in which “forces would be in direct confrontation”. For Foucault (2012:129,130), the 
Hobbesian wild is a “theoretical and legal wild that come from the forests to contract and to found the 
society”. As we have seen, that Foucauldian “brutal war”, made of energy and desire, finishes in the 
pacific care of the self. 
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more I fight, the more effectively the truth will unfold before me”. For Foucault, “the 
more the subject is decentered, or better, engaged in the battle, partisan, the more the 
truth can show itself and deploy itself before him” (Chevallier, 2014:100). And this 
truth is our space. Chevallier (2014:100) adds, the Foucauldian truth “implies the full 
engagement of the subject into the discourse he addresses” or into the space he 
creates.  
And Foucault here seems again to know Proudhon. For Proudhon, antagonism 
or the perpetual war or our need to survive is fundamental, as we have already shown. 
Proudhon also finds inspiration in the Hobbesian state of nature - the war of all 
against all. Proudhon uses this state of nature as a device to show that in his anarchy 
need or the “body and limbs” are “the only true law” - a virtuous way. Proudhon 
(1861:78) also criticizes Hobbes who, in his opinion, did not grasp the ethical and 
“chivalrous” perspective of the state of nature; Proudhon says:  
 
It is this virtuous and chivalrous character of the war that Hobbes did 
not grasp; having wisely recognized that the war is inherent to 
humanity, and almost its natural state, immediately contradicted 
himself, saying that this state of nature is a bestial state, an evil and 
wicked war and, through a new contradiction, Hobbes claims that the 
state was established for the sole purpose of preventing that state of 
nature  
 
For Proudhon, war or antagonism or critique is “the natural state of 
humanity”, and the virtuous tool human beings use to take care of itself and of society 
through anarchy.  
As Revel (2016) and also Chevallier affirm, Foucault politicizes ethics. When 
we fight or take care of the self, we constitute our power (Revel, 2016). For Foucault, 
truth telling or critique means the enunciation of our values, rules and provisional 
order or space, as we have already studied. When we create space, when we win, we 
install our “stable mechanisms” (Chevallier, 2014:57). We pass from the 
subjectivation to the “objectivation” or subjectivity or the constitution of power 
(Revel, 2016). The “non-person” becomes “person”, a subject with an identity or 
subjectivity. For Foucault, a power relationship sets up an “aiming point” and a 
“border” (Chevallier, 2014:57). Foucault (1977b) explains, when the resistant wins 
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and creates space, he crystalizes: “in order to resist, we must be like power, as 
inventive, as mobile, as productive as it. Like power, resistance organizes itself, 
coagulates itself, and cements itself”. But this “coagulation” is temporary or cyclical, 
because, Foucault (1977b) clarifies, “since there is a relationship of power, there is 
again a possibility of resistance”, as we have already discussed. Thus, when we 
crystalize, we pass once more from objectivation to subjectivation, from “person” to 
“non-person” (Revel, 2016). And this way to see power is spiritualization and an 
ethics: a political ethics. 
Proudhon also supports a political ethics. For Proudhon, we are warriors and 
war and struggles are our natural state. So, when we win the battle, we occupy space 
or affirm our values or laws, being faithful to our own being or needs. When we win, 
we create power which is the affirmation of our truth or necessity. Proudhon’s 
mutualism is supported by this ability to establish our will with others through the 
contract. This reciprocal agreement is an affirmation of wills and desires. And this is 
a cyclical or revisable process, a perpetual struggle or modification, because our wills 
and desires change permanently, as we have already outlined. According to 
Proudhon, as we have stated in the outset of this section, “the war of all against all” is 
a solar society or a permanent devir or an anarchy constituted by fighters – an ethical 
and a political perspective. This is “the wheel of continual birth” of Deleuze and 
Guattari, as we have quoted before (see image 1, pg: 17).  
For Foucault, our need is the motor of this perpetual movement, as we have 
examined above. We have only our need as free law in order not to be governed. The 
other exterior laws are always oppressive, unless our will agrees to follow them. So, 
when we face crystallization or identities and our will does not agree with this 
objectivation or exterior law, war or resistance re-starts in ourselves. Why? The 
spiritual fighter resists or re-acts in order to restore his needs here and now, as we 
have already argued. For that reason, Foucault notes, “philosophy’s question - 
critique - is a question about this present which is ourselves”. The Foucauldian 
activist lives ‘today’, realising its power. At stake is this ubiquitous power here and 
now. According to Foucault, the truth of history or our truth is “its ability to weaken 
and modify the present”, setting up through critique a new pacific order again and 
again or a “new temporary balance of forces” (Chevallier, 2014:90; Negri, 
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2011:202). 204 Jolly and Sabot (2013:10) conclude, “power is what structures and 
what mutilates identities, what does and what undoes the ‘human’ lives” here and 
now. 
Proudhon has also this perspective of power as a strategic force or ‘space and 
time’ or an action here and now, as we have outlined before. 
Hence, as we live now according to our needs and we are engaged persons or 
not neutral persons, our truth and our values are always subjective. As we have 
shown, we are historical beings, determined by our necessities here and now. The 
Foucauldian subject has a “historical a priori” (Jensen, 2016). We live on a time - and 
space - grid, as we have studied earlier. Our knowledge, thought and sciences are 
“built on the categories of a certain time” and they “change throughout time” (Jensen, 
2016). Our truths and our knowledge are always ephemeral and subjective and never 
absolute. For this reason, we need to fight in order to live and to create our values or 
space in harmony with our needs and the world around us – our time. Nevertheless, at 
the same time, we cannot be subjugated by others’ subjective power, values and truth 
– by the Foucauldian order of things. This is a horological work in order to create a 
delicate collective balance.  
Foucault also shares this historical perspective with Proudhon. For Proudhon, 
we are also historical beings. The author explains history is time, movement, force or 
war. For Proudhon, we create ourselves permanently through an aesthetic and 
poetical war - antagonism, critique – according to our needs. And our creations, laws 
or contracts or mutual spaces are, for that reason, always subjective or mobile or 
historical.  
This historical or mobile feature of Foucault and Proudhon’s values, laws and 
spaces is the safeguard against oppression and crystallization. Mobility created by 
resistance is the way to fight against vertical or hierarchical links, establishing 
horizontal or egalitarian relations between people. This historical perspective is the 
guarantee of equality. For Foucault (2011b: 326,327), the “[horizontal] axis” links 
people together and even the intellectual - the person with “the courage of truth” - is 
linked horizontally “vis-à-vis those who are mistaken”. For Foucault, we are all                                                         
204 Foucault (2012:20) explains his intentions:  
“What I have been trying to look at since 1970-1971 is the ‘how of power’. Studying the ‘how of 
power’, or in other words trying to understand its mechanisms by establishing two markers, or limits: 
on the one hand, the rules of right that formally delineate power, and on the other hand, at the opposite 
extreme, the other limit might be the truth-effects that power produces, that this power conducts and 
which, in their turn reproduce power … the triangle: power, right, truth”. 
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equals; we are beside the other rather than above or below. Foucault (2012:61,62) 
talks about “the anarchy of the small differences that characterize the state of nature” 
- the widespread struggles in order not to be governed or oppressed. According to 
Foucault (2012:61), this anarchy is the “war of all against all”; it is “an equal war, 
born from the equality and taking place in this equality”; and this equality is “a non-
difference” or an “insufficient difference” or a “pacific difference”. And how is it 
pacific when it is conducted by warriors? These struggles are “pacific”, because 
“even the weak knows - or thinks in any case - he is not far from being as strong as 
his neighbour” (Foucault, 2012: 62). According to Foucault, even the weak knows 
that he has power and is able to create space. For Foucault, this perpetual fight or 
anarchy is a pacific way.  
According to Foucault, there is a difference between this “war of all against 
all” and the classic war, for instance, between states. For Foucault (2012:63), in terms 
of “war of all against all”, at stake is “the forces themselves in a direct manifestation” 
here and now. For instance, when we discuss the conservation of the building where 
we live with our neighbours or when we solve misunderstandings in our workplace 
with our co-workers; these are direct actions. In classic war, there is “theatre” – and 
struggle is “a representative system that operates in the field of diplomacy” 
(2012:63). Foucault prefers the former approach. The Foucauldian idea is that people 
solve permanently the spread of struggles - “the war of all against all” or agonism - in 
order to make classic war unnecessary (Foucault, 2012:18). And this is a solution or a 
way that everyone can access. 
Here Foucault seems again to know Proudhon or to be inspired by him. The 
theme of war and peace, and consequently of equality, is a central topic, in 
Proudhon’s thought, as we have just seen. This topic inspires and entitles one of his 
fundamental writings War and Peace. And, as we have already analysed, for 
Proudhon, war - the permanent antagonism - is divine and not the same as violence or 
piracy or terrorism; it is creative power or immanence, as we have already outlined. 
This immanence is everywhere and all of us are fighters and have access to this 
creative power or force. We are all equals because we have all similar “conditions or 
means” and this similarity or equality is a pacific way, as Foucault also explains. This 
creative power or spontaneous force allows us to satisfy our needs directly or, in 
other words, to achieve satisfaction, tranquillity and peace. Proudhon stresses, 
“directly” is synonymous with an immediate and equal power that manifests itself 
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without hierarchies, for instance, in order to set up the mutualist contract. As we have 
already pointed out, Proudhon defends the idea of individuals and groups bargaining 
directly “with each other for the things they want, without any intermediaries”. As we 
have studied, mutualism is justice or to “become equal” and this is a harmonious 
social way. 
According to Foucault (2012:39,177), this anarchy is similarly an 
“explanation from below”. And, although harmonious, for Foucault (2012:39,177), 
this anarchic “below” means, “the most confused, the most obscure, the most 
disordered, the most hazardous”. Nevertheless, Foucault (1977b) adds, resistance 
“comes from below and distributes itself strategically”. As we have already noted 
“strategically” signifies the direct manifestation of our will or power or truth. 
According to Foucault, this anarchy or state of nature works from the chaotic micro 
level to the level of truth. This micro level is the beginning of that strategic path 
which leads to truth, the ‘other epistemology’ or the local knowledge. The ‘other 
epistemology’ is the true knowledge of the weak or the small, those – everybody - 
who are below. So, if those struggles are the truth or a pacific way, how are they 
chaotic as well? Foucault (2012: 124) clarifies, “this varied technological knowledge 
in their dispersion, in their morphology, in their regionalization, in their local 
character, with the secrecy surrounding them, were the challenge and the instrument 
of an economic and political struggle”. Those ‘knowledges’ without voice – secrecy - 
are transgressive and challenge politically and economically institutional or installed 
knowledge or order. And this is the reason they are chaotic. Nevertheless, their 
novelty or contribution is the truth and another perspective of order. For Foucault, as 
we have studied above, when we rise up, we introduce subjectivity or space in history 
and “give it breath” - novelty (Bocquet, 2013:120). Nevertheless, Foucault warns, 
“these ‘confused voices’ do not sing better than the others, nor tell the – objective - 
truth” (Bocquet, 2013:120). Each of them is just one more - equality. 
Proudhon also defends a bottom-up perspective, criticizing the concepts of 
government and authority. According to Proudhon, as we have just explained, “the 
government of man by man is illegal and illegitimate”, is verticality, oppression or 
even theft: private property. According to Proudhon, modern government means 
private dominion - and “property is theft”. Proudhon’s life was a public combat” 
against this social, economic and political reality: property and government. 
Proudhon wants to finish with the notion of government and authority. For that 
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reason, he criticizes Rousseau’s social contract that “sets up an authority that is 
external regarding the contractors” (Préposiet, 2007:203). Proudhon would prefer 
Saint Simon’s stance, which intends the end of government (Préposiet, 2007:207). 
According to Proudhon, government works from above and, for that reason, is 
repressive. For Proudhon, the producer or the worker or the author is the ruler, ruling 
his creations from below and horizontally (with the others), for instance, in groups 
through the contract in a legitimate way. Proudhon proposes those “inter pares 
conventions” (Préposiet, 2007:203). 
So, we could depict this Foucauldian and Proudhonian anarchist landscape, as 
“a field of power”, composed by “a set of occasional and disseminated struggles, a 
multiplicity of local unpredictable and heterogeneous resistance” (Foucault, 2012: 
187). And this variety of points of resistance is the Foucauldian “diagram”. The 
diagram is a “cartography” that exposes “power relations that constitute power” 
(Deleuze, 2012:42,44). 205   For Foucault, as we have already noted, those power 
relations are “microphysical, strategic, multi-point, diffuse”; they are “local” and also 
not “localizable” connections (Deleuze, 2012:44). The diagram is a “network of 
alliances” or “small local groups” of power relations, which forms “an unstable 
system in perpetual imbalance” (Deleuze, 2012:43). The diagram is “inter-social”, 
fluid and a “becoming” (Deleuze, 2012:43). This is the permanent war of all against 
all. This is anarchy. 
As we have set out, Proudhon calls this “diagram” or set of struggles 
“federalism”. For Proudhon, the federation is a “political contract” based on 
mutuality or mutualities. It is also a way to organize groups externally and internally. 
Foucault and Proudhon give the same image of this anarchic field of power: the war 
of all against all. Nevertheless, the authors have a complementary task. Foucault is a 
researcher. Proudhon is more political.  
Foucault’s proposal develops this informal war – no form - and its content. In 
our opinion, it seems Foucault explains how Proudhon’s federalism, mutualities and 
contract works from inside, how their content behaves. Foucault talks about 
heterotopias, diagrams and virtualities – abandoned tips we could link at any time. As 
we have studied, Foucault (2013:XIV) just gives some informal political recipes,                                                         
205 Foucault distinguishes between diagram and structure. The diagram is constituted by alliances that 
create a “flexible and transversal network that is perpendicular to the vertical structure” (Deleuze, 
2012:43). 
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suggesting “what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over 
unities, mobile arrangements over systems”. In short, Foucault tells us how power 
works. For this reason, his philosophical experiences and recipes explore, explain and 
complement Proudhon’s proposals, showing why they are so important and useful. 
In turn, Proudhon just says that these federations, mutualities and contracts 
are something collective, fluid and mobile. Nevertheless, the author does not work on 
this fluidity. Proudhon is more concerned with the pragmatic and practical side of 
politics: people need to understand and to know how to organize and to work together 
freely and directly. So, Proudhon goes further than Foucault politically – in terms of 
polis organization - and suggests some more specific formulas or solutions, although 
without any content.  
This complementarity between Foucault and Proudhon continues. For 
Foucault, this big heterotopia or diagram or federation created through critique or 
parrhesia - the scandalous truth telling - and permanently opened to the exterior 
world is the alternative landscape to property or government, as Proudhon says. 
Foucault gives the example of the Cynic, in order to show how truth telling - 
parrhesia - or critique opens a transparent way of life that contrasts with the closed 
way of property. Foucault (2011b:254,255) remembers that the Cynics applied the 
principle of non-concealment literally. For instance, the Cynic Diogenes ate and 
masturbated in public. For Foucault (2011b:254,255), the aim of this exaggerated 
“blaze of naturalness” was to scandalize and to explode the “codes” of privacy 
associated with property implicitly or explicitly. 
Thus, we could say Cynic activists inhabit this Foucauldian “diagram” or big 
heterotopia. This Cynic or Foucauldian activist, an egalitarian person, works directly 
without intermediaries and representatives. He is a nomadic, mobile, and plural 
personality, opened to the other, who creates transparent spaces in order to survive 
and to live in peace. He is the other political subject or the anarchist that runs a 
spiritual path of moderation, having need as the unique law and critique as the main 
political tool or alternative to government.  
And Foucault also seems to be one of these activists. Foucault is really 
interested in those struggles; Foucault is an engaged intellectual, as we have just 
shown. Critical struggles are his main field of work. But more than work, they are his 
life or his “autobiographic” work, as we have pointed out. For Foucault, “to think is 
to experiment and to problematize”, also about his own life (Deleuze, 2012:124). 
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Foucault says, “whenever I had tried to do theoretical work, it was from elements of 
my own experience” (Eribon, 2011:54). According to Foucault, “theory is not the 
result of a disinterested intellectual” (Bocquet, 2013:121). As we have seen, the 
“theory does not dictate the law”, because the intellectual is engaged (with his life) in 
his theories: “in truth and power regime” (Bocquet, 2013:121). The intellectual is an 
activist or a militant.  
For Foucault, this engagement in truth - the other epistemology - is his 
concept of “militancy”. Militancy means “bearing witness by one’s life in the form of 
a style of existence” (Foucault, 2011b:184). This militancy “must manifest directly, 
by its visible form, its constant practice, and its immediate existence, the concrete 
possibility and the evident value of an other life, which is the true life” (Foucault, 
2011b:184). According to Foucault, to be an activist, and also an intellectual, is to act 
in order to create true space or the truth or the true life. It means to stylize his 
existence according to his necessity. In another way, the truth or the true space is his 
life or his body, which he sculpts militantly. The body is the very beginning of the 
militant heterotopia or the autonomous space. The body is the Absolut zero point 
from where the heterotopia or the militant space begins. So, for Foucault, to be 
militant is a “mode of life”, the “scandalous” life of truth - the courage of truth - an 
“other life” or anarchy. Militancy is a life in a diagram composed by heterotopias or 
in a big heterotopia.  
Foucault explains that this militancy or heterotopias or autonomous spaces 
already exists in society and gives living examples: 
 
the aspect of bearing witness by one’s life, the scandal of the revolutionary 
life as the scandal of the truth were, roughly speaking, much more dominant 
in the movements of the mid-nineteenth century. Dostoyevsky should of 
course be studied, and with Dostoyevsky, Russian nihilism; and after 
Russian nihilism, European and American anarchism (Foucault, 2011b:185). 
 
Foucault sees nineteenth century anarchism as a living example of the true life 
that even should be studied in order to better understand what this true life or 
militancy really is. So, we could deduce that Foucault’s own practice or life from this 
kind of militancy or anarchism. And as we have been arguing, Proudhon, an anarchist 
of the nineteenth century, seems really to share this same kind of militancy and true 
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life. Proudhon is really an intellectual that “sinks theory into practice”. Proudhon 
researches and fights as a politician and anarchist in order to change society, for 
instance, theoretically through mutualism, federalism and anarchy, and practically 
through workers’ associations, cooperatives and the bank of the people (Préposiet, 
2007:177,192,194).  
Foucault had the same anarchistic and militant attitude, for instance, when he 
created the GIP - Groupe d’information sur les prisons - his “scandalous” prison 
movement (Bocquet, 2013:113). For Foucault (2011b:185), the political function of 
the intellectual is to “denounce the intolerable” - scandal - or “going after the truth, 
manifesting the truth, making the truth burst out”. And this is his main objective 
regarding his concrete struggles, for example, in prisons. Foucault (1971) wants “the 
intolerable, imposed by force and silence” to “cease to be accepted”. According to 
Foucault (1971), the GIP’s fight “is not made to accumulate knowledge, but to 
increase our intolerance and to give rise to an active intolerance”. Foucault (1971) 
throws down his challenge and invites people to become intolerant about “prisons, 
justice, the hospital system, psychiatric practice, military service, etc”.  
Foucault is a “specific intellectual” or activist thinker engaged in particular 
fights - prisons, for instance. “Specific” means the intellectual is linked with 
struggles, which occur on particular issues, in concrete places: “local struggles” 
(Eribon, 2011:409,410). For Foucault, “the era of the universal intellectual (à la 
Sartre) is over” (Bocquet, 2013:118,121,122, Eribon, 2011:409). Foucault and his 
GIP companions explain their local or concrete work: “we ask those who … have had 
an experience of prison or a relationship with it. We beg them to contact us and let us 
know what they know” (Foucault; Domenach; Vidal-Naquet, nd).206 Foucault and his 
companions include themselves in the prisons fight. They write in GIP’s Manifesto: 
“we are under ‘custody’ (garde à vue); prisons are “one of the hidden regions of our 
social system, one of the black boxes of our lives” - the “carceral continuum” - 
(Foucault; Domenach; Vidal-Naquet, nd). This said, for Foucault, theory strengthens                                                         
206 Kelly (2013) frames Foucault’s prisons activism: “This research on prisons began in activism. The 
French state had banned several radical leftist groups in the aftermath of May 1968, and thousands of 
their members ended up in prisons, where they began to agitate for political rights for themselves, then 
began to agitate for rights for prisoners in general, having been exposed by their incarceration to 
ordinary prisoners and their problems. Foucault was the main organizer of a group formed outside the 
prison, in effect as an outgrowth of this struggle, the Groupe d’informations sur les prisons (the GIP – 
the Prisons Information Group). This group, composed primarily of intellectuals, sought simply to 
empower prisoners to speak of their experiences on their own account, by sending surveys out to them 
and collating their responses”. 
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struggle (Bocquet, 2013:121). In another way, theory is a practice that multiplies the 
struggles and does not totalize them (Bocquet, 2013:122).  
And Foucault really multiplied those fights during his life. As Eribon 
(2011:444) says, Foucault was a great organizer. He participated in several 
movements or spaces - relations of people - in order to give visibility to those at the 
margins. Foucault fought against prisons, racism, the death penalty, for migrants’ 
rights, against the administration and tax following a fire at a nightclub that killed 
about 50 people, against people’s courts in China, against the justice system as a 
whole, against the Franco’s regime because eleven people were sentenced to death in 
Spain, against oppression in Poland, and against the Gulag in Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).  
While he was involved in political activism, Foucault does not fix himself in a 
movement – preferring informality instead (Golliau, 2014:7). He is always inside and 
offside. Zamora (2016) describes Foucault as follows:  
 
he believed in neither Marx nor Freud, nor in the Revolution nor in Mao, 
in private he snickered at fine progressive sentiments, and I knew of no 
principled position of his on the vast problems of the Third World, 
consumerism, capitalism, American imperialism 
 
As Eribon (2011:385) remembers, Foucault was viscerally against 
institutions,207 which, in his perspective, threaten every movement and uprising. So, 
Foucault dwells in this unstable and informal landscape, the diagram, and he is also 
an informal or nomadic person - also an intellectual - in perpetual motion.  
And what is the political goal of this perpetual movement? As we have 
already affirmed, Foucault inhabits a non-representative diagram. Deleuze (2012:43) 
explains, the Foucauldian diagram  
 
does not work to represent a pre-existing world. It produces a new kind of 
reality, a new truth model ... It makes history, undoing the realities and 
previous meanings, providing new points of emergence and creativity, 
                                                        
207 As we have affirmed, Foucault supports the diagram, rather than the structure. 
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unexpected combinations and improbable continuities. It overtakes history 
in a becoming. 
 
In his writings Foucault presents the intellectual as an informal person or a 
theoretical activist, a becoming or a critic, rather than a representative. Foucault 
really assumes his “philosophical life as militancy” in his last days (Foucault, 
2011b:292). And as we have already argued, this militancy is a style of existence or 
the care of the self. For Foucault (2011b: 243,300,302), the philosopher is “the 
physician of everyone” who has a double task, “a double epimeleia”: “to take care of 
men’s care”, as kind of “universal night-watchman” or as a cynic “guard dog’s life”. 
This task is an “aptness and general usefulness” based on parrhesia, the courage to 
tell truths useful for everyone (Foucault, 2011b:326). And Foucault characterizes the 
person that tells those true things. This kind of person has a “pure heart, courage, and 
a noble soul”, because he takes care of himself (Foucault, 2011b:326). So, for 
Foucault (2011b:243), those noble’s souls and this double care is “useful to all men”. 
Foucault (1971) explains his political intentions and how to be a useful intellectual; 
Foucault wants  
 
to give the word to those who have experience of prison. Although they do 
not need help to ‘become aware’: the consciousness of oppression is there 
perfectly clear, knowing very well who the enemy is. But the current 
system denies them the means to formulate, to organize themselves.208 
 
So, the intellectual or the philosopher who is immersed in the struggle is there 
also to help them to organize and fight - “to take care of men’s care”.  
Thus, as we have already shown, this Foucauldian critical alternative 
presupposes an “other” kind of representation, “a new truth model” or a ‘truth’ 
representation, inspired by cynicism. “The Cynic appears as a man whose poverty, 
destitution, lack of home and country are nothing other than the condition for being 
able to exercise, in a positive way, the positive mission he has been given”: to be                                                         
208 It seems, here, Foucault admits some kind of representation. However, in our opinion, as Foucault 
states, the intellectual’s task is just to be an amplifier ipsis verbis of the voices that have no “means to 
formulate” or “to organize” themselves, because reality – the system – forecloses them. And the 
intellectual is always engaged in the struggle. Foucault also feels himself a prisoner, as he writes in 
GIP’s Manifest: “we are under ‘custody’”. So, the intellectual or the activist just looks after his 
comrades, just manifests inter pares solidarity. 
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“guard dog’s life” (Foucault, 2011b:300). Foucault suggests these new kinds of 
‘politician’ – with “pure hearts, courage, and noble souls”- criticizing the 
“intermediary” concept. The other politician might also have the austere conditions of 
life, we have referred above: “poverty, destitution, lack of home and country” (Eribon, 
2011:387). As Tacheji (2008:151) tells us, in his later works, Foucault invents a “new 
figure”, “the latest figure of Foucault’s philosophical breviary”. This figure is “the 
dog”, the cynic described as kataskopos, as “scout” - éclaireur; the cynic sees with 
“other eyes” and “beyond our human too human perspective”; the cynic “does not 
think differently, but is inherently different”. For Foucault (2011b:302,303), the cynic 
who tells the truth to the other in a scandalous mode is the politician par excellence. 
The Foucauldian politician takes a protest action or “the duty to contradict the other” 
(Balibar, 2016). And this critical true mode is democracy and “contra-democracy”; it 
is “not to accept a real government”; for instance, it is to criticize the liberal 
democratic representation or government (Foucault, 1994a:565,566; Balibar, 2016). 
This cynic is the Foucauldian politician or activist: the anarchist.  
Nevertheless, from a Foucauldian perspective, to become anarchist or cynical 
is a possibility open to everyone. As we have already seen, for Foucault, we are all 
philosophers or ‘kings’ (‘sun kings’: éclaireurs) by nature. Nevertheless, not 
everyone wants to take this path (askesis). Hence, to be cynic or anarchist is the 
challenge Foucault takes upon himself, answering the question: “what is the task of 
the intellectual today?” (Tacheji, 2008:151). Foucault answers with his own life. As 
we have studied before, Foucault wants to take this cynical path and to provide a new 
light for his time, as the cynics do. For Foucault (2011b:233), “cynicism sheds a new 
light on, gives a new form to that grand old political and philosophical problem of the 
courage of the truth”. And to be anarchist is to shed this light and to take care of 
ourselves, having our animality as law; to be anarchist is that spiritual, ethical and 
political path without exterior laws and moral laws. The cynic is the naked man who 
reduces “all pointless conventions and all superfluous opinions”; he practices “a sort 
of general stripping of existence and opinions in order to reveal the truth” (Foucault, 
2011b:171). This is the ‘other life’; it is an effort of personal and collective 
organization. The one who takes this ethical and virtuous path (askesis) becomes 
anarchist: who takes care of oneself and at the same time contributes to another world 
– ‘taking care of the other’ care.  
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 216 
To be anarchist is to be a carer, as Foucault (2011b:279, Eribon, 2011) 
pretends to be; he is not a doctor as his father would want him to be, but, as a cynic 
and as activist, he has a “care relationship, a medical relationship” with others. He 
was ‘doctor to everybody’. He was not the physician of bodies, but he was a ‘doctor 
of humanity’.  
And also like the cynics, to be anarchist is to be a nomadic person, as 
Foucault was. Foucault lived many years abroad a kind of exile, for instance in 
Sweden and Tunisia where he was lecturer and professor (Eribon, 2011). From a 
Foucauldian perspective, to be cynic or anarchist is to “roam”, is not to be “integrated 
into society”, is not to have “household, family, hearth, or country” (Foucault, 
2011b:170). To be anarchist or cynic may also be to be unmarried or without 
children, and to devote oneself to philosophy, as Foucault did. In turn, to be anarchist 
could be to have a marital life. Perhaps, for that reason, Foucault (2011b:302) 
launches the question,  
 
‘Who’, Epictetus asks, ‘provides the greatest service to men, those who 
bring two or three ugly-snouted brats into the world [that is to say, those 
who marry and have children; M.F.], or those who, to the best of their 
ability, exercise supervision (hoi episkopountes) over all men, observing 
what they do, how they spend their life, what they care for, and what they 
neglect contrary to their duties’. 
 
So, Foucault does not deny the cynic or the philosopher could be married and 
have a partner and a family. Nevertheless, it might be hard to reconcile these ways. It 
seems Foucault thinks about himself, a single man, and he suggests to be an anarchist 
is to have another kind of family where both partners take care of themselves. As we 
have already seen, for Foucault, marriage would be more virtuous and society too, if 
partners share the same spiritual path or life. Foucault (2011b:170) illustrates with the 
story of Hipparchia and Crates.  
 
Hipparchia really wants to marry Crates, a Cynic philosopher who, as 
such, has absolutely no desire to marry. So Crates, exasperated by the 
attentions of Hipparchia, who said she would kill herself if he did not 
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marry her, stood before her, stripped naked, 209  and said: This is your 
husband, this is what he possesses, decide then, because you will not be 
my wife unless you share my way of life  
 
As we have seen above, the relationship between husband and wife is based 
on the care of the self and this is the main key and law to the resolution and 
arrangement of common lives. This is the main way to have a spiritual and happy life 
in common or an anarchist life - in polis.  
For that reason, the other political being lives an alternative life. It is a carer 
and not an intermediary or a representative who, according to Foucault, shares the 
ideological values and themes imposed by the bourgeoisie and capitalism (Eribon, 
2011:387). As we have seen, the political being just looks after his comrades, 
manifesting solidarity in common struggles. As we have just argued, for Foucault, the 
intellectual is also a carer and a kind of courageous whistle-blower who shares and 
makes his fellow fighters’ claims heard, because those claims are also his claims. The 
intellectual’s task is just one among others, because each participant has his own task 
and contribution.  
 
                                                        
209 It is interesting to note that nudity or the body is the ultimate thing the Cynic possesses: it is his law 
or his virtuous referential. 
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                                                                               Image 11 
                Michel Foucault and Jean Paul Sartre 
 
For Foucault, the intellectual or the anarchist must above all “listen” to fellow 
activists and “reproduce in quotes the words of those who speak” (Eribon, 2011:394). 
Foucault adds, regarding his work in GIP with prisoners, “everyone must know that 
one is participating in the writing by the fact one speaks” (Eribon, 2011:394).  
The Foucauldian anarchist is very similar to Proudhon’s anarchist. Proudhon 
is also against the concept of political representation – representative government. 
Although he was a member of parliament (1848-1849), he was so direct and so 
radical he was arrested for fighting against property in the French National Assembly. 
Then, as Préposiet (2007:178) tells us, Proudhon became an “abstentionist”; he 
stopped participating in formal or representative democracy and he wrote “Shame on 
universal suffrage!” (“Honte au suffrage universel !”). Proudhon (2009b) declares 
himself “disappointed” about “direct universal suffrage”, and considers it 
“responsible” for the Second Empire. Proudhon (2009b) blames both the “imbecile” 
proletariat and the “coward” and “greedy” bourgeoisie though he tries to conciliate 
them. Consequently, as we have seen, Proudhon proposes the contract as an 
alternative to government. And in terms of federalism or coordination between 
spaces, as the author has mainly a local perspective, he just suggests a political 
simplification: the agency. As we have analyzed, the agency has revisable functions 
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and very limited ones. The idea would be: the bigger the number of contractors, the 
fewer the agency services. This agency is created and allowed by the contractors in 
order to help the articulation between groups and is based in a perpetual fight. So, 
instead of a representative, Proudhon proposes a contractor limited by a permanent 
fight working in a local dimension. In terms of larger dimensions or federations, 
Proudhon suggests just a coordinator with restricted functions that are also 
permanently revised. For Proudhon, as we have seen, this contractor is a free person 
who follows a virtuous path, understood as moral self-direction - the care of the self. 
It is the anarchist who supports the mutuality principle and federalism. It is a group or 
a collective or mobile subject who lives through ongoing transformation.  
For Foucault, those fluid political figures - intellectuals, philosophers, 
anarchists - who inhabit this informal map are “new subjectivities”, forms without 
form or an undefined set of power relations, as we have discussed earlier (Deleuze, 
2012:123,131). Deleuze (2012:123) takes up the story, “for Foucault, everything is 
variable and variations”. According to Deleuze (2012:123), this Foucauldian “new 
self” emerges slowly from “capitalism mutations”, as a “nucleus of resistance”. This 
Foucauldian permanent fluidity is the way not to fall in to crystallized, oppressive and 
fascist situations and relations.  
For that reason, for Foucault, this alternative subject is also a mutualist one as 
it is for Proudhon. As we have seen, this nomadic self is the conjugation of a pure 
matter and a pure form (Deleuze, 2012:43). The self is constitutively pluralistic from 
the start. Form and matter work together, allowing, on one side, the subject to take 
care of itself and to be free and self determined. And, on the other side, this critical 
path permits the subject to create nomadic relationships with the others - ‘other 
spaces’ or heterotopias – in a double sense: (i) escaping from capitalism and from 
hierarchical and oppressive relations; and (ii) emerging from those capitalist relations 
in a mutualistic, collective and harmonious way, taking care of the others’s care.  
Foucault highlights, those “specific” struggles that rise from oppressive 
relations “are part of the revolutionary movement”, because: (i) they are “radical”, 
they have “no compromise nor reformism”, they do not attempt to develop the same 
power with only a change of holder (Eribon, 2011); and (ii) they have to “fight 
against all controls and constraints that lead to that same power everywhere” (Eribon, 
2011). For Foucault (2012:54), the revolutionary discourse has placed itself on “the 
history-claim, the history-insurgency side”. For Foucault, what produces unity 
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between those partial struggles and the revolutionary movement is the same system of 
power; both fight against “all forms of exercise and application of power” (Eribon, 
2011). According to Foucault the revolutionary “problem of exploitation and wealth” 
is also a problem of “too much power”. Zamora (2016) believes that Foucault was not 
concerned with exploitation and wealth, as a consequence. 
Nevertheless, there is a difference between those nomadic struggles and the 
proletarian movement. The proletariat wants to take power - “for the first time in 
history” - through a “violent dictatorial and bloody revolution” - the dictatorship of 
the proletariat (Eribon, 2011:388,399). But, for Foucault, this attitude is a 
“bureaucracy” or the rest of “the petty bourgeoisie” that exercises this power rather 
than the proletariat itself (Eribon, 2011:388,399). And here is the difference. The 
specific intellectual is not a member of this “petty bourgeoisie” and his role is neither 
administrative nor the state’s work; his role is neither to “form the working class 
consciousness” nor to take power, but to help this “consciousness” - just in case it 
wants to be helped - and this “worker knowledge” to “enter into the information 
system in order to diffuse their ideas”.  
As we have argued, for Foucault, we could not seize power nor the state, nor 
make a revolution, as Marxists suggest, nor just reform the state, because we live in a 
disciplinary society: (i) invaded and surrounded by that diffuse power or by relations 
of power that are not seizable and where (ii) the state almost does not exist, as we 
have pointed out before (Foucault, 2012:173,174; Bocquet, 2013:116).  
And here Foucault recognizes his proximity with some anarchists, like 
Proudhon. Foucault (2002:154,155) argues, 
 
According to that, I would be much more anarchist. I must say that I do not 
accept this entirely negative view of power, but I agree with you when you 
say that the revolutionaries want to take power ... the question is whether, 
within the current system, we can change power relations in microscopic 
levels, at school, in family, in such a way that when there will be a political 
and economic revolution, we will not find the same relations of power that 
we now find.  
 
So, Foucault could not support the Marxist “theoretical and political 
vanguard” that claims to have a scientific discourse in order to educate the proletariat 
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to seize power. Nevertheless, Foucault (2012:12) notes his main objection regarding 
Marxism is its pretension “to be a science” (Foucault, 2012:12). Foucault (2012:12) 
asks, “which speaking subject, which discursive subject, which subject of experience 
and knowledge do you want to minimize as long as you say ‘I have this discourse, I 
have a scientific discourse and I am a scientist?’” And Foucault (2012:12) continues, 
“What theoretical and political vanguard do you want to enthrone?” Foucault 
(2012:12) sums up: this is the bureaucratic “petty bourgeoisie’s” “ambition of 
power”. For that reason, the author (2012:120) would prefer  
 
an immense and multiple combat of knowledges, ones against the others. … 
The plural, polymorphous, multiple, dispersed existence of different 
knowledges, which exist with their differences according to the geographic 
regions and the size of businesses and workshops, … a kind of huge 
economic and political struggle ... and not the day progressing over night 
nor the knowledge over ignorance (Foucault, 2012:120). 
 
It should be noted that Foucault opposes the economic theory of power. 
According to Foucault (2012:15), power is not a “good”, as it is in the juridical 
conception, to liberals, to eighteenth century philosophers and later to Marxists. They 
all defend a kind of “economism” in the theory of power (Foucault, 2012:15). 
Foucault (2012:15) explains, for eighteenth century philosophers and Marxists, 
“power is regarded as a right” which we could possess as a good and “we could 
therefore transfer or dispose totally or in part, by a juridical act or by a law founding 
act”. As we have already shown, Foucault has another conception of power. For 
Foucault (2012:16), “power is not given, not exchanged, not taken back, but it is 
exercised and it exists only in act”. 
According to Foucault (2012:16), power is a movement, a “balance of forces” 
and “what represses”; it is a “struggle”, a “confrontation” or a “war”. For Foucault 
(2012:16), “power is the continuation of war by other means”, as politics is. 
Foucauldian power is ubiquitous and dispersed, as we have seen. Power is not 
“univocal”; there are “countless points of conflict”, temporary fights and “inversion 
of the balance of forces” (Negri, 2011: 202). And the inversion of these micro-powers 
“is not acquired once and forever with a new control or by the destruction of 
institutions”. They are something biological, also sexual, mutual and permanent, as 
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we have outlined. Negri (2011: 202) explains “these localized episodes may just be 
etched in history through the effects they produce on the whole network where they 
happen”. They are just another kind of reality or spaces that rise beyond the existing 
institutions inside the system, but not “beyond power”, as we have said (Sabot, 
2013:18). Those “localized episodes are “counter conducts”, “rebellions” or “forms 
of dissent” (Sabot, 2013:18). And Foucault’s main goal is the reactivation of this 
local and “minor” knowledge using the archaeological method and genealogical 
tactics (Foucault, 2012:13). 
Chevallier (2014:57) gives an overall vision of Foucauldian thought; on one 
side, we have “immediate and anarchic struggles that are always transversal and 
local” - the diagram; on the other side, we have “devices or very complex systems” 
with “global goals” that aim at “governing a particular community as a whole and 
each individual over a lifetime” (Chevallier, 2014:58). We face two kinds of 
historiography, an anarchic and local and another systematic and global, which are 
linked together by freedom (Chevallier, 2014:58). 210 So, this anarchic power that 
creates space undermines also the system and its power relationship locally. We 
could say that this anarchy is the ‘true regime’ that mines every system - or political 
system -, occupying space permanently and not taking power through revolution. 
This is the Foucauldian agonistic concept of power or movement (Negri, 2011: 202).  
The Foucauldian solution would be a cross between revolution and 
constitution. According to Foucault (2012:128), “what is fundamental … is the 
coupling of these two concepts”. In this sense, for Foucault, revolution is a 
subjectivation, a “revolution of forces”, for instance, “the move from night to 
daybreak or from the lowest point to the highest point” (Foucault, 2012:128). In turn, 
constitution is an objectivation or “a balance of forces” (Foucault, 2012:128). As we 
have already outlined, Foucault talks about a “philosophy of cyclical history” 
(Foucault, 2012:129). This means “history develops in circles” permanently: after a 
revolution a constitution, after a constitution a revolution and so on and so forth 
                                                        
210 As we have studied Foucault advocates a freedom that is successively an objectivation and a 
subjectivation. Foucault (2012:100) defends a warrior’s freedom or a “freedom of selfishness, avidity, 
the love of battle, the love of conquest and plunder. The warriors’ freedom is not that of tolerance and 
equality for all; it is a freedom that can be exercised by the domination ... freedom of ferocity”. 
Foucault (2012:106) adds, “Freedom is to be able to take, to be able to appropriate, to take advantage, 
to be able to order, to be able to obtain obedience. The first criterion of freedom is to deprive others of 
freedom. ... Freedom … is exactly the opposite of equality”, although we are all equally free, as we 
have studied. Freedom is the capacity we all have to create our space. 
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(Foucault, 2012:129). Foucault (2012:129; Bocquet, 2013:116) defends a “solar 
revolution” and not a democratic or conventional one, because the demos does not 
exist, only the “avant-garde” exists but Foucault does not believe in it. 
Once again, Proudhon has a similar position regarding revolutions. Proudhon 
is a “moderate” man with a “peasant common sense”, as Préposiet (2007:178) 
characterizes him. Proudhon advocates a “slow” and “patient” revolution, considering 
that “only the ignorant makes revolutions” (Préposiet, 2007:179). In Proudhon’s 
opinion it was not necessary to “bring down the entire superior sense” to achieve 
equality and anarchy (Préposiet, 2007: 179). In a letter to Michelet, Proudhon says, “a 
revolution lasts centuries” and is “a long process without an end, more than a 
cataclysm”. Proudhon supports anarchy or a permanent revolution or a daily struggle 
or production: an economic211 revolution above all (Préposiet, 2007: 179.180). As an 
anarchist, Proudhon is also a critic of Marx with whom he shared long hours of 
discussion (Prépositet, 2007:217). As Foucault, Proudhon believes neither in 
revolution by the demos nor in Marxist vanguards (Castleton, 2009). Proudhon 
(2009b) notes, “the people are a monster that devours all his benefactors and 
liberators. There is no revolutionary people; there’s only elite men who thought they 
could excite people and put their ideas of public good into practice” (Proudhon, 
2009b).  
Nevertheless, Proudhon believes in the “working class” and affirms its 
revolutionary practice should be exercised “outside the influence of the bourgeoisie” 
(Préposiet, 2007:199). The workers have a word to say due to their “numerical 
power”; their force could change society (Préposiet, 2007:193). However, Proudhon 
notes the working classes have no practical experience of economic or commercial 
life, which, in his opinion, is fundamental to act as in real life (Préposiet, 2007:193). 
For Proudhon, the workers need just the economic and commercial help of some 
“enlightened” and experienced people, in order to transform society according to their 
will (Préposiet, 2007:193). Those “enlightened” and experienced people seem very 
similar to the Foucauldian specific intellectuals who similarly exercise a solidarity 
with their struggles.                                                          
211 Proudhon does not accept the distinction between politics and economy, although Proudhon, as 
Foucault, does not see power as a good, as Marxists do (Préposiet, 2007: 182). Nevertheless, Proudhon 
has a mutualistic or reciprocal perspective of life and, in this sense economic because based on the 
exchange (reciprocity). For the author, “from the government to the administered people and from the 
administered people to the government all is reciprocal service, exchange, wage and reimbursement” 
(Préposiet, 2007: 182).  
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Hence, this Foucauldian other fighter is a non-Marxist fighter - not anti-
Marxist - and also a “violent anti-communist”, although it sounds contradictory or 
paradoxical (Eribon, 2011:237,238). Foucault wants to avoid the repetition of 
“dangerous traditions”, as the USSR was. We use the expression ‘non-Marxist’, 
taking Foucault’s life as example because Foucault joined the Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF) in 1950. Foucault had been a PCF militant for three years (1950 - 
1953) and, after that experience, he developed that “ferocious hatred” against 
communism . Kelly explains (2013),  
 
Foucault began his career as a Marxist, having been influenced by his 
mentor, the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, as a student, to join the 
French Communist Party. Though his membership was tenuous and brief, 
Foucault’s later political thought should be understood against this 
background, as a thought that is both under the influence of, and intended 
as a reaction to, Marxism 
 
Foucault had practical experience of Marxism. Foucault became completely 
opposed to communism, the party of the proletariat and the “petty bourgeois” 
vanguard, as we have already seen he called it. He did not want to attempt revolution 
once and for all, lead by this ‘bourgeois’ vanguard.  
In turn, as we have already highlighted, Proudhon was also completely against 
communism and its radical revolution. According to Proudhon, the concept of 
community means “absolutism” and is also synonym with “the economic idea of 
state” that absorbs the “personality” and the “individual initiative” (Préposiet, 
2007:200). For Proudhon, the concept of community bears on the concept of property 
(Préposiet, 2007:201). Although the members of the community possess nothing, the 
community is the “owner” of “goods”, “persons” and their “wills” (Préposiet, 
2007:201). And here is the point of discord with Marx.  
Proudhon tries to synthesise the concept of property and community through 
the concept of mutuality, based on reciprocity and solidarity, as we have already 
studied (Préposiet, 2007:190,191). And Marx does not agree at all. Marx accuses 
Proudhon of being a protector of “the middle classes, artisans and peasants” and also 
an “apologist of the smallholding” (Préposiet, 2007:190,217). And here is Proudhon’s 
main point. This issue could be the great Achilles’ heel of the later communist 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 225 
regimes after Proudhon - for instance, in Foucault’s period. For Proudhon, those 
“intermediate elements” of society, such as farmers, other more or less definable 
social groups and some “marginal survivals” intervene decisively in societies 
(Préposiet, 2007:219). For Proudhon, all those groups, farmers, artisans, the petty 
bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the “white-collar”, marginalized by the Marxists, 
always maintained their “historical burden” (Préposiet, 2007:219). They broke and 
delayed the Marxist “duel” between labour and capital (Préposiet, 2007:219). Those 
groups had a voice in history and Proudhon’s intention was to show these 
marginalized cries of protest, complementing the dualist Marxist perspective of 
history (Préposiet, 2007:219). 
And Foucault agrees again with Proudhon. First, Foucault supports the ‘other 
voices’, as we have been developing. And, second, his fighter or activist is a critic of 
Marxist political methods and their liberal roots. As Foucault (2012:182) explains, 
 
Fascism and Stalinism have only extended a series of mechanisms that 
already existed in the social and political systems of the West. After all, 
the organization of the big parties, the development of police equipment, 
the existence of repressive techniques like forced labour camps, this is a 
legacy well established by liberal Western societies that Stalinism and 
fascism just absorbed.  
 
Foucault (2012:182) adds, “there would be between ‘liberal societies’ and 
totalitarian states, a strange affiliation, from normal to pathological, even monstrous”.  
 Foucault sees in liberal 212  democracy the roots of big states, “big parties”, 
“police equipment” and “repressive techniques” that would be adapted by fascism and 
Stalinism. For that reason, perhaps, when his party of the proletariat’s pet hate arose, 
Foucault never again joined another party. He collaborated with Maoist movements, for 
example, on prisons, but, as we have already explained, Foucault never belonged to any 
of these movements. His political option was the nomadic subject engaged in fluid 
movements or spaces.  
Notwithstanding his leftist stances, Foucault did not vote for the socialist party 
nor support François Mitterrand’s election (Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). Some days                                                         
212 For Foucault (2012:151,152), liberal means bourgeois. 
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after the election, he gave “public and spectacular support for the new socialist 
government” (Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). However this support “deteriorated quickly” 
(Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). At stake were the public disagreements between 
intellectuals and the French government about the coup d'état in Poland in 1981 
(Eribon, 2011:476,478,485). At the same time, French intellectuals claimed their 
“independence” against “all powers”, pleading for a “return to ‘the libertarian tradition 
of the left’, stifled by the left’s political apparatus and apparatchiks” (Eribon, 
2011:485). 
In fact, as we have seen, Foucault dreamt of another kind of politician 
inspired by Cynicism. He defended another kind of government, a different 
relationship between rulers and ruled. And “work” plays here a fundamental role, as 
we have already outlined. Foucault supported critical work, where “obedience” and 
“subjection” between rulers and ruled have no more place (Eribon, 2011:477). 
According to Foucault, to work is to take care of the self or to criticize; “both things 
go hand in hand” (Eribon, 2011:477). As we have been studying, critique is 
Foucauldian alternative to government.213  
Proudhon shares the same alternative way. For Proudhon, work is the key to 
set government and social order. Work or movement or moral self-direction means 
“divine creation”, as we have already said (Préposiet, 2007:183). According to 
Proudhon, the human being is mainly a creator and through work generates goods, 
wealth, society and himself, as we have just analysed (Préposiet, 2007:183). For 
Proudhon, man should exit from “servitude”; man is not a “cogwheel” (Préposiet, 
2007:183,184). Proudhon wants to “restore the cultural dimension of work” 
(Préposiet, 2007:184). According to Proudhon, “labour work is a practice that 
duplicates knowledge”, where “intelligence accompanies the hand” (Préposiet, 
2007:184).  
In order to restore the cultural dimension of labour and to exit from servitude, 
Proudhon dreamt also of another kind of social organization. Mutuality is again the 
solution, as we have already set out. Through the contract we oppose or criticize the 
oppressive state power and create or affirm ourselves (Préposiet, 2007:191). The 
mutual contract, being another kind of property, balances state power and ensures                                                         
213 After Foucault’s public support for socialist government, the socialists offered him two new tasks 
or “places”: “cultural counsellor in New York” or “the managing director of the National Library” 
(Eribon, 2011:477). Foucault rejected the first proposal; nevertheless, he was open to accepting the 
second one. But the position had been offered to a friend of Mitterrand (Eribon, 2011:477,478).  
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freedom (Préposiet, 2007:191). The Proudhonian contract is “the denial of the idea of 
authority”; it foresees just one law, the mutualist principle: “respect for the other and 
for oneself” (Préposiet, 2007:210). Through the contract people govern or create 
themselves and share freedom. 
In the aftermath of May 68, Foucault’s goal was not to reform democracy214 
nor to make a revolution, as we have already affirmed. Foucault was not a reformist. 
He considered that reform of democracy was impossible, as his GIP struggle showed. 
Foucault would never agree with prison reforms (Bocquet, 2013:117). The author and 
his GIP comrades, Domenach and Vidal-Naquet, (nd) said, “it is not our intention to 
suggest a reform. We just want to know the reality”.  
In fact, Foucault just wanted to shed a new light on his present, as we have 
already pointed out. Despite his critiques of Marxism and liberal democracy in his 
writings, interventions and actions, Foucault did not suggest either a political 
programme or an alternative in order to fight the state or biopolitics. Like Proudhon, 
the author just left one single spiritual and political testament: (i) the subject is a 
heterotopia, a nomadic and a collective self; (ii) the task of this subject is to take care 
of the self. In his final days Foucault reveals himself as an anarchist, dispensing with 
external laws and having only his internal guide, his body or need, as we have shown 
in this sub-chapter. Beyond this, Foucault proposes nothing, as he recognizes that  
 
to offer programs of another society, another way of thinking, another 
culture, another vision of the world has led in fact to set up the most 
dangerous traditions. I prefer the very precise transformations ... in a 
number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, authority 
relations, the sexes relations, how we perceive insanity and disease 
(Foucault, 1994a: 575). 
 
Proudhon has an identical stance. The author does not provide a program. 
As he says, “I just set up some points. Do not expect me to give you a system” 
(Préposiet, 2007:171). As we have already discussed, Proudhon just suggests the 
contract and its unique law, the mutualist principle, where he bears his 
federalism and anarchism.                                                          
214 Before May 68, Foucault participated in an Education reform in France. May 68 was really an 
important mark in his political life. 
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To take care of the self or to respect oneself are the anarchist suggestions 
of Proudhon and Foucault. In terms of their content, each of us, regarding our 
needs, will know what to do with these spiritual and political landmarks.  
 
 
EXAMPLES  
 
As a framework to better understand the Foucauldian – and Proudhonian - care of the 
self – other representation - or the Foucauldian political spirituality, Foucault presents 
two cases of ‘other political realities’ or agonistic societies in his writings that could 
inspire this permanent spiritual, ethical and political path. These examples can be 
found in Foucauldian studies about the Franks and the Iranian Revolution. As 
Foucault notes, there is, for instance, in Iran a case of “spiritual dimension” or a “new 
political spirituality”, as we are going to see (Eribon, 2011:463; Stangroom, 2015). 
Foucault uses “an almost mythic rhetoric” to explain those revolutionary struggles 
that, in his opinion, have “potential to transform the political landscape of Europe as 
well as the Middle East” (Stangroom, 2015). From our perspective, Foucault sees 
examples of “the utopia now” – the care of the self - in the cases of Iran and the 
Franks. These cases would involve an attemp to realise here and now a distant 
“utopia” or an “ideal” in order “to renew fidelity rather than maintain obedience” 
(Stangroom, 2015). And this “fidelity” is not a religious one, but just a spiritual one: 
the fidelity to oneself and consequently the fidelity to the other – to care - as we have 
studied above. 
In turn, these two cases are apparently opposed types of agonistic options: a 
warrior type - the Franks - and a non-warrior type (but also agonistic) - the Iranians. 
Foucault shows with both examples how the care of the self - the agonistic path – is 
just a way to achieve peace and a balanced life. From our perspective, the Frank and 
Iran cases are key examples in order to understand Foucault’s political thought (see 
Appendix: tables 1, 2, and 3). 
In the next chapter we are going to carve the postanarchist ideal type, the 
main goal of our thesis. We are about to conclude our philosophical path and to close 
our main circle, returning to postanarchism.  
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V. THE POSTANARCHIST IDEAL TYPE 
 
The postanarchist ideal type: Introduction 
 
In this chapter we are going to construct the postanarchist ideal type that is the final 
goal of this doctoral dissertation. With this chapter we are closing the circle of our 
thesis or concluding our philosophical walk.  
Adopting our circular method, we started this dissertation by outlining 
postanarchism in The State of The Art. Along the postanarchist road, we met Michel 
Foucault and then Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. We found that Foucault has been a great 
influence on postanarchism. We also found there are many important similarities 
between Proudhon and Foucault, for example, in terms of the concepts of space, 
struggle, movement, necessity, power and anarchy. We have suggested that Proudhon 
can be regarded as an author that Foucault read, but did not talk about (Revel, 
2011:132,134). This intuition came after reading both literatures and, then, during our 
research visits to Bibliothèque Nationale de France and Collège de France in Paris. 
The confirmation consolidates the choice of our authors.  
In fact, in Chapter IV, we showed that there are bibliographic gaps in 
Foucault’s work. Proudhon seems to fill these Foucauldian gaps. Then, we also 
discovered striking similarities between both authors and postanarchism. These 
similarities underpin the surprise of this thesis: the ‘gap’ between these anarchisms – 
classical and contemporary – is not only as significant as Newman argues, but that 
Proudhon can be regarded as a significant influence on post-anarchism. So, with both 
authors, Proudhon and Foucault, in Chapter III, we tried to better understand the 
roots or the genealogy of postanarchism. Then, in the Chapter IV, we constructed the 
Foucauldian activist ideal type with Proudhon’s aid. The goal was to introduce the 
postanarchist ideal type we are creating now. The aim was also to close the 
methodological solar circle returning to postanarchism.  
For that reason, in this chapter we will have always as inspiration and as 
counterpoint the Foucauldian activist ideal type. This conceptual network provides a 
fundamental lens to better understand and interpret postanarchism. 215  And,                                                         
215 As we have stated in the Introduction, beyond Foucault, postanarchism is also inspired by the other 
French theorists of the twentieth century and consequently by May 68 which is “a fruitful ‘family tree’ 
for postanarchism” (Evren, 2011:5,7; Noys, 2000:112).   
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conversely, today’s anarchism is an important device to understand Foucault’s 
thought and his activist practices. Moreover, postanarchism is also very important to 
better know Proudhon’s anarchism. Hence, in this chapter, we are going to critically 
discuss the postanarchist activist, to characterize him and to summarize the points 
where the Foucauldian activist is replicated in Newman’s work. Our intention is not 
to quarrel with Saul Newman’s postanarchism. But we are going to examine some of 
his ideas, to complement them. The aim in comparing and discussing Foucault’s and 
Proudhon’s concepts is to better illuminate and understand the typical postanarchist.  
So, now in a more enlightened – solar - way, we are returning to that initial 
concept of postanarchism. The goal in delineating this postanarchist ideal type is 
mainly to give our perspective on postanarchism, engaging critically with Saul 
Newman’s writings. 216  Our purpose is also to understand what anarchism, 
contemporary activism, and horizontalism are at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Through the ideal type, we are going to pick up the main characteristics of 
today’s anarchist, including the anti-globalization social movement activist, as Saul 
Newman presents it (Evren, 2011:5).  
To construct this ideal type is an exercise of political theory. As we explained 
in the Introduction, the postanarchist ideal type intends to be a theoretical point of 
comparison or a theoretical contribution in order to help to better discuss and 
understand the real struggles and social movements of today. We intend to make 
theoretical contribution here and now and not advance a theory for now, as we think 
Newman risked also doing. 
As Evren (2011:5) writes, Saul Newman’s ‘post-anarchism’ “is actually an 
attempt to create the theoretical equivalent of the anti-globalization movement” and, 
in this way, to make a contribution to today’s radical politics. In other words, 
Newman’s contribution is theoretically (post)anarchism here and now, as the anti-
globalization movement is empirically activism or (post)anarchism217 here and now. 
And Newman’s postanarchism is a theory ‘here and now’ because it is something that 
comes from Newman’s need in a certain moment – the contribution he intends to 
make in his time. Classical anarchism also had a theoretical or a philosophical                                                         
216 See Bibliography on Saul Newman. 
217 The label ‘anarchist’ is not peaceful within the alter-globalization movement, as it is not for 
Foucault. Many in the anti-globalization movement would dispute the label anarchism. Nevertheless, 
as we have written above, for Graeber, for instance, the alter-globalization movements exhibit some 
anarchist characteristics. 
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perspective or side – making a “theoretical innovation” - in its epoch, with Proudhon, 
Bakunin and Kropotkin among others (Newman, 2011:1,2).  
Nevertheless, we could say Newman’s postanarchism here and now could 
become a theory ‘for now’ when, in a top-down movement, Newman links his 
postanarchism (theoretical side: top) to the alter-globalisation movement (empirical 
side: down), as Evren notes. Or, in Foucault’s and Proudhon’s framework, Newman’s 
postanarchism, working theoretically, risks becoming a theory without context or an 
essence or a “fixed idea” that could oppress the alter-globalisation movement of 
movements (Newman, 2003, Franks, 2000:140). 218 And paradoxically Newman is 
completely against those essences or “fixed ideas” or “spooks”. As Newman (2003) 
defines it, a “spook” is “an abstract ideal that has been placed beyond the individual 
and held over him in an oppressive and alienating way”. As Foucault explains of his 
writings, theoretical work is an experience, a practice and not the other side of the 
practice (only theory) or something theoretical that fits the experience in a top-down 
movement. As we will observe later (pgs: 232-235), this stance by Newman has 
political consequences.  
One of the original contributions of this thesis is to show the theoretical 
significance of Saul Newman’s work for today and to discuss this critically. For that 
reason, we are going to construct aesthetically the theoretical postanarchist or the 
theoretical alter-globalization activist or the postanarchist ideal type. 
The construction of this ideal type is an aesthetic or “poetic” exercise or a 
work of art in Foucauldian sense: a creative act. We are designing the postanarchist 
figure and it is just an “experience” or a discussion, as Foucault relates in his books. 
Our intention is to avoid, in Foucault’s terms, theorizing our ideal type for now or to 
make an objectification or a “subjectivity” or a crystallization, as we have stated 
above. In our viewpoint, this ideal type is a philosophical, subjective and revisable 
work, à la Foucault. It is just a ‘theory here and now’ – a need to contribute. With 
this subjective ‘objectification’, our goal is to generate circularly more resistance and 
critique and, then, new objectifications, new resistance and so on and so forth. We 
would not like to fit the practice, just to discuss critically the practice and the theory. 
This is our difference with Newman. 
                                                        
218 Just to emphasize that, in our perspective, Newman's work is a contribution here and now, as we 
have argued above. 
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In this chapter, we will also have in mind our three working hypotheses: 
postanarchism is space constitution; to establish space is to survive and constituting 
space is a struggle. Following the study of Proudhon and Foucault these three 
hypotheses have been confirmed. These hypotheses will once more inspire this 
chapter in the circular way, as we have already explained in the Introduction: 
postanarchism is a fight for survival that creates space and this creation of space is 
postanarchism. 
We are going to sculpt the postanarchist figure by dividing it into three parts: 
the legs, the torso and the head (see image 12). 
 
 
Image 12 
At the outset, we are going to design the legs or the postanarchist movement – 
the struggle; then we are going to sculpt the torso or the postanarchist work or 
workspace – the survival - and, finally, we are going to carve the head or the 
postanarchist ethical or spiritual way – the space. We start with the postanarchist legs. 
 
 
THE LEGS | the postanarchist movement 
 
                                     
Image 13 
 
 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 233 
The Kantian framework: a theory here and now 
 
As we have pointed out, Saul Newman’s (2011:1,2) intention is to bring the 
“theoretical innovation (of classical anarchism) to light” and also to affirm anarchism 
“as the very horizon of radical politics” today. As we are about to explain, we do not 
agree in a critical perspective with the former affirmation but we do agree with the 
latter one. 
According to Newman’s first stance - postanarchism wants to bring the 
“theoretical innovation (of classical anarchism) to light” - as we have already shown 
in this thesis with Foucault and Proudhon, anarchy is always from the present. So, 
from our perspective, today’s anarchism is not just an innovation on classical 
anarchism. It is mainly something that comes from the present. It is a practice “here 
and now”. It is an ethical and spiritual way having our needs or our animality as its 
main law, although the other or society - in this case also classical anarchism - is 
always the condition of possibility in our world, as Foucault teaches. For Foucault 
and Proudhon, anarchy is an “innovation” or a difference. And Newman’s writings go 
in the same direction. So, classical anarchism was an innovation in its time just as 
postanarchism is today. Both are ‘today’s’ anarchism and different proposals. For that 
reason, after studying Foucault, Proudhon and also Newman, we could designate 
postanarchism as ‘today’s anarchism’ and not as a ‘post-anarchism’ or a post-
classical anarchism.  
In our opinion, paradoxically the postanarchist, the mutualist and the 
heterotopist despite being temporally different proposals inhabit the same anarchist 
‘paradigm’: anarchy here and now. The postanarchist is not a step forward from the 
Proudhonian mutualist and the Foucauldian heterotopist. Postanarchism, as we are 
going to study in this chapter, claims anarchy here and now. For that reason, we argue 
that recent anarchist thought continues to work within “the epistemological paradigm 
of classical anarchism” - and vice-versa – and this is the great novelty of this 
research. In fact, when we look closely, although historical epochs are different and 
proposals are time limited, there are fundamental similarities between today’s 
anarchists, Proudhon from the nineteenth century and Foucault from the twentieth 
century, as we have said before; and their anarchy here and now has political 
consequences, for instance, in this thesis we argue that Newman’s criticism on 
essentialism and humanism - of some nineteenth century anarchists - and on 
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feminism does not apply to Proudhon’s thought (Newman, 2011:139). As we have 
already shown, Proudhon is neither an essentialist nor a humanist nor a feminist as 
some other classical anarchists are and, in these particular matters, he is very close to 
Foucault who is a great influence of today’s anarchism, as we have studied. Thus, 
they – the postanarchist, Proudhon and Foucault - fall within the same paradigm. 
They are all anarchists, as we are going to develop later. We criticize and discuss 
Newman’s stance that lumps all classical anarchists together because he does not 
study Proudhon. For that reason, Newman (2009:3) assumes a new postanarchist 
paradigm that “transcends” classical anarchism. The author (2009:3) explains his 
intention is really to show the way in which the “anti-essentialist and anti-humanist 
anarchism transcends and, thus, reflects upon, the limits of classical anarchism”. We 
disagree with this kind of ‘transcendence’ because this ‘transcendence’ already exists 
in Proudhon’s anarchism (classical anarchism), which also is anti-essentialist and 
anti-humanist, as we have already shown.  
According to Newman’s second stance - postanarchism wants to affirm 
anarchism “as the very horizon of radical politics” today - we do agree with this. 
Newman is right. The anti-globalization movements are really anarchist proposals for 
today’s radical politics. As Evren argues, the anti-globalization movements are 
today’s anarchism. Evren (2011:3; Graeber, nd, 2002) adds, “the soul of the anti-
capitalist movement is anarchist; its non-authoritarian make-up, its disavowal of 
traditional parties of the left, and its commitment to direct action are firmly in the 
spirit of libertarian socialism”. And those are anarchist empirical examples from 
today that enrich radical politics.  
Hence, the postanarchist is interested in the here and now - although the 
theoretical postanarchist postulated by Newman is not the same as the alter-
globalisation protester, as we have just studied. Newman fits the Kantian framework - 
the concepts of space and time – just like Foucault and Proudhon did. The 
postanarchist is engaged in his time and space and concerned with it.219 Newman 
(2011:106) asks: “is it not evident that there is a massive disengagement of ordinary 
people from normal political processes, an overwhelming scepticism – especially in 
the wake of the current economic crises – about the political elites who supposedly 
govern in their interests?” And Newman (2011:106) continues: “is there not, at the                                                         
219 From our perspective, postanarchism is not just a ‘theory for now’, as we have explained above.  
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same time, an obvious consternation on the part of these elites at this growing 
distance, signifying a crisis in their legitimacy?” To answer these questions, we start 
here a set of brief sections. The goal is to emphasize the main ideas and concepts that 
characterize postanarchism - and postanarchist - showing as it tries to overcome the 
gap between ruler and ruled.  
 
Bipolitics 
One of the consequences of this ‘gap’ between political elites and ordinary people is 
Foucault’s biopolitics. Newman (2011:106) notes: “as a defensive or pre-emptive 
measure”, the political elites make the state “more draconian and predatory, 
increasingly obsessed with surveillance and control, defining itself through war and 
security, seeking to authorise itself through a politics of fear and exception”. The 
author (2011:106,107) continues, 
 
Societies in the developed world increasingly resemble giant, hi-tech 
prisons, with their surveillance cameras, databases, biometric 
technologies and their enclosure of the commons. Are we not all haunted 
by the desire to destroy the chains that binds us, to escape these confines, 
to roam freely in wildness of a state of nature? Does not the desire to 
escape domestication recur as a powerful social fantasy? (Newman, 
2011:155). 
 
Desire and dreams 
The postanarchist desires to escape from those “giant, hi-tech prisons” and to realise 
the “social fantasy”. To realise this fantasy or dream would be the way to overcome 
that ‘gap’ between elites and ordinary people and those “draconian” politics. And the 
postanarchist fantasy or solution is the identification of radical politics today with 
anarchism, as this takes place in anti-globalisation movements empirically. 
Newman’s postanarchist follows the same path. 
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The concept of space 
This postanarchist dream is the construction of autonomous spaces here and now. As 
our first hypothesis affirms, postanarchism is space constitution. This is the 
postanarchist’s goal or path: to construct oneself or one’s space collectively.  
Nevertheless, here the divergences with Proudhon and Foucault become 
apparent. Newman’s space could not be a collective self – a heterotopia or a group - 
as it is for Foucault and Proudhon. In this stage, Newman could not walk side-by-side 
with Proudhon and Foucault (see: image11). And why?  
 
                                      
                                                                        Image 14 
 
Newman adopts Stirner’s ego. And this ego is less plastic than Proudhon’s 
and Foucault’s proposals. Newman (2003) talks about “a continuous process of self-
formation of the subject”, “an active and deliberate practice of inventing oneself”, 
just as Foucault does. However, this “work of art” or “self-aestheticization” for 
Newman is first of all an individual path, although it is fluid and mobile and it is open 
to the other (Newman, 2003). Newman (2003) tries to work around Stirner’s 
“individuality”; Newman (2003) adds that it “may be seen here in terms similar to 
Foucault’s - as a radically contingent form of subjectivity, an open strategy that one 
engages in to question and contest the confines of essentialism”. But, in our view, 
Foucault would disagree with Newman’s grounds. As we have shown above, 
although Foucault - like Newman - also fights essentialism and pre-definitions, the 
author is completely against a “formal” individuality like, for instance, the Kantian 
subject. He sees the self as a “we” or a heterotopia – something without form or a 
subject a posteriori. Foucault is even against an empty self or form. As Newman 
(2003) points out, Stirner’s individuality is a “creative nothingness”, “a radical 
emptiness which is up to the individual to define”. Foucault would criticize this 
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“radical emptiness” - without definition - because it is still a form (from the very 
beginning).220 In turn, Newman (2003) quotes the Foucauldian “care of the self” as a 
help to better understand Stirner’s proposal. However, in our interpretation, this is not 
the best aid to clarify Stirner’s thought in this concrete point. As we have studied 
before, the Foucauldian care of the self means also a combat between the formal and 
the material sides of the self, which in itself is a plurality without fixed form. And 
Newman does not develop this Foucauldian plural perspective. Newman finds a 
‘subject’ – a unity - in Foucault’s writings; assumes it and makes the link with 
Stirner. For Newman (2003; 2009:8), Stirner deconstructs “the essential subject”, but 
accepts the ego and constructs “a theory of ownness [Eigneheit] to describe this 
radical individual autonomy”. Newman (2003) gets stuck with this ‘ego’ 221  or 
individual, which, in his vision, is “paramount”.  
So, we agree with Smith (2004:2). Newman does not deepen this collective 
perspective because Stirner stops him (Smith, 2004:2). According to Smith (2004:2) 
“Stirner’s brief but important treatment of insurgent collectivity suggests an absence 
in his own design, and in Newman’s”. According to Smith (2004:2) Newman would 
need to restore this “possibility of collective uprising”, because, in our opinion, this 
“possibility” would help him to better present his solutions and alternatives - for 
instance, the concept of space - against the political context he is concerned about in 
his ‘today’. Stirner’s ego limits Newman’s space, as we have already stated, because, 
in terms of space, Newman speaks about “possibilities of individual autonomy within 
power” (Smith, 2004:3). According to Newman, to create space is to open these 
autonomous individual possibilities (Smith, 2004:3).222 Nevertheless, from the outset, 
this autonomy is an ‘individual’ impulse that opens space through relations of power. 
For Newman, we open space between others, but this is an individual – and 
hierarchical, as Foucault would advocate - effort through power. According to 
                                                        
220 As we have already argued, we could admit a self in Foucault’s thought but this self would be the 
end of the virtuous path. As we have just said, this question could be explored in a future research.  
221 Newman is not able to release completely his postanarchist from Stirner’s ‘egoist’ or its “ownness”. 
He tries, through Levinas’s concept of “an-archy” and through the “openness to the other”, not to be 
influenced by the Stirnerite ego, but Stirner’s predominance is stronger and really limits Newman 
concept of space, as we are going to study later (Newman, 2011: 178). We do not develop Stirner or 
his egoism in this thesis. We decided to follow Proudhon and Foucault’s path and to compare Newman 
with both authors. Nevertheless this is a research line we could develop in a posterior work in order to 
design Newman’s Stirnerite ego or ideal type, complementing this doctoral research, as we have 
already said.   
222 Newman warns against the dangers of this concept of autonomy, as we are going to study later. 
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Newman, space is relations of people but those relations depart from an individual 
perspective and construct an individual autonomy as Smith notes.  
And here, as we have already said, Newman is closer to Kant’s a priori 
subject than to Foucault’s ‘we’ or a posteriori subject. Newman’s starting point in 
order to construct space is always individual, as we are going to show during this 
chapter. Newman (2003) tries to walk side-by-side with Foucault (and Proudhon), 
showing even “the long-ignored Stirner may be seen as a precursor to contemporary 
poststructuralist thought”, included one of Foucault’s precursors. Nevertheless, as we 
have already explained, in terms of subject and space, Newman goes beside, but on 
another path to Foucault (and Proudhon). They claim similar ideas; they have close 
arguments, as we are going to verify, but there is Stirner between them and, for that 
reason, Newman walks a parallel spatial path. 
 
Spaces beyond State: movements 
Like Proudhon and Foucault, Newman aims to turn a new light on to his today. And a 
solution would be to articulate the utopian anarchist ideas with our democracies or to 
work beyond our democracies and to make democracy more radical or more 
democratic (Newman, 2011:96). In other words, for Newman, the postanarchist 
intends to make democracy more anarchical, building up autonomous spaces beyond 
the state.  
For the postanarchists, “autonomous” signifies beyond state or something we 
construct without the aid of state sovereignty. And here, Newman meets Foucault and 
Proudhon. As we have already defined it, the postanarchist space means people 
relating to each other free from hierarchy, verticality and oppression (Newman, 
2011:9,36). Thus, in other words, autonomous spaces signify equal, horizontal and 
free relations of people beyond the state framework.  
And postanarchists construct those spaces and overcome state (i.) criticizing 
the state’s limits (ii.) in articulation with others. These are the tasks of the “newly 
emergent radical struggles and movements”: the critique223 or the creation of space 
beyond the state. Newman’s (2011:168) goal is to show those radical struggles – 
critiques - are autonomous spaces. So, for Newman, postanarchism is about space or 
                                                        
223 We are going to develop the concept of critique later (pgs: 242-243). 
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social movements224 - or movement or relations of people. And those spaces allow us 
to reflect on the state and on politics today, realising the “social fantasy” or our 
dreams collectively (Newman, 2011:168).  
 
Utopia now: the other voices 
Through “autonomous spaces” – or movement of people - Newman (2011:96,161-
163) develops also the utopian 225  concept – dreams or fantasies - that some 
nineteenth-century anarchists tried also to apply: the utopia now. Autonomous spaces 
are the utopia now. They are the realization of our dreams or imaginary here and 
now. As we have argued above, Proudhon’s utopia now is his anarchy or the 
mutualism. Following Proudhon, this mutualism is horizontal and consists of 
reciprocal relationships of people or spaces that already exist. And their aim is to 
have a fairer, more horizontal and freer society beyond state and government. 
According to Newman (2011:1,2), postanarchism is likewise a “social fantasy” that 
already exists: the anti-globalization movements – the theory for now? Postanarchism 
is in the twentieth century “the recurring desire for life without government” and “the 
rejection of political authority in the name of equality and liberty”. As Newman 
(2011:155) explains, this “desire” or movement is a “kind of utopia” - or the ‘utopia 
now’.226 Desire is an “anti-political imaginary of freedom and autonomy”. And this 
“imaginary” is a “powerful” device to criticize “contemporary conditions” and 
politics (Newman, 2011:155).227 For the postanarchist, utopia provides 
 
 a point of escape from the current order, a way of orienting and inciting 
(anti) political desire. Utopian thinking might be seen a way of puncturing 
the ontological status of the current order, introducing into it a moment of 
disruptive heterogeneity and singularity (Newman, 2011:162).  
 
This utopia or “anti-political imaginary” is the “disruptive” power which the 
postanarchist has in order to transgress the “ontological status” and to create his own                                                         
224 Movement means here “instability and chaotic flow” and not something close to a party, as Noys 
(2000:118) argues. 
225 As we have studied earlier, utopia means ‘no place’. 
226 Like the Foucauldian desire, the postanarchist desire is not a lack perspective. As we will see, the 
desire presupposes always a certain lack or necessity, but it is mainly a constructive and affirmative 
movement: a fight (Newman, 2011:177). 
227 The affirmative power of freedom, as Nietzsche and Foucault would argue. 
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world here and now in articulation with others. For Newman (2011:155,156), the 
postanarchist utopia is a kind of Kantian a priori or “a kind of negative imaginary” or 
desire that “point of exteriority and excess” that allows postanarchists to run away from 
“the mental confines of this world”. Utopia is the postanarchist’s device against 
repression and oppression and the path to freedom.  
So, for Newman (2011:162), there are “two different utopian moments”: 
“scientific utopianism” and postanarchist utopianism. The “scientific utopianism” of the 
nineteenth century is “a future anarchist society” that is “founded on scientific and 
rational principles” and is “the inevitable outcome of a revolution against the state”. 
Newman argues that (2011:156) the construction of a utopian world or a “desalinated 
world would be impossible and even undesirable”. This “utopian tendency” was just a 
“vision of a society without a state”, a vision of “a society based on free, voluntary 
arrangements and decentralised social structures” (Newman, 2011:39). The nineteenth-
century anarchist Proudhon whose ideas are close to postanarchism, is not included in 
this anarchist set. 
In postanarchist utopianism - the utopianism of the here and now - the “focus is 
less on what happens after the revolution, and more on a transformation of social 
relations within the present” - now. This utopianism works with the existent world “in 
the immediate sense, of creating alternatives”, “at localised points” – here (Newman, 
2011:7). The postanarchist’s intention is not to invent something completely new and 
“desalinated” from the real world. As we have said, the postanarchist supports “utopia 
in terms of action” or desire based on our animality (Newman, 2011:7). For 
postanarchists, utopia is something “which emerges in political struggles themselves”, 
for instance, in the anti-globalization movement (Newman, 2011:7). Postanarchist 
utopianism is the “spontaneous human action (movement) and the urge to rebel” 
(Newman, 2011:40). For that reason, the postanarchist goes beyond “visions” without 
connection to reality, trying to bring to light “the underworld of today” or the 
Foucauldian “other voices” that are desire’s manifestations (Newman, 2011:39,156). 
The postanarchist adopts, for example, Proudhon’s utopian federalist system, which, as 
we have said, the author tries to apply to his time, not waiting for a revolutionary 
moment – the Proudhonian federalist organization linked cooperatives, voluntary 
associations, etc. (Newman, 2011:40). Postanarchists could not return “to the primeval 
bliss of the state of nature” (Newman, 2011:156). As some anarchists and also 
Proudhon warned, a society without political authority would not emerge inevitably 
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(Newman, 2011:40). The postanarchist’s goal was not to set up “an anarchist society” 
or a regime change (Newman, 2011:162). Hence, for Proudhon and postanarchists, 
radical politics only has consistency if a “utopian dimension” is present; “otherwise it 
remains caught within existing political frameworks and imaginaries” (Newman, 
2011:138,139). Thus, postanarchism is the utopia now: a real and alternative politics 
“outside of, and in opposition to, the state” (Newman, 2011:4).  
 
State vs antagonism 
Newman (2011:35,107) defines the state as “a violent institution of domination – as a 
structure which sustains and intensifies other hierarchies and relations of power and 
exploitation, including economic relations”. The state is about violence, repression, 
domination, hierarchies and exploitation. For Newman (2011:106,107), the state 
seems to be yet “the central problem in radical politics”. And why is it a problem in 
radical politics still? Newman (2011:9) answers, for the postanarchist, “the state is 
actually the order of depoliticisation”. And “depoliticisation” means “the structure of 
power that polices politics, regulating, controlling and repressing the insurgent 
dimension” - desire or utopia now; the state forgets “the conflict and antagonism at 
the base of its own foundations” (Newman, 2011:9, May, 2000:125). For the 
postanarchist, the state is “stabilisation and naturalisation” or sovereignty that deletes 
antagonism (Newman, 2011:169). And this is a big problem in radical politics today, 
as we have studied before (Newman, 2011:169). According to the postanarchist, there 
is a mismatch between the state - crystallization - and people’s lives - movement and 
desire. This is the ‘gap’ between politicians – also radical ones - and ordinary people, 
as we have said before. Newman’s stance seems to be close to Proudhon’s 
antagonism or war and Foucault’s agonism. As our hypothesis states: to create space 
is a battle. Newman sees postanarchism as an “insurgent dimension” – a war. And it 
is this insurgent dimension or the utopia now that radicalises democracy. As Foucault 
remembers, to rebel and to riot is a good thing or a spontaneous thing - the ‘stasiastic’ 
potential. According to postanarchists, the insurgent dimension is anarchism or 
democracy’s roots. It is the postanarchist solution - the fantasy or dream - to today’s 
‘democratic’s gap’. 
In this sense, Newman (2011:97) distinguishes between “conflictual 
democracy” and “insurgent democracy”. The former takes place within the “nation-
state” and in the “parliamentary institutions”, as a “safe agonism”. The latter, 
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insurgent democracy, is the opposite of the conflictual one. It is anarchism or 
postanarchism. Newman (2011:97) explains, 
 
Whereas conflictual democracy practices conflict within the state, a 
democratic State which in its very name presents itself as an avoidance of 
the original conflict, inclining as a result conflictuality towards permanent 
compromise, insurgent democracy situates conflict in another space, outside 
the state, against it, and far from practicing the avoidance of the major 
conflict – democracy against the state – it does not shrink from rupture, if 
need be. 
 
The pacific insurgent 
The postanarchist is an insurgent rather than a violent person. The postanarchist is 
anti-terrorist and supports a “non-violent violence” or a non-violent war as the 
“ethical horizon” of its postanarchism (Newman, 2011:131). This idea also resonates 
with Proudhon and Foucault. The postanarchist distinguishes between (a non-violent) 
violence and force. The (non-violent) violence is synonym for postanarchist power. 
As we have learned with Proudhon and Foucault, power is war and “authoritarian” 
and creates “sovereign relationship, something that violates the autonomy of the 
other”. But this power stimulates antagonism and leads the other to use the same 
power circularly (Newman, 2011:131). In turn, as Proudhon and Foucault teach, 
power is a pacific way (equality). It also allows the interior battle or the mystical 
battle against passions and excesses: the care of the self. According to Newman 
(2011:131), the problem of (non-violent) violence is when it becomes force. And it 
happens when violence is used by the state in an overwhelming way in order to 
neutralize antagonism, for instance as Jacobins did: “the terror” (Newman, 
2011:131).   
 
Political power vs politics 
Thus, according to Newman (2011:169), postanarchism is about “the political” or 
movement and the state is about politics or crystallization (Newman, 2011:177; 
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Evren, 2011:4). 228  According to Newman (2011:8; 2001:149), the postanarchist 
‘political’ could be seen as “the repressed unconscious of politics – the dimension of 
antagonism, movement and conflict at the heart of social relations”. For 
postanarchists, movement presupposes “a certain lack and open-endedness” or an 
“unfinished act, without telos” (Newman, 2011:177). For postanarchists, “the 
movement is the indefiniteness and imperfection of every politics” (Newman, 
2011:177; Evren, 2011:4). Movement always leaves “a residue” or a seed or a loose 
end, which leads to new movements or insurgencies, as we have just affirmed 
(Newman, 2011:177). As with Foucault, movement is “virtual”. It connects the loose 
ends we leave behind us. The postanarchist politics is an “unfinished act, without 
telos” that always exists. 
Newman (2011:8) explains, “there is a certain paradoxical inextricability 
between the political and the anti-political moment in anarchism; a certain productive 
tension that postanarchism uses to formulate new approaches to radical politics” 
(Newman, 2011:8). From a postanarchist perspective, to move against politics is to 
produce. It is this “tension” or antagonism between politics and anti-politics that 
creates other kinds of identities or spaces, as we are going to show. And this ongoing 
movement comes from postanarchist needs or, as Kant explains, it is the a priori 
power.  
  
THE TORSO | the power to create space  
 
                                          
Image 15 
 
 
                                                        
228 Regarding our interpretation, this postanarchist political is more crystalized than Foucault and 
Proudhon’s political. At sake is the postanarchist ‘Stirnerite ego’ rather than the Foucaudian ‘we’ or 
the Proudhonian ‘group’ we have already talked about (Eribon, 2016). 
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The critic, the resistant, the activist 
Like Foucault, and mainly like Kant, the postanarchist proposes insurrection or 
critique as its main work or work device (Newman, 2011:49). The postanarchist’s 
aim is to overcome the current order and ‘gap’, producing the “fantasy” or utopia 
now or an alternative space (Newman, 2011:49). The postanarchists critique 
undermines the current order or established knowledge, for instance, the “claims to 
universal truth made by scientific discourse” and also by scientific socialism. For 
postanarchists, “knowledge cannot be disassociated from power” and from the here 
and now (Newman, 2011:49). Hence, the critique shows these punctual power-
knowledge relationships (Newman, 2011:49). The critic fights it – in war. At the 
same time, the critic unveils those power-knowledge relationships, local “clash(es) of 
interpretations” and local “struggles over meaning and knowledge” that are always 
subjective (Newman, 2011:49). So, the postanarchist is a critic. For postanarchists, to 
work is to critizice or to resist or to act. The postanarchist is also a resistant or an 
activist. 
 
The postanarchist workplace  
For Newman (2011:169), this postanarchist “political” action creates space “between 
the society and the state”. Put differently, this “in between” space is the 
postanarchist’s space (Newman, 2011:169). To create this “in between” space is also 
the postanarchist’s work. In other words, this “in between” space is its workplace. For 
the postanarchist, “the appropriate domain of politics” is this “in between” space 
where it creates “autonomous spaces” or spaces outside the state (Newman, 
2011:9).229 So, the postanarchist workspaces outside the state are relations of people 
free from hierarchy, verticality and oppression (Newman, 2011:9,36). They are 
“decentralised” and “free” “communities” (Newman, 2011:9,36).230 The question is: 
are those workplaces heterotopias? 
We answer that, indeed, the postanarchist workspace seems to be a 
heterotopia. Nevertheless we note again, comparing to Proudhon and Foucault, that 
the postanarchist workspace seems less free than the Proudhonian and Foucauldian 
workspaces. Despite the similarities, the latter implies also a fight against the ego or                                                         
229 Returning to utopias or “visions”, in the limit a postanarchist society without a state would be “a 
society of decentralised, free communities” (Newman, 2011:36).  
230 Newman does not distinguish between autonomous spaces or mutualities and communities, as 
Proudhon does. Would it be because Newman adopts the Stirner’s ego or a closed ego’s form?  
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an ego’s fight against itself. The postanarchist space assumes the self as an empty 
form – the ego - as Stirner did. The question is to know whether the postanarchist 
workplaces are, in fact, relations of egos - and are those relations free? Or whether 
Stirner’s ego could be the Foucauldian zero point - the body – of the heterotopia. 
Perhaps Stirner’s ego is a heterotopia? Foucault would say no. For Foucault 
(2006:368), the self is virtue or on the virtuous path we have outlined. Only through 
virtue is it possible to achieve self-unity - balance, harmony - that is always a fight 
against oneself and the exterior world: the care of the self (Foucault, 2006: 
221,368,386-389).231 Nevertheless, doubt remains. As we have already proposed, the 
answer to this is something that can be developed in future research.  
 
An ethical and powerful activity 
Newman (2011:169) answers that the existence and proliferation of such autonomous 
communities, other than state, dissolves or at least weakens state sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, the postanarchist’s goal is not to fight the state directly. As we have just 
said, the postanarchist goal is mainly an ethical path, which indirectly weakens the 
state, constructing ‘other spaces’ (Evren, 2011:5). So, for postanarchists, to work is to 
have an ethical activity rather than politics.232 As Newman (2011:176) exemplifies, 
this is also the anti-capitalist movements’ task: to construct ethical forms of politics 
outside the state “from multiple points” in different ways.  
According to Newman (2011:169), the construction of these alternative spaces 
between society and the state creates an alternative type of work and workers that 
have “two functions”: (i) to rupture “the existing social relations, identities and roles” 
or to create a “moment of ‘dis-identification’”. For postanarchists, “dis-
identification” means another kind of subject or relationships or spaces; 233 (ii) to 
emphasise that “the tasks of radical politics are not reducible to politics, for instance, 
to the overthrowing of the state power”, 234 as we are going to study in the next 
section (Newman, 2011:169).                                                          
231 As we have argued, for Foucault (2006:368,386-389), the self is something we could achieve and 
not something we have a priori or a previous form, as for Stirner. 
232 We will develop the relation between ethics and politics later (pg: 258). 
233  As we have studied, there is a conceptual difference between the postanarchist self and the 
Foucauldian and the Proudhonian subjectification, although Newman does not refer nor valorise this 
difference, working beyond it. 
234 Does Newman suggest here a reductive vision of anti-politics? Or a reductive difference between 
politics and radical politics mainly focused on the overthrowing of the state power? Could this 
reduction be a consequence of the way Newman defines the self? Does a ‘formal self’ limit the way 
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For postanarchists, to work alternatively is to construct spaces, which are 
deterritorialised forms of power (Newman, 2011:169). These “deterritorialised” 
spaces presuppose the postanarchist’s power concept, which is similar to Foucault’s 
power. According to Newman (2011:6), the postanarchist’s power is relations of 
people and also the other side of space, as it is for Foucault - despite the differences 
we have already pointed out in terms of the “ego”. Nevertheless, postanarchist power 
is everywhere and intersects the human body - “deterritorialised” forms of power. It 
is ubiquitous as well (Newman, 2011:174). For that reason, for postanarchists, there 
are always power relations in society and we never transcend power entirely 
(Newman, 2011:6). The postanarchist’s desires or critiques are also power 
manifestations. Power is also an a priori energy or necessity. Even autonomous 
spaces are power manifestations or powerful relations of people. As Newman 
(2011:6) explains, 
 
Following Michel Foucault’s insight that power relations are both 
pervasive and constitutive of social identities, practices and discourses, 
politics – even radical politics – is an activity conducted within a field 
structured by power  
 
In other words, only an “active engagement with power” allows us to 
‘transcend’ or to modify this field of power relations (Newman, 2011:8). So, the 
postanarchist is a powerful worker. He is actively engaged in power through ongoing 
“practices of freedom”, as Foucault and Proudhon were (Newman, 2011:6). Foucault 
points out, freedom and power take place always and everywhere - both are 
“deterritorialised” and come from diverse points. The postanarchist works or acts in 
this field of multiple practices of freedom. For Newman, he is a free worker and 
power is his raw material. And how does he work?  
 
A circular work 
The postanarchist runs away circularly from power to power in order not to be 
oppressed. And then immediately he creates new power relations or spaces to his                                                                                                                                                               
politics could develop? Does a ‘formal self’ just propose a ‘politics for now’ – a ‘theory for now’ – 
rather than open to plural politics/anti-politics relationship here and now, included a spiritual politics - 
as we are going to study later? We would answer yes, in line with Foucault and Proudhon spiritual 
proposals, including Foucault’s warning against the ego’s ‘fascism’, as we have studied above. 
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measure – free and equal spaces. Then, if those spaces become oppressive, the 
postanarchist flees again, and so on and so forth. This is postanarchist activity or 
work. As Newman (2011:169) remembers, radical politics is permanently 
“confronted with the problem of analysing, mapping and contesting” deterritorialised 
forms of power. Those are moments of “dis-identification”.235 
According to Newman (2011:8,169), today’s struggles - or work - against 
capitalism have another kind of work relations. They are based, as we have shown 
above, on another conception of power, another way to act and “different forms of 
domination”: victories, defeats and strategies, gains and reversals (Newman, 
2011:8,169). Those alternative work relations are precarious or always renewable; 
they are also non-exploitative, free and equal relations. The postanarchist anti-politics 
has mainly a circular vision of work - or power - as Foucault and Proudhon argue as 
well. Those postanarchist struggles are not intended to reach a goal. They are just a 
walk or a path from home to home or an ongoing work. As Nietzcshe teaches, the 
postanarchist is always working having fun (pleasure), because his life is a permanent 
and circular struggle to survive. The postanarchist invents himself everyday 
according to the day’s needs – the “dis-identification”.  
In another perspective, the postanarchist inhabits mobile spaces. His walks are 
reversible works or nomadic forms of freedom. Like Foucault, Newman (2011:174) 
recognises “the reversibility of power relationships”, even those that are 
overwhelming. As we have argued, this “reversibility” of power works through the 
critique or through “instabilities and moments of resistance” (Newman, 2011:174). 
The postanarchist agrees with Foucault. Power is repressive, but also constitutive 
(Newman, 2011:141). Power “plays some role in constituting and defining social 
identities and practices” - spaces. Postanarchist power is mainly creative. 
 
A collective work 
Postanarchist work is an ongoing resistance and creation that implies the other. We 
could say his goal is to survive in a harmonious way with the other. The postanarchist 
worker is “an egalitarian and collective subject” (Newman, 2011:105). For 
postanarchists, we are all equal subjects because we are all powerful people; the 
                                                        
235 Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, this postanarchist ‘Stirnerite’ “dis-identification” does not 
seem as deep as the Foucauldian and the Proudhonian ones. 
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power one has is the same power the other has. And we are collective because this 
power is relational (May, 2000:124).236   
The postanarchist claims the “equal-liberty” that “implies the inextricability 
of liberty and equality” (Newman, 2011:144).  The postanarchist refuses “the 
opposition between individual freedom and collective, egalitarian freedom” 
(Newman, 2011:144). For postanarchists, “any constraint on one involves a constraint 
on the other” (Newman, 2011:144). According to postanarchists, democracy is 
conditioned by “an ethics of equal-liberty, where neither liberty is subordinate to 
equality, or equality to liberty” (Newman, 2011:179). Equality and liberty are 
promoted in “equal measure” (Newman, 2011:20, 179). Postanarchists would affirm 
“I become free … only by virtue of the liberty of others, so much so that the greater 
the number of free people surrounding me the deeper and greater and more extensive 
their liberty, the deeper and larger becomes my liberty” (Newman, 2011:20,21). For 
the postanarchist, equality and liberty presuppose “mutually”, as Proudhon argues 
(Newman, 2011:21). 
From our perspective, the postanarchist equality-liberty implies also the 
Foucauldian concept of “care” or “care of the others’ care”. One wants the others to 
be free, because one wants to be free. So one fights – or cares - for others’ freedom or 
one cares the others’ care. Here Newman assumes again the Foucauldian and 
Proudhonian ‘social’ – altruist – stance or work, despite Stirner’s influence. 
 
Non-liberal and non-Marxist worker 
Hence, the postanarchist proposes new forms of workers or political subjectivities, for 
instance, beyond liberalism and Marxism (Newman, 2011:21,116,117). According to 
postanarchists, there is a difference between “the radical reading of equal-liberty” and 
“the liberal reading” which says “every man has the freedom to do all that he wills, 
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Newman, 2011:21). 
For postanarchists, this is a “laissez-faire” doctrine (Newman, 2011:21). And 
although postanarchism “shares with liberalism a suspicion of state and an insistence 
on individual freedom”, there are some important differences between the two 
stances, because:  
                                                         
236 If it were not the influence of Stirner's egoism, we would say openly that Newman would be an 
altruist. 
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liberalism subordinates the political to the orders of economics, morality 
and law – it leads to a certain depoliticisation in which the political moment 
of action and contestation is swallowed up by the private interests and 
market preoccupations of civil society (Newman, 2011:10,17).  
 
 The liberal person is neither an insurgent nor a collective worker because the 
“market” and “private interests” have the last word. For postanarchists, liberalism 
“naturalises society as a domain of individual freedom and market exchanges”. 
Liberalism does not recognise “the constraints” the market imposes on society and on 
freedom – also on workers’ freedom (Newman, 2011:10,11,16,17). Then, in 
liberalism there is also the “notions of universal human rights and humanitarianism” 
that the postanarchist criticises as a “new form of imperialism” (Newman, 
2011:11,17; Franks, 2000:141). So, for the postanarchist, a liberal fight against state 
is not enough, because liberalism accepts “the state as the guardian” of freedom with 
this notion of universal human rights (Newman, 2011:11). For postanarchists, 
liberalism “is neither sufficiently political, nor sufficiently anti-political” (Newman, 
2011:11). 
In terms of Marxism – or the Marxist revolution - the postanarchist criticizes, 
for instance, the notion of the proletariat (Newman, 2011:116,117). In Marxist theory, 
the category of the (proletarian) “worker” has two senses. Firstly, the Marxist worker 
is “a socio economic category” in the industrial system whose condition shows “the 
general inhumanity” and exploitation of capitalism. As we have studied, the 
postanarchist is more than a “socio economic category”. He is mainly an ethical and 
spiritual self, as we are going to develop later. Secondly, the Marxist worker is “a 
revolutionary subjectivity politically constituted through a revolutionary vanguard 
whose goal was the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Newman, 2011:116,117). For 
Marxists, the proletariat is the class “excluded from the fruits of the wealth they 
produce and whose deprivation is the necessary structural feature of capitalism” 
(Newman, 2011:119,120). In Marxist theory, the proletariat is a “disciplined, united 
working class” or a “coherent, uniform identity” and it is the factory that imposes this 
discipline and coherency (Newman, 2011:120). By contrast, the postanarchist is an 
autonomous, critical and transgressive subject who does not need masters – 
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vanguards and parties – nor a uniform subjectivity, but heterogeneity and difference 
(Franks, 2000:143).237 
So, the postanarchist asks whether the proletariat was ever a coherent and 
uniform class (Newman, 2011:120). The postanarchist answers that the proletariat 
comprises “multiple, heterogeneous and often conflicting struggles and identities – 
artisans who sought to defend traditional ways of life and work, workers who rebelled 
against the coercion and discipline of the factory system”. As we have seen, the 
postanarchist worker is insurgent and transgressive. And it is these rebellions, 
“sabotages” and “spontaneous and immediate struggles” that postanarchists celebrate 
(Newman, 2011:120). Moreover, postanarchists criticize “the consistency” and 
“revolutionary consciousness” of this proletarian subject arguing, “elements of the 
industrial proletariat had already taken on bourgeois and conservative values” 
(Newman, 2011:117). For postanarchists, “other classes, such as the peasants and the 
lumpenproletariat should also be designated as revolutionary” (Newman, 2011:117). 
The “lumpenproletariat (or sub-proletariat)” is “the global poor”, the precarious or 
“those completely excluded from employment and the market” who are “‘disposable’ 
millions”.  
For postanarchists, the revolutionary subject is formless (Newman, 
2011:117).238 Postanarchists break “with class as the determining element of radical 
political subjectivity”. Nevertheless we could not say that the category of class is no 
longer important (Newman, 2011:117). Postanarchists highlight that classes still exist 
because “economic inequalities, deprivations, exclusions and antagonisms” are very 
important questions to radical politics, as the anti-capitalist movement has shown 
(Newman, 2011:117).239  
 
Radical subjectification  
For postanarchists, radical subjectification has two main characteristics: (i) an 
exterior struggle: the postanarchist is a critic of the state and its inherent violence and                                                         
237 The question here would be: how far is the Postanarchist subject - or worker - a non-uniformity? Is 
this non-uniformity fair enough? Or is this still uniformity or an ego? 
238 Here Newman approaches Proudhon and his revolutionary subject: the group. The question would 
be again to know how far this plural revolutionary subject is compatible with Stirner’s ego. 
239 Newman (2011:119) says, “even in our ‘post-industrial’ societies there are still sectors of the 
population who do manual work and who are subject to terrible forms of exploitation – to say nothing 
about the countless millions of workers who live a desperate and deprived existence in poorer 
countries”. According to Newman (2011:119), globalisation is producing “a re-proletarianisation of 
the entire world”. 
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domination; (ii) an interior struggle: the postanarchist makes “a kind of ethical 
interrogation of one’s psychological dependence on the state” – the virtuous path or 
struggle (Newman, 2011:118; May, 2000:130). 240  Due to this spiritual struggle, 
postanarchism does not lead “into a vague notion of ‘identity politics’” (Newman, 
2011:117). A “vague” option would weaken the postanarchist work condition. Here 
Newman is again very close to Foucault and Proudhon. He disagrees with the concept 
of the proletariat as well. 
 
Non-labels & Non-feminism 
Newman also disputes capitalism’s categorizations in terms of gender and feminism. 
Postanarchists criticize the gender labels as a state and capitalist control over people 
and workers as well. Newman remembers (2011:117), in many Western societies “the 
simple assertion of a cultural, sexual or gender identity difference is no longer 
necessarily radical, and it is often all too smoothly accommodated within the state 
system”. Newman (2011:117) continues, “demands for recognition on the part of 
minority groups often bind them further to the state, making them more dependent on 
the state for the recognition of this identity and the protection of their rights, thus 
allowing the state to extend its power over life”.  
The same happens with feminism. According to Newman (2011:117), “the 
rights claims of certain feminist groups simply reaffirmed their status as victims 
requiring the protection of the state”. The feminist workers’ struggles are mainly an 
affirmation of woman as capitalist worker or object or wage earner. For Newman 
(2011:118), gender differences, sexual differences and also religious differences are 
“forms of identification that can be incorporated into the structure of power in 
‘multicultural societies’”. Newman (2011:118) adds this kind of institutionalisation 
“de-politicises differences” and “is often unable to politicise capitalism”, accusing 
just capitalism to be “racist, sexist or homophobic”. For the postanarchist, this 
identity politics leads to “the restriction of freedom” or exploitation of the people or 
workers (Newman, 2011:118).  
 
                                                         
240 Newman’s spiritual path is mainly a psychological struggle in order to fight state and ‘individual’s’ 
dependence on it. This is not an internal fight between the formal and material sides of the self, as it is 
with Foucault. 
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Non-capitalist 
According to Newman (2011:118), the postanarchist claims “a more explicit 
problematization of global capitalism and state power”. Postanarchists propose “new 
modes of political subjectification” which challenge people’s subordination to capital 
(Newman, 2011:118). Those new modes of political subjectification call into question 
capitalist “authoritarian relationships, practices and institutions” (Newman, 
2011:118). For postanarchists, radical subjectification is the self’s fight against “the 
identities and roles imposed on us by the state” (Newman, 2011:118,119). Radical 
subjectification is “the process” which leads the subject to “take distance” from 
capitalism and state, creating itself or its space (Newman, 2011:118,119). 241  
 
The creative worker 
Postanarchists propose “an active, even utopian experimentation” of the self, for 
instance, “in modes of artistic expression – particularly culture and poetry” 
(Newman, 2011:120,121). 242   Postanarchists refuse “one’s established identity as 
worker”, as Marxists do (Newman, 2011:120,121). The postanarchist’s self is itself a 
worker or a creator. For that reason, postanarchists displace the Marxist concept of 
class, as we have already seen. Postanarchists would prefer the concept of “mass” – 
formless - 243  which is more comprehensive, as Bakunin suggests (Newman, 
2011b:51). Although Marxists criticize postanarchist’s stance as “‘bourgeois’ and 
unsuitable for workers”, postanarchists argue their subjectification is neither a 
commodity nor a crystallization or a comfortable and self-assured stance, but a 
creativity, an insurgency (Newman, 2011:120,121).244  
 
Anti-essentialism & anti-humanism 
For postanarchists, subjectification is about “‘dis-identification’, a displacement of 
one’s socially defined role – something that produces a dissonance or disruption of 
the order of established identities and places”, as Foucault also teaches. (Newman, 
                                                        
241 We note again Newman’s radical subjectification is not a deep and internal fight between the self’s 
sides, as it is for Foucault. 
242 As we have stated before, Newman’s poetry or plastic path does not seem to carve the inside of self, 
as with Foucault, but it departs from the self or subject understood as a whole – Stirner’s influence. 
243 In our understanding, Newman’s formless mass does not dissolve the self as Proudhon does. 
244 Here, as we have already stressed above, in terms of subjectification, we could say anarchists, like 
Proudhon and even Foucault, would also criticize the postanarchist, although the anarchist’s 
argumentation differs from the Marxist one. 
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2011:121). Postanarchism is a “post-identity politics” that “is no longer strictly 
identified with specific class interests, or even with any sort of identity politics as 
such” (Newman, 2011:176). For instance, postanarchists reject also the classical 
anarchist “notion of rational social object” (Newman, 2011:147). For the 
postanarchist, this notion is a “rational social totality” that forms the basis of classical 
anarchism’s ethics and its “revolutionary philosophy” (Newman, 2011:147).245 As we 
have just seen, postanarchists have a creative and a “non-essentialist approach to the 
political subject” (Newman, 2011:122). Like Foucault, postanarchists (Newman, 
2001: 129,130) also criticize the concept of “man” and humanism as something 
oppressive and defined a priori. It proposes “the un-man”, Stirnerite concept, which 
is “a reaction to this oppressive humanist logic,” 246  as we have referred above 
(Newman, 2001: 129, 130). For postanarchists, “man” as an “identity” is not 
something “immanent”, which “has to be constructed” politically, ethically and 
discursively (Newman, 2011:122).  
 
A true subjectification 
Hence, according to postanarchists, this “dis-identification” or the critique of imposed 
roles, and the desire to live without them, is an “ethical” option – as we are going to 
see in the next section - and also an aesthetic one or an “artistic expression” or a work 
of art, as we have written above (Newman, 2011:118). That “dis-identification” is 
“discursive” or about language or languages whatever they are: discursive language, 
pictorial language, sculptural language, performative language, gestural language, 
etc. Foucault would say this postanarchist work is a parrhesiastic action. It is about 
truth telling. To work is to produce truly – plastic act - according to our desire and 
dreams. As Koch (2011:33) explains, the postanarchist truth is not “discovered”, but 
“produced”. These aesthetic and also ethical paths are what distinguish the 
postanarchist position from other left politics, as we are going to show (Newman, 
                                                        
245 As we have studied, Proudhon proposes a mobile and fluid self: a group. And here Newman seems 
to come over Stirner and his ego, but this is not something affirmed openly. 
246 The question is, indeed, to know how far Stirner and Foucault are compatible regarding this 
“unman” concept. Does this “unman” mean the death of man and the ego as Foucault talks about or 
not? Were Foucault and, before him, his inspiratory, the German Nietzsche, influenced by the German 
Stirner? Is Stirner Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s ‘great absentee’? Another one as Proudhon seems to be 
to Foucault, as we demonstrated in this dissertation? Those are some of the questions we could answer 
in future work.  
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2011:118). Foucault and Proudhon also propose this kind of path,247 as we have 
studied before.  
So as Newman (2011: 10,17,121) asks, if the proletariat and the liberal subject 
no longer serve as a category for radical politics today, who can supplement their 
place? The answer is: the postanarchist or the “supplementary” subject (Rancière, 
2000:174). And who is the postanarchist? 
 
 
THE HEAD | the anarchist ethical path 
 
                                     
               Image 16 
 
The anti-opressive and anti-hierarchical carer 
Thus far then, we have established that the postanarchist is an aesthetic person and 
also an ethical one. And what does it mean? As we have argued, the postanarchist is 
one who resists hierarchy and oppression. And this resistance is first of all a 
spiritual 248  and ethical path, because it implies “a certain care for the existent”, 
“without coercion by the subject on him – or herself”, as Foucault also argues 
(Newman, 2011:179). Levinas teaches, the anti-politics is “an-archical” - no-arche, 
no-principle, no-law - in several senses (Newman, 2011:54).  
 
A spiritual and ethical being 
First, it is “an-archical” spiritually in the sense that it undermines the sovereignty of 
the ego (Newman, 2011:54). Postanarchism leads to a “radical self-questioning” or an                                                         
247 Perhaps the differences in subjectification between Newman and Proudhon-Foucault would not be 
so deep if we better understood the similarities between Stirner, Nietzsche and Foucault, as we have 
stated before. Who knows? 
248 Spiritual does not mean religious in an institutional perspective, but reflexive and ‘re-ligious’ – 
linked with the other - in Proudhon’s framework, as we have studied. According to Newman 
(2011:17), postanarchism is a heretical politics “because it rejects the principle of government and 
political authority … - it goes against the entire tradition of politics and political thought that maintains 
we cannot do without sovereignty”. 
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“interrogation of one’s self-contained sovereignty” (Newman, 2011:54). These 
critical moments imply a break up of “the limits of one’s own identity” (Newman, 
2011:55).249 This means “dis-identification” or subjectivation, as we have discussed 
above. Newman (2011:161) adopts here the Foucauldian “ethical and ascetic 
strategies” or “ways of thinking about the self.”250 These strategies are reflections 
about oneself that have our needs as referential; these strategies are paths the subject 
“constructs, rather than discovers” (Newman, 2011:161). Newman (2011:161; May, 
2000:130) calls these strategies a “process of self-creation”.  
The postanarchist is free when he rids the self from the self or from “essence”, 
because “essence is not the basis for the freedom”, as we have explained before. 
Essences and principles are pre-definitions or oppressions (Newman, 2011:55; 
Franks, 2000:140). For postanarchists, essences subjugate the power to create oneself 
(Franks, 2000:140). To be postanarchist or to be free implies an ongoing struggle 
against the self, a permanent movement or fight - a spiritual way - as Foucault and 
Proudhon advocate as well.  Freedom is an-archical – plastic - in order to allow 
survival. The postanarchist sculpts himself or cares for himself permanently in order 
to adapt himself to life circumstances.  
 
Transgressive and generous being 
The postanarchist needs to live with the other harmoniously. And this is also an 
ethical perspective. So, secondly, postanarchism is an-archical because it disturbs the 
political order. The postanarchist opens his self and this order to “the Other” that 
exceeds that order (Newman, 2011:57). For that reason, the postanarchist is 
transgressive; he transgresses and challenges the established order. 251  The 
postanarchist claims an an-archical ethics: his “terrain” or space “emerges through an 
encounter” with the other (Newman, 2011:54). That means, for the postanarchist, 
                                                        
249 Here, Newman seems to solve Stirner’s ego and approaches to Foucault’s plural self or “we”. The 
Levinas’s “an-arche” seems really an attempt to avoid the ego’s closed form. Nevertheless, Stirner 
continues to be an ongoing influence in Newman’s writings. 
250 As we have affirmed above, the question is to know how far this postanarchist “radical self-
questioning” means a break up of the limits of the self or of Stirner’s ego. Or is it just a fight against 
defined identities and state’s labels, leaving the ego intact? 
251 Is this concept of order similar to the concept of ego? Is to transgress the order (arche) and to 
transgress the ego the same thing? Is it to break up the ego’s form? Could we conciliate Foucault and 
Newman through Levinas? And Stirner? Why does Newman maintain Stirner’s contribution? The 
question remains. 
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“freedom is relational and communal”252 or freedom implies the other in an equal and 
free way, as we have just explained; freedom is not something the postanarchist 
guards against the other jealously, but he shares his freedom with the other (Newman, 
2011:55); freedom is a “generous excess” that overflows self interest (Newman, 
2011:55). Newman (2011:161) explains, although “the care of the self is 
ontologically prior to the care of others, it nevertheless entails a certain ethical way of 
relating to others”. As we have highlighted above, the postanarchist follows Foucault 
and the Cynics care of the other´s care. Although Newman gives priority to the care 
of the self (regarding the care of the others care), Foucault says both are 
simultaneous.253 Nevertheless even this postanarchist ethical way of openess to the 
other is a great responsibility because the other cannot be reduced to our necessity or 
to our “structures of conscience” or to our arche (Newman, 2011:54). In turn, the 
other would not allow oppression by our law. The other cannot accept our rules 
(arche) if those rules do not fit ones need for survival. In this case, the other causes us 
“disequilibrium” or unsettles our ego, refusing and transgressing our law (Newman, 
2011:54). Nevertheless, we need to survive with our necessities and with the other. 
So, in order to survive, the postanarchist balances himelf through an “equal-
libertarian ethos of anarchism” (Newman, 2011:55). The postanarchist takes care of 
the other’s care, in a sense of “community and solidarity” (Newman, 2011:55,56; 
May, 2000:131). 
 
The anarchist: the necessity 
Thirdly, as we have stressed above, the postanarchist needs to take care of himelf, 
with regards to his need or his law. And this configures an anarchist stance, as we 
have just observed with Foucault and also Proudhon. The postanarchist’s need is his 
law. The other’s law oppresses him if this law does not fit the postanarchist’s 
necessity. So, for the postanarchist, there is no-arche - no-government, no-state - than 
his arche. Or there is just an-archy. Nevertheless, in an anarchist way, we might 
harmonize our law with the other in order to survive, as we have just written. Or our 
law also needs to be other’s law in a balanced way. The laws shared with the other 
could “change over time and are opened to dialogue and critical negotiation”                                                         
252 For that reason, as we have already studied, postanarchism could be also spatial or heterotopical, 
although Newman does not develop the heterotopical perspective in his writings, in our opinion, due to 
Stirner’ego influence.  
253 Is this priority a sign of Stirner’s egoism? We leave the question. 
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(Newman, 2011:160). The postanarchist supports a “situated ethics” (Newman, 
2011:160). For the postanarchist, “different situations demand different ethical 
relations and rules” (Newman, 2011:160).  
 
A “spiritual politics”: a work of art 
Despite the absence of universal laws, this postanarchist’s an-archy is not hostile to 
the idea of “political organisation” that is his “very condition of realisation” 
(Newman, 2011: 178). As we have noted, postanarchism is “self-organization” - the 
care of the self - and also in a collective dimension (Newman, 2011: 178). So, this 
postanarchist openness to the other is an ethical and also a ‘political’ way, although it 
cannot be reduced to politics - formal politics (Newman, 2011:56).  The postanarchist 
claims a “spiritual politics”, as Foucault proposes in his later work. For Chevallier 
(2004), “political spirituality should be thought as an irruption” - an insurrection. 
Necessity leads the subject to act on his own and always together with the other – 
spiritually, ethically and politically (Chevallier, 2004). As Newman (2001: 131) 
explains, postanarchism is “an outside generated from the inside”.254 
Nevertheless, postanarchism is not a politics nor does it propose a “particular 
form of social organisation, nor even any specific political strategy” (Newman, 
2011:56). For the postanarchist, anarchy is just a spiritual and ethical path, with 
spatial or aesthetic consequences, that disturbs any political order. And those ethical 
actions are spaces or works of art or “artistic expressions” – creations - as we have 
already studied. The postanarchist sculpts his interior and exterior life carefully and 
harmoniously according to his needs and to the other’s. So, both ethical and aesthetic 
proposals are another option in polis and, in this sense, another political option. As 
Newman (2011:146) notes,  
 
the anti-political gesture does not mean an avoidance or withdrawal from 
political struggles, but rather the revolutionary abolition of formal politics 
and power (particularly in its statist form), and this is also obviously a 
political gesture. This is why it only makes sense to see anti-politics – even 
in its utopian dimension – as a certain type of politics (Newman, 2011:146). 
                                                         
254 Foucault would say both at the same time. 
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Micro-politics 
According to Newman (2011:161), the postanarchist’s “political gesture” is the 
Foucauldian “micro-political ethics” or Deleuze’s intention “to become minor”, as we 
have already discussed. This micro dimension is the spiritual path of the self. For 
Newman (2011:181), “democracy to come should be supplemented with a libertarian 
micro-politics and ethics”. And this micro politics aims to dislodge “our psychic 
investments in power and authority through the invention of new practices of 
freedom” (Newman, 2011:181). These new practices of freedom are realised through 
spiritual, local and decentralised actions, as we have noted above. Examples of these 
practices are the several “decentralised and autonomous forms of direct democracy” 
of nineteenth century anarchists, which inspire the postanarchist: Proudhon’s 
mutualism and federalism, Kropotkin’s agriculture and industry organization, 
Godwin’s “progressive perfection of human society through education and intellectual 
improvement” (Newman, 2011:40,96). 
 
The universal dimension 
Although this spiritual and ethical path has a “micro” dimension and is decentralised, 
this has also a “universal dimension” (Newman, 2011:119). Nevertheless, this 
dimension is neither “a terrain defined by globalisation” nor a universal law, as we 
have already stated (Newman, 2011:119). This universal perspective goes also 
beyond a “mere assertion of a particular identity” or a standardization which features 
globalisation (Newman, 2011:119). The postanarchist accepts dissent and “seeks to 
form alliances, networks and solidarities” between different kinds of people 
(Newman, 2011:119; May, 2000:). Newman (2011:175) talks about a transnational 
organization “in the form of movement rather than a party”. And this transnational 
organization – the universal dimension - aims to build those “alliances between 
people and activist groups around the world” (Newman, 2011: 175). This is the case 
of the global anti-capitalist movement, constituted by struggles or movements that are 
considerably different (Newman, 2011:174). Newman (2011:174) also points to “the 
Zapatistas in the Chiapas region in Mexico” or “the Landless movement in Brazil”. 
Locally, we could find some similarities in those movements: “alternative social and 
economic relationships”, “innovative experiments in land sharing”, “communal grass-
roots organisation”, “dissent”, “direct action” and “democratic decision making” 
(Newman, 2011:174). In turn, those movements also develop solidarities with other 
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groups, articulating “global issues”: environmental concerns, the injustices of 
neoliberalism, the massive corporate power and the state violence and domination. 
(Newman, 2011: 174,175).  
As for Proudhon, the postanarchist bears this universal dimension on the 
“notion of political articulation” - articulation of movements or the Foucauldian 
diagram or the Proudhonian mutualism and federalism (Newman, 2011b:57).255  
According to this universal perspective, postanarchism presupposes the 
Foucauldian heterotopical dimension: fluid and nomadic spaces or movements - 
relations of people - connected to one another living ephemerally or circularly in a 
permanent creation. 256  The postanarchist also adopts the Proudhonian federalist 
perspective in terms of networks of groups or movements that articulate or 
disarticulate themselves according to their momentary necessities in a mutualist 
manner, as we are going to show. Postanarchism is a no borders politics257 and, for 
instance, “the figure of the refugee (or illegal migrant)” embodies ‘others’ sites of 
politics and “the possibility of a new postnational space”, as Foucault claims 
(Newman, 2011:172). 
For Newman (2011:119), this fluid, borderless and collective dimension is the 
way to fight “sovereign politics – the assertion of a sovereign identity, self-contained 
in its difference”: the state, the government, the capitalist and the Marxist forms of 
organization, among others (Noys, 2000:111). 258 As we have already studied, the 
postanarchist defends a radical subjectivation that applies also to collectives. And 
those postanarchist subjectivations are radical because “the subject or group of 
subjects understands its suffering and struggles in relation to those of others” 
(Newman, 2011:119). For the postanarchist, “a part must come to express – if only 
temporarily or contingently – the iniquity of the whole and the struggle to rectify it” 
(Newman, 2011:119).259  
 
 
                                                        
255 According to Proudhon, this articulation or federalism is also a spiritual flow, as we have studied 
above.  
256 The question is always the same: to know whether or not the postanarchist self is already a 
heterotopia, as Foucault considers. 
257 As for Stirner’s ego, is it also a no borders one? 
258 Could we include Stirner’s ego in this “sovereign politics”? 
259  And, for postanarchist, the whole overcomes the parts, as Foucault argues? Again Stirner is 
between Newman and Foucault/Proudhon. 
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The “tyranny of private property”  
So, for the postanarchist, today there can be neither this ethical path, nor equality, nor 
liberty, nor solidarity under the current conditions of the state, government, 
capitalism and its “tyranny of private property” (Newman, 2011:34). For the 
postanarchist, “everyone shall be a lord over himself” (Newman, 2011:16).260 Here 
the postanarchist approaches again Proudhon and “his famous slogan”, ‘Property is 
Theft’ or government is property and theft (Newman, 2011:35). For the postanarchist,  
 
not only does the concentration of property in the hands of an elite in effect 
deny property to a majority of people, it also reproduces relations of social 
and political domination in which those without property are subordinated 
and through which they are deprived of liberty. The subordination of the 
worker to the boss is as much a relationship of political domination as it is 
one of economic exploitation. Moreover, unequal relations of property 
always necessitate a strong and authoritarian state, a state which perpetuates 
the conditions for their ongoing enrichment and accumulation of power 
(Newman, 2011:34).  
 
As an aside, Newman (2011:35) adds, “although Proudhon allowed for limited 
possession of property, seeing it as important to one’s security and liberty, he 
remained opposed to large accumulation of wealth, claiming that these were precisely 
what endangered security, equality and liberty”.261 Like Proudhon, the postanarchist’s 
intention is to transform “property relations so that they are no longer exploitative” 
(Newman, 2011:35).  
Like Proudhon and Foucault, the postanarchist’s solution is mutualism, “in 
which workers would retain possession of the means to their labour and would 
organise economic exchanges based on voluntary contracts” (Newman, 2011:35). 
Newman (2011:39) notes, the foundations of mutualism could be found in a “simple                                                         
260 According to Foucault’s subjectivation, are we a “lord” or proprietor over ourselves? Foucault 
answers no. The Foucauldian self is no-sovereign. In Foucault’s perspective, to be “a lord over 
oneself” is more a Kantian understanding of the subject than a Foucauldian one. Could we find here a 
contradiction in Newman’s thinking between the subject understood as “lord” - a landlord - and the 
fight against the “tyranny of private property” due to Stirner’s influence?  
261  In our opinion, Newman could have here a misunderstanding of property as possession and 
dominium – because, according to Proudhon, there can be no accumulation where there is no ‘right’ to 
property in the self and in the thing.  
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biological fact of mutual assistance: in struggling to survive, people must work and 
cooperate with one another”. As Koch (2011:25) notes, a similar situation pertains 
between animals that use “mutual aid” as a “tool for survival”. Examples of 
mutualism are “cooperative organisations, voluntary associations and mutual 
assistance societies which operate without any involvement from the state – the 
Lifeboat Association, trades unions, social and sporting clubs” (Newman, 2011:38).  
 
Non-Marxist 
As the postanarchist fights capitalism, he also rejects Marxism for similar reasons. 
Marxism presupposes the state as a sovereign identity or proprietor, as we have 
already affirmed. For the postanarchist, the state is not a revolutionary tool (Newman, 
2011b:50). Postanarchists criticize the revolutionary vanguard party and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as authoritarian, oppressive and exclusive solutions 
(Newman, 2011b:58). For the postanarchist, as for Proudhon and Foucault, the 
vanguard party is another kind of state or a small state with an oppressive method: the 
“dictatorship” - as the Marxists assume openly (Newman, 2011:105). The 
Postanarchist also dismisses the “Marxist determinism view of history” and “Marxist 
stagism” (Newman, 2011,127). Inspired by Foucault, Newman (2011:111) recalls, 
“there might be a more intimate interaction between society and power”, and this 
intimacy – power engagement - unsettles in a certain way “the revolutionary narrative 
of the great, spontaneous upheaval against state power”. As Noys (2000:117) notes, 
anarchists and Marxists remain divided: between ‘changing the world without taking 
power’ (as suggested by John Holloway) and ‘taking power to change the world’ (a 
more ‘traditional’ left position)”. 
 
Modern and democratic activist 
Changing the world without taking power implies to live here and now. As we have 
studied, impressed always in power, the postanarchist tries to democratise power 
“without the desire to be in power” and without the desire to reverse the regime 
(Newman, 2011:103).  
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For that reason, despite the postmodernist influence, the postanarchist works 
always within the same paradigm: modernity 262  or democracy (Newman, 
2011:48,49). As we have argued above, postanarchism is ‘not a step forward’. The 
anti-politics ‘transcends’ the current order, modernity, within modernity. In fact, it 
does not overcome modernity, because “to do so would be to affirm the very logic of 
development” of modernity (Newman, 2011:49). For the postanarchist, to overcome 
modernity is “to invent a new set of foundations” and to conform to modern “ideas of 
progress, telos and origins” (Newman, 2011:49). Here the postanarchist is again close 
to Foucault. As we have argued above, Foucault does not intend to find a beginning 
or a principle nor an end, rather to start again and again – circularly - in order to 
capture the “here and now” or to meet the needs. The postanarchist works in the 
context of democracy in an anarchistic way. For the postanarchist, democracy is not 
just “a mechanism” for “expressing a united popular will” but it is also “a way of 
pluralising this will – opening up within it different and even dissenting spaces and 
perspectives” (Newman, 2011:179).  
 
The event 
As the postanarchist does not intend to make a revolution, nor to reverse democracy, 
it lives in the field of small insurrections, as we have already outlined. As Foucault 
and Proudhon argue, we live in an ongoing ethical battle or agonism. The 
postanarchist’s ‘revolution’ are the micro battles or micro-political revolutions “at the 
level of the subject’s desire” (Newman, 2011:6). For the postanarchist, these micro 
battles are “events” (Newman, 2011b:53). The event is “a different ontological 
register” or “the emergence of something entirely new” or “a moment of rupture with 
the existing order” (Newman, 2011:128).263 For example, a big event was the French 
Revolution or the Paris Commune and a micro event is to start gardening in a public 
garden because one loves flowers or to write poetry because one really enjoys writing 
(Newman, 2011:128, Noys, 2000:108,111). This event or radical moment – time - 
starts in a “point” or “eventual site” - space (Newman, 2011:128). For the 
postanarchist, the “privileged sites” of events are “art, politics, science and love” 
                                                        
262 Although the postanarchist criticizes certain ideas of Enlightenment – humanism and essentialism -, 
it supports “the politics of emancipation and the principles of liberty and equality, which motivates 
anarchism (Newman, 2011:6). Here, the postanarchist coincides also with Foucault and Proudhon. 
263 Are there “events” inside Stirner’s ego? 
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(Newman, 2011,128). Those events produce a “new subject”264 – the postanarchist 
(Newman, 2011,128).  
And this “new subject” is a collective subject,265 as we have already outlined. 
With those events, insurrectional micro attitudes, the postanarchist creates alternative 
spaces beyond the state or “movements at the level of civil society” (Newman, 
2011:103). For instance, Foucault’s always-informal struggle for migrants’ rights just 
intended to invent a better and dignified life for migrants and not to fight directly 
against the state. This migrants’ movement is just a parallel contesting space 
regarding the state.  
 
Non-representative 
As we have already shown, the postanarchist supports a decentralised politics based 
on “grass-roots mobilisations and participatory decision making rather than 
centralised leadership” (Newman, 2011:176). Postanarchists speak for themselves, 
“rather representing their interests to the formal channels of power” (Newman, 
2011:175). These “non-authoritarian” transnational organizations have invented “new 
modes of non-representative or direct democratic politics” (Newman, 2011:175). 
These “new modes” are anarchist modes. Those movements “display a clear 
proximity to the anti-authoritarian and decentralist political ethos of anarchism” 
(Newman, 2011:176). It happens with the anti-capitalist movement in terms of “its 
tactics, organizational principles and forms of mobilisation”, as we have just noted 
(Newman, 2011:176). According to Newman (2011:175,176), the anti-capitalist 
movement is “an unconscious anarchism” – about desire and pleasure. This 
“unconscious anarchism” is not “a coherent ideology or identity” (Newman, 
2011:176). Postanarchism is not a formal politics, as we have already argued. 
For that reason, the postanarchist criticizes the representation and verticality of 
formal politics. According to the postanarchist, representation “binds democracy to 
the state – it is a way of channelling the will of the people into state structures” 
(Newman, 2011:132). Proudhon’s approach to representation inspires the 
postanarchist who sees representative government as a “perpetual abuse of power for 
                                                        
264  How far could we conciliate this postanarchist “new subject” with Stirner’s ego? This is an 
interesting point of research. 
265 The question is again to understand why Stirner’s ego is a fundamental influence on this ‘collective 
subject’. 
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the profit of the reigning caste and the interests of the representatives, against the 
interests of the represented” (Newman 2011:132,133). 
As we have learned, postanachism is an ethical and spiritual path or a 
harmonious care of the self always in accordance with the other (Evren, 2011:13). For 
this reason, the postanarchist just accepts the necessity rule and lives in mutuality 
with the other regarding this necessity. As Proudhon suggests, one could articulate 
the groups through agencies, but those informal structures never overcome the care of 
the self. The care of the self is the base and agencies are just supplements or 
precarious contracts in order to better organize people horizontally or ethically.  
 
The sign 
Although the postanarchist avoids representation, he accepts his creations and that 
spaces are representations or signs of his ideas in a collective context, as Foucault 
says. As Koch (2011:31) argues, representation “signifies a process by which 
experience is turned into the signs of experience”. Nonetheless, the postanarchist’s 
creations – or “experiences” - are distortions of his original plans (Koch, 2011:31). 
The postanarchist is influenced by postmodernism. As Newman (2011:50) explains, 
for postmodernism,  
 
there is no necessary correspondence between linguistic signs and external 
‘reality’, and …the structural relationship between signifiers is itself 
unstable and incomplete. It is this project of questioning the consistency, 
stability and totality of foundations – foundations of knowledge, science, 
experience, identity – that is central to the postmodern condition. 
 
In terms of representation, we could say the postanarchist follows Deleuze’s 
audio-visual battle. For the postanarchist, there is always a fight between what we say 
(our discourse, whatever the language it uses) and what we see (our creations). 
Hence, the postanarchist lives in a permanent battle or “movement” against 
representations. Newman (2001:51) calls it “the war model” which jeopardizes 
representations and essences, because representations and essences are the 
“temporary and precarious domination of certain forces - or powers - over others, and 
there is nothing transcendental or permanent about them.” For Newman (2001:146), 
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“power — as diffuse as it is — is maybe just another attempt to symbolize the un-
symbolizable” (Newman, 2001:146). 
And this battle around this un-symbolizable – the postanarchist’s truth - 
includes our own creations or representations. The postanarchist needs to fight their 
likely oppression and authority, because in each structure we set up there have an 
“authoritarian potential”, 266  as we have already noted. According to Newman 
(2011:139),  
 
a politics of anti-politics points to the possibility of a libertarian politics 
outside, and ultimately transcendent of, the state and all hierarchical 
structures of power and authority. To counteract such structures requires, 
however, the development of alternative libertarian and egalitarian 
structures and practices, coupled with a constant awareness of the 
authoritarian potential that lies in any structure. 
 
Or as Stirner asks, “how can one be sure that in acting against a particular form 
of power one does not merely put another in its place?” (Newman, 2001:54).267 For 
that reason, power or insurrections happen circularly. Postanarchism is “the recurring 
desire for life” without hierarchy, authority and government: an ongoing struggle, as 
we have just said. 
 
Political movements  
“Movement” is again the suitable word here, instead of crystalized “representations” 
or “essences” or an “immanent268 organic269 social principle” that never changes, as 
                                                        
266 Hobbes would say all creations are about authority because they imply always the author (singular 
or plural). Foucault says something close: all creation are a manifestation of power. 
267 Is it for this reason, according to Stirner, that we never get rid of our ego? 
268 For Newman, the word “immanence” does not mean power as it means for Foucault and Deleuze, 
as we have already explained. For Newman, the immanence is something organic and essential. 
Immanent means also “natural or historically determined” (Newman, 2011:140). Or, in another way, 
the author identifies the “organic social principle” of some classical anarchists with the concept of 
‘immanence’. And this difference of meanings problematizes the understanding of Newman’s thought 
in terms of his meeting with Proudhon and Foucault. For both authors, this “immanence” is something 
fluid and a fundamental feature of Proudhonian God and of Foucauldian power, as Deleuze notes and 
defends. Hence, this apparent mismatch is just a matter of conceptual convention or definition, 
because, as we have studied, in terms of contents, Newman (2011:64,65) also supports the Foucauldian 
power and criticizes essences and identities.  
269 As we have seen, Foucault is against the organic or essential perspective. For him, life, body and 
power are intimately linked. And the body is the “zero point” of the space-power relationship. 
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we have seen before. “Movement” is also the political solution and the best way to 
fight these representations and authority. “Movement” is the way to create alternative 
spaces. It is a “certain displacement of social identities – a certain dislodging or 
rupturing of normal social processes” (Newman, 2011:103) For this reason, Newman 
(2011:110; Noys, 2000:112,113) works on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “libertarianism” 
that bears on “polar opposites” as “Flux and System, the Nomad and the Despot, the 
Schizo and the Paranoic”. For Newman (2011:110), those polar opposites are a 
consequence of desire or insurrections and their goal is dislodging representations, 
identities and essences. 270  They mean an ongoing “spontaneous, revolutionary 
movement of desire against fixed, authoritarian structures and identities” (Newman, 
2011:110).  
The postanarchist has a “constant awareness” of oppression and 
authoritarianism. For that reason, postanarchist politics tries to develop permanently 
alternative, egalitarian structures and practices. Newman warns about the dangers that 
exist inside autonomous spaces, beginning with the dangers of the word 
“autonomous” that is a controversial one, as we have already seen. According to 
Newman (201:179), autonomy could just refer to “the independence from the state of 
a particular political and territorial space”, and it is not enough in order to define a 
postanarchist autonomous space.271 The postanarchist should be concerned with “the 
internal micro-political constitution of that space, to the organisation of social, 
political and economic relationships within it”, because postanarchist spaces “can be 
subject to the worst kinds of authoritarian, repressive and fundamental politics” 
(Newman, 201:179). 
Hence, for the postanarchist, we should start struggling against oppression at the 
micro level – the level of our spaces or ourselves.272 According to the postanarchist, we 
can only work with “what we have” (Newman, 2011:156). As we have argued, the 
postanarchist claims a utopianism of the immediate “that builds on the possibilities of 
community that already exists” (Newman, 2011:163). As Foucault teaches, the world 
                                                        
270 And Stirner’s Ego?  
271 Could we ask whether this ‘autonomy’ presupposes the ego and, for that reason, is a dangerous 
concept? As we have noted above, the postanarchist does not distinguish between autonomous spaces 
and communities, as Proudhon does. Did Newman feel the ego’s danger, but he himself not work on 
it?  
272 Is this Stirner’s ego level? We would need to study Stirner to answer this question. As we have 
noted, in our opinion, Newman’s self is not a heterotopia, as it is to Foucault, due to Stirner’s 
influence. 
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surrounding us is just a stimulus or the condition of possibility of another world - or the 
Proudhonian material space. As we have learned, the postanarchist works on this world 
in a utopian way, “utilising and civilising” certain technologies, “resisting and 
destroying” others, but, more importantly, creating “new spaces for autonomy and 
equality, new ways of life that resist and escape domestication” (Newman, 2011:156). 
And, as we have sketched before, that “utopian dimension” means “a certain spiritual 
transformation of relationships” by “behaving differently” - a libertarian micro-politics 
and micro-ethics” (Newman, 2011:162). For the postanarchist,   
 
the state or political domination as a way of thinking and as a mode of 
relating to others – must be overcome in our heads and hearts before it 
can be overcome as an external institution; or rather, that the two 
processes would be concurrent (Newman, 2011:163).273   
 
This radical politics of the “hearts” or “the utopianism of the present” is not the 
“abandonment of politics”, as we have just noted (Newman, 2011:163). It could be a 
‘small big’ gesture – just to read a book in the garden, instead to do extra hours at 
work, to “take part in activities of the nearby social centre”, to organise “opposition 
to the extension of a motorway”, to “play with … children and friends”, or to “write a 
book on how to change the world” – which is also a political or revolutionary action, 
for instance, against capitalist exploitation (Holloway, 2010: 256). According to the 
postanarchist, the construction of autonomous ways of life bears also on the ideas of 
political confrontation or contestation of the existing order, as Proudhon and Foucault 
also taught (Newman, 2011:163). The postanarchist utopia is expressed by struggles 
or movements, as Foucault’s fights against prisons and for migrant’s rights, the anti-
globalisation movement, Zapatistas struggles, Spanish anarchism during the Civil 
War and so on. Postanarchist utopianism is the responsibility of “political 
engagement” (Newman, 2011:163). 
Newman (2011:163) systematises the postanarchist utopia as an expression of 
two desires or commitments: (i) “the desire for alternative forms of existence”: the 
creation of autonomous spaces here and now; (ii) “the need to confront politically the 
dominations of the present”: “to disrupt border control activities and to campaign for                                                         
273 Again Newman distinguishes two wars: internal and external. They do not merge with each other 
nor dissolve the ego. 
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the rights of ‘illegal' immigrants” (Newman, 2011:163). According to Newman 
(2011:163), “in such acts is presupposed the idea of a society of free circulation, 
without the tyranny of the borders”. According to Newman (2011:7), this kind of acts 
includes both “the moment of utopia” in which everything is possible, and also “the 
moment of ethics” or an action here and now. The utopia now or the insurrection 
“might be seen as the anti-political underside of other more mainstream forms of 
politics, their critical conscience and their wild unconscious” (Newman, 
2011:181,182). 
Through those autonomous spaces, the postanarchist challenges and questions 
actual democracy proposing, as we have already argued, “freedom beyond security, 
democracy beyond the state, politics beyond the party, economic organization beyond 
capitalism, globalisation beyond borders, life beyond biopolitics” (Newman, 
2011:2,82,111; Noys, 2000:109,110). The postanarchist calls this democracy of 
spaces, “democracy of singularities” 274  or “politics of anarchism” (Newman, 
2011:13).  
 
Non-party, non-parliament, non-elections 
This “politics of anarchism might take the form of non-party political organisations 
which shun involvement in parliamentary processes” (Newman, 2011:109). The 
postanarchist organizes himself beyond, parties, elections, parliament, and, 
consequently, also beyond the politics of left and right (Noys, 2000:111).  
In terms of elections, the postanarchist points out “the dangers of 
majoritarianism”, “the tyranny of the majority”, “the authoritarianism of the general 
will” and “the unjust sacrifice of individual rights and dissenting minority voices to 
the will of majority” (Newman 2011:133). For the postanarchist, “voting has become 
a symbolic act which legitimises political power” or “a game of revolving 
oligarchies” (Newman 2011:133). According to the postanarchist, there is no 
“ideological difference between major political parties” and Western democracies 
became “one-party states” (Newman, 2011:32). The postanarchist links the party, the 
parliament and the state. For that reason, the postanarchist does not support the 
“centrally organised Marxist-Leninist vanguard party”, as we have just studied 
(Newman, 2011:105; Noys, 2000:113). For Newman (2011:96), even “progressive                                                         
274 Here Stirner’s influence emerges again and it seems Newman proposes an autonomous spaces of 
egos or singularities, as we have discussed about before. 
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left politics” has been deformed into state sovereignty. For the postanarchist, the 
ideological opposition between left and right have ceased to make sense today and 
has been replaced by technocratic governments, and “neoliberal economic consensus” 
– the “one-party states” (Newman, 2011:146,47). 
Thus, the postanarchist would prefer a democracy of spaces or singularities. 
According to Newman (2011:112), some of those singularities failed - the anarchist 
collectives in Spain during the Spanish civil war or the Paris Commune in 1871, 
among others - but to say they failed because they tried an “autonomous existence 
outside the party and the state” is “entirely to miss the point”. For Newman 
(2011:112), the innovation of those spaces, “the way they gave us a glimpse of a new 
way of life, a new way of organising social relations and making political decisions, 
was possible only because they were autonomous from the party and the state”. 
Newman (2011:112) notes, an important success case was in Argentina in 2001 the 
way that in the beginning of “the economic crisis cooperatives and local assemblies 
provided basic social services in the absence of functioning government”. Newman 
(2011:109) clarifies, what is really called into question, here, it is the “concrete 
political organization” which “is not imposed by, and confined to, the state”. Then, 
Newman (2011:112) specifies what an anarchist politics needs:  
 
An anarchist politics requires conscious and patient organisation: the 
building and defending of autonomous, collective spaces outside the state; 
the experimentation with alternative forms of democratic decision making 
and egalitarian form of exchange; and even a form of discipline, as long 
as it is a discipline imposed voluntarily and without coercion by the 
subject on him – or herself … - a discipline that comes, for instance, with 
a commitment to a cause (here we might speak of a discipline of 
indiscipline, an anarchist discipline). This is what I mean by an 
engagement with the realities of power. 
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Engaged activist: the animality 
Hence, those postanarchist autonomous spaces imply a “patient organization”, a 
necessary and ethical engagement in power (Newman, 2011:112,113).275 Here, the 
postanarchist meets again Foucault – and Proudhon - who was an engaged intellectual 
or an activist.  
This necessary engagement with the transcendent and diffuse power ‘starts’ in 
the postanarchist’s body – the animality or the City of the Sun, as Foucault would say 
(Newman, 2011:54). As Newman points out, the postanarchist desire is not organic, 
but corporal and necessary. It is something a priori; it is about necessity and dreams, 
as we have already observed with Proudhon and Foucault. Nevertheless, it is also 
something a posteriori. This engagement begins also with the postanarchist self that 
goes along with the others (Newman, 2011:54). 276 For this reason, we could say the 
postanarchist’s desire seems “heterotopical” – spatial or relational - despite Stirner’s 
ego influence.  
In brief, postanarchism is “a kind of ethical distance from politics which … 
disturbs the political order” (Newman, 2011:57). And this ethical option has shown to 
be an alternative or “supplementary” way to formal politics and its “high levels of 
voter disinterest”, the “sense of disillusionment about the efficacy and adequacy of 
democratic mechanisms and processes”, the “alienation from formal politics” 
(Newman, 2011:31; Rancière, 2000:174). Postanarchism or this spiritual and ethical 
path is the way to work around the “state of exception” of our democracies, “building 
new political relationships, new understandings of community” (Newman, 
2011b:47,62). For the postanarchist, ethics “acts as a Katechon to politics” (Newman, 
2011:10). The postanarchist is mainly a spiritual and ethical fighter and this is his 
“political gesture par excellence” (Newman, 2011:57).  
In the next section, we will summarise the postanarchist features. 
 
  
                                                        
275 As we have already explained, for the postanarchist, anarchy “is not a politics on its own” and it 
does not serve “as a sovereign principle of social organisation” (Newman, 2011:57).  
276 Again Newman says the self “goes along with the others” and does not merge with the world 
surrounding it. 
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THE POSTANARCHIST IDEAL TYPE: TABLES 
 
Although Newman’s postanarchist walks a path parallel to Foucault and Proudhon, 
separated by Stirner, there are many similarities between the postanarchist ideal type 
and the Foucauldian activist. The three could be considered anarchists and share many 
characteristics. As we have planned in the outset of this chapter, we will summarize 
the points at which the Foucauldian activist is replicated in Newman’s work (see: 
Apprendix, table 4). 
We present also a table with the common features shared between the 
postanarchist ideal type and the Foucauldian one. We colour the postanarchist 
features. Saul Newman does not develop the non-signalled features, for instance, he 
does not develop the Foucauldian anti-racism and anti-colonialism, although the 
postanarchist fights racism and colonialism within the traditional meaning of the word 
in terms of skin colour (see: Apprendix, table 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 272 
CONCLUSION 
 
Taking “The Postanarchist, an activist in a ‘heterotopia’: building an ideal type” as 
the theme for this thesis we constructed the postanarchist ideal type, bearing on 
another ideal type, the Foucauldian activist, designed with Proudhon’s aid. We drew 
both ideal types based on three working hypotheses: (i) postanarchism is space 
constitution; (ii) to establish space is to survive; (iii) the constitution of space is a 
struggle. Guided by these hypotheses and by a circular or solar method, we started 
our philosophical path through postanarchism and its genealogy.  
Our itinerary was mainly: (i) To understand what postanarchism is in depth 
and in a contextualized way; (ii) To know why Foucault’s thought (post-
structuralism) is anarchism and is a fundamental influence on postanarchism, having 
Proudhon as reference – the first person who labelled himself anarchist; (iii) To catch 
the similarities between postanarchism and classical anarchism, studying Proudhon in 
depth; (iv) To extract from Saul Newman’s work the postanarchist ideal type; (v) To 
grasp the differences in theoretical outlook on postanarchism, having as reference the 
Foucauldian ideal type. 
Specifying those purposes: 
  (i) In order to understand what postanarchism is in depth and in a 
contextualized way, we started our circular walk (oriented by the solar method) from 
postanarchism to postanarchism (ideal type) - reviewing The State of The Art. In this 
State of The Art, first of all, we analysed how postanarchism is understood in the 
main literature: by Saul Newman, Todd May, Lewis Call and Richard Day. Second, 
understanding postanarchism as a construction of space, we discussed this concept of 
space in several postanarchist perspectives: state, non-humanist space, nomadic 
space, rhizomatic space, micro-space, cyberspace, working space and utopia. Then, in 
the Chapter II, we studied postanarchism genealogically, its main influences and we 
met Michel Foucault and also Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. We outlined the similarities 
between Proudhon and Foucault and we filled the bibliographic gaps of Foucault’s 
work with Proudhon’s concepts. Then we focused on the concept of space with 
Proudhon and Foucault’s aid. The intention was to know the postanarchist roots in 
terms of space. To better understand this concept of space, we joined three further 
concepts: movement, necessity and war.   
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(ii) In order to understand why Foucault’s thought - post-structuralism – is 
anarchism and is fundamental to postanarchism, we continued our walk with Foucault 
and Proudhon. We showed that Foucault has an anarchist perspective, developing 
mainly the concepts of necessity and care. We compared Foucault’s concepts with 
Proudhon’s, building a conceptual network in order to characterize the Foucauldian 
ideal type as anarchist. The goal was also, on the one hand, to confirm the 
“bibliographic gaps” or silences in Foucault’s work, filling them with Proudhon’s 
concepts and, on the other hand, to show Proudhon can be one of the “great 
absentees” of Foucault’s works. With the Foucauldian ideal type we introduced the 
postanarchist ideal type, demonstrating Foucault and also Proudhon were 
fundamental influences on postanarchism. 
(iii) In order to catch the similarities between postanarchism and classical 
anarchism, we demonstrated, first, there is an important proximity between Proudhon 
– classical anarchist – and Foucault, a great influence of postanarchism, in terms of 
the fight against essentialism and humanism. In this way, first, we deconstructed and 
criticized the main postanarchist criticisms of classical anarchism: essentialism and 
humanism. Second, we highlighted the commonalities between postanarchism and 
Proudhon - and Foucault - mainly in terms of care, necessity and war, concluding 
postanarchism is anarchism.  
(iv) In order to construct the postanarchist ideal type and to conclude our 
philosophical walk, we grasped the perspectives, concepts and ideas needed to 
characterize the postanarchist from Newman’s work. We designed the ideal type 
using the Foucauldian activist as framework and inspiration. 
(v) In order to grasp the differences in theoretical outlook on postanarchism, 
having as reference the Foucauldian ideal type and to reopen our philosophical 
circular walk to the future, we pointed out the concepts and ideas of fundamental 
polemics between Newman and Foucault-Proudhon. We showed Newman’s studies 
on Stirner could be an important point of controversy due to Stirner’s egoism and 
structural ego that could not be compatible with Foucault and Proudhon’s thought. As 
a result, we drew some lines for future research on Newman, Stirner, Foucault and 
Proudhon.  
Summing up, and regarding our first hypothesis - postanarchism is space 
constitution - we demonstrated that the postanarchist is a constructor of autonomous 
spaces which are horizontal equal, free, alternative relations of people, free from 
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hierarchy and oppression. According to our findings, the postanarchist seems to be - 
or to inhabit - a Foucauldian heterotopia, despite the influence of Stirner’s egoism. 
The postanarchist body is also the zero point of this heterotopia or ‘other spaces’ or 
alternative spaces that are similar to autonomous spaces. The Foucauldian heterotopia 
is “something like a counter-site” where “the real sites, all the other real sites that can 
be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted”. 
So, the postanarchist and his body, the zero point – and his autonomous spaces - look 
like a ‘we’ or a collective self constituted by relations of people. The postanarchist, as 
a Foucauldian heterotopia, is linked to “all the other real sites that can be found 
within the culture”. The postanarchist is an opened space or self, always welcoming 
and contesting “the other real sites”. The postanarchist is virtuality. He looks like a 
virtual ball with multiple tips that could be connected and disconnected with the 
others and the world around them at any time. Welcoming and contesting 
permanently his space or the others’ spaces, the postanarchist opens and constructs 
more space around him, always free from oppression and hierarchy. 
Due to all those spatial reasons, the postanarchist is a positive or determined – 
constructor - free, equal, different, multiple, fluid, mobile and nomadic self. He is an 
anarchist, because he admits no-archê, no law and no principle. And, regarding our 
second hypothesis - to establish space is to survive – necessity or survival is his 
unique law. As we have said, the postanarchist’s body or his necessity is the zero 
point. Necessity is the unity of measure, which is located in the body - although need 
as power overcomes it. This necessity guides the postanarchist – as we have studied, 
necessity is also the Proudhonian and Foucauldian law. Necessity means power that 
is something ubiquitous, pervasive – an energy without creator that crosses the body. 
For Foucault and Proudhon, power or immanence are relations of people, the other 
side of the space.  
Nevertheless, this necessity or power has to be cared or exercised moderately. 
It cannot exist in a raw state. The postanarchist is neither excessive nor needy. Rather 
he wants to live a balanced life in harmony with himself and with the others. He is a 
moderate person, as Proudhon and Foucault teach. For that reason, the postanarchist, 
being an anarchist, is a carer or a spiritual and ethical being. He adopts Foucauldian 
care or the Proudhonian self-direction. He follows a spiritual or divine path 
controlling, moderating and caring his internal passions in order to achieve balance 
and harmony internally. At the same time this internal path is also openness to the 
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other ethically - having always just necessity as law: anarchy. The postanarchist takes 
care of himself or of his necessity – or power - and of his relationships with the other.  
Hence, the postanarchist fight against desires in order to balance them; also 
his relationship with the other is mainly a struggle against oppression. And this is a 
permanent battle or war. For the postanarchist, to fight means to resist, to act or to 
criticize as Foucault and Proudhon explain. The postanarchist is a critic. The critique 
- or Proudhonian antagonism or Foucauldian agonism - is his main device. It is also 
an activism – an action - or a resistance. It implies the concept of power, as we have 
said. Whenever the postanarchist creates space he manifests his freedom of 
determination – his power. Nevertheless, once this space is created, the power could 
become oppressive if there is not an ongoing battle against this oppression or a battle 
against desires – excesses and lucks - internally and externally. Foucauldian agonism 
- or Proudhonian war - is the condition of possibility of free, equals and non-
oppressive spaces – or selves. The war provides a grid of intelligibility in order to live 
better and to better understand life. The postanarchist looks like the Foucauldian 
subjectivation, which is an ongoing struggle or war against fascism, oppression and 
hierarchy in order to create himself freely and virtuosly. The postanarchist is a solar 
self that jumps permanently from victory to defeat and from defeat to victory to fight 
the oppression that could own in all the spaces it creates. The postanarchist lives a 
solar or circular agonism or war as Foucault and Proudhon also do. So, the 
postanarchist is also a warrior as our third hypothesis points out: the constitution of 
space is a struggle.  
Postanarchism is an ongoing fight of the collective self – the “we” - for 
balance and harmony: a subjectivation. As Nietzsche teaches, this solar or circular 
fight is “playfulness”. This is about joy, “innocence and forgetfulness”. This is 
poetry. And this means postanarchism is also an aesthetic proposal. The postanarchist 
looks like a dandy, as Foucault suggests. Being a carer, he carves and stylizes his 
body and way of life – familiar, social and political life - carefully according to his 
needs and having fun. As Foucault remembers, this subjectivation and collective 
invention is related to the way we eat, love, manage277 our family, and act in polis – 
activism. And in all these fields (family, society and politics) there is just one law:                                                         
277 As Negri (2011:203) highlights, Foucault claims an “economy of domination”, of creation and 
occupation, the economy of the warrior, not an economy of exchange. The economist or the manager 
is a carer that acts having the necessity and its balance as unit of measure. 
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necessity. So, the postanarchist links or merges the personal, the familiar, the social 
and the political. They are all interrelated through necessity. We are facing another 
kind of politics: anarchism. Postanarchism is anarchism as its similarities with 
Proudhon and Foucault show. And, as Foucault and Proudhon argue, it is beyond 
liberal democracy, liberalism and Marxism. It is also beyond state and representation. 
The postanarchist is a collective carer. He does not represent anyone nor is he 
represented. He is just engaged in fights that his necessity points out strategically. If 
he is not engaged ‘necessarily’, the postanarchist will not be there. Foucault and his 
GIP – the prison group - are an example of this engagement. Foucault felt himself a 
prisoner, although he was not in in jail. For the author, the whole society looked like 
a prison. For that reason, he fought against the prison system. Foucault is not a 
representative of the prisoners, but just a peer, a comrade – a specific intellectual. 
Hence, postanarchist activism is something transcendental that comes from our needs 
or power – a priori. And it is also something transcendent - a posteriori - a creation 
of space in and with the world.  
So, again, like Foucault and Proudhon, postanarachism has no political 
programme, but just need as a compass and harmony, the joy and the peace as 
atmosphere, this peaceful atmosphere being conquered by a permanent fight against 
excesses and lacks. Foucault proposes some recipes “to everyday life”. It is “the art of 
living counter all forms of fascism”. This anti-fascist ‘art’ presupposes the 
constitution of positive, multiple, different, fluid, mobile, nomadic and productive 
relations. And these kinds of Foucauldian relation are heterotopias. These kinds of 
relations constitute the postanarchist collective self as we have said in the outset of 
this conclusion – despite Stirner’s influence. The postanarchist is an opened “we” or a 
heterotopia or an anti-fascist artist: a creative collective self. 
So, the postanarchist seems not to be an egoist, as Stirner would suggest. His 
necessity needs to be in harmony and engaged with the other and the world around in 
a perpetual fight for peace. Necessity and war are the guarantors of non-selfishness 
and openness to the other. As Proudhon also explains, this creative fight between 
forces is the way to avoid a “Meta-Subject” or the “essentialisation of forces” –
Foucauldian subjectivity. Thus, the postanarchist looks like a cyborg: a kind of a 
disassembly and a reassembly of a personal-collective self or a cybernetic 
personality. The cyborg is “a labouring subject, a creative, productive, affirmative 
subject” (Day, 2011:112).  
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 It is here that the main difference between Newman and Foucault-Proudhon 
resides. Newman does not develop the concept of cyborg as other postanarchist 
authors do, for instance, Richard Day and Lewis Call. Newman (2011:125) criticizes 
the cyborg. For Newman (2011:125) “there is a fetishisation of the cyborg”. Newman 
(2011:125) adds, “while Hardt and Negri see a radical potential in such 
transformations, the technologically manipulated cyber-human may not signify so 
much an escape or exodus from biopolitical capitalism, as its ultimate fantasy”. And 
why does Newman’s criticize the cyborg, the nomadic and plural self? Would it be 
due to Stirner’s influence? It could be just Newman’s critique about the technological 
manipulation of capitalism, because the cyborg would be the “ultimate fantasy” of 
capitalism as Newman claims. But, if the postanarchist self looks like a heterotopia 
linked with the exterior world, why could this self not be linked with technology? 
Why impose limitations or impediments on heterotopia’s connections? Is it because 
Newman adopts Stirner’s ego? How to conciliate Stirner’s formal ego, although 
empty and without definition, with the Foucauldian necessity or power and 
Proudhon’s immanence? Is there a contradiction between Foucault’s power, 
something ubiquitous, shared that is in all of us and everywhere and this empty and, at 
the same time, formal ego? Could Stirner accept the Foucaldian subjectivation or the 
virtuous and collective path – the care of the self – an ongoing stylization? Could 
Stirner accept the self or the harmonious life is not something we have at the outset, 
but it is a path or a virtuous stage we achieve in a permanent agonism? 
 Foucault (2006:305) argues that Stirner attempted to create an aesthetic of the 
self. Nevertheless, for Foucault (2006:305), the question remains: to refuse or not to 
refuse the self. As Foucault asks, “is it possible to constitute, to reconstitute an 
aesthetic and an ethics of the self? At what price and under what conditions? Or else: 
should not an ethic and an aesthetic of the self finally be reversed in the systematic 
refusal of the self (as in Schopenhauer)?” 
 Foucault is concerned with the ego’s fascism and its “price”:  
 
How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one 
believes oneself to be revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech 
and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret 
out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior? 
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How can we articulate Foucault’s call to fight fascism in all of us, with 
Sirtner’s ego, a closed form or structure? On the one hand, Newman welcomes the 
social proposal – the heterotopia or the openness to the other – of Foucault and 
Proudhon. On the other, Newman lets himself be influenced by Stirner’s egoism.  
Those are the questions we launch in order to engage in a future research 
programme on Newman, Stirner, Foucault and Proudhon, complementing this 
doctoral dissertation. The goal would be to better understand this postanarchist 
spiritual and ethical path: to create space as we wish or need in a non-fascist way: the 
utopia here and now.  
By raising these doubts about Newman’s works on Stirner, we demonstrated 
in this thesis postanarchism is just an anarchism like Proudhon’s, due to the 
conceptual similarities between both authors. We confirmed also the proximity 
between postanarchism and Foucault due to the common approach and concepts 
utilized. So, taking into account those similarities between Newman’s postanarchim, 
Foucault and Proudhon, we could resume that the postanarchist is an anarchist who 
only has need as law. And, this anarchist is a constructor or a creator, a carer and, 
consequently, a permanent activist. He is a fighter against biopolitics, oppression and 
hierarchy or the gap between ruler and ruled in order to build himself collectively in a 
free, equal, horizontal and mobile way. The postanarchist is an inventor of 
autonomous spaces here and now. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1 
 
The Franks 
 
As we have seen above, Foucault believes that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” 
(Foucault, 2012:16,17) and, here, the Franks are a source of inspiration. They are an example of the 
‘other’ politics continued by ‘other’ means or by ‘other war’: the ethical path or agonism.  
Foucault (2012:100) notes the word ‘Frank’ means free etymologically. And free, for the Franks, 
signifies “fierce”, “intrepid”, “proud”, “cruel” (Foucault, 2012:100).278  The Franks or the barbarians 
were a warrior people and in peacetime they were a society of independent and individual owners 
(Foucault, 2012:100,101). They took care of themselves or ruled themselves, being headed by a king 
who was just a war chief and, in peacetime, just a civil magistrate who mediated conflicts (Foucault, 
2012:100,101). This king looks like the Foucauldian specific intellectual whose main task is to help 
people to live better when people need and ask. Foucault describes him as the ‘other’ representative or 
carer who takes care of the other’s care. His power was minimal and the citizen’s freedom was maximal 
(Foucault, 2012:100). This king was chosen by a “common consent” by the group of warriors and he was 
also an owner like the other warriors (Foucault, 2012:100,101).  They were all equal, free and powerful 
people. Being a warrior people, the Franks, after the victory, divided equally the conquered lands by the 
different winners and the king did not have privileges in this division (Foucault, 2012:101). The king had 
“no pre-emptive right”, “no right of first and absolute possession of what was won in war” (Foucault, 
2012:101). Being a people of “independent owners”, which took care of themselves, the Franks had “no 
reason to accept above them the existence of a king who was somehow heir of the Roman emperors” 
(Foucault, 2012:101).  
So, the Frankish society was a localized or decentralized warrior society, an anarchic society, as we 
studied above, that had the maximal freedom to self-create, to self-manage, to self-produce and to self-
rule collectively, having a king with minimal powers who was above all a war chief, as we have just 
noted. This was “an enlarged democracy with an “egalitarian people of citizen-soldiers”: carers 
(Foucault, 2012:135; Chevallier, 2014:54). As Foucault (2012:130,131,135) explains, “upon this people, 
(there is) no followed authority, no rational or constituted authority ... this (is a) brutal Barbarian 
democracy” or a free society, in Nietzschean sense, that has just a useful and necessary king in order “to 
multiply its strength, to be stronger in its rapine, to be stronger in its flights and in its rape, to be more 
sure of his own invading force” – the power to create space. People and king had an equal and free 
relationship, which worked through reciprocity. The king was just a caring companion who was in 
solidarity with the people. 
 
The postanarchist: an ideal type 
 
 280 
 
 
The Iranians 
 
As we have already said, Foucault will find also this type of ‘other’ society, and ‘other’ politics, in a 
peaceful way, in Iran in the seventies/eighties - the Iranan Revolutionof 1979. 279 Iran is another 
example of political spirituality.  
Foucault was in Iran three times as “journalist” or “historian of the present”, reporting for the Italian 
newspaper Corriere della sera. In Iran, Foucault discovered a kind of localized and decentralized 
society: a society of carers. It was a society that rejected the Shah’s regime or the modernization of the 
country, a political project inspired by Europe – from top to bottom -, its despotism and corruption 
(Foucault 1994c:680,681,682).  
Foucault (1994c:701-704) found in Iran “The Revolt with Bare Hands”, a corporal power revolt. For 
him, this was an ‘other’ historical event that stimulates “reflection on the notion of power” (Eribon, 
2011:457). This is the uprising of an entire population without weapons, just bodies - the measure of 
all things, as we have studied above - that “suffocated the civil war”, with an “obstinate and almost 
unanimous will” and “short slogans” (Foucault 1994c:701-704). This is the revolt of an entire 
population, despite “the distance that separates the towns” and the “communication difficulties” 
(Eribon, 2011:457). This was an “undercurrent” “without military apparatus”, “without vanguard” and 
“without parties”, just “with flowers and flags” – the need - that immobilized the Shah’s army 
(Foucault 1994c: 701,715,716). 
This entire Iranian society was composed of “Islamic or Marxist280 communities of ex-guerrillas and 
social movements” that took care of themselves: managed themselves, governed themselves and 
sustained the imams economically and financially (Foucault, 1994c: 681,711,712,716). These imams 
are other representatives or specific intellectuals who depended on these people reciprocally (Foucault 
1994c: 681,711,712,716). According to Foucault, the Iranians saw the Ayatollah just as an “invisible” 
and “silent” leader - the Ayatollah was living in exile in Paris - who unified in solidarity the will of the 
various communities in the country (Foucault 1994c: 681,711,712,716). For the Iranian people, the 
Ayatollah “(was) not radically away”; “the men (made) him come back as they (illuminated) him with 
the truth that they (were) unveiling” (Foucault 1994c:681). The Ayatollah and people worked mutually 
or reciprocally - like a mirror. The men’s will and action were the sine qua non condition to the 
Ayatollah’s return. For the Iranian people, the Ayatollah was just a symbolic figure or “mythical chief” 
that did not interfere in the affairs of communities, just represented them externally (Foucault 
1994c:713-716,). He was a comrade with an ‘other’ task: no task. “Khomeini said nothing, nothing 
other than no - to the Shah, the regime, the dependence; Finally Khomeini (was) not a politician: there                                                                                                                                                               
278 This is the Nietzschean “freedom of ferocity” that we have spoken about above.  
279 In the Iranian case, Foucault (1994c: 716) does not agree with the term ‘revolution’. He says we are 
before an “insurrection”, as we are going to see later. For Foucault, the “Iranian Revolution” is the first 
“insurrection against the planetary systems” and the “craziest” revolt (Foucault 1994c: 716). 
280  Again, the Marxist influence is present, although this revolution has neither vanguard nor 
representatives and is something beyond Marxism, as we are observing. 
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(was) no party of Khomeini; there (would not) be government of Khomeini. Khomeini (was) the fixed 
point of a collective will”. In Iran, the clergy does not have a function of direction and supervision, but 
it is as (i) a utopia towards which (ii) the Iranians go “renewing the faith and not maintaining the 
obedience” (Foucault 1994c:692). According to Foucault, the Islamic Iranian state and government 
had a program without program (Foucault 1994c:702). They just had the Iranians’ ideas, values and 
events – their needs as moral law (Foucault 1994c:707). Foucault tells,  
 
Islam values work; no one can be deprived of the fruits of his labour, what must belong to 
all. (Water, the sub-soil) shall not be appropriated by anyone. With respect to liberties, they 
will be respected to the extent that their exercise will not harm others; minorities will be 
protected and free to live as they please on the condition that they do not harm the 
majority; between men and women there will not be inequality with respect to rights, but 
difference, since there is natural difference – the need. With respect to politics, decisions 
should be made by the majority; the leaders should be responsible to the people, and each 
person, as it is laid out in the Quran, should be able to stand up and hold accountable he 
who governs (Stangroom, 2015).  
 
There is a reciprocal and solidary relationship between who ‘governs’ and the people. 
Externally, for Foucault, the “Iranian Revolution” is the first “insurrection against the planetary 
systems” and the “craziest” revolt (Foucault 1994c: 716; Eribon, 2011:457,458). This is a revolution 
led by people who “want to lift the tremendous burden that is upon all of us but particularly upon 
them, these oil workers, these peasants who lives in the empires’ borders: the weight of the order of the 
whole world” (Foucault 1994c: 716; Eribon, 2011:457,458). And Foucault specifies that this 
revolution 
  
will be able to disrupt the political situation of the Middle East, and the global strategic 
balance ... It would be great ... this “Islamic” movement can fire the whole region, 
reversing the most unstable regimes and disturbing the strongest. Islam - which is not only 
a religion, but also a way of life belonging to a history and a civilization - can constitute at 
the scale of hundreds of millions of people a gigantic powder keg. Since yesterday, all the 
Muslim state can be revolutionized from within, from its secular traditions” (Eribon, 
2011:460). 
 
Despite his expectations about a new political spirituality or a new ethical and political path, Foucault 
noted that the Iranian events were just in the outset, and his intention was only “to try to understand 
what is happening because in these days nothing is finalized and the dices are still rolling”. Foucault 
mainly stressed the spiritual dimension of the revolution. He said, “a spiritual dimension crossed the 
revolt of a people who risked everything in favour of another world” (Eribon, 2011:463). Foucault 
added, “it was not the desire to be ruled by a mullahs’ government”; Muslims sought “their future in 
an Islam in which they will shape its new face by their hands”: the need or the other ethical path 
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(Eribon, 2011:463). From Foucault’s perspective, Muslims were living a kind of ‘Arab Spring’ in the 
seventies trying to take care of themselves. Foucault saw this revolution as a seed indeed. Foucault 
explained, “the problem of Islam as a political force is an essential issue for our time and for years to 
come” (Eribon, 2011:459). As Eribon (2011:461) explains, “Foucault saw clearly that this country 
would not return to traditional forms of politics and the religious impulse that gave full force to the 
insurgency would not disappear after the victory”. 
So, although the Iranians were not a warrior people, as the Franks were, we could say that they had 
agonistic “ideas” or “strong”, “resistant” and “passionate” ideas (Foucault 1994c:707,711). The 
“explosive force” of these ideas (the will to power or the ethical need) opened, created (produced) and 
occupied autonomous and decentralized communities (events) or networks of communities (Foucault 
1994c:707,711). And these communities (or events) finally overthrew the Shah’s regime, acclaiming 
the Ayatollah (an ‘other’ representative) and, during Foucault’s time life, this pacific, horizontal, 
ethical and anarchic society (Foucault 1994c:707,711).  
Table 2 
   
The Nation 
 
To better understand the behaviour of these anarchic Frankish and Iranian networks, Foucault 
(2012:145) introduces the concept of nation. According to the author, for the constitution of a nation 
we need two things: a common law and a legislature - that makes these laws (Foucault, 2012:145). 
Foucault (2012:145) emphasizes that it is not necessary to have a king or a government – 
representatives - in order to have a nation, as we have seen in the Frankish and Iranian cases. It is just 
necessary to have a group of people that takes care of itself, clustered around an interest, sharing 
common customs, habits, and even a language (Foucault, 2012:146). Agriculture, trade and industry 
are not also sine qua non conditions for the existence of a nation, but they are its necessary “effects” 
(Foucault, 2012:146). For Foucault (2012:146), if the nation has no ability to produce, to create or to 
do agriculture, trade and industry – to take care of itself - without a king or a government – 
representatives - it means that the nation is not a nation (Foucault, 2012:146). To be a nation means to 
take care of itself - inter pares - without representatives.  
Adopting Chevallier’s perspective, the Franks and Iranians are also two cases of local and anarchic 
historiography, composed by several communities or nations - other creative and agonistic spaces or 
heterotopias - that rule themselves or take care of themselves according to their needs. They had ‘other 
political solutions’ or the spiritual politics that Foucault looked for (Foucault, 1994c:694). Therefore, 
the Foucauldian other political being is the spiritual fighter or “the big nomad” that, in a permanent 
devir and determination, “violate(s) the social pact” and creates - taking care - these ‘other spaces’ or 
‘other political solutions’, perpetually according to his needs and without representatives (Foucault, 
1999:89). 
Table 3 
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Main points shared by both ideal types 
1- Non-elections 
2- Non-feminism 
3- Non-labels  
4- Non-liberalism  
5- Non-Marxism  
6- Non-parliament  
7- Non-party 
8- Non-representation 
9- Political movements  
10- Political vs politics 
11- The activist 
12- The aesthetic path  
13- The anarchist 
14- Antagonism 
15- Anti-authoritarianism 
16- Anti-hierarchy 
17- Bipolitics 
18- Care 
19- Circularity 
20- The concept of body  
21- The concept of critique 
22- The concept of desire - and dreams 
23- The concept of equality 
24- The concept of event 
25- The concept of freedom  
26- The concept of insurrection 
27- The concept of movement 
28- The concept of power 
29- The concept of resistance  
30- The concept of sign 
31- The concept of space 
32- The concept of transgression  
33- The concept of truth 
34- The criticism of the state 
35- The ethic path 
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36- Desire  
37- Generosity  
38- The Kantian framework: the here and now 
39- Micro-politics 
40- The modern and democratic activist 
41- Necessity 
42- The other voices  
43- Peace  
44- Pluralism or collectivism 
45- Radical subjectification 
46- The spiritual path 
47- Spiritual politics 
48- The “tyranny of private property”  
49- The universal dimension: networking 
50- Utopia now  
                             Table 4    
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The activist ideal type: features 
Abnormal, 
 
Atypical - 
‘other type’ 
Dependent,  
 
Experienced, Nomadic, 
 
Non-
sovereign, 
 
Solar, 
 
Activist 
 
Autonomous, 
 
Direct, 
 
Free, 
 
Non-capitalist, 
 
Non-statist,  
 
Spatial,  
 
Actual, 
 
Borderless, 
 
Desirous 
 
Hero, Non-elections, 
 
Opened, 
 
Spiritual,  
 
Aesthetic, 
 
Carer Determined, 
 
Imaginative, Non-
hierarchical, 
 
‘Other 
worker’ 
Superman, 
Collective, 
 
Agonistic, 
 
Corporal – 
alive/dead, 
 
Discontinuous, 
 
Insurgent, Non-humanist, 
 
Poetic, Transfigured, 
Anarchist 
 
Crazy, 
 
Dreamer, 
 
Local, 
 
Non-liberal, 
 
Powerful, Transgressive 
Anonymous, 
 
Creative, 
 
Equal Major - 
adult,    
 
Non-liberal 
democracy,  
 
Practical, True, 
 
Anti-
colonialist, 
 
Creator - 
constructor, 
 
Eternal Material, 
 
Non-Marxist,  
 
Problematic, Untimely,  
 
Anti-racist,  
 
Critic-
philosopher,  
 
Ethical Minor, 
 
Non-political 
parties, 
Resistant, Warrior, 
 
Anti-
terrorist, 
 
Dandy, Evil spirit,  
 
Net-worker, 
 
Non-
representation – 
‘other 
representation’, 
 
       Sexual, We  
  
Table 5  
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